











This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
Dynamic Modelling of Generation Capacity

















A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.




The ability of liberalised electricity markets to trigger investment in the generation capacity re-
quired to maintain an acceptable level of security of supply risk has been - and will continue to
be - a topic of much debate. Like many capital intensive industries, generation investment suf-
fers from long lead and construction times, lumpiness of capacity change and high uncertainty.
As a result, the ‘boom-and-bust’ investment cycle phenomenon, characterised by overcapacity
and low prices, followed by power shortages and high prices, is a prominent feature in the de-
bate. Modelling the dynamics of generation investment in market environments ca provide
insights into the complexities involved and address the challenges of market design.
Further, many governments who preside over liberalised energy markets ae developing policies
aimed at promoting investment in renewable generation. Of particular interestis the mix and
amount of generation investment over time in response to policies promoting highpenetrations
of variable output renewable power such as wind. Consequently, improved methods to calculate
expected output, costs and revenue of thermal generation subject to varying load and random
independent thermal outages in a power system with a high wind penetration are needed.
In this interdisciplinary project engineering tools are applied to an economic problem together
with knowledge from numerous other disciplines. A dynamic simulation model of the ag-
gregated Great Britain (GB) generation investment market has been develop d. Investment is
viewed as a negative feedback control mechanism with current and future energy prices acting
as the feedback signal. Other disciplines called upon include the use of stocha ic processes
to address uncertainties such as future fuel prices, and economic theory o gain insights into
investor behaviour. An ‘energy-only’ market setting is used where generation companies use
a classical NPV approach together with the Value at Risk criterion for investment decisions.
Market price mark-ups due to market power are also accounted for.
The model’s ability to simulate the market trends witnessed in GB since early 2001 isscru-
tinised with encouraging findings reported. A reasonably good agreement of the model with
reality, gives a degree of confidence in the realism of future projections. A advancement to
the dynamic model to account for expected high wind penetrations is also included. Build-
ing on the initial model iteration, the short-term energy market is simulated using probabilistic
production costing based on the Mix of Normals distribution technique with a residual load cal-
culation (load net of wind output). Wind speed measurement data is combined wth the outputs
of atmospheric models to assess the availability of the GB wind resource and its relationship
with aggregate load.
Simulation results for 2010-40 suggest that the GB system may experience increased generation
adequacy risk during the mid to late the 2020s. In addition, many new investmentsar unable to
recover their fixed costs. This triggered an investigation into the design of acapacity mechanism
within the context of the modelling environment. In light of the ongoing GB marketelectricity
market reform debate, two mechanisms are tested; a strategic reserve tender and a market-
wide capacity market. The goal of these mechanisms is to mitigate generation adequacy risk
concerns by achieving a target winter peak de-rated capacity margin.
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5.1.2 Following Ḧani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.1.3 The GB investment market model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.1.4 Data considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.1.5 System dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.2 Modelling the “real-time” GB wholesale energy market . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.2.1 The marginal cost element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.2.2 Price mark-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.2.3 Price setting procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.3 Modelling investment decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.3.1 Investment logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.3.2 Present value of an investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.3.3 VaR criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.3.4 Mothballing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.4 Historic GB case study assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.5 Simulation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.5.1 Base case results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.5.2 Investments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.5.3 Mothballing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.5.4 Importance of the reserve market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.5.5 Wholesale energy prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.5.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.6 Chapter summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6 Modelling High Penetrations of Wind 157
6.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.2 Approach taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.2.1 Onshore wind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.2.2 Offshore wind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
6.3 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.4 Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
6.5 GB hourly wind production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
6.6 Capacity credit of wind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.6.1 Caveats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.7 Chapter summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
xvii
Contents
7 Improving the Investment Model 175
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
7.2 Updates to general investor logic assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .176
7.2.1 Mothballing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
7.2.2 Modelling aggregate investment response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
7.3 Production costing by Mix of Normals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
7.3.1 MOND with conventional thermal generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
7.3.2 MOND with a thermal-wind system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
7.3.3 Expected revenues from the energy market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
7.3.4 Expected price mark-up calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
7.3.5 Test of accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
7.4 GB case study assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
7.4.1 Intermediate analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
7.5 GB Case study results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
7.5.1 Base case results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
7.6 Sensitivity analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
7.6.1 Test case 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
7.6.2 Test case 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
7.6.3 Test case 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
7.6.4 Test case 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
7.6.5 Test case 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
7.6.6 Test case 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
7.6.7 Test case 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
7.6.8 Test case 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
7.6.9 Test case 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
7.6.10 Summary of test results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
7.7 Chapter summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
8 Implementation of a Capacity Mechanism 229
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
8.2 A GB market capacity mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
8.2.1 Need . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
8.2.2 Design and testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
8.2.3 Strategic reserve tender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
8.2.4 Market-wide capacity market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
8.3 Chapter summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
9 Discussion and Conclusions 255
9.1 General discussion of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .255
9.1.1 The dynamic generation investment market model . . . . . . . . . . . 255
9.1.2 Wind modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
9.1.3 ‘Energy-only’ market results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
9.1.4 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
9.1.5 Capacity mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
9.1.6 Reliability of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
9.2 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
9.2.1 Modelling developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
xviii
Contents
9.2.2 Generation investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
9.2.3 GB electricity market reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
9.3 Recommendations for further work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
9.3.1 Multiple agent model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
9.3.2 Complimenting the stochasticity of wind production . . . . . . . . . . 269
9.3.3 Transmission network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
9.3.4 Electrification of heat and transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
9.3.5 Other considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
9.4 Thesis conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
References 274
A Additional material 291
A.1 AIMMS source code for calculating COPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
A.2 Marginal cost equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
A.3 Capital expenditure schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
A.4 DECC fuel assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
A.5 Regional simulated monthly offshore wind generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .294
A.6 Regional simulated monthly onshore wind generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295




2.1 The wholesale market structure with retail competition. Also demonstrated are
vertical and horizontal integration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Overview of financial and physical flows under an ‘energy-only’market. . . . . 10
2.3 Example of market equilibrium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Example of (a) variable operating cost function, and (b) equivalentshort-run
marginal cost function. The linear approximations are also shown. . . . . .. . 15
2.5 Example of linear approximation of (a) variable operating cost function,which
is used to derive (b) the aggregate supply curve. Examples of base, mid-merit
and peaking capacity also shown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6 Example aggregate supply function with VOLL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.7 Example aggregate supply function with competitive market equilibrium for
two levels of demand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.8 (a) Consumers’ surplus and (b) producers’ surplus. . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.9 Plot demonstrating how generators earn scarcity rents. . . . . . . . . . .. . . 21
2.10 Example of quantity withholding and price mark-up. Breakdown of wealth
transfer also shown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.11 Half-hourly load-over-time (year) for GB in 2010 and equivalent LDC. . . . . . 25
2.12 Demonstrating the minimum cost of supply; load-duration curve; screening
curves and price-duration curve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
2.13 Investment dynamics and boom-and-bust cycles in electricity generation. . . . . 31
2.14 Example of convergent fluctuation. Equivalent example pattern for dive gent
and continuous fluctuations also shown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.15 Example of oscillations in price and quantity converging to equilibrium under
convergent fluctuation. Equivalent example pattern for divergent and co tinu-
ous fluctuations also shown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.16 MottMacDonald composition of levelised costs of generation for 2009 project
start with 10% discount rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.17 Influence of demand response on market clearing. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 47
2.18 Demonstration of how adequate investment in generation over time converges
to operational time scales. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.1 Industry structure under (a) the SSEB and NSHEB and (b) mildly less monop-
olised CEGB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2 (a) Plot of system LOLP and (b) PPP with E&W demand. . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3 Overview of financial and physical flows under NETA/BETTA with numbers
to indicate order of events. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 Availability windows and payments under STOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5 Generation capacity margin in the GB since industry privatisation. Dates of
significant market framework changes also shown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66
3.6 Plot of ACS peak demand in GB for winters 2001/02 - 2010/11. . . . . . . .69
xx
List of figures
3.7 (a) Plot of pdf and (b) cdf for available conventional generation calcul ted using
COPT technique. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.8 Plot showing distribution for available conventional generation when 4 GW of
capacity is removed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.9 Plot of LOLE results for 10 winters. Also shown is forecast theoretical de-rated
margin, normalised hindcast de-rated margin, and winters where ACS peakwas
exceeded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.10 Plot showing number of hours demand contained in LOLE and proportion of
LOLE in each 1% bin. The bins are the normalised load as a percentage of the
60 GW peak demand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.11 Plot of LOLE results for 10 winters using reduced conventional fleet. . . . . . . 74
3.12 Price-duration curve results for GB market in the Pöyry study. . . . . . . . . . 77
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So far, in many countries, energy market liberalisation has been seen as asuccess in terms of ef-
ficiency and lower prices. Yet worries still remain. One of the main concerns is that the onus is
on privately owned generating firms to predict and respond to supply shortages. They must in-
vest in a mix and amount of generation capacity that will maintain an adequate level of security
of supply (or generation adequacy) risk. Many governments are seeking to reduce greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions from the power sector by developing policies promotinginvestment in
low carbon and renewable generation. This has introduced uncertaintiesthat liberalised energy
markets are struggling to handle efficiently. As the International Energy Agency states:“Im-
proving decision-making processes for investment related to generationcapacity may be one of
the most significant benefits of liberalisation. But it is also one of the most serious challenges
in liberalised electricity markets”[1].
Pure ‘energy-only’ electricity markets are epitomized by payments for supplied energy being
the only source of revenue for generators to cover their fixed and variable costs and provide
adequate returns on investment. As a result, short-run profits (scarcity rents) are the primary
mechanism to mitigate long-term generation adequacy problems. Their ability to trigger in-
vestment in the generation capacity required to maintain an acceptable level of security of
supply risk is one of the most hotly debated topics in power systems economics.The question
is asked: are short-run price signals strong enough to ensure long-term generation adequacy?
Further, critics of ‘energy-only’ markets argue that because the framework is relatively new
and constantly changing, it has not been properly proven and the market must be sufficiently
concentrated in order to ensure high enough prices to cover fixed costs[2].
Modelling the dynamics of merchant generation investment can further our understanding of
the feedback mechanisms that exist between market conditions, capacity investment and subse-
quent levels of security of supply risk. By engineering dynamic projectionm dels, the debate
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about whether governments will meet their environmental, security of supplyand customer cost
goals can be informed. Furthermore, whether the system will experience rliability, price and
capacity oscillations in the meantime can be assessed. This is neatly summarised below:
“Economics focuses on equilibria but has little to say about the dynamics of amarket. Once
economics shows that a system has a negative feedback loop so that thereis a point of balance,
it considers its job done. Engineers move beyond this stage of analysis to consider whether a
system will sustain oscillations and, if not, whether is is over- or under-damped.” - Stoft [3].
Further, in a speech delivered to the Royal Society, the governor of theBank of England said:
“Predicting the precise timing and dynamics of instability ... is very difficult. It is, however,
possible to identify a sand pile or forest as being prone to large-scale instabilityand determine
the factors that contribute to that instability ... Economists have been able to learnfrom other
disciplines about how to cope with these types of instability ... [they] have learned much from
engineers about how to control dynamic systems.”[4]
Recently, particularly in Great Britain (GB), interest has turned to the response of the market
to policies promoting investment in variable generation such as wind. This has highlig ted the
limitations of many existing long-term simulation models, and so there is a need to develop
new methods of calculating expected output, costs and revenue of thermal generation subject
to varying load and random independent thermal outages in a power system with a high wind
penetration.
1.2 Project objectives and scope
The project has a number of distinct objectives:
1. To gain an understanding of the complexities of power systems economics,in particular
generation capacity investment in market environments, and the methods available to
represent these complexities within a simulation environment.
2. To explore the nature of the feedback mechanism that exists between market conditions
and generation investment by developing a long-term dynamic generation investment
simulation model. This should capture the negative feedback loop that exists between
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generation capacity investment and wholesale market prices and how year-on-year in-
vestment decisions influence long-term market dynamics.
3. To examine the current status of research concerned with the impact ofpolicies promot-
ing investment in wind generation on thermal plant investments. This includes identify-
ing the limitations of existing approaches, specifically the need to develop new methods
of calculating expected output, costs and revenue of thermal generation subject to vary-
ing load and random independent thermal outages in a power system with a hig wind
penetration.
4. To apply the dynamic market model to an existing market, in this case Great Brit in
(GB). For simplicity, network effects will be neglected and the market will be modelled
as a ‘single bus’ system.
5. To investigate the need for, and design of, capacity mechanisms appropriate for the GB
market test case, and explore scope for their implementation within a dynamic modelling
environment.
1.3 Thesis and contribution to knowledge
Overall, the research will test the hypothesis that:
‘energy-only’ markets (i.e., without capacity mechanisms) with high penetrations
of wind generation are capable of inducing adequate and timely generation invest-
ments over a long-term time frame.
The project should provide insight into the nature of capacity margin oscillations in the GB
generation market. Further, the likely response of liberalised ‘energy-only’ markets to policies
promoting investment in renewable generation such as wind is not yet fully understood. The
work presented here helps move this field of knowledge forward. By extending and applying
existing probabilistic production methods to the GB market, the impact of a high wind pe etra-
tion on investment dynamics can be investigated. As part of the application to a nonequilibrium
oligopoly market, a method for estimating revenues from price mark-ups due tomarket power
within the dynamic simulation is derived.
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It is envisaged that the modelling techniques, analysis and insights herein willbe of interest to
not just the UK Government, but all governments seeking to reduce GHG emissions from the
power sector whilst maintaining an adequate level of security of supply risk. It would also be
of major interest to policy makers, regulators, market designers and others involved in planning
and design of the power sector.
1.4 Thesis outline
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the fundamental economics under-pinning modern power
markets and the costs and associated investment risks for different generating technologies. A
number of existing market frameworks are reviewed with close attention paid tothe impact
that high standards of system reliability have on market design. In addition,a variety of ex-
isting capacity mechanisms are surveyed. Finally, methods to measure generation adequacy
risk, including how they are adapted to account for high penetrations of wind generation, are
discussed.
Chapter 3 takes a close look at the GB power market. This begins with a brief history of the
power industry in GB that illustrates how security of supply concerns havebeen addressed to
date. This is followed by an account of liberalisation in the early 1990s including an overview
of market structures. Some policy-informing modelling works applied to the GB market in
recent years are also reviewed.
Chapter 4 contains a comprehensive literature survey of the tools availableto those modelling
generation capacity investment in electricity markets. This includes a review ofmodelling
methodologies, the handling of uncertainty, market power and investor expectations and risk
preferences. Finally, a discussion of the scope and value of techniques from control theory to
model the investment market is included.
Chapter 5 presents the methodologies used to address the research question posed. To begin,
the fundamental model design concepts together with their application to a dynamic i vestment
model of the GB power market are presented. Included are details aboutll elements of the first
iteration of a model. Also included are the results and discussion accompanying this stage of
the work. The model’s ability to simulate the market trends witnessed in GB since early 2001
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is tested along with a discussion of model limitations.
Chapter 6 describes the cutting-edge techniques used to model productionfrom high penetra-
tions of wind power. These results are used to update the investment marketsimulation model
to account for high penetrations of wind. Moreover, the work presented helps answer the fol-
lowing questions: 1) given historic wind resource availability in GB, what would have been
the hourly production for a higher level of installed wind capacity; and 2) what is the likely
contribution from wind to meeting peak demand?
Chapter 7 has two foci. Firstly, in light of the preliminary results and need fordeveloping
computationally fast models, an improved technique for calculating expected ou put, costs and
revenues from the energy market is developed. This includes a method of estimating generator
revenues from price mark ups due to market power in an oligopolistic market.Th technique
uses probabilistic production costing that considers the annual load curve and convolves it
with generator outages using the Mix of Normals distribution (MOND) approximation. The
accuracy and speed of the technique is tested with encouraging findings reported. Secondly,
the integration of the MOND technique in the dynamic simulation model of the GB market is
presented.
Chapter 8 explores the scope for including a capacity mechanism within the dynamic model. To
begin, the challenges faced when applying techniques from classical control theory to design a
robust economic controller are discussed. This motivates consideration of existing modelling
methodologies, which given the model application, can provide new insights.In light of the
ongoing electricity market reform debate, two mechanisms, namely a strategic reserve tender
and a market-wide capacity market are tested. These aim to 1) mitigate generation adequacy
risk and 2) make generator revenue streams more predictable.
Finally, Chapter 9 presents headline results, with a discussion of their validityand implications
in a GB market context. Also the modelling methodologies and implications to the generatio
adequacy problem are reviewed. Lastly, final thoughts and thesis experi nc s are shared.
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1.5 How to read this thesis
If the reader is familiar with the fundamentals of power system economics and the generation
adequacy problem then Chapter 2 can be overlooked. Similarly, if the historyand workings
of the GB market are already fully understood, then Chapter 3 can also bekipped, although
the historic generation adequacy risk calculation presented in Section 3.5 maybe of interest.
Further, the literature review of Chapter 4 can be overlooked if the contribution of this thesis,
which is presented in Chapters 5 - 8, is of primary interest.
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Chapter 2
Electricity Supply and Markets
In order to grasp the complexities of generation capacity investment in liberalised energy mar-
kets, it is necessary to understand how the electricity supply industry (ESI) is structured. This
chapter provides an overview of the fundamental economics under-pinning modern power mar-
kets, such as short-run marginal cost and long-run market equilibrium. Also included is a
discussion about the costs and associated investment risks for different generating technolo-
gies. A number of existing market frameworks are discussed, and particul attention is paid
to the impact that high standards of system reliability have on market design. In addition, a
variety of existing capacity mechanisms are reviewed. Finally, methods to measure generation
adequacy risk in power systems, including adaption for high penetrations of wind generation,
are discussed.
2.1 Introduction
Various structures of ESI exist around the world. Broadly speaking, these are distinguished
by the level ofvertical andhorizontal integration(or ownership) andcompetitionwithin their
component parts; namely the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity within a
geographical area (see Chapter 1 of [5]). This work focuses on thegen ration sector of a
liberalised electricity market.
Chile was the first country to liberalise its electricity market in 1986. It was followed by GB
in 1990 and Norway in 1991 [6]. Since then, a number of other countries have established
wholesale energy markets: Australia (firstly in Victoria, 1994), Brazil (1995), New Zealand
(1996), Germany (1998), Spain (1998) and Canada (2002) to name a few. By 1998 many
regions of the US also had liberalised ESIs involving Independent SystemOperators (ISO)
for California,1 Texas (ERCOT), Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM), New York, New
1California was the first US market to move to market-based pricing in 1998.
7
Electricity Supply and Markets
England and the Midwest. Over the years, each liberalised market has evolved differently. The
intimate workings of each are beyond the scope of this study, though a wealthof information
can be found in [6].
Although market design differs between countries, the goal of all liberalisd electricity market
designers is to ensure that the industry operates in the best interests of society. This includes
providing affordable, secure and reliable electricity for consumers. They must also be designed
in order to remain liquid, promote competition and reduce barriers to entry wherever possible.
2.2 Overview of wholesale energy markets
In the presence ofwholesale competition, generating firms (or generators) trade directly with
large industrial loads and retailers acting on behalf of consumers. Generators can be vertically
integrated or independent power producers (IPPs). The generationmarket structure varies, with
oligopoly being the most common structure seen in liberalised markets (e.g., GB, Germany,
Spain, Italy). An oligopoly market is a situation where a relatively small number of competing
firms dominate. The market is deemed ‘energy-only’ if payments for energyare the primary
source of revenue for generators.2 Examples of ‘energy-only’ markets currently operating in-
clude GB, Australia’s National Electricity Market, Alberta, Nordpool, Ontario, and Texas.
Transactions take place on thewholesale market(Fig. 2.1). In this market, the commodity is
energy, typically, a mega-watt hour (MWh), which is the flow of power (MW) over a period
of time (h) for an agreed price (£/MWh). The process of committing (or dispatching) generat-
ing units in order to meet demand is calledunit commitment. Sometimes a distinction is made
betweenunit commitmentandenergy dispatch. More precisely, unit commitment pertains to
unit start and stop times, and level of generation, whereas energy dispatch relates to the level
of generation only. Depending on market structure, this is either operatedby the System Op-
erator (SO) or involves private (or self) dispatch independent of the SO. In general terms, unit
commitment simply informs generators when to switch on and how much to produce [3].
To date, it remains uneconomic to store electricity in large quantities, thereforeelectricity gen-
2Some generators can obtain additional revenues by providing ancillary services (AS); this is discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2.3.
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Figure 2.1: The wholesale market structure with retail competition. Also demonstrated are
vertical and horizontal integration. Based on [5].
erated must equal demand at all times. Furthermore, the physical properties of el ctricity mean
that system instability can arise in a matter of seconds and thus markets must facilitate (and
ultimately make way for) the proper operation of the power system. Consequently, electricity
must be traded in advance of physical delivery. These trades can be divid d into categories
based on the lead time from the price agreement to product delivery, market operation and
product type. More precisely, ‘energy-only’ markets consist of prompt delivery markets, power
exchanges, and in some instances bilateral trading between generators and retailers (Fig. 2.2).
These mechanisms are described below.
2.2.1 Bilateral trading
Bilateral trades between participants is a standard feature of most commodity markets, nd is
also present in many electricity markets. These trades are characterised by the duration and
quantity stipulated in the agreement. Forwards and futures contracts (or structured contracts)
allow electricity trading over longer periods (a year or more) sometimes withoutformal price
disclosure and can be customised to allow for flexibility. Because of their hightransaction costs,
9
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Figure 2.2: Overview of financial and physical flows under an ’energy-only’ market. Layout
inspired by [7].
long-term contracts are only attractive to those who wish to trade large volumes of energy [5];
hence they are attractive in highly vertically integrated markets.
Forward trading occursover-the-counter(OTC); these trades are custom-made and can involve
shorter durations and less volume, and prices are not disclosed. Thesetak place on a variety
of different platforms and as a result price discovery is reliant on a range of sources including
price reporters and informal market intelligence [8].
Futures are a more transparent form of trading and take place onexchanges, where formal bids
and offers are submitted by buyers and sellers with volumes bought and sold at a clearing price.
Participants do not know the identity of the bidder or offerer, the price is there for all to see.
This form of trading via auction usually goes up to the day-ahead stage andit is the job of
centrally managed markets to address the prompt delivery phase.
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2.2.2 ‘Spot’ markets
‘Spot’ markets for electricity are run by the SO who combines its knowledge ofthe network,
accepted bids and offers, forecast demand, generation availability andsecurity constraints to
determine any adjustments that must be made. Bids/offers are submitted to decrease/increase
production or increase/decrease consumption. These are accepted orrejected accordingly, and
system balance is achieved. These markets tend to start at the day-aheadstage and work inward
toward ‘real-time’ (meaning half-hour ahead). They allow participants to adjust their volumes
closer to real-time (because of changes in demand forecast or unforeseen generator contingen-
cies) and also ensure that the agreed trades are physically feasible in respect to the electricity
network power flows.
2.2.3 Ancillary markets
All power markets require ancillary services. These additional servicesare necessary to ensure
the efficient production of reliable, high-quality power [3] and that supply and demand match
at all times. In most cases, there are separate markets for these services, although some parts of
the service (e.g., frequency response) are mandated as part of Grid Codes. The main types of
ancillary service are listed below; a more detailed description can be found inChapter 3-4 of
[3]:
• Frequency response: This service is concerned with the real-power balancing of the sys-
tem.
• Response and reserve: This service is made up of fast response (spinning reserve) which
can respond (i.e., increase generation or reduce consumption) within a matter of seconds.
Reserve services are also included here; these provide additional back-up which can
be made available in tens of minutes. Both services come together to maintain system
security and real-power balancing.
• Reactive power: Although currently only a small service within most ancillary markets, it
is vital for voltage stability. This service may become more prominent with the increasing
connection of new types of generator configuration.
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• System security: A broad area of the ancillary market, it includes services to maintain
system security in both pre- and post-fault conditions. Generator curtailment agreements,
generator or load intertrips and black start are key services.
2.2.4 Regulation
Most markets are imperfect, which may or mat not be corrected. Some marketsrequire regula-
tion to guide them toward classical ‘perfection’ and some, regulated or not,will never match the
textbook model [9]. Power markets are an example where there is a strong case for regulation.
The regulatory framework is established collaboratively by government, the regulator and the
SO [1]. The regulator must be independent so that government legislationc n be implemented
in a transparent manner and can be easily followed or challenged. The term ‘d regulated’ is
often used in the context of restructured competitive power markets. This term is misleading as
no power market, or indeed major financial market, exists today that is not regulat d in some
form. The main priority of the regulator is to protect consumers, by preventing power shortages
as a result of inadequate investment, or high energy prices because of market inefficiencies or
manipulation. This role is of significant interest for the dynamics of capacity investment in
liberalised energy markets and is discussed in detail in sub-section 2.6.5. Further, it is widely
accepted that transmission and distribution operation and ownership (cf. Fig. 2.2) should re-
main monopolies. Therefore, in the absence of competition, the regulator mustensure that these
elements also operate efficiently.
2.3 Key economic concepts
Moving on from a general discussion of liberalised electricity markets, this section introduces
some fundamental economic concepts that underpin market design and provi e a foundation
for the work undertaken here. This review is by no means comprehensive, and the interested
reader should consult Kirschen and Strbac [5] or Stoft [3] for a fuller explanation.
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2.3.1 Supply and demand
In economics, theinverse demand function,D−1(q), andinverse supply function, S−1(q), illus-
trate the interaction between supply and demand by relating quantity,Q, o price,Π (Fig. 2.3).
More precisely, the curves show the price that demand (resp. supply) iswilling to pay (resp.
sell) in exchange for a certain quantity. Or more intuitively, thedemand function, D(π), and
supply function, S(π), provide quantity for a given priceπ. Both representations are included
for completeness, though when representing these interactions within a mathematical odel,
the standard is to use inverse functions. Whether it is better to model produces as choosing
prices or quantities as strategic variables has been debated in economics for many years [10].
Figure 2.3: Example of market equilibrium. Based on diagram in Chapter 2 of [5].
2.3.2 Price elasticity
In most commodity markets, demand for a product responds to price. If the price increases,
consumers will buy less and will seek cheaper alternatives or use less. Theprice elasticity of












whereq is quantity andπ is price. If ǫ is negative, then demand is said to beprice responsive
(the more negative, the greater theelasticity). Intuitively, ǫ < 0 because a change in price,dπ,
will always result in a opposite sign change in quantity,dq. Therefore it is common to re-define
demand elasticity to be positive by taking the absolute value ofǫ. ǫ is invariably positive for
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price elasticity of supplybecause a price change,dπ, will lead to a same sign change in quantity,
dq.
A characteristic of electricity markets is that the demand-side of the market is almot completely
unresponsive to price. Thisnelasticityarises as demand (or consumers) neither sees nor pays
the “real-time” price. For example, residential loads pay either a flat rate orone that changes
between peak and off peak hours, e.g., Economy 7 in GB. Some large industral consumers
offer price responsiveness through interruptible contracts (e.g., [11]), however these remain
insignificant relative to total levels of demand. The long-term elasticity of the demand side
is more noticeable; if prices in the retail market increase, then consumers are likely to reduce
energy consumption or switch to a cheaper provider. This change happens ov r a long period
of time and so the short-run price elasticity of demand is usually very low (or zero). That
said, with demand response and dynamic pricing likely to become significant in the future, this
characteristic may change (cf. sub-section 2.7.4).
2.3.3 Short-run marginal cost in an ‘energy-only’ market
The marginal (or opportunity) cost is the change in total cost when the amount produced
changes by one unit. It applies to both the demand and supply side of a market. The marginal
cost of supply is derived from the production cost function. This couldbeshort-run, where the
cost of producing an additional unit is incurred by increasing output from existing facilities.
Or it could belong-run where new facilities must be built in order to produce the additional
unit. This section looks at short-run production with long-run production tackled in sub-section
2.4.3.
In power systems economics, theshort-run marginal cost(SRMC) is incurred when producing
an additional unit of energy (e.g.,£/MWh). It is derived from generatorvariable operating costs
using input-output curves. If the variable operating costs can be repres nted by a differentiable
function, sayC(P ), whereP is power produced, then its SRMC is given bydC
dP
. Typically,
generator variable operating cost functions are convex because as production increases, the
amount of input fuel required per additional unit of output power increases (law of diminishing
returns). As a result, the generator SRMC function is monotonically increasing with production
[5]. An example variable operating cost (a) and equivalent SRMC (b) functions are shown in
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Fig 2.4. Also plotted is a piecewise linear approximation for both curves, whichis a reasonable
approach when the variable operating cost function is estimated from measurement data of var-
ious levels of output, and where a smooth curve cannot always be produced [5]. Also shown on
the SRMC function (right) is a typical characteristic of power markets, whereby once supply
hits the capacity limit, the supply curve takes an infinite jump upwards. This prevents the gen-
erator from being dispatched above its rated capacity because it is uneconomi al or physically
impossible to do so (discussed in detail in sub-section 2.3.6).
Figure 2.4: Example of (a) variable operating cost function, and (b) equivalent short-run
marginal cost function. The linear approximations are also shown.
2.3.3.1 System merit order
A typical generation mix will contain a variety of variable operating costs and ordering in-
dividual generators’ by increasing SRMC provides the systemmerit order. Summing these
horizontally, provides theaggregate supply curve[3].
The system merit order can be broken down into three main categories:
• Base-loadgenerators are expected to operate during most hours due to their low variable
operating costs.
• Mid-merit generators are not expected to run in all hours and provide operational flexi-
bility.
• Peakinggenerators are called upon for a small number of hours per year typicallydur-
ing high demand hours. They have high variable operational costs due to low thermal
efficiency and running on expensive distillate fuels [12].
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The duration of operation for each category is discussed in sub-section2.4.3, but a brief demon-
stration of how these characteristics define the system the merit order is provided. Consider the
simple example is shown in Fig. 2.5(b); each flat segment of the supply curverepr sents a
different SRMC (indicated bySRMCbase, SRMCmid−merit andSRMCpeaking on y-axis).
Here linear approximations of variable cost functions have been used for all generators leading
to a stepped aggregate supply function.
Figure 2.5: Example of linear approximation of (a) variable operating cost function, which is
used to derive (b) the aggregate supply curve. Examples of base, mid-mer t and
peaking capacity also shown.
2.3.3.2 Value-of-lost-load
But what happens when demand exceeds available supply? In this example(Fig. 2.5) the value
of the supply curve is infinite for quantities (MW) above total capacity. In order for the supply
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curve to remain finite for levels of demand above available capacity, the marginal cost of the
demand side must be considered.
The SRMC of demand determines the change in total cost from consuming oneunit more or
less of a product. This change in total cost is typically positive if consuming more and negative
if consuming less. If negative, the SRMC of demand can be thought of as the amount of
compensation required by consumers to reduce their demand. If the marketc nnot be cleared
because the available generating capacity is not adequate to satisfy demand, and to avoid load
shedding (or worse, blackouts), the price must rise to a level necessary to ration demand to
available supply. This price can be defined“as the marginal cost of power at that time, set
not by variable operating costs but by the opportunity cost of a consumer that has decided to
reduce its demand”[12], namely thevalue-of-lost-load(VOLL). The inelasticity of demand
(2.1) means VOLL is typically very high and there is a willingness of retailers (on behalf of
consumers) to pay up to the VOLL when there is a shortage in order to avoid disconnection
without notice. Fig. 2.6 shows how the system supply function is adapted to include VOLL;
there is now a limit to the (previously infinite) final vertical segment at maximum capa ity.
Figure 2.6: Example aggregate supply function with VOLL.
The issue with the VOLL discussed at great length by market designers, iswhat is the VOLL
exactly? Depending on its use, electricity is valued very differently. For example, a hospital
will place a much higher value on its energy supply than a domestic user running a washing
machine. Furthermore, the load centers are highly integrated, with currentlyno method of
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disaggregation within a region. Therefore it is largely impossible to provide different levels of
reliability within a geographical region and defining a single VOLL figure remains contentious
issue.
2.3.4 Perfect competition
The point where demand and supply intersect is known as themarket equilibrium(see Fig. 2.3).
If suppliers are price-takers, i.e., they cannot influence the market pricby performing strategic
actions to increase their market share and/or revenue, then the market isperfectly competitive
and the equilibrium price (π∗ in Fig. 2.3) is thecompetitive equilibrium price. In a perfectly
competitive electricity market, the market price,π, is set by the SRMC of the last generator to
be dispatched in theconomic dispatch, π = SRMC. This is referred to as thesystem marginal
price (SMP), or alternatively, thesystem marginal cost(SMC). The economic dispatch is de-
rived from the system merit order and provides the SO with the optimal unit commitment
regime (cf. Section 2.2). Because it must account for network constraints nd generator ramp-
ing restrictions, unit commitment dispatches plant as economically andefficientlyas possible
and may not follow the system merit order precisely.
Not all forms of generation are dispatchable. Dispatchable generation has full operational con-
trol over its input-output. Non-dispatchable (ormust-run) generation has limited operational
flexibility, due to component preservation (e.g., nuclear) or fuel availability(e.g., wind). Con-
sequently, commitment schedules typically start with non-dispatchable generatio and work up
though the merit order. This does not cause an inefficiency in the wholesale market because
their SRMC is usually very low or zero and so are typically considered base-lo d. However
an externalityarises as a result of non-dispatchability when either i) production needs tobe
constrained-offas a result of, for example, insufficient demand or network constraints or; ii)
production exceeds expectations as a result of, e.g., higher than forecast wind production. In
case i) the generator will be paid its offer price, which is typically very high, and this is the
negative externality. In case ii) the generator will be providing cheap (and sometimes ‘free’)
electricity and thus displaces a generator with a higher SRMC. This benefit of a reduction in
total production cost is thepositive externality. Note that in a well-functioning market, when
constraining-off dispatchable generation, the bid price should be greater th n the offer price
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(e.g., in the case of fossil-fuel generation, from savings made on fuel not burnt), thus reducing
total production cost. This is not always the case, but a detailed discussion i beyond the scope
of this thesis.
Figure 2.7: Example aggregate supply function with competitive market equilibrium for two
levels of demand.
Two example demand curves and equivalent competitive equilibria are shown in Fig. 2.7. The
leftmost curve, demandD1, intersects a flat portion of the supply curve and the rightmost curve,
demandD2, intersects a vertical portion. The steep gradient of demand indicates low demand
elasticity. A discontinuous supply curve means that the SMP can take on arangeof values for
the same level of supply (x-axis). In this event, competitors will adjust their output so that the
SRMC-range containsπ, i.e.,MCL ≤ π ≤MCU , whereMCL is the savings from producing
one unit less of output (e.g.,SRMCC in Fig. 2.7) andMCU is the cost of producing one
unit more (e.g., VOLL in Fig. 2.7) [3]. This change in outputs makes intuitive sense in a
perfectly competitive market because price-taking generators will reduce their output at a cost
of π, savingMCL, as long asπ < MCL or increase it ifMCU < π. This means that the
competitive market price never exceeds marginal cost and the fundamental rules of economics
hold [3].
With the perfectly competitive market model based on the SRMC of generation,there is no ex-
plicit mechanism to cover startup and no-load costs, though some markets havbeen designed
with this in mind. For instance, under a classical pool system,side paymentsare made to gen-
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erators with accepted bids when the pool price is insufficient to cover start-up and no-load costs
(known asquasi-fixed costs) [3]. Some exchanges tackle this problem by having a multiple bid
structure where generators bid in a price and a minimum run-time. There is somedebate as to
which design is better, yet the relative infancy of markets makes it difficult tode ermine which
is most efficient. Furthermore, as noted in [3], the cost of committing generating units is about
1% of retail bills and although generators may change their commitments closer to real-time if
the price is too low, they are more likely to do it in low demand hours when there aradequate
alternative resources available.
2.3.5 Revenue and profit
For markets to endure, all parties must benefit, for example producers must receive profits and
consumers must experience good value for money. In economic terms, these are known as
supply and demandsurplus. If the demand and supply function are well-defined then, given
market price,π, these values can be quantified. Furthermore, if the market is perfectly compet-
itive, then the market equilibrium maximises the producers’ and consumers’ surplu . Thegross
andnet surplusfor consumers’ is shown if Fig. 2.8(a), with similar concepts for producers’
revenueandnet surplusshown in Fig. 2.8(b).
(a) (b)
Figure 2.8: (a) Consumers’ surplus and (b) producers’ surplus. Plot inspiredby [5].
Scarcity rentsfor producers’ are an important concept in power system economics. Taking
the definition used by Stoft [3], they are revenue minus variable operatingcost. Equating this
with the concepts described above they are the producers’ (short-run) net surplus. Subtracting
startup and no-load costs from scarcity rents providesshort-run profits. Note that an alternative
20
Electricity Supply and Markets
definition of scarcity rent exists, termed the“folk definition” by Stoft [3], where scarcity rent
is defined as revenue minus the highest revenue earned before total generation becomes scarce
(Area 3 in Fig. 2.9). For the remainder of this thesis, the first definition is used.
Figure 2.9: Plot demonstrating how generators earn scarcity rents.
Using a simple supply curve, Fig. 2.9 demonstrates how at very high levels ofdemand, all
generators earn scarcity rents. All available generation is producing atfull output and demand is
willing to pay up to the VOLL for additional production. When the market clearsat a price level
above the SRMC of the most expensive generator in the merit order (i.e.,MCL ≤ π ≤ MCU
in Fig. 2.7), this is termed aprice spike. At other times generators gain scarcity rents in periods
when the market price is above their SRMC.
While standards of generation adequacy remain high, there is a need for adequate volumes of
peaking capacity to be connected to the system. If the market is perfectly competitive, peaking
units will only gain scarcity rents from price spike periods. In a well-functioning market,
price spikes occur during a small number of, typically high, demand periods. The uncertainty
surrounding the height and duration of price spikes makes the recoveryf fixed costs (FCs)
uncertain and investment in peaking capacity a risky prospect for investors. M reover, in order
to recover invested capital and FCs, base-load generators require scarcity rents in the majority
of operating hours. Mid-merit generators can be economic even with a lower utilisation factor,
provided they gain scarcity rents in an adequate number of hours.
There is no fundamental limit to how high these price spikes can go, howeversome markets do
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impose a price cap (e.g., Australia’s National Electricity Market is capped at10,000 $/MWh).
A cap ensures that energy buyers do not continue to pay higher and higher prices for energy
that is not available. This cap is the maximum amount that any generated MWh ofelectricity
can be purchased for. As suggested in Fig. 2.9, a good benchmark forthis cap is the VOLL.
Price caps appear later when regulatory issues are discussed.
2.3.6 Market power
Sub-section 2.3.4 described the characteristics of a perfectly competitive mark t. Yet competi-
tion is not always perfect and participants may be able“to alter profitability prices away from
competitive levels”[3] and exercisemarket power. It can be described as a three step process
[3]: i) exercise; ii) effect on price and quantity; and iii) impact on market participants. The first
point is an important one in terms of market regulation, because participants may havemarket
power, yet they may not actuallyexerciseit. That said, it is a fundamental assumption of eco-
nomics that if a participant has market power, then the rational form of action is to exercise it
[3].
Figure 2.10: Example of quantity withholding and price mark-up. Breakdown of wealth trans-
fer also shown.
Market power works in the following manner: Firstly, the characteristics ofparticipants with
the ability to exercise market power must be defined. To keep things simple, thisxplanation
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is restricted to the supply-side of the market, which is reasonable given thatgenerator market
power is of primary concern to ESI regulators and market designers. Consequently, the ability
to move pricesabovethe competitive level is of interest. This is termedmonopoly power.
Generators with monopoly power have a large share of the generation market andquantity
withholding is the primary method of increasing profitability. By withholding capacity, the
supply curve is shifted to the left and the market price is higher than in the perf ctly competitive
case. This defines the effect on quantity and price (point (ii) above). An example of this is
shown in Fig. 2.10. The revenue received from thequantity withheld, Qw, is zero, and the
higher market price,πmp, results in an increase in profitability across all remaining dispatched
capacity, which as a monopoly firm, the generator will own a large share of.This increase
in priceπ∗ − πmp is referred to as market pricemark-up. Submitting a supply curve above
marginal cost is often equivalent [13]; both move the price away from thecompetitive level and
hence increase profitability. A third method of exercising market power is theexploitation of
network congestion to raise prices in a particular location [13]; this is not ofprimary concern
here.
The potential for generators to submit a supply function well above marginal cost is more evi-
dent in peak demand periods due to the lack of alternatives. Generators submit a normal supply
curve for most of their capacity, apart from the last few MWs which are bid in at an extremely
high price (“hockey-stick” bidding). This pricemark-upduring peak demand hours occurs be-
cause firms can raise their bids knowing that the lack of alternative resources will mean bid
acceptance. This has been observed in US [14] and more recently in European markets [15].
Industry regulators are concerned about market power because it re ults in a transfer of wealth
from consumers to producers. In economic terms, this means a reduction in csumer surplus
comprising ofwelfare transfer, which is the pricemark-uptimes the total quantity produced,
anddeadweight loss, which is the loss as a result of market inefficiency (Fig. 2.10) [3]. This
describes the final step of the process: the effect on market participans (point (iii) above).
Methods to measure market power are discussed in Section 4.5.
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2.4 Generation investment in market environments
So far the discussions of power markets has focused mainly on short-runissues and this thesis is
concerned with electricity market dynamics over a long-term time frame. Therefor it is useful
to consider the long-run dynamics of supply and demand, in particular the mix and amount of
generation over time required to maintain generation adequacy standards.
2.4.1 Standard of generation adequacy
In countries with a reliable electricity supply industry, electrical energy is viewed as a public
good that should always be available, and standards of system adequacy in the power industry
are high. System adequacy is a broad topic, however this thesis focusesong neration adequacy
only. This is the existence of enough generation capacity installed or underconstruction to meet
system demand in the long-term whilst considering plant maintenance, unscheduled outages,
utilisation factors, variable generation and unpredicted contingencies [16].
Expanding on this, plant maintenance is a type ofunforced outage, i.e., a schedulable outage
that can be shifted in time if required. Aforced outageis the result of a disturbance (e.g.,
generator fault) which is not planned. The possibility of such an event is kown as acontingency
[3]. Given this, a capacity margin over theoretical peak demand is needed. The available
methods for assessing generation adequacy are discussed in Section 2.8.
In order for adequate capacity to be maintained in the face of demand growthand retirement of
existing capacity, investment in new capacity must be forthcoming. Moreover, to maintain an
acceptable level of security of supply risk and keep prices within reason, this investment must
be timely and efficient.
2.4.2 Competitive market-driven investment
In a perfectly competitive power market, the competitive price is established byfinding the
marginal resource that balances supply and demand [1]. Generators receive short-run profits
(or scarcity rents) in periods when the system price is above their SRMC. In order to cover
their total fixed cost of capital, these profits must be positive on average.The market is said to
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be in long-run competitive equilibriumif 1) each generator (or type of capacity) receives, on
average, scarcity rents that are equal to their fixed costs, and thus totalprofit for all generators
is zero in the long-run, and 2) the total cost of supply is minimised [3, 17]. More precisely, if
scarcity rents are insufficient to cover fixed costs (long-run profit below zero), then generators
will not invest. Conversely, when supply tightens or demand expands, price spikes increase
scarcity rents and this is viewed as an investment signal to generators [18].
2.4.3 Demonstrating the minimum cost of supply
Firstly consider demand. The most common method of describing demand in the long-term
is via a load-duration curve(LDC); the LDC is equivalent to the load-over-time curve sorted
in order of decreasing power. This is demonstrated in Fig. 2.11, where theaggr gate load
time series in GB for 2010 is shown above the equivalent LDC. Note the maximumduration of
17520, representing a full year of half-hourly loads. A LDC is made up of five main features:
duration, peak-load power, base-load power, total energy (area under the curve) and shape. The
first four are single parameters and the latter can be described using a table of durations and
powers or using a fitted function. When constructing the LDC, unpredictable f ctors such as
weather or shifts in consumption timings tend to cancel out.
Figure 2.11: Half-hourly load-over-time (year) for GB in 2010 (grey) and equivalentLDC
(black). Source: [19].
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Figure 2.12: Demonstrating the minimum cost of supply; load-duration curve (top); screen-
ing curves (middle) and price-duration curve (bottom). Optimal plant mixhigh-
lighted by solid black line.
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To demonstrate the minimum cost of supply, a simple linear LDC is shown in Fig 2.12,and the
middle plot shows how the technologyscreening curvesare constructed and the optimal (least
cost) plant mix is determined. The solid thick black line traces the optimal mix, with secions of
each screening curve used. Screening curves are a straight-forward way to compare generation
costs. They account for total fixed costs (investment and operational),variable costs (VCs) and
capacity factor (CF), and are a plot of average cost (e.g.,£/MW-h or £/kW-y) as a function of CF
(the proportion of time the plant is expected to be operating). Moreover, variable costs are the
slope, fixed costs the intercept and the area under the optimal mix curve is thetotal supply cost.
It is important to note that this is not an average cost of energy (£/MWh), but the average cost
of capacity measured in£/MWh (i.e., a long-run view) [3]. The method used here to determine
the screening curves is based on Stoft [3] and a fuller explanation of theinformation obtained
in these graphs is given by Green [12].
Both components of the generation costs must be expressed in the same units -in this case
£/MWh. VCs are typically expressed in cost per unit of energy producedso no extra work is
required here, though the FC element requires conversion. The technique used is to amortise the
FCs over the plant lifetime via thecapital recovery factor(CRF) for a given discount rate. The
CRF is the ratio of the stream of fixed payments (annuity) to the present valueof th payments
over a given length of time (in this case the power plant lifetime).
The formula is given by:
CRF =
r · (1 + r)n
(1 + r)n − 1 =
r
1 − un (2.2)
wherer is the discount rate,n is the lifetime of the project andu = (1 + r)−1 is the discount
factor. The deferred (by one year) CRF is given by:
DCRF = u · CRF. (2.3)
The FC element is made up of two parts. The overnight (or construction) cost (OC) (£/kW) of





Mi · (1 + r)−(i−τ), (2.4)
wherepc is the cost (£/kW),Mi is the capital expenditure vector for the project with
∑τ−1
i=0 Mi =
1, as it is common for capital expenditure to be spread throughout the construction period.τ
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is the construction time (years). For simplicity, OC may be left aspc, with full construction
cost assumed to be incurred instantaneously. Next are the annual FCs (£/kW) of plant upkeep,
which can be transformed into a stream of fixed payments assumed to be made at the beginning
of each year (annuity-due):
FC = pf ·
1 − un
1 − u , (2.5)
wherepf is the fixed operating cost (£/kW/yr). The full amortised fixed cost (FAFC) (£/kWy)
discounted to the start of the first year of operation is given by either [3]:
FAFC = DCRF · (pc + FC)
= DCRF · pc + pf , (2.6)
or if considering the expenditure schedule in (2.4) then:
FAFC = DCRF ·OC + pf . (2.7)
The full screening curve (£/MWh) is defined asFAFC/8.76 + CF · V C.
The three screening curves plotted in Fig. 2.12 are constructed to represent the main categories
of operating range. Base-load generators are typically capital-intensive with high fixed costs,
which results in a high screening curve intercept, but shallow screening curve gradient on ac-
count of low SRMC. Mid-merit generators have lower capital and fixed costs and therefore a
lower screening curve intercept. By comparison variable operational costs are higher, which
results in a steeper gradient than base-load. Peaking generators havea low screening curve
intercept due the lowest capital costs, but have steep screening curvegradi nt on account of
high SRMCs. Screening curves are a good starting point for comparing costs of generation,
although it is important to note that they do not capture every aspect considered by investors.
That said, they do demonstrate the reason for having a generation marketwhich consists of a
wide range of technology types each with varied cost and operational characteristics.
Also shown in Fig. 2.12 is the cost of satisfying load throughout the year viatheprice-duration
curve(PDC). Note that this is thelong-runmarginal cost (LRMC) of generation (indicated on y-
axis for each category of generation). SRMC represents the incremental cos of instantaneous
adjustment in production, whereas LRMC accounts for the building of new capacity and so
includes FCs. The PDC also reaches the VOLL in some hours, although the duration of this
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period is quite short. The PDC in Fig. 2.12 also demonstrates how in the presence of some
demand response the total cost of supply (area under optimal plant mix curve) is educed.
In the example given in Fig. 2.12, if the level of total installed capacity is givenbyCAP , which
is below the maximum value of loadML, i.e., there are periods where available generation is
not adequate to meet required load. The areaUL gives the expected annual average load that
is required to be shed (GW) (or perhaps, more precisely, the duration that load is required to
be rationed to available supply), and the duration of this load shedding is given byDUL. In a
reliable power system, typical values ofDUL are 0.003 or 1 day in 10 years [3]. Furthermore,
the marginal price for power in these periods will reach the VOLL, and if theamount of installed
capacity is in long-run equilibrium,DUL · V OLL, is just high enough to cover the fixed costs
of peaking generators.
The greater the installed capacity,CAP , the smaller the value ofDUL. This reduces the cost of
unserved energy (DUL·V OLL), although it increases the cost of serving load (cost of additional
capacity). The VOLL and total FC (or FAFC (2.6)) of the most expensivepeaking generator can
be used to determine the optimal level of reliability, or duration of load sheddingDUL, from the
point of view of society. The condition for optimality is given by:DUL ·V OLL = FAFCpeak.
So the optimal duration of load shedding is given by
DUL = FAFCpeak/V OLL. (2.8)
Note that this does not take into account the SRMC of the generator servingthe extra en-
ergy, though given thatDUL is typically very small, then the extra cost incurred (DUL ·
SRMCpeaking) is small in relation to the cost of the additional capacity.
Plainly, this result is based on a very simple model of reliability. There is unlikelyto be a
situation where total installed capacity is below theoretical maximum load. However onc gen-
eration outages and load forecast errors (Section 2.8) are considered, one can see the importance
of this result. What is more this enables the long-run equilibrium to be characterised with little
information [3]. That said, the VOLL is notoriously difficult to determine, and, in a market
environment where cost of capital differs between participants, the FAFC can also be difficult
to establish. This makes design of reliability policies challenging. This will be discussed in
sub-section 2.7.3.
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To conclude, Fig. 2.12 is a neat way of comparing load, production costs and price duration.
It also demonstrates that both energy and capacity prices are required inorder to determine the
minimum cost of supply. However this representation does not consider many of the important
factors such as time delays, lumpiness of new build, growth in demand, marketpow r and
changing fuel costs. These topics are discussed in the following sections.
2.4.4 Effect of market power
Although the exercise of market power occurs in the short-run, there arlong-run effects of
market power to consider. These are of particular interest for generation investment over the
long-term. The result of pricemark-upmeans more profit for generators and one of two out-
comes: Either the result of increased revenues bring on investment in newcapacity, which in
turn feeds back into the market and lowers prices. Alternatively, more sophisticated firms who
account for the effect of their investment upon mark-ups for their existing fleet may deliberately
not invest in order to keep prices (including mark-ups) high. In the faceof d mand growth and
capacity retirement, large market players may invest to maintain market share.Mo over, the
system becomes reliant on large market players to undertake the bulk of investment in response
to the additional profits received.
2.4.5 Investment cycles in power markets
Many existing commodity markets are known to exhibit cyclical patterns, e.g., aluminum, real
estate and copper [20]. More recently, attention has turned to liberalised electricity markets.
Even the most mature power markets are less than 25 years old, thus limiting the scope for an
investigation into the presence of cycles. A recent study by Arango [20]looked for empirical
evidence of investment cycles in deregulated electricity markets by exploringa “cycle hypoth-
esis”, with capacity margin as the indicator of cycles. Autocorrelation analysis wasperformed
on 18 years of historic capacity margin data to establish the presence of cycles in the England
& Wales (E&W), Chile and Nordpool systems. For the data analysed, resultsshow that both
the E&W and Chilean systems show a strong indication of cycles, with results from Nordpool
consideredambiguous.
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Generation capacity investment is prone to investment cycles owing to the long lead time, cap-
ital intensiveness and lumpiness of new build. Time delays and lumpiness of capacity play a
key role in the boom and bust cycle phenomenon. Generation investment has time lags of 3-5
years for gas and coal plants and 8-10 for nuclear before becoming operational [21]. Fig. 2.13
shows this cyclical concept in its most basic form. Tightening of supply and demand results
in frequent and high price spikes, which induce a wave of new (lumpy) investments. This is
followed (after time delay) by a supply increase and a period of excess capacity. This leads to
lower prices and capacity withdrawal, which returns the system to a period of high prices. Thus
the cycle repeats.
Figure 2.13: Investment dynamics and boom-and-bust cycles in electricity generation.
The cobweb theorem[22] neatly describes the interaction between supply and demand over
successive periods of trade. The elasticity of total market supply and demand curves determine
how quantity and price evolve as either continuous (elasticity of supply and demand equal),
divergent (elasticity of supply greater than demand) or convergent (elasticity of demand greater
than supply) fluctuations. Fig. 2.14 shows a convergent fluctuation; a dem nd ofq1 will result
in priceπ1. Supply will react by withdrawing some quantity to leave onlyq2 available to the
market. This will then result in priceπ2, which is higher thanπ1 on account of the supply
“shortage”. Equivalent examples of the patterns witnessed for divergent and continuous fluc-
tuations are shown to the right of the main figure. The oscillations in price and quantity as a
result of these fluctuations are displayed in Fig. 2.15. One can see the oscillati ns are damped
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and converge to the equilibrium after a number of time periods. The frequency of oscillation in
Fig. 2.15,dt, is dependent on the supply and demand adjustment time lag.
Figure 2.14: Example of convergent fluctuation. Equivalent example pattern for divergent and
continuous fluctuations displayed on right.
Figure 2.15: Example of oscillations in price and quantity converging to equilibrium under
convergent fluctuation. Equivalent example pattern for divergent and co tinuous
fluctuations displayed on right.
The cobweb theorem is used here to illustrate the characteristics of price and qu tity oscilla-
tions. It is noted that in order for these dynamics to persist, producers’ must form expectations
about future production on the assumption that present prices will continue, a d that individual
production plans will not affect the market [22], i.e., producers may continue to make system-
atic forecast errors even if their expectations, based on historic trends, turn out to be wrong.
The implications of alternative expectations hypotheses are discussed in section 4.4.1.
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2.5 Costs of generation
It is worthwhile exploring the cost characteristics of electricity generating capa ity in more
detail. So far the discussion has been very general, with capacity discussed in terms of base-
load, mid-merit and peaking generation only. In this section, some specific technologies of
relevance to GB are given.
To begin, the concept oflevelised cost(LC) must be introduced. The LC for a generating
plant is the discounted cost of each unit of energy produced over the lifetime of the plant. LCs
provide a straight-forward method of comparing the unit costs of generating technologies over
their lifetime (e.g., [23]). They can be computed statically with a snap-shot cost analysis where
costs and capacity factor are assumed constant over the plant lifetime or asa dynamic analysis
where energy served and costs factors vary from year to year. Theform r is the more popular
approach, with [24] showing levelised cost comparisons for regions across the world.
A recent GB-specific study [21], has estimated the LC for the primary technologies used in
power generation (and estimates future costs and less mature technologies). Fig. 2.16 shows a
breakdown of LC into its components parts for five of the technologies studied. This demon-
strates how for some technologies costs are dominated by fuel costs (e.g., fossil-fuel generation)
and others by capital costs (e.g., nuclear and wind). These are importantconsiderations for any
investor and the implications of these characteristics are explored in the following sections.
Figure 2.16: MottMacDonald composition of levelised costs of generation for 2009 project
start with 10% discount rate [21].
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2.5.1 Fossil-fuels
Coal- and gas-fired generation are the main conventional technologies used in large power
plants. During the early days of large-scale power generation investment,an abundance of
cheap indigenous coal (or more recently natural gas) meant that fossilfuel-based generation
was relatively cheap. Although both coal- and gas-fired generation have been a stalwart of
electricity generation for many years, the drive to decarbonise the electricity se tor has changed
their economic attractiveness. For example, the European Union (EU) introduced the Large
Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) to control emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen
oxide (NOx) and particles from large combustion plants with a thermal output greater than 50
MW. As a result, existing generators must either close by 31 December 2015or earlier if the
running limit of 20,000 operational hours is reached (which commenced on 1January 2008)
or retro-fit Flue-gas desulphurisation (FGD) equipment. New builds are required to conform
with the directive. Furthermore, the development of the EU Emissions TradingScheme (ETS),
which went live in January 2005, has led to an increase in variable operating costs for these
forms of generation. Expected improvements in thermal efficiencies from arund 35% today to
over 50% for coal and from 50% today to over 60% for combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGTs),3
mean that some of the additional costs incurred from rising fuel and emissionsprice can be
partly mitigated [26]. Furthermore if these technological improvements are complimented by
carbon capture and storage (CCS) on a large-scale, decarbonisationof the electricity sector is
still achievable with fossil fuels albeit with continuing resource depletion issue .
According to [21], the most economic new coal-fired generators are based around the advanced
supercritical (ASC) design, with the more expensive integrated gasification combined cycle
(IGCC) also available. The cost premium for IGCC reflects the still largely dmonstration
status of this technology. However once CCS is integrated, its costs are expect d to move in
line with ASC with CCS [21]. In the case of gas-fired generation, CCGT designs span the
full operating range (peaking to base-load). Furthermore, CCGT designs combining power and
heat production (CHP) are becoming popular, with GB experiencing an increase from 0.8 GW
in 2000 to nearly 2 GW in 2010 [27]. Open cycle gas turbines (OCGTs) arealso available for
3For instance, Mitsubishis J Class gas turbine is on course to achieve 60% efficiency in combined-cycle mode
[25].
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use as peaking units. Other examples include diesel generators; these are th most efficient
option if only a small amount of energy is required [12] and are common source of back-up
generation on small island systems with poor interconnection (e.g., Scottish Western Isles).
2.5.2 Nuclear
Nuclear power plants are considered base-load owing to high capital coss and limited opera-
tional flexibility. They have very low variable operating costs, and are deemed ‘must run’ in
order to recover capital expenditure. From an emissions perspective,nucl ar power is carbon-
free at the point of generation. However a recent study [28] estimated emissions to be between
7 and 22g/kWh over the lifecycle of a plant4 compared to 380g/kWh and 830g/kWh for gas and
coal-fired generation, respectively.
Nuclear power requires significant waste management during and after the life ime of the plant.
Depending on the fuel cycle, fuel replacement must be carried out every 12-18 months [28].
The radioactive spent fuel must be stored and then eventually placed in ageological repository
where it will remain for thousands of years. This process adds a significa t amount to de-
commissioning costs, e.g., the World Nuclear Association (WNA) estimates these tobe ar und
9-15% of capital cost [29]. In contrast the GB Magnox nuclear powerstations currently under-
going decommisionning are estimated to be substantially higher with a combined costof £12
billion across 11 sites5 totalling around 5 GW, i.e., 2,440£/kW [30].
2.5.3 Renewables
Energy generated from renewable sources is an increasing trend in power systems. Many coun-
tries have signed up to binding targets to reduce GHG emissions and the electricity sector is
expected to make a significant contribution to these goals.
There are many forms of renewable generation, some more established thanothers. For exam-
ple, run-of-river (RRH), dam and pumped storage (PS) hydro power have been used since the
4This figure can be much higher if the ore quality is low.
5Berkeley, Bradwell, Calder Hall, Chapelcross, Dungeness A, Hinkley A, Hunterston, Oldbury, Sizewell A,
Trawsfynydd and Wylfa.
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1880s. PS is perhaps the closest power systems come to having storable energy, while RRH
is more reliant on the day-to-day availability of the resource as there are nostorage facilities.
Large hydroelectric dams are popular in many countries and although expensive, they can last
for many years.
Wind power generation has experienced considerable growth in recentyears. In 2009, global
wind energy production was 347TWh, which is about the annual electricityconsumption of
GB [31]. This figure is expected to increase 15-fold by 2030 [31]. In GB, the industry is
developing rapidly onshore, with offshore wind expected to accelerate inth coming decade as
the deadline for emissions targets approaches. Wind generation, like otherrenewable sources,
is not only attractive because of its zero emissions but also because it is a “free” form of energy
with virtually zero variable operating costs. It is non-dispatchable on account f its reliance
on the availability of the fuel resource. As a result, wind is considered base-load generation.
Wind capacity experiences high upfront costs with a recent report showing that onshore wind
is around twice as expensive per installed kW than a CCGT plant, and offshore over 3 times
[21]. These are expected to reduce significantly as the technology matures. For instance, costs
of £157-186/MWh for offshore wind in 2010 are projected to reduce to£110-125/MWh for
projects commissioned from 2020 (both 2010 real terms) [21].
Other forms of renewable generation used in the electricity sector include biomass, solar pho-
tovoltaics, geothermal and wave and tidal stream energy sources. The intensity of deployment,
degree of maturity and level of cost varies greatly across these technologies and is resource and
policy dependent. A detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis.
2.6 Investment uncertainties
In competitive markets, in order to avoid the risk of losing market share and even financial
ruin, firms are incentivised to improve efficiency and avoid bad decisions.Furthermore, as
documented extensively in the literature (e.g., see Chapter 1 of [32]), when fac d with a largely
irreversible investment decision under uncertainty, whenever possible,investors will delay until
more information becomes available and there is less uncertainty. These delays can result
in a potential generation capacity shortfall and exacerbate the boom and bust phenomenon
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discussed earlier. Table 2.1 shows the key uncertainties faced by investors and the impact of
these uncertainties are explored within this section.
Technical Market Financial Regulatory Policy
Construction costs Fuel costs Weighted Average Market design Emissions
Cost of Capital limits
Operational costs Demand growth Credit risk Regulation of Subsidies
transmission
Lead time Emissions costs Contractual risk Regulation of Energy efficiency
competition
Decommissioning Wholesale prices Planning process
Availability Degree of competition
Capacity factor
Table 2.1: Key uncertainties affecting firms investment decision. Source: [33] and[24].
2.6.1 Technical uncertainty
Capital-intensive and long lead time plant are less economically attractive for investors. They
will prefer technologies with short lead times that can be brought online in small incremental
steps [1]. For instance, capital costs have a high impact on nuclear but less so for CCGT,
conversely primary fuel cost has a high impact on CCGT; but less so fornuclear. The timing
and size of other projects in the pipeline and whether more efficient technologies are available
is also important. Competing firms choose different generating technologies and hence face the
financial consequences of unwise investments.
2.6.2 Market uncertainty
Many investment uncertainties are introduced by competition. For example, und r a monop-
olistic market, change is technology driven with uncertainties in demand and costs being key
[34]. However monopolies are vulnerable to inefficiencies that can lead tocustomers over-
paying for the service. In a competitive market, the introduction of multiple players means
firms can no longer take prices and customer base for granted [34]. Furthermore the nature and
degree of these risks will differ between project, technology and investor type. Before a build
decision is taken, each of the factors must be exhaustively explored.
To address the uncertainty of fuel prices, companies may agree upstream contracts to guarantee
fuel supply at a fixed cost. As stated in [23], a generator’s exposureto price uncertainty depends
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on the technology. If a producer is aprice maker- for example CCGTs tend to set the wholesale
price in GB owing to their position in the merit order - they are largely able to passfuel cost
variations onto consumers. Conversely,price takersare positioned lower in the merit order and
have little price setting influence.
Electricity demand in most power markets is expected to increase year-on-year (e.g., until re-
cently, Scotland experienced a 1% annual increase [35]). That said,owing to the recent eco-
nomic downturn and improvements in energy efficiency, this trend may no longer persist. Re-
gardless of whether it is an upward or downward movement, it is very difficult to predict future
demand accurately. However“accurate long-term estimates of both power and energy require-
ments are crucial to effective power system planning and operation”[35], thus highlighting the
need for good demand forecasting tools.
2.6.3 Financial uncertainty
Profitability is an important factor in any investment decision. By exchanging alarge sum of
money today for an income stream in the future, investors will require a goodrate of return.
Investment risk is further exacerbated by the fact that the cost of capital is higher for private
firms than for governments. Therefore investors will intuitively require a higher rate of return
[36], which further exacerbates the problems described above.
Under a liberalised market framework, investment in new generation is financed by private
capital. This may be done with project finance where investors create a newcompany for the
purpose; this limits their risk because it isolates the project from existing operations, meaning
lenders cannot claim against existing assets if the firm defaults on a loan. The alternative is cor-
porate finance when new investments are financed from the company balance sheet [37]. Many
forms of generation, such as nuclear and coal, are highly capital intensive i the construction
phase. As a result, only large utility firms have the financial strength to take onsuch projects
[24]. Gas-fired generation is less capital intensive and so has fewer barriers to entry; a good
example being the ‘dash for gas’ in GB during the 1990s (and described insection 3.2.1.2). In
the case of renewables, although there are no fuel or emissions costs during operation, capital
costs, which account for the majority of total costs, are usually high. Perhaps a good example
of this is large-scale PS; once built the system cannot do without it, yet financi g it is almost
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never carried out privately.
In addition to technology cost characteristics, the perceived level of risk involved will differ and
must be compared to alternatives (including the option of doing nothing). This concept can be
explored through the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The formula is given by [36]:
r = (χ) · γ + (1 − χ) · κ (2.9)
whereχ, γ andκ are the gearing ratio (debt/equity), expected bond return, and requiredinvestor
equity return, respectively. The higher the risks, the higher the costs ofdebt and equity, and
the higher the required return on investment [24]. The WACC can be usedin a levelised cost
analysis or net present value (NPV) analysis when revenues as well as costs are considered.
When using the WACC formula to calculate the discounted costs it is important to deermine
whether thenominalor real rate should be applied. The formula for calculating the real rate of
return is given by [36]:
1 + rn = (1 + rr)(1 + ri) (2.10)
wherern is the nominal rate (2.9),rr is the real rate andri is the rate of inflation.
The amount of debt involved varies between projects and size of firm. Owing to the capital-
intensiveness, long economic life and uncertain revenue streams, IPPs may seek non-recourse
project finance with 60 to 75 percent debt typically witnessed [38]. The debt is guaranteed by
the project assets, rather than from the general assets or credit ratingof he IPP. Further, [39]
reports figures of 50:50 (debt:equity) for nuclear and 40:60 for both coal and CCGT.6 This is
perhaps reflective of the additional capital required for a nuclear investment over other tech-
nologies. There is a similar pattern for required equity return (κ), with nuclear requiring 15%
and CCGT requiring 12%. The additional risks - and hence higher required returns - together
with the financial strength required for these capital intensive investments means investment in
these types of technologies can be difficult to induce in a market where lessrisky options are
available.
The ability to secure debt will depend on the company’s credit rating. Credito s will typically
assess a firm’s creditworthiness using rating firms such as Moody’s and Staard & Poor’s.
6Note that these ratios may differ during the construction and operational stages of the project. For example an
increase in debt once the plant is operational is not unusual; the firm is more likely to secure more debt once the
plant is operational as many of the risks associated with the construction stage have passed.
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Rating symbols Aaa to C are used to reflect the relative credit risk of a firm. For example
“obligations rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality, with minimal credit risk” and
“obligations rated C are the lowest rated class ... with little prospect for recovery of principal
or interest” [40].
Some information about company financial structure can be deduced fromannual reports. Table
2.2 shows the most recent available cost of capital figures for the “big six” generating firms in
the GB market. These statistics are for the whole firm, all of whom are verticallyintegrated in
the GB market and have contrasting generation portfolios with expertise in certain technologies.
Furthermore, many participate in electricity markets elsewhere. Therefore thes figures may
not be a fair reflection of their GB generation business or investment decisions, it is informative
nonetheless.
Firm WACC Gearing Long-term Moody’s
Credit rating
E.ON UK 4.2% 43% A3
Edf - 62% Aa3
RWE 9.0% 65% A2
SSE 5.4% 63% A3
Iberdrola (SP) - 50% A3
Centrica 9.3% 10% A3
Table 2.2: GB large electricity utilities financial statistics. Derived from sources [41–46].
2.6.4 Policy uncertainty
Policy plays a key role in generation investment in power markets. Government backing for, or
opposition to, a particular technology, can make or break a technology’s chances of investment.
There may be policy mechanisms in place to encourage investment in cleaner technologies.
These are not necessarily the best option from the investor perspective, yet if the policies are
effective and the market operates efficiently, investors will choose the inended technologies
and the policy goals will be met. For instance, Renewable Obligation Certificates(ROCs)
are a UK Government policy mechanism used to stimulate investment in renewablegeneration
whereby each MWh generated from a renewable source is eligible for subsidy. Other objectives
concerned the environment and, in the case of Europe, were addresse through the LCPD (sub-
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section 2.5.1) and the Integrated Prevention Control Directive (IPCD) of2000 [23].
In the early days of liberalisation, the main policy drive was to promote competitionin the gen-
eration market and lower prices for consumers. Examples of policies that are currently hoping
to influence investment decisions in GB are the Renewables Obligation (RO) and EU ETS. Both
are geared toward GHG emissions reductions, the former by incentivising investment in renew-
ables and the latter by capping on emissions by handing suppliers a finite number of emissions
credits. They must trade these credits through the ETS market if they require more credits or
wish to offload surpluses. The latest incentive scheme, aimed at small-scalerenewable devel-
opments is the feed-in-tariff (FiT) mechanism. Already implemented in Germany for many
years with success, this scheme provides a payment for small-scale low carbon installations for
energy produced.
2.6.5 Regulatory uncertainty
Regulatory policy has a significant bearing on generation adequacy. For instance it determines
the height and duration of price spikes [3], which as discussed earlier isthe primary mechanism
to induce timely investment in a perfectly competitive market. A general assumptionmade
when implementing price caps is that the market is perfectly competitive. Some argue that price
caps dampen the market signals required to bring on investment and are onlyimplemented in
order to avoid politically unacceptable price spikes [47]. It is argued in [48] that almost any
price-cap level can potentially induce both too little and too much investment. If markets start
to produce frequently high prices, this puts regulators under pressureto intervene and change
market design.
Moreover, delays and uncertainty in changes to market regulation can also cau e investors to
delay building of new capacity. This is precisely what regulators wish to avoid, and may in fact
be why the market reform was being considered in the first place. Therefor delays and uncer-
tainty surrounding reform must be kept to a minimum. That said, there has been no experience
of a complete 25 year capital cycle in the power sector in Europe or elsewher , so reliable regu-
latory mechanisms aimed at ensuring efficient investment are difficult to develop. Some of the
mechanisms that have been designed to reduce uncertainty for investors and mitigate periods
of generation shortfall are discussed in Section 2.7.
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The most commonly cited example of a power market failure - and one which canlargely be
attributed to insufficient regulation - is that of California in 2000/01. California was a unique
case, yet it did demonstrate the need for clear regulation on some level andfor transparency
from the moment the framework is implemented. This was quite a unique event as not just
one, but a series of factors came together to cause numerous blackouts which left millions
without power during both the summer and winter seasons. A decade of regulatory uncertainty
had led to significant under investment in capacity [49]. Additional factorswhich confounded
the State’s problems included firstly, a retail rate freeze (capped at 6.7 cents p r kWh [50])
which left the retail firms close to bankruptcy once unhedged generation costs started to rise,
and significant demand growth in both California and neighbouring regions(the latter reducing
import capabilities) [49]. These factors led to serious congestion problemsand an inability to
get enough power to the load centres. It was later alleged that the energycompany Enron had
manipulated the market in order to make a significant financial gain from the payments received
for congestion alleviation.
2.7 Markets for capacity
A “laissez-faire” approach to generation capacity investment, means no security of supply stan-
dards or planning reserve margin requirements are enforced, althoughregulators or system op-
erators may identify target reserve margins [51]. Advocates of this formof arket design cite
that the ability of generators and retailers to enter into forward contracts for energy acts as
a means of ensuring long-term security of supply. By entering into long-term contracts gen-
erators are incentivised to maintain a generation capacity capable of meeting thir contracted
obligations, thus avoiding having to pay penalties for non-fulfillment. Further, both generators
and suppliers are risk averse and wish to avoid the costs associated with volatile wholesale
prices. Forward contracting is seen as a method to hedge these risks and requires no more reg-
ulation that standard commodity markets [3]. Another benefit of forward contracting is that it
reduces the potential for market power when there is low demand elasticity and a concentrated
(e.g., oligopoly) generation market structure [15]. By comparison in order to make generator
revenues more predictable, lower investment costs and provide adequateand timely investment
in generating capacity, some markets have additional mechanisms in place. Some of the mech-
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anisms have been implemented - with varying success - and some are still purelytheoretical. A
selection of these mechanisms are discussed below.
2.7.1 Capacity payments
This is a price-based mechanism. Rather than producers receiving largesums of money only
during a handful of periods owing to power shortages (i.e., price spikes), they receive a smaller
amount on a regular basis. These payments are typically administratively-det rmined and seek
to achieve reliable and adequate generation capacity. They aim to cover atleast part of the
capital cost of new generation and encourage companies to keep rarelyused units rather than
decommission them [5]. The implementation of this mechanism can be split into two main
categories; either it is delivered as a flat-fee independent of the wholesale price (as initially
implemented in Argentinian and Spanish markets) or it is added to the wholesale price. The
amount added is dependent on the amount of firm (reliable) capacity provided by generators, as
in Chile where probabilistic models were used to calculate each units’ contribution to verall
system reliability [16].
Advocates of these mechanisms argue that the investment risk of having to rely n a small
number of high price hours is removed along with the consumer risk of being expos d to very
high prices for energy. Note that the argument for a wholesale price capis stronger in a market
with capacity payments. Critics argue that it is difficult to fix the capacity price:too high
and consumers can end up over-paying for capacity, too low and the system could fall short.
Furthermore, the definition of reliability must be clear and the metric used to determine the
reliability of both individual units and the aggregated system must be transparent.
Examples of use[51]: Spain, Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Peru, South Korea.
2.7.2 Capacity markets
This is a quantity-based mechanism where a target level of installed capacityis determined by
the regulator, hence the name Installed CAPacity (ICAP) markets. All suppliers which provide
electricity to end-users and wholesale market customers are then requiredto buy a share of this
requirement. Thus by stipulating a target level of installed capacity and makingit a obligation
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of the suppliers to participate in the capacity market, this mechanism balances thesupply of,
and demand for capacity not met by the bilateral market or using self-supply [52]. Another
benefit of such mechanisms is they can be extended to include locational signls whereby the
ICAP price varies in different regions of the network depending on capa ity demand within a
region.
The amount of installed capacity required is typically determined by identifying atarget reserve
margin which is calculated based on an acceptable risk level. The capacity pri e is determined
by the amount of capacity on offer and can sometimes be quite volatile. Further,the target risk
level must be economical. For example, [53] shows how setting the level too high may lead to a
cost for the expected energy served by the plant required to meet the target risk level being very
high (over $6,000/MWh levelised). The problem of the target reserve margin is further exac-
erbated in systems with high penetrations of wind, where the calculation is complicated by the
dependence of output between plants within a geographical area. Therefore obust methods for
determining the optimal level of reserve margin based on standard reliability metrics are more
challenging to define. The length of the period over which capacity obligations are calculated
needs to be decided. Retailers prefer a shorter period as it reduces amount of the obligation they
have to purchase. Having a short time-step also increases the liquidity of thecapacity market.
By comparison producers prefer a longer time-step as they receive morecapital for investment.
Assessing and rewarding generator performance is difficult becauseinstalled capacity must be
higher than peak demand and unreliable generators add to the required reserve and impose
additional cost on the system. This was addressed in the Eastern US ISOs capacity markets
whereby the ICAP market was replaced by the unforced capacity (UCAP) market. In this
market the ISO was able to discount, depending on historical plant availability, the capacity
for which it was given the credit [16]. This incentivised generators to keep a good availability
record to increase the credits it would receive.
As mentioned, the prices in capacity markets can sometimes be quite volatile owing to the
quantity of capacity on offer. The price paid for capacity can jump from zero to the maximum
payment (typically covering peaking unit FCs) if the reserve margin is movingbetween being
above and below the target level. To address this issue, a hybrid price- and quantity-based
mechanism described in [54], which went live in PJM in June 2007 has been developed [55]. It
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uses a sloped ‘demand curve’ for capacity where the payment level vari s in the vicinity of the
target reserve level (e.g., +/- 4% of target UCAP). This makes the pricingmechanism smoother
and less volatile compared to a stepped function which is the maximum capacity price if the
system is below the target reserve level and zero above it. This mechanismis discussed, with
example demand curves provided, in further detail in section 8.2.4 when it is applied to the
dynamic investment market model presented in this thesis.
Examples of use[51]: PJM, New York ISO, ISO-New England, Guatamala, France, Australia’s
South West Interconnection.
2.7.3 Reliability requirements
As discussed above, it is possible to address reliability within both the capacitypayment and
capacity market designs, although specific reliability-based mechanisms areavailable to mar-
ket designers. The most commonly cited design (and one which has been implemented in the
Columbian power system) is that of the so-called ‘reliability option’ described in[56] and [57].
This mechanism is a financial product constructed using“a combination of a financial call
option with a high strike price and an explicit penalty for nondelivery”[56]. Similarly to a
capacity market, the regulator sets a forward target amount of capacity and a strike price for
the call options. The generators then submit any number of bids to the reliabilityauc ion for
the options on this target volume of power. The total of all the successful option bids is equal
to the target capacity. Supporters of this mechanism argue that this coordinated entry reduces
the uncertainty in achieving the target level of capacity and mitigates the boom-and-bust invest-
ment cycles described earlier [58]. The companies must also calculate the premium for their
bids in order to cover potential losses when the options are exercised (i.e.,market spot price ex-
ceeds option strike price). The regulator must also set the penalty fee fornondelivery of power
stipulated in the option contract. A summary of its implementation is given in [18]. From a de-
mand perspective, these instruments are attractive because there is a capon the maximum price
paid for energy (the strike price of the call option). They are also attractive from a generator
perspective because they enable hedging against price volatility. From aegul tor perspective,
these instruments are appealing because they do not interfere with normal market dynamics;
the mechanism only becomes active when the system approaches scarcity.Furthermore, they
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incentivise generators to only bid reliable units as the penalties for nondelivery are high. One
short-coming of this mechanism is that the demand-side must decide how much it iswilling
to pay for reliability [5], i.e., a similar problem to determining the VOLL. This is something
that varies between consumers and it is currently impossible to isolate individual loads within
the system. That said, the regulator can achieve the level of reliability it believes consumers
are willing to pay for by setting the amount of contracts to be auctioned at the level required to
achieve “optimal” reliability.
Examples of use[51]: Columbia.
2.7.4 Alternative mechanisms
The sections above detail the most common capacity mechanisms, all of them implemented in
real markets, yet there are numerous other designs available, outlined below.
In [59], a design for acapacity subscriptionsmarket is given. Here customers purchase capac-
ity (through retailers) and install a load limiting device (LLD) which limits usage to capa ity
purchased. The price in these contracts is modelled via a demand (for capacity) curve similar to
that described in sub-section 2.7.2, by comparison the curve is defined in terms of willingness
to accept demand reductions. Whenever the demand for electricity exceeds the stipulated load
limit, the LLD limits consumption.
A similar approach is described in [11] where two types of product are described, both of
which are active on the demand-side. The first is apay-in-advanceinterruptible contract where
retailers can agree with industrial customers to interrupt a given percentage of their load a fixed
number of times throughout the contract in exchange for a tariff discount.The next ispay-as-
you-gointerruptible contract where the retailer can interrupt part of a customersload a fixed
number of times in exchange for compensation. This method is not tested in terms of generation
adequacy as it applies to the retail-side, if the contracts are activated during scarcity periods,
this type of contracting provides the system with short-term demand elasticity and therefore
partially addresses one of the main flaws of modern electricity markets.
Another option discussed in [56] is a so-calledmothball reservewhich consists of a number
of mothballed old plant (typically peaking units) which can be returned to service if necessary.
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In principle this method works well and can provide sufficient capacity in a rel tively short-
time frame compared with a new build (typically, plant can be returned to servicein 6 months,
compared to around 2 years for a new OCGT build). The down-side is thatthe longer plant
remains idle, the more likely that they will be used for spares and will take longer to r turn to
service [2]. Note that GB effectively provides this capability without an explicit mechanism in
place.
Finally, by having short-termdemand response(Fig 2.17) when there are periods of supply
shortages, the SO can ration demand to available supply at a lower cost. That is, demand
responding to real-time wholesale energy prices and showing significant elasticity. Furthermore
the market will be more efficient and the risk of blackouts as a result of inadequate available
generation and subsequent system instabilities can be reduced. For instance, the system will no
longer be at the mercy of “hockey-stick” bidders when there is a generation resource shortage.
Figure 2.17: Influence of demand response on market clearing. Based on [60].
It seems increasingly likely that many countries will turn to demand-side participa on as part
of so-called “smart grids” in the coming years to increase market efficiency, reduce aggregate
energy requirements and compliment increasing penetrations of wind generatio . It should
be noted that the simulation model presented here does not consider the effect of demand-
side participation on generation investment dynamics. Possible extensions to the modelling
methodology in order to represent this additional characteristic are discussed in Section 9.1.5.
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2.8 Measuring generation adequacy risk
Moving on from the basis of generation adequacy and methods to enhanceit, this section
presents the mathematics used to measure generation adequacy risk for a particular genera-
tion background. This is particularly important for this project where the ability of a liberalised
market framework to induce timely and sufficient generating capacity investment is of interest.
A number of risk metrics typically used in power systems are formally defined and methods to
calculate them explained.
2.8.1 Risk metrics
When developing models to determine loss of supply indices, it is important to consider the
exact definitions of those indices. Listed below are some of the most common risk metrics used
in the power sector.
1. Loss-of-load probability(LOLP) in periodt is defined as the probability that the amount
of available generation is unable to support a particular value of load:
LOLPt = p(Xt < Dt) (2.11)
whereXt is the available generation andDt is the system demand, both of which are
random variables.
2. Loss-of-load expectation(LOLE) is the expected number of periods over a given time










whereLOLPt is the LOLP in periodt. A typical example is a time horizon of one year
with periods of one hour. Note that different LOLEs can only be directly compared if
bothT and t are equal. For instance, if the time period is 1 hour then an outage of 2
hours at peak load would be recorded as 2 hours, in contrast if the time period is 1 day
the same outage would effectively be recorded as being 24 hours long [61].
3. Expected energy unserved(EEU) is the expected volume of energy not met over a given
time horizon. This risk index“considers the severity of power shortages as well as
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their existence”[61]. Assuming no demand reductions can be applied, the EEU is given
by EEUt = (Dt − Xt) · LOLPt. Alternative equivalent metrics are Loss Of Energy
Expectation and Expected Energy Not Supplied [61].
Other risk metrics, which are not formally defined here includeexpected duration of load cur-
tailment, average load curtailed, average energy not suppliedandaverage duration of curtail-
ment. The majority of these measures relate to the risk of load curtailment (or load shed ing).
“Curtailment” is carried out in order to prevent system instability and, in severe cases, rolling
blackouts. Usually the SO can take actions to reduce voltage and frequency, whi h may be
enough to avoid a ‘failure’ event and the high economic and political costs as ociated with it.
Consequently, the risk metric may be calculated based on the reduced load. This was the case
in [62] where failure was defined as the requirement to disconnect load,assuming that load
would first have been reduced by 7.5% via voltage and frequency adjustments [63].
Full mathematical details about how to calculate these measures can be found in[64]. I addi-
tion, [63] provides a comprehensive review of the use of these risk metrics in the GB system.
This paper also looks at the influence risk modelling has had on the GB transmission system,
both on operational and planning timescales.
2.8.2 Proxies for risk
Capacity margin can be viewed as a proxy for the level of security of supply risk. It is typically
defined as the difference between total installed capacity (TIC) and most probable peak demand





The time scale considered is important. For instance,planning reservesrefer to the maintaining
of system adequacy in order to meet demand in the long-term, whereasop rating reservesare
required to handle short-term issues, such as response to a disturbance [3]. The planning time
scale is of interest here in identifying if enough capacity has been built in thefirst place. Fig.
2.18 demonstrates how planning and operational margins converge to real-im to produce “out-
turn” (or realised) margins.
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Figure 2.18: Demonstration of how adequate investment in generation over time converges to
operational time scales.
With the introduction of high penetrations of variable generation with resource interdependence
(i.e., output is correlated across different sites owing to the nature of the energy source), such
as wind power, physical capacity margins will increase, however levels of generation adequacy
risk will not necessarily move in the same direction. Therefore using the capacity margin as a
proxy for system risk is no longer a credible approach.
A more recent concept used to analyse system security is de-rated capacity m rgin (e.g., [65]
and [66]). The de-rated margin (DRM) is the ratio of de-rated capacity (DRC) to MPPD,





The DRC is computed by scaling installed capacity by expected availability at peak demand.
The use of de-rated margin is preferable when calculation of an absolute level of risk is difficult,
and it provides a robust alternative to the full capacity margin. Moreoverit can easily be
compared with the SO’s estimate of what constitutes an acceptable margin (e.g., [66] and [67]).
An example calculation of historic de-rated capacity margins in GB is given in Section 3.6.
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2.8.3 Demand
From a risk modelling perspective, the available generation and demand at each time period are
random variables. Demand patterns can usually be predicted well at the short operational time-
scale (i.e., hour-by-hour), though looking ahead brings more uncertainty and hence prediction
is challenging. Factors such as weather, demand management, seasonal trends all contribute
to the predictions. The main uncertainty on the operational timescale is weather vriation. On
a planning timescale, additional uncertainties about underlying long-term deman trends must
also be considered [61]. For example, in GB some analysts forecast thatincreased demand
owing to economic growth will be offset by increased energy efficiency [68].
2.8.4 Conventional generation
When considering conventional generation, the LOLP (2.11) can be calculated via the Capacity
Outage Probability Table (COPT) method developed by Billinton and Allan [64] ([ 9] contains
a neat explanation on implementation). Available capacity at each period (e.g.,one hour) of
a particular unit is a random variable, characterised by the unit’s ForcedOutage Rate (FOR).
The FOR is the proportion of hours a unit is unavailable due to a forced outage, and to a
good approximation FORs between different conventional generators are independent [61]. A
common approach is to assume that units will be available with full capacity or on outage with
zero available capacity. More precisely, if the capacity of unitis cu and its FOR isρu then
the expected available capacity is given byE(Gu) = cu(1 − ρu). That is, the distribution of
the unit’s available capacity follows a Bernoulli distribution between zero andcu. So the unit is
either available at full capacity with probability1 − ρu or on full outage with with probability
ρu. Methods to account for de-rated states are covered in [64], however the two-state approach
is most common (e.g., [61, 70]).
Broadly speaking , the COPT involves a iterative calculation, adding each unit u to the model
one at a time based oncu andρu. For instance, the iterative expression used to calculate the
probability of a forced outage ofX (e.g., MW) after unitcu with FORρu is added to the system
is given by [64]:
p(X) = p
′
(X)(1 − ρu) + p
′
(X − cu)ρu, (2.15)
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where the primed values represent the probability of the forced outage ofX be orecu is added.
If mu units of typen share the same capacity and FOR characteristics (e.g., this may be the
case for units of the same fuel type) and are subject to independent forced utages then they
can be treated as a single pseudo-unit with a distribution with the following moments:
E(Gn) = µn = mucu(1 − ρu), (2.16)




uρu(1 − ρu), (2.17)
where each (pseudo-) generator,Gn, has capacitycn = mucu. This is a useful property for a
system with a large number of units and can lead to a reduction in computational intensity when
calculating the COPT. A demonstration of how systematic deviations in the FORs for a gr up
of ‘similar’ units can lead to significant differences in the overall availability distribution of
conventional generation (and the risk metric) is given in [71]. This paperlso includes a novel
technique to modelρu as a random variable when calculating the distribution and determines
the error bars on the system LOLP.
The FOR encapsulates forced (or unplanned) unit outages. Units also undergo planned mainte-
nance outages throughout the year, which must also be considered when calculating year-round
system risk. The nature of a planned outage is that the SO is given adequate warning of when
they will occur and therefore has time (at the operational level) to plan the syst m accordingly.
There may also be an option to shift outage schedules when margins are tight[61]. Fortunately
during periods of highest demand (when wholesale prices are typically highest), most genera-
tors will try to make available as much capacity as possible. It is argued in [61], that under the
assumption that these peak demand hours dominate the risk calculation (i.e., the LOLP (2.11)
is highest in these hours so contributes significantly to the year-round LOLE (2.12)), it might
be reasonable to ignore planned outages, and assume that the distribution for he availability of
units is the same in all hours of the year.
2.8.5 Wind generation
One of the main concerns when considering wind generation is its variable nature nd the
impact on system reliability. Even if countries install many wind turbines, the amount of wind
generation will seldom reach total installed capacity. For instance, wake effects, where output
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is reduced for turbines situated behind the first row, are a feature of large f ms. In addition,
wind farms are constructed so the turbines harvest the wind from a certaindirection and they
lose efficiency in varying wind direction. Also due to spacial variation in the resource, when
one farm is active another may be inactive. By installing more wind capacity, the chances of
harvesting more wind is increased.
The capacity credit(CC), or capacity value(used interchangeably), is common when mea-
suring the contribution of renewable energy generation to meeting demand. CC is not a new
concept in power systems and in fact has been used for many years in relation to conventional
sources of generation. A number of different definitions of capacity credit exist in the litera-
ture, most of which are dependent on the method of calculation. Essentially they all concern
the ability of plant to support load and are independent of the risk metric used. A discussion of
the various definitions can be found in [61] and [72]. In [61] the definitioused is theeffective
load carrying capability(ELCC), which can be summarised as [61]:
1. Calculate the risk index before the additional generation is introduced.
2. Introduce the extra generation and re-calculate the risk index.
3. The ELCC of the extra generation is the additional demand which returns the risk index
to its original value.
That is, the ELCC for a particular level of additional generating capacity estimates the amount
of additional demand that can be served due to the extra generation whilst maintaining the
original level of system risk [72].
Another available method is theeffective firm capacity(EFC), which is calculated as follows:
1. Calculate the risk index before the additional generation is introduced.
2. Calculate the risk with the additional generation introduced.
3. The EFC is the amount of firm capacity whose addition gives the same reduction in risk
as addition of the new generation.
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There is virtually no difference between EFC and ELCC for small penetrations of variable
output generation. In contrast for larger penetrations the differenceis noticeable. For instance,
consider two wind distributions for a large installed wind capacity; they are similar for low wind
availabilities, but the first has a much higher probability of very high wind avail bility. This
first distribution will give higher ELCC, but the EFCs will be very similar as there is basically
no risk when wind availability is high, so the precise detail of that part of the distribution does
not influence the result of EFC [73].
The CC is typically expressed as a percentage; CC = [ELCC or EFC]/[totalextra generation].
The CC of wind is an important metric in this type of work because it provides a measur of
wind’s contribution to overall system reliability, and it can be used to de-ratewind capacity
when measuring the de-rated capacity margin.
2.9 Chapter summary
This chapter has covered some of the fundamentals of power systems economi s. In Section
2.2 an overview of ‘energy-only’ markets and ancillary services was provided. Next in Sec-
tion 2.3 some key economic concepts were introduced. The key findings of this review were
the calculation of generator short-run marginal cost and how, under a pfectly competitive
market, the last generator dispatched in the economic dispatch provides the sys em marginal
price. Also the concepts of scarcity rent and wealth transfer via price mark-ups in imperfect
markets formed a vital part of the review. In Section 2.4 attention turned to long-run issues, in
particular generation investment and how as supply tightens or demand expands, rice spikes
increase scarcity rents, which is viewed as an investment signal to generators. In section 2.4.3,
the minimum cost of supply was derived using load duration, technology screening and price
duration curves. This demonstrated that both energy and capacity pricesa e required in order
to determine the minimum cost of supply. In Section 2.5 the cost of generation was explored,
and particular attention paid to technologies used in later investment modelling. Following this,
Section 2.7 gave an overview of capacity mechanisms available to market designers aimed at
mitigating the generation adequacy problem. Finally, Section 2.8 surveyed methods of measur-
ing generation adequacy risk in power systems via metrics such as LOLP andLOLE. Also a
discussion on the use of de-rated margins as a proxy for risk, particularly in system with high
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As this thesis is concerned with the GB energy market, it is important give a brief overview of
the ESI to date. This brief history of the ESI illustrates how security of supplyconcerns have
been addressed to date. This is followed by an account of liberalisation includi g an overview
of market structures. Finally, some of the key modelling works applied to the GBmarket in
recent years are reviewed.
3.1 Pre-liberalisation
The ESI in Britain was initiated through The Electricity Lighting Act 1882 and a 132kV Na-
tional Grid began interconnected regional grid operation in 1933. This review begins with the
creation of the centrally managed system some years after the Electricity Act 1947.
Shortly after the end of the second World War, the Electricity Act 1947 was pas ed and the
numerous (well over 600) small-scale local electricity suppliers were merged into sixteen larger
firms. During this time, consumers were forced to buy their electricity from the monop ly
utility operating in their area. In 1957 the Central Electricity Generating Board(CEGB) was
created and made responsible for electricity generation in England and Wales (E&W) with
two similar entities in Scotland; the South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) (circa 1955)
and the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board (NSHEB) (circa 1943).These companies
owned the generation and transmission assets in their respective areas and were responsible
for the security and quality of supply. The distribution network in E&W was madeup of
12 area electricity boards (AEB) who were responsible for the distributionof electricity to
end consumers (i.e., also monopolies but within a smaller region). In the case of the Scottish
network, these were fully vertically integrated monopolies with both the regional transmission
and distribution grids managed by SSEB and NSHEB. These structures aresummarised in Fig.
3.1. As the name suggests, the CEGB was a central organisation with generation xpansion
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planning driven by cost minimisation. It was a classic example of a cost-of-service regulated
public utility and its generation fleet was dominated by coal and (eventually) nuclear plant [74].
Figure 3.1: Industry structure under (a) the SSEB and NSHEB and (b) mildly less monopolised
CEGB. Inspired by [5].
3.1.1 The security of supply standard
To tackle the challenge of generation adequacy, standards were developed and any additional
generating capacity required was constructed at the optimal time. With it taking around 2 years
to build a gas turbine (GT), a planning horizon of 7 years was regarded as a equate to address
any upcoming generation shortfall in good time. It was decided that a targetrisk level of 3%
winter peak LOLP, which translated into a 28% planning margin was adequate [75]. These
target levels were later changed on cost-benefit grounds to 9% and 24%respectively [62]. The
cost-benefit approach calculated the LOLP under the following assumptions:
• Frequency and voltage reductions can reduce demand by up to 7.5%.
• Cost of providing incremental capacity for the planning margin of about£15/kW p.a. at
March 1982 prices [75].
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• A VOLL of £2/kWh.
The recommendation to relax the standards to 9% was made on the basis that the incremental
capacity costs would rise to£30/kW per annum owing to the increased costs surrounding new
high cost coal-fired plant, which was the technology of choice at the time (there was some PS
and hydro capacity in Wales with nuclear plant being deveploped latterly). The other justifi-
cations included the VOLL figure dropping to£1/kWh together with additional assumptions
surrounding disconnection minimisation.
3.2 Liberalisation
In 1990, under the third parliament of a Conservative government the CEGB was restructured
and privatised. Deregulated markets had already been implemented in supplyof gas, airlines
and transportation and it was considered time to do the same with the electricity industry [5].
The CEGB was divided between four companies; the high voltage transmission network be-
came the responsibility of the National Grid Company (NGC), a not fully independent com-
pany. The generation fleet was divided between National Power (50%), PowerGen (30%) and
Nuclear Electric (NE), with the PS capacity at Dinorwig and Ffestiniog going toNGC [76]. NE
consisted exclusively of the UK’s nuclear power capacity and was keptunder state ownership
as it was felt the nuclear reactors were too expensive to be privatised [76]. NGC was not fully
privatised until 1996 (floated on London Stock Exchange on 11 December 1995) because there
were no other privatised transmission companies to use as a comparison to obtain a fair share
price value. Up until its privatisation, NGC was owned by the 12 AEBs. It was around the time
of NGC privatisation that it’s PS generating capacity was sold to the American firm Edison
Mission Energy (acquired by International Power in 2004) as it was deemed anti-competitive
to own both generation and transmission assets.
3.2.1 The England and Wales Power Pool
Much has been written about the history of liberalisation in GB and none more so than the
period immediately after industry privatisation during the days of the Pool system. This section
contains a brief overview of that period, but is by no means comprehensive. A particularly
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informative account of the history of the pool can be found in [77] or for an analysis of its
competitiveness see [78].
The E&W Pool went live on 1 April 1990. It was based on a classic pool system, whereby the
48 half-hourly prices for each day were determined by generators submitting a supply curve for
each period at the day-ahead stage. The SO then computed the least-costeconomic dispatch
required to meet demand in each period and all committed generators were paidthe SMP.
As real-time approached, the differences between actual and forecast demand, and generation,
together with transmission constraints would usually lead to the day-ahead dispatch being ad-
justed. The additional costs incurred by the SO (i.e., ancillary services) were covered via a price
uplift element. The breakdown of thisuplift, together with the availability payment, which was
paid to generators dispatched at the day-ahead stage but were not dispatched at real-time, can
be found in [79]. In addition to trading on the spot market, financial swapsand Contracts for
Differences (CfDs) were facilitated. CfDs allowed participants to exchange volatile pool prices
for a fixed price stipulated in the contract [7].
3.2.1.1 Market for capacity
In addition to the spot market for energy, the Pool included a market for capacity. This com-
prised a capacity payment which was added to the SMP at each half-hour period to give the Pool
purchase price (PPP). This additional payment was centrally administeredand was a function
of the system LOLP and VOLL:
PPP = SMP + (LOLP · (V OLL− SMP )). (3.1)
where VOLL was set at£2000/MWh in 1990.1 This was increased in the GB regulation model
of 1999 to£2770/MWh.2 A plot of the system LOLP and PPP for the financial year 2000/01
is presented in Fig 3.2. The plot clearly shows how the PPP rises sharply in periods where the
LOLP is highest, which interestingly do not always coincide with periods of highest demand.3
Note that the uplift element was then added to the PPP to give the Pool selling price (PSP).
1Likely as a result of existing CEGB standards.
2This VOLL was derived from a Finnish study from the 1970s; it was converted into pounds sterling and cor-
rected for inflation [80].
3For a commentary on some of the more interesting price movements underthe pool (inc. underlying reasons),




Figure 3.2: (a) Plot of system LOLP and (b) PPP with E&W demand. Source: [82].
The capacity payment was designed to ensure that generators received the r venues needed to
invest in new capacity. It was engineered to increase exponentially as deman approached total
available system capacity [79]. As pointed out in [77], producers with a large market share can
exploit a capacity payment that is a function of system LOLP by declaring plant as unavailable
- an action which lowers the available reserve, thus increasing the LOLP and capacity payment
element of the wholesale price.
3.2.1.2 Issues with the Pool
Owing to their substantial market share, and ability to exercise market power, National Power
and PowerGen set the spot price over 90% of the time although they suppliedless than 60% of
total electricity generated [77]. Observations of this type led to an investigation by the regulator,
OFFER; it was concluded that after only a few years of operation, Poolprices had risen from
a lower than expected level in the first year to a level that was unacceptabl . Consequently, the
large incumbents began to divest their generation assests, the most notible of these was the sale
of 6 GW of capacity to Eastern Electricity during 1994/5 [76]. In addition a temporary price
cap was in place between 1994-96 while the sales were finalised [74].
Toward the end of the 1990s, electricity generation had been restructured from a market dom-
inated by three firms to one where the generation market share by a single participant was no
higher than 20%. In addition to heavier regulation, the shift can be attributedto the fall in
demand for coal and a ‘dash for gas’. This prompted a huge influx of CCGT entry into the
generation market from a number of new IPPs. This gave rise to another problem surrounding
interactions with the UK gas market. Electricity prices were set at the day-ahead stage while
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the gas market operated much closer to real time. Thus, gas generators could influence elec-
tricity prices set at the day-ahead stage, then if prices were unfavourable, they could sell their
gas closer to real time on the gas market, adding further complexities to the issueof short-term
supply-demand matching [83]. Such was the discontent with the pool systemthat a review of
electricity trading arrangements was ordered. In 1998, the review [84] recommended that the
pool system be replaced by the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA), which went
live in March 2001.
3.2.2 NETA and BETTA
The British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) were established in
April 2005 when the electricity market in E&W merged with its counterpart in Scotland into a
single GB wholesale market.4 Prior to then, the market in E&W operated under NETA.
3.2.2.1 Structure
There are currently over 40 generation firms in GB, yet 70% of generation is wned by the
so-called ‘big six’ generators: Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE), RWE Npower, EdF, E.ON,
Centrica and Iberdrola/Scottish Power (SP). Many of these entities are vertically integrated,
participating in both the generation and retail side of the market. The two Scottishfirms also
own transmission assets in Scotland with most of them also owning one or more ofth 12 li-
censed distribution operators. To ensure that trading between parties who have interests in more
than one element of the market provides a cost effective service for consumers and facilitates
competition, market regulation is required. Under BETTA this role is carried out by OFGEM.
3.2.2.2 Trading arrangements
BETTA facilitates bilateral trades between generators, suppliers, traders nd customers on a
rolling half-hourly basis [27], depicted in Fig. 3.3. These bilateral tradescan divided into two
categories [85]:
4Northern Ireland has been participating in the Single Electricity Market in Ireland since 2007.
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• Forwards and futures contract market (or structured contracts): allows electricity trading
between generators and suppliers over longer periods (a year or more) without formal
price disclosure. In GB over 90% of electricity is traded in this way.5
• Power Exchanges: allow parties to trade a range of electricity products includi g half-
hourly, peak and base-load and day-ahead contracts [87]. Examplesin GB include the
APX Group and the Intercontinental Exchange. About 3% of electricity is traded in this
way. These exchanges also publish price information which can be used as r ference for
over-the-counter platforms and structured contracts.
Figure 3.3: Overview of financial and physical flows under NETA/BETTA with numbers to in-
dicate order of events. Based on diagram in [7].
On top of these bilateral mechanisms there is also a balancing process, known as the Balancing
Mechanism (BM), which is operated from gate closure (set at 1 hour) by the SO in order to
ensure supply matches demand. Through this mechanism, participants can submit bids to de-
crease generation (or increase demand) andoffersto increase generation (or reduce demand).
The mechanism operates on a ‘pay as bid’ basis. Some 2-3% of electricity is traded in this way
5Interestingly, the regulator, OFGEM, is in the process of undertaking a review on GB wholesale market liquidity
and has launched a consultation as part of the process [8]. Broadly theresponses state that forward market liquidity
should be deeper, and that it is difficult to hedge a long-term position. There is also concern that market trading for
small players could be better facilitated [86].
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[85]. Generators who are requested to deviate from their contracted obligations as a result of
system imbalances (e.g., network congestion), will still receive their contracted payments and
save on fuel not burnt.
Any participants who stray from their ‘Final Physical Notifications’ (FPNs) must pay one of two
prices. Those whose generate more (resp., consume less) will pay the System Sell Price (SSP).
If, for whatever reason, a generator falls short of its contracted volume, or a retailer requires
additional energy, then they must pay the System Buy Price (SBP). Both these prices are higher
than the prices stipulated in the bilateral agreements due to the restricted time available to deal
with this imbalance problem. There is no price cap under BETTA, although the BM can only
enter four digits, making the maximum allowed price£9999 [2]. The revenue received from
SBPs and SSPs is used to cover the additional costs imposed on the SO as a result of having to
balance the system.
3.2.2.3 Ancillary markets
Additional revenue may be obtained from provision of ancillary services,although agreeing to
provide these services, means that participation in the energy market is restricted or forbidden.
These products are procured by the SO. Of particular interest is the short-term operating re-
serve (STOR) market, which is a targeted ‘pay-as-bid’ tender for capacity. Generators submit
bids for unit availability and utilisation to the tender and participation in the energymarket is
restricted. It is targeted because the technical characteristics of plant must also be submitted.
The tender includes two types of contract; one for flexible and one for committed capacity.
Flexible contracts are from 1 or 2 seasons up to 2 years ahead. And committed contracts are
from 1 or 2 seasons up to 15 years ahead.Flexible units declare themselves available within
certain time windows (Fig. 3.4); these windows are not fixed and can be alterd up until a week
ahead. These units do not participate in the BM.Committedunits must be available within a
window and can be BM or non-BM units. Payments for availability are withheld if the unit is
unavailable during an agreed window, thus encouraging a good reliability record.
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Figure 3.4: Availability windows and payments under STOR. Imported from [88].
3.2.2.4 Summary
Since their introduction, it is generally accepted that NETA/BETTA has successfully enabled
competition to fully emerge in the generation market for the first time [7]. The purpose of
these new trading arrangements was to prohibit generators with substantialmarket power from
abusing their position and adversely affecting consumers or distorting competition between
companies. The debate about whether this was a consequence of the newtrading arrangements,
restructuring, or a combination of both, continues.
3.3 Capacity margin oscillations in GB
The historic capacity margin for GB at realised peak demand is plotted in Fig 3.5 (solid line).
Also plotted is the theoretical capacity margin at the year-ahead stage using the NG forecast
(dashed line); this data was only available back to winter 2001/02 hence the short r period.
This is included to provide a better illustration of the perceived generation adequacy risk at
the planning stage. To illustrate the influence of analysing alternative (but deemed equally
reliable) data sources, this is compare with the margin used in [20] (dotted line), which looked
for evidence of capacity cycles. This data was taken from a UK Parliamentnote on security of
supply [89] and plainly gives different values of capacity margin. Theydiffer due to alternative
sources of installed capacity and peak demand data used when constructing the margin. That
said, both lines exhibit an oscillating pattern overall (as confirmed by analysis in [20]), with an




Figure 3.5: Generation capacity margin in the GB since industry privatisation. The solid line
uses data from the Economic and Social Data service (ESDS) [90] and thedo ted
line uses data from [89]. The shortened dashed line is ESDS data combinedw th
NG forecast peak demand [73]. Dates of significant market framework changes
also shown (indicated with arrows to x-axis).
3.4 Generation adequacy in GB
The risk metrics described in sub-section 2.8.1 have been employed in GB system operation and
planning in the past. Firstly, a LOLP (2.11) calculation was carried out for the CEGB standards.
Secondly, the method for capacity pricing presented in [70] was subsequently used to inform
the capacity payment system under the E&W Pool. Finally, the GB SO issues a annu l outlook
statement containing the perceived levels of system risk for the coming wintera d summer.
The published availability of the conventional GB generation fleet for the winter 2010/11 [66]
is summarised in Table 3.1.
It has been widely accepted in recent years that a benchmark capacity margin at or above 20%
for a predomiately thermal system provides an acceptable level of risk. Given that peak demand
is typically around 60 GW in GB (Fig 3.6), Table 3.1 suggests this current system remains
broadly inline with this benchmark (100% ·(74.4−60)/74.4 = 19%). However for the reasons
discussed earlier, a 20% capacity margin is no longer adequate once high volumes of variable
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Power station type No. units Full metered Assumed De-rated
capacity (GW) availability capacity
Nuclear 22 10.1 0.75 7.6
IFA 1 2 1 2
Hydro 9 1.1 0.6 0.7
Wind - 2.5 0.1 0.3
Coal 62 27.9 0.9 25.1
Oil 4 2.7 0.8 2.2
Pumped storage 16 2.7 1 2.7
OCGT 34 1.2 0.9 1.1
CCGT 124 27.5 0.9 24.8
272 74.4 66.3
Table 3.1: Summary of transmission connected conventional unit types for 2010/11[66] .
output non-dispatchable generation is introduced.
3.5 An historic generation adequacy risk calculation
When making a forecast about future generation investment trends and resulting levels of gen-
eration adequacy, it is helpful to consider historic levels of system adequcy risk. Further, any
debate about whether or not a capacity mechanism is required must be informed by a robust
generation adequacy risk measure. This permits assessment of the risk in any given investment
scenario, and also guides the design of energy and capacity markets by setting a baseline for
what the market should deliver (e.g., an adequate capacity mix should be consistent with ap-
propriate returns on investment) [91]. Further, by carrying out a historic generation adequacy
risk calculation, one can gain an insight into how relative levels of risk haveevolved in recent
years and what levels of relative change have been experienced.
These results will also inform the debate about how the emerging trend of reduced capacity
margins in GB since market liberalisation have impacted security of supply. Forinstance,
weather-adjusted historic capacity margin data presented in [12] for E&W, Finland, Norway,
Sweden and the US (national average) shows a general trend of a reduction in GB capacity
margins since market liberalisation at the start of the 1990s. This pattern is evident in Fig.
3.5 for the period immediately following industry privatisation. This has increased the overall
efficiency of the system (holding too much capacity is expensive [12]), but by looking at relative
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levels of system risk we can go some way to determining the impact on security ofsupply.
3.5.1 Historic demand time series
Historic half-hourly demand data from April 2001 (i.e., NETA introduction) isavailable from
the GB SO, National Grid (NG) from [19]. Such is the climate in GB that the highest d -
mands are driven by low temperatures and occur during winter (November-March). It is during
these high demand hours that the adequacy risk is typically highest. With this in mind, the his-
toric risk calculation has been carried out for the demand hours spanning10 winters 2001/2 -
2010/11. The GB ‘IO14DEM’ data is the most applicable for generation adequacy calculations
because this is based on operational generation metering and includes station load and pumped
storage (PS) pumping [61]. However the GB ‘IO14DEM’ data is inconsistent; before April
2005 it is for England and Wales only. ‘INDO’ demand, which excludes station load and PS
pumping, is available for the entire period and the winter ‘IO14DEM’ can be approximated by
‘INDO’ plus 600 MW. This is the approach taken here when ‘IO14DEM’ data is not available.
To account for underlying changes in both demand patterns and the absolute levels of peak
demand, each winter period’s demand is normalised by its realised ‘AverageCold Spell’ (ACS)





whered is the realised demand andd∗ is the result of the rescaling. These values are displayed
in Table 3.2. ACS peak demand is forecast each year in advance of the for coming winter by
the SO, and is described as having“a 50% chance of being exceeded as a result of weather
variation alone” [92]. The realised ACS peak is calculated post winter and is a measure of
what peak demand would be given a winter’s underlying demand patterns and “typical” winter
peak weather conditions [93]. This makes it suitable value for the normalisation. These values
are plotted in Fig 3.6. Demand data is been transformed to an hourly resolution by taking the
hourly demand to be the maximum of the two half-hour periods.
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Figure 3.6: Plot of ACS peak demand in GB for winters 2001/02 - 2010/11.
01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11
ACS peak (GW) 59.1 60.1 60.2 61.0 60.8 60.2 60.4 58.1 57.4 57.7
Norm. peak 58.6 60.6 59.3 58.2 59.2 57.9 60.2 61.1 61.7 62.1
De-rated capacity 66.2 63.44 64.4 66.3 68.1 65.6 65.3 64.9 66.1 66.3
De-rated margin (%) 11.9 5.6 7.0 8.6 12 9.0 8.1 11.7 15.2 14.9
Norm. de-rated (%) 12.8 4.7 8.7 13.8 15.1 13.4 8.5 6.3 7.1 6.8
Table 3.2: Data for de-rated capacity used in Fig. 3.9. Data on de-rated capacity is contained
in NG Winter Outlook reports 2005/06 - 10/11, e.g., [66]. De-rated capacityfor
winters 2001/02 - 04/05 estimated by de-rating total installed capacity (using ESDS
data [90]) by 0.9.
3.5.2 Probability distribution for available conventional generation
The next step is to construct a probability distribution for available conventional generation.
Here, the term conventional generation covers all forms of generation currently connected to
the high voltage transmission system in GB, bar wind. Technical plant availability data is
not available in GB. The approach here is to use generation unit data fromthe NG Seven Year
Statement [27] for unit capacities and expected winter peak availability assumed in NG’s Winter
Outlook [66] as FORs. This data is summarised in Table 3.1 and is assumed reliable (given
that NG use it to assess the generation adequacy risk for the forthcoming winter). The Unit
Effective Capacity (UEC) in [27] has been used for all units, except those which are behind a
transmission constraint (e.g., Peterhead), in this case the individual UEC are scaled so that total
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export capability is equal to the transmission limit. This resulted in the amount of available
CCGT capacity in Table 3.1 reducing from 27.5 GW to 26.7 GW. Hydro units belonging to
the same hydro scheme are combined into single pseudo-units owing to their depndence in
terms of resource availability. These pseudo-units are displayed in Table 3.3. Using the COPT
technique (2.15) with a 1 MW bin size, the probability distribution for available capa ity is
determined. This was implemented in the AIMMS programming language; the main procedure
is provided in Appendix A.1. The aggregate probability density function (pdf) and cumulative
distribution function (cdf) for available generation are displayed in Fig. 3.7The mean of the
distribution is 65.25 GW and standard deviation 1.80 GW.
Hydro scheme Capacity (MW)
Affric Beauly 235
Breadalbane 90
Conon / Shin 136.3
Great Glen 110
Kinlochleven 30




Table 3.3: Combined hydro scheme pseudo-units. Based on [94].
(a) (b)
Figure 3.7: (a) Plot of pdf and (b) cdf for available conventional generation calculated using
COPT technique.
Given that the GB SO’s current view is that a de-rated margin of 5 GW capacity is required
going into winter [66], this distribution seems reasonable, which is encouraging given the un-
certainty associated with generator FORs. Furthermore, if one wanted to carry out a risk cal-
culation for a “more risky” system (e.g., in the absence of closed LCPD plant), then it would
be reasonable to shift the mean of the distribution and rescale the standard deviation (scales
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with the square root of the number of units) rather than rerun the calculationwith some volume
of plant removed.6 This will also resolve all issues of exactly how to deal with transmission-
constrained plant and emission constraints [73]. One such shift where 4GW of capacity (8
units) was removed is shown in Fig. 3.8.
Figure 3.8: Plot showing distribution for available conventional generation when 4 GW of
capacity is removed.
Using the first distribution shown in Fig. 3.7, the hourly winter LOLPs (2.11) can be computed.
That is, LOLP= F (d) = p(D < d) whered is the demand for that hour andF (d) is the
cdf for available generation (Fig. 3.7(b)). Hourly LOLPs can then be summed to produce the
10-winter hindcast LOLE (2.12). For simplicity, the probability distribution forc nventional
generation used to calculate the LOLE for each winter period remains unchanged throughout
the 10-year analysis. The mean of 65.25 GW is broadly in line with the mean de-rated capacity
for the whole period (65.65 GW) (Table 3.2), and given that the underlying mix and amount of
capacity has not altered significantly over the period analysed, this approach is reasonable.
3.5.3 Treatment of wind
Given that the installed wind capacity in GB is currently quite low relative to the overall total
installed capacity (3%, Table 3.1), the approach taken here is to de-rate wind and treat it as a
pseudo-thermal unit in the COPT calculation. This is a reasonable approach given that 300 MW
6An algorithm for removing a unit from the original COPT without re-running the entire COPT calculation is
presented in Chapter 2 of [64], yet this shift is an efficient option when considering the removal of multiple units.
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of additional de-rated capacity is unlikely to affect the risk calculation significantly. Techniques
to properly account for high penetrations of wind in the risk calculation arecov red in Chapter
6.
3.6 Historic generation adequacy risk calculation results
Results of the 10 winter LOLE calculation are shown in Fig. 3.9. The averageLOLE over
the 10 winter period was 0.06 hrs/yr (or 6 hours in 100 years) with a standard deviation of 0.01
hrs/yr. The graph shows how the relative risk remains largely unchanged over the first 8 winters
but rises sharply in the last two winters. The red LOLE bars indicate winterswhere realised
peak demand exceeded the ACS peak forecast (which is in fact in nearly50% of the years
analysed). On closer inspection of the data, which is presented in Fig. 3.10, nearly 80% of
the 10-year LOLE is contained in just 40 demand hours, with 15% contained injust 2 demand
hours.
Figure 3.9: Plot of LOLE results for 10 winters (bars). Also shown is forecast theoretical de-
rated margin (black line), normalised hindcast de-rated margin (blue line), and
winters where ACS peak was exceeded (red bars).
Also shown in Fig. 3.9 is the historical theoretical de-rated capacity margin (black line). This
is the de-rated margin that would have been forecast at the year-aheadstage given the de-rated
capacity and forecast ACS peak published by NG. For instance, in 2010/11, it is the sum of the
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Figure 3.10: Plot showing number of hours demand contained in LOLE (dashed line with
hours marked) and proportion of LOLE in each 1% bin (solid line). The bins
(x-axis) are the normalised load as a percentage of the 60 GW peak deman .
fifth column in Table 3.1. Plainly the de-rated margin in the winters 2009/10 and 2010/11 is
higher relative to historic levels whereas the hindcast relative risk calculation was in fact highest
in these winters. This can be explained by the fact that realised demand washigh relative
to underlying demand levels and “typical” winter weather conditions. Or put ano her way,
although levels of de-rated margin have been higher in recent winters relative to historic levels,
a succession of mild winters up to 2009/10 has kept relative levels of generation adequacy risk
down. The normalised de-rated capacity margin in Fig. 3.9 is calculated using the normalised
realised peak demand figures (3.2). This acts as a proxy for the LOLE, and provides a picture of
realised de-rated margins, compared to the forecast. The winter with the highest risk, 2010/11,
demonstrates that even seemingly healthy margins can be eroded in the face of ‘high’ (but not
extreme) peak demand; in this case reduction of 8% is witnessed.
The importance of considering relative levels of risk in this type of calculationis demonstrated
when the underlying distribution for available conventional capacity changes. Using the proba-
bility distribution for the reduced generating fleet described by Fig. 3.8, theLOLE calculation
was re-run. The results are shown in Fig. 3.11. The relative levels of LOLE remain unchanged,
by comparison absolute values increase by an order of magnitude (the previous values of LOLE
are barely visible at this scale). Note that the absolute levels of risk could also be altered by
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changing the normalising factor of 60 GW in (3.2), though the same relative levels of risk will
be produced.
Figure 3.11: Plot of LOLE results for 10 winters using reduced conventional fleet (gry bars).
Also shown are LOLE results from Fig. 3.9 (black bars).
3.6.1 Summary
The results of this historic risk calculation have demonstrated how relative levels of risk have
changed in recent years, with particularly high levels witnessed in over thelast two winters. It
is no surprise to find that the system is at its most vulnerable at times of highest deman , but
just how much of the risk is contained in a small number of extreme demand hoursis worth
emphasising.
The results also demonstrate why a healthy de-rated capacity margin is required in order to
accommodate periods of higher than expected peak demand. These insightscan be used when
analysing the levels of forecast de-rated margin in the investment dynamics modelling. That is,
given a particular level of forecast peak demand and de-rated capacity, it is worthwhile applying
additional ‘stress tests’ when forecasting levels of de-rated margin to ensure that the system is




3.7 Models applied to the GB market
A number of studies have been commissioned in recent years to investigate GBenergy market
performance and, in particular, answer questions about generation adequacy, costs and security
of supply risk [23, 95–97]. This section contains a selection of key projects which have perhaps
made the biggest impact in GB, that is either had a substantial influence on policy or have been
the focus of significant press attention. The difficulty with reviewing work carried out by energy
consultants is that, in most cases, model development is carried out in-house and typically
details about methodology are not published. That said many of the results and associated
sensitivity analyses can be examined and discussed.
3.7.1 OFGEM’s Project Discovery
Much of the most recent work has focused on the capability of the current market framework
to deliver a secure electricity mix whilst meeting firm emissions reduction targets and renew-
able energy obligations. A prominent example of this is the recent work by theGB regulator,
OFGEM; their Project Discovery consultation [96] examines the“prospects for secure and
sustainable energy supplies over the next 10-15 years”. This objective is explored using a sce-
nario analysis with additional“stress tests”being applied. Four core scenarios are considered,
all devised with decarbonisation as the ultimate goal (although this goal is not met in all sce-
narios), each with alternative outlooks for key factors such as economicand renewable growth,
gas imports and commodity and carbon prices. An example of one such stresstest i a situation
when there is little or no wind output in a system with a significant wind penetration(up to 30
GW in the 2020 green scenarios for example). The outlook for security ofsupply risk levels7
are assessed via de-rated capacity margins. The plots do not show pastvalue of the de-rated
margin so there is no way of knowing whether the situation is getting better or worse. The
outlook is good for the near-term (3-4 years out), in contrast there is a significant erosion of
margins after around 2013 followed by a slow recovery out to 2022.
A static approach to modelling is taken whereby an investment forecast is madeassuming fu-
ture gas and coal prices and then key indicators such as electricity pricesa e calculated. It could
7The report also considers security of supply risk for up-stream fuels pplies, namely gas imports from Russia,
but this review examines their results concerning generation adequacy only.
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be argued that a model of this type overlooks the market feedback mechanism that is present,
whereby investors adapt their year-on-year investment decisions based on current market con-
ditions; this includes projects in the pipeline, time delays, fuel prices and so on. S me of the
other headline conclusions include that wholesale prices are expected to rise (although only
average prices are shown and the volatility is not considered) with higher pric s for consumers.
These are to some extent offset by benefits of the low carbon electricity setor which may lead
to lower bills in the long-run beyond the 15 year time horizon of the model. Theseadditional
costs come from a variety of sources such as fuel price increases, new capacity builds and net-
work reinforcements, with the last two sources amounting to£200bn of cumulative investment
in some scenarios.
3.7.2 P̈oyry
It is widely accepted that the introduction of more variable output forms of generation such as
wind will lead to higher wholesale price volatility which will impact on investment. Onestudy
which addresses these issues is that of Pöyry [98]. This study was commissioned in 2008 and
with selected results published in 2009. Little information about the modelling methodology is
in the public domain (e.g., [99]), although it is worth exploring the content of what is available
owing to the influence the report had on government-informing bodies suchas the Committee
on Climate Change (CCC) [100].
The study takes 2000-08 wind and demand conditions, known as the‘mini-Monte Carlo’ it-
erations [99], and maps them onto 2020 and 2030 installed wind capacity in order t predict
the contribution of wind to meeting demand and also assess the impact on market prices and
thermal plant utilisation in both the GB and Irish markets. Price volatility is assessed via a
price-duration curve (PDC) in both 2020 and 2030, the results for GB are shown in Fig. 3.12.
The 2030 graphs show both negative and high wholesale prices. In times of high wind the price
may become negative when there is a surplus of wind over demand or export ca ability in a
given transmission-constrained area. On the other hand, at times of low wind the prices are
expected to reach very high values as thermal peaking units will be seekingto recover their
investment costs while operating at low utilisation, this is something which is also noted in
OFGEM’s Project Discovery. Mapping these changes to investment, the Pöyry report concludes
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Figure 3.12: Price-duration curve results for GB market in the Pöyry study [98] (used di-
rectly).
that“power stations built now will face a future of not only far lower load factors exp cted as
a greater portion of the electricity but also dramatically increased uncertainty of revenues than
at present”. Interestingly the uncertainty of revenues is reduced in the Irish market. This is
owing to a capacity payment mechanism, which forms part of the existing marketdesign being
included in the simulations.
The P̈oyry model uses a mixed integer mathematical program which takes a number ofin-
puts including historic demand; simulated wind output (36 locations in total across GB and
Ireland), wave (using data from a Carbon Trust study [101] across5 regions); simulated tidal
barrage output (using profiles provided by DECC for the River Severn area); conventional plant
availability (taken from half-hourly Maximum Export Limit data from the GB BM Reporting
System [102]); realised commodity price data; and reserve and transmission zone data (7 GB
zones modelled). The model time-step is hourly and plants are split by characteristi s such as
fuel, technology, efficiency, LCPD issues and capacity (although no derivations of plant cost
curves or short-run marginal costs are provided). Using this data historic GB wholesale prices
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are simulated as a method of model validation. The simulated SMP provides a goodfit during
base hours, yet is below realised prices at peak (an example amount of£8/MWh is quoted).
This is described as“the value of capacity”and it is attributed to peaking plants bidding in
above their short-run marginal costs in order to recover fixed costs. Asa re ult, simulated fu-
ture prices are adapted to include a pricemark-upin tight supply-demand hours. This amount
is a multiple of the historicmark-upcalibrated in order to allow peaking units to recover their
fixed costs, however derivations of this multiplier are not provided explicitly. By including this
price mark-upduring scarcity periods, this allows for the expected wholesale price to climb
above the SMP in periods of reduced capacity margins.
This method of price simulation has a significant impact on investment; investors inmid-merit
and peaking units (i.e., CCGT and OCGT) are able to recover their fixed costs fr m the energy-
only market because they can bid anything they like during scarcity periods, although a short-
fall in revenue for very low-merit plant in reported. Base-load generation such as CCS coal
and nuclear is treated as“non-market determined”and so growth in this type of capacity is
made in addition to CCGT and OCGT investment in order to maintain an adequate capcity
margin (although if periods of overcapacity occur, these plants will be closed if they are unable
to recover their FCs). Thus in a model such as this, where the aim is to report the impact on
prices of high penetrations of wind, security of supply concerns are less s vere assuming the
price and bidding strategies are permitted to operate in this manner.
3.7.3 Redpoint
The work carried out by Redpoint in reports such as [65, 95] and the many before it by the
same group, is very relevant to the generation adequacy debate in GB because it has informed
government departments such as the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and
the Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (BERR), and will thus influence
policy. The most recent publication [65] has looked at options for GB market reform and others
have included decarbonisation of the power sector [65], renewable support schemes [103] and
the dynamics of generation investment [104]. All of these look at investmentin generation
capacity in some way and the results presented are typically very detailed. In[65] an outlook to
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2030 with de-rated capacity margin, expected energy unserved and probability of brown out8 is
used to measure the level of security of supply risk. Additional policy mechanisms are modelled
and their impact on reducing carbon emissions intensity and mitigating security ofsupply risks
are measured. A wealth of sensitivities are also included. The headline result is that under
current market arrangements de-rated margins will deteriorate after 2012 - with the situation
becoming critical around 2018 - and remain below 10% for the remainder of the time horizon.
Expected energy unserved will also increase dramatically after 2020, thisis shown in Fig. 3.13.
The large oscillation in unserved energy with frequency 1 year and amplitude 2-3 GWh after
this date is curious as investment and retirements are reasonably linear throughout this period.
It was argued by Redpoint [105] that the high values of unserved energy are on account of
power shortages during summer when low wind resource periods coincidewith large volumes
of conventional generation being offline for maintenance.
Figure 3.13: Expected energy unserved results for GB market in the Redpoint study base case
[65] (used directly).
Policy schemes which successfully promote renewable generation lead to a reduction in whole-
sale prices and therefore insufficient conventional generation is built. To address this issue, a
capacity payment is introduced from 2018 (the simulation year when significant risks arise)
via a payment fund given byFPD · (1 + TDRM) · (TFCO), whereFPD is the forecast




peak demand,TDRM is the targeted de-rated capacity margin andTFCO are the fixed and
capital costs of a new OCGT plant. The pot is the same size despite the volume and type of
capacity installed (annual payments will vary based on expected peak deman only). However
the pot is spread wider when there is more capacity connected (and available), and therefore
individual payments are less, and vice versa when less capacity is available. It also requires a
target de-rated margin to be calculated. All generators receive the payment based on year-round
availability and not at peak. It could be argued that a year-round calculation does not encour-
age generators to be available at peak (e.g., moving maintenance to summer), yet the payment
does demonstrate that an additional revenue stream, which is less volatile andmore predictable
than the wholesale price, leads to more efficient investment in generation. Interestingly the
additional revenue required to cover OCGT fixed costs via the capacity mechanism is found to
be£7/MWh for an OCGT with amortised total FCs of 60/kW/yr and target de-rated margin of
10%. This figure is not too dissimilar to the requiredmark-upin [98]. Here amark-upis added
to the wholesale price simulations in the base case scenario (i.e., without capacity payments)
and assuming this can be avoided in a market with capacity payments, increases to consumer
bills as a result of the capacity mechanism being introduced are offset by prices being less
volatile in periods of supply shortage.
In addition to the capacity payment, a targeted capacity tender is modelled. The tender period
is annual and it is aimed at a“small subset of generating plant or demand-side response”[65].
This could be viewed as an extension to the existing annual reserve tenderof 2 GW currently
procured by the GB SO (cf. sub-section 3.2.2.3). Simulation results show that the tender
serves its purpose and the target de-rated margin is achieved and the security of supply risk
is “significantly reduced” [65]. The savings to customers are dependent on how the reserve
tender market operates. More precisely, does the reserve capacity get called upon once all
energy-only resources have been exhausted, or can an economic cond tion be specified over
which the reserve volumes can be tapped in order to prevent prices reaching unacceptably high
levels? In the former case, ‘hockey-stick’ style bidding (cf. sub-section 2.3.6) may still occur
with an additional unnecessary cost to the consumer. Although not discussed in this report, a
tender strike (or utilisation) price would prevent this from occurring, i.e., exercise the option to
use tendered reserve, thus paying the strike price rather than the high wholesale price.
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Details about the modelling methodology are hard to determine from reading the most recent
publications alone, although assuming the same logic has been used throughout this series of
work, some details can be determined by reading previous reports by the same firm. For in-
stance, no detail about how the wholesale price mark-up function is calculated is given in [65],
however in [104], the model“adds an uplift factor which relates to capacity margins and has
been calibrated against historic prices”, which would suggest an approach similar to [98].
Other model features such as how the investment decision process is carried out is mainly pro-
vided through schematics describing information flows and software used with specific details
omitted.
3.7.4 UKERC
Finally, a comprehensive review of the literature by the UK Energy Research Centre in [23]
looks at the risks associated with investing in generation. The levelised costsof various“lead-
ing” forms of generation are discussed with sensitivities on key inputs such as discount rate,
fuel price and capacity factor reported. A discussion about investor revenue and risks is in-
cluded with points covered similar to those displayed in Table 2.1. Investment cycles in genera-
tion investment are seen as a key source of electricity price risk with timing of investment seen
as critical. This last point is extended to look at the value (in terms of avoided revenue losses)
investors can gain from waiting, in particular waiting for a policy change. This is interesting in
light of the recent announcements regarding market reform [67]; if investors decide to perform
these strategic actions, the market may see a investment hiatus until policy has been finalised.
3.8 Chapter summary
In this chapter a review of the GB ESI to date has been provided. This included a history of its
industry structure in Section 3.1, with particular attention paid to the period post-liberalisation
in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 and 3.4 focused on the generation adequacy problem in GB and
reviewed some past experiences. They key findings of this review wereth evolution of market
design from a pool to a primarily bilateral trade-based market, and the breaking up of large
incumbent generating firms during this time. Another key finding was how the STOR market
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forms a vital part of current market arrangements in GB.
Next in Section 3.5 a historic generation adequacy risk calculation for GB was presented with
results and discussion provided in Section 3.6. The results also demonstrated why a healthy de-
rated capacity margin is required in order to accommodate periods of higher than expected peak
demand, and that the scale of relative risk has changed in recent years, with particularly high
levels witnessed in over the last two winters. Absolute values were also reported: the average
LOLE over the 10 winter period was 0.06 hrs/yr with a standard deviation of 0.01 hrs/yr. A
sensitivity analysis on the probability distribution for available conventional generation, showed
an order of magnitude increase in these figures when the underlying distribution for available
conventional capacity reduces.
Finally, in Section 3.7, an exploration of some of the key works which have looked at the GB
market was provided, this included the work of the GB regulator OFGEM together with energy
consultancies P̈oyry and Redpoint. The key findings of these works were 1) more variable
output forms of generation such as wind will lead to higher wholesale price volatility which
will impact on investment and 2) that under current market arrangements d-rated margins will
deteriorate after 2012 - with the situation becoming critical around 2018 - andremain below




Investment in Electricity Markets
In the previous chapters an overview of various electricity market designs and generation tech-
nology characteristics was provided. This chapter presents an investigation into the many mod-
elling techniques used in academia and industry. Particular attention is paid to studies which
have addressed the issues of generation capacity investment and generation adequacy in liber-
alised energy markets. This includes a review of methodologies, the handlingof uncertainty,
market power and investor expectations and risk preferences. Finally,a discussion about the
scope and value of using techniques from dynamic control theory to modelthe investment mar-
ket is included. This will set the scene for the next chapter where the methodologies used in
this work are presented.
4.1 System modelling
The transition to a privatised ESI together with targets to decarbonise electricity generation has
given rise to many new and interesting challenges. By modelling these complex syst ms us-
ing the latest theoretical methods, understanding can be improved and betterjudgments made
about what the future might hold. As described in [106], the most commonly used modelling
techniques follow three main trends: optimisation models, equilibrium models and dynamic
simulation models. These frameworks can be applied to a number of interesting problems
within the electricity market, including the short-term unit commitment problem, marketde-
sign, capacity expansion planning and congestion management. Plainly some models cannot be
positioned within a single category because they have characteristics whichmake classification
less straight-forward. However the representation forms an excellent basis for expanding the
discussion.
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4.1.1 Optimisation models
Optimisation models are the most common mathematical framework used in the energy sec-
tor today. This structure is applied in many situations owing to its flexibility, computation l
tractability and the numerous numerical solution methods available which can be appli d to
solve a range of difficult and complex problems. General research in thefield of optimisation
has led to significant improvements in the computational time needed to solve such problems.
These methods can be applied to formulate an objective function as a maximisationof expected
profit for new generating capacity investment subject to constraints on a number of (uncertain)
decision variables. This can be extended to modern portfolio theory to maximiseprofit subject
to returns on the firm’s existing portfolio of generating plant. Methods such as t ose devised
by Bloom and Gallant [107] can be used; their primary goal was to obtain theoptimal expected
production of the generating units at each interval subject to matching the LDC and general
linear constraints. Once the problem has been formulated, various optimisation techniques
are available, including column generation methods (e.g., Danzig-Wolfe [108]) and active set
methods [109], which solve smaller problems that expand (but never to an uncomputational
size) to optimality. Applications of optimisation models go beyond the scope of generation
adequacy to include optimal power flow, hydro scheduling and construction of bid and offer
curves.
4.1.2 Equilibrium models
Equilibrium models are founded on the concepts discussed throughout Section 2.3. They are
popular in electricity market modelling on account of their flexibility. For instance, both in-
dividual and aggregate supply functions can be modelled. They can be appli d to a variety
of market structures, with oligopoly generation markets a popular application(an approach
originally developed in [10] and since applied by others, e.g., [110]).
There are two main kinds of equilibrium models that exist, namelysupply function equilibrium
(SFE) andCournot equilibrium. In the former, market participants make strategic decisions on
price and quantity whereas in the latter participants decide about quantities only and prices are
determined via the inverse demand function. Both methodologies are based oncomputing the
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market equilibrium and can be applied in perfect or imperfect competitive markets.
In equilibrium models, under the perfectly competitive case, the overall level of capacity is
typically determined by assuming that the scarcity rents received by peakinggenerators are just
high enough to recover their investment and fixed operating costs [17]. Recall that scarcity
rents for peaking generators occur during periods when total availablesupply is not sufficient
to meet demand, and thus the price reaches the VOLL. The volume of each type of capacity
(i.e., base-load, mid-merit, peaking) within the overall level of capacity is choen so that that
total profit for all generators is zero in the long-run. This can be represent d mathematically
using an optimisation with capacities as the decision variable and an objective to maximise
gross consumers’ surplus less the total costs of production, including both total fixed and vari-
able operating costs, e.g., [111]. If the market is not perfectly competitive, for instance in an
oligopoly, then the overall level of capacity is determined by profit maximisation. In this case,
a firm may not increase capacity (the decision variable), even if long-runprofit is above zero.
More precisely, if the addition of new capacity triggers a reduction in scarcity rents across the
firms existing fleet sufficient enough to incur fixed costs, then the firm will not i vest. This can
be represented mathematically using an optimisation similar to the perfectly competitivecase.
Here the objective is to maximise profit which is the price received for selling power less the
cost incurred producing it (e.g., [111] uses a SFE model of this type).
Cournot equilibrium models are traditionally reasonably tractable, e.g., [76,77, 110, 112]. Sup-
porters of this approach suggest that a Cournot game is a fair reflectionof what is actually
going on in some markets and“can support detailed cost modelling, and do not usually suffer
from the multiple equilibria common with other modelling approaches”[113]. This approach
has been found to model the events of the California crisis of 2000/01 quite well, yet they
tend not to give a good representation of how prices are set in electricity markets in general
and their price predictions have generally been too high [76]. That said,they can still further
understanding of competitive electricity markets. A recent example of a SFE model is [15]
where the level of price mark-up in a market with a number of competing firms is inve tigated.
This modelling framework has been used to highlight the potential for market power in highly
concentrated markets. For example, in [78] the potential for submitting a supply function well
above marginal cost in the highly concentrated E&W power pool was reported.
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More recently these models have been used to assess the impacts of wind generation in compet-
itive markets. In [17] the potential impact that a varying output profile fromlarge volumes of
wind generation (30 GW total; 19 GW onshore 11 GW offshore) has on half-hourly equilibrium
prices is put forward. A market with six competing generating firms together with a duopoly
of two symmetric firms is simulated. Results showed a significant increase in the variability of
prices (and hence generator revenue uncertainty) for the high wind penetration. This was par-
ticularly so in peak demand hours, with the situation worse for a symmetric market.Although
less common, SFE models that consider multiple firms can be adapted to model both aggre-
gate system supply curves and also to assess more long-term market trends, p rhaps embedded
within a dynamic simulation model.
4.1.3 Dynamic models
The methodologies above can be embedded into a static or dynamic modelling framework. By
choosing a dynamic model when considering the problem of generation adequ cy, the outcomes
of earlier stages of the simulation time horizon will directly influence the system dynamics at
a later stage. For example in the case of power markets, current prices and their predictions
are fed back to investors hence modifying the investment behaviour. The resulting investment
decisions are then fed back to the pricing mechanism hence closing the informati n loop. This
is precisely the approach taken for this project (Chapter 5). Consequently, a review of existing
dynamic models applied to power markets has formed a vital part of this research. Dynamic
simulation models are usually very computationally intensive and as a result somesimplifica-
tions to reality must be introduced. On first inspection, this might be viewed as adisadvantage,
yet by making reasonable simplifications control over input variables and model structure is
achievable [114].
4.1.3.1 Introducing system dynamics modelling
One such area of modelling which has been widely applied in such situations is that of System
Dynamics (SD). SD was developed during the 1960s by Forrester and colleagues at MIT where
classical control theory was applied to various industrial systems exhibitinginteracting growth
and decline characteristics (or“multi-loop nonlinear feedback systems”) [115]. These included
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a number of public policy problems such as energy, health, environment, social welfare and
security [116].
Although SD had been applied to electric power systems expansion before privatisation (see
review in [117]), it really took off post-liberalisation and has been appliedto the long-term
generation adequacy problem to great effect. The work of Ford [117] in the US, and Bunn
et al. [34, 118] in the UK are the main protagonists. SD continues to be a popular choice
for electricity market modelling [119–123]. For example in [119], SD modellingis employed
to address questions of stability and dynamics and draw attention to the idea thatcapacity
expansion and wholesale prices are governed by the negative feedback connections between
supply and demand.
4.1.3.2 SD to highlight investment cycles
In [124] a simulation of the western US power markets is presented. The model is used to
assess construction cycles in generation capacity and the effect of longlead times and capital
intensity under the prevailing Californian market rules. The study highlights the tendency for
the timing of private investment to be late with resulting dramatic price spikes and reliability
problems. There is then a subsequent boom in capacity construction, followed by a bust cycle.
SD models are described as a good method for illustrating these cycles because there is a need
to understand the feedback mechanisms present in such a system [124].Broadly speaking, the
SD work of Ford draws the same conclusion about market-driven investment in new generating
capacity; fixed capacity payments are needed to provide the extra revenues to generators.
Expanding further on the commodity cycle problem, it is widely accepted in economics that
oscillations occur as a result of long-term dynamics in supply and demand orsome form of
system shock (e.g., a reduction in demand due to economic depression). Inthe case of an SD
model of capacity expansion, these are either endogenous (e.g., demand) or exogenous shocks
(capacity expansion or contraction) [115]. Such random variations mayoccur for a number of
reasons, such as lumpy investments and individual strategic moves [125].
In [126] a SD framework is used to examine the over-investment effect ofa pricing mechanism.
The test cases are ‘energy-only’ with and without a price cap and a capacity payment mecha-
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nism. The model is quite stylised, with a SFE pricing mechanism assumed. Investment take
5 years to build and the model includes an option for investment to be abandoned uring the
4th year of construction. An interesting conclusion of the paper is that ‘energy-only’ markets
do provide adequate investment signals under“ideal conditions”, presumably meaning in a
market which is in long-run equilibrium, and capacity payments lead to over-invstment and
oscillations in capacity, although supply shortages occur less frequently.
4.1.3.3 Incorporating market structure
SD models can also be formulated to compare how a system comprising of a number of tech-
nology types, orvintages, impact on investment dynamics. Vintage modelling is a method used
in macroeconomics to differentiate between types of capital (here, generating plant) each with
their own rate of productivity (here, thermal efficiency). For example, long-term electricity
market dynamics is the focus of [121] where a simplified capacity mix has beenmodelled us-
ing a number of vintages. The capacity within each vintage is time-dependent and is described
by the rate at which new capacity enters the vintage (i.e., new builds) and the rate at which
capacity leaves it (i.e., retirements).
Assumptions about market equilibrium have also been tested in SD models, with [127] describ-
ing a feedback model of generating capacity investment decisions. Resultsfrom imulations
that assume an equilibrium versus a nonequilibrium liberalised market are compared. They
show that assuming an equilibrium market can lead to strategic errors in the investment deci-
sion process and significant differences in realised wholesale prices and reserve margin. The
main difference between the assumptions underpinning each model relates toth aggregate in-
vestment rate. The equilibrium investor assumes that the aggregate industryinvestment will
evolve in order to maintain a target reserve margin. Here an investment is deeme profitable
if the expected wholesale price is greater than the total levelised investment cost. As expected
prices are modelled as a function of reserve margin (prices increase as threserve margin de-
creases), the feedback between investment and prices is captured.
In [128], two neighbouring perfectly competitive electricity markets are modelle . The system
consists of four thermal generating technology types in each region, with an interconnector
linking the two. The relationships are defined in terms of a causal loop diagram, with an
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endogenous generation investment decision component. To reflect the interaction between spot
markets, two feedback mechanisms are present. The first is a negative feedback loop between
installed generation capacity and expected spot prices, with construction lead times included.
The second, also a negative feedback loop, defines the relationship between the two regional
markets, with regional demand impacted by power trading. When imports increase, the residual
demand in the importing region reduces, which in turn reduces electricity spotprices. Three
types of market design are modelled and the impact on investment, system reliability and price
dynamics is assessed. Capacity margins and traditional power system reliability metrics are
used to assess 30 year generation adequacy risk in each region. An ‘energy-only’ market is
used as the base case design in each region. This is compared with markets with price caps,
and a capacity obligation with a forward ICAP market and price cap. A mixtureof symmetrical
and asymmetrical markets designs is also trialled. Results show that an asymmetricmarket
design can lead to some unintended consequences in a neighbouring region, particularly if the
market designs differ between energy-only and price cap, where capacity transfers to the non-
price cap region in times of supply shortage. It is stated that“similarities of approaches lead to
better performance in terms of price level and variability and in terms of reliability” [128]. Of
those trials where an energy-only market is adjacent to an ICAP market, twohings are noted.
Firstly, the ICAP market does not rely on the energy-only market for back-up, and secondly,
the energy-only market does not gain an advantage from being interconne ted with a market
that has a formal adequacy policy in place.
4.1.3.4 Incorporating investor profiles
In [122] a stochastic model to analyse long-term characteristics of electricity markets and to
“determine the fundamental factors contributing to (long-term) supply adequacy” is presented.
The focus is on how future prices inform investment, and argues that“futures provide market
participants not only an instrument to hedge price risk, but are also an indicator of future
supply and demand conditions, which are critical in making an investment dcision”. The
wholesale market price is modelled as a function of reserve margin. Demand ismodelled by
a seasonal factor, in one case this is constant and in another it has monthlyvariation, with a
stochastic element to represent uncertainty about future load. Various timedelays are tested
with two investor models, namely forward- and backward-looking investorswith and without
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an ICAP market. The market performs more efficiently with a forward-looking investor in all
cases (lower prices and less capacity oscillations).
In [129] an SD model incorporating credit risk theory is used to differentiate between firms
and concepts from game theory are called upon to include strategic behaviour from market
participants. The model is applied to a simplified model of the Spanish system (mixed hydro-
thermal, no wind) comprising two large companies, one medium, three small and several IPPs
(as one pseudo-company). A gaming element is included by assuming strategic actions under
a spot market design. A fully competitive market is also tested along with a market with large
volumes of forward contracting. Interestingly out of the four unit types avail ble to investors,
(nuclear, coal, CCGT, GT) only the latter two are chosen. This may be becaus the cost charac-
teristics are unfavourable for nuclear and coal (no cost information is shown so it is difficult to
establish whether these are suboptimal choices of investment for all utilisation). As with the
actual Spanish system, the market arrangements in all cases are such thata cap city payment is
included in addition to energy market revenues. In fact it is noted that without is mechanism,
many of the GT investments would not take place.
In [130] a dynamic model incorporating game theory with multiple firms participatingin the
market is presented. This work is applied to real electricity markets, in total eight countries are
considered. Three scenarios for levels of competition are included, namely fully competitive
market and a market consisting of strategic firms. More precisely, the strategic scenarios are
two-fold; one takes production levels of rival firms into account and the or models aStack-
elberg game(where the leader firm moves first and then the follower firms move sequentially).
As a general point, if the market is perfectly competitive, firms’ decisions about quantities will
follow a Nash equilibrium, where each agents strategy is the best one in light of the other agents
strategies. An assumption of the Nash equilibrium is that agents have perfect information about
the strategies of others. Note that perfect competition is not necessary to obtain a Nash Equilib-
rium, in fact it is actually a more powerful tool in imperfectly competitive markets.The focus
is on the impact that investment trends have on prices and the environment in the long-term
(2000-2050). The investment decision element of the model is dynamic with investment based
on feedback obtained from the most recent market information. Constraint on production
capacity, electricity trade and GHG emissions are also taken into account.
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4.1.3.5 Information flows
The advantage of SD models is that the flows of information between elements ofthe market
can be captured. Fig. 4.1 shows some of the key information flows in power markets. In this
particular depiction there is a high penetration of wind present; the diagram shows how the
availability of the wind resource influences price dynamics which feeds back into the invest-
ment decision and hence impacts on the economics of conventional generatio. Information on
capacity in development also flows though to current investment decisions as do current and
future market prices. The volatility of the wind output and prices impacts plant utilisation. This
can lead to a change in available capacity on account of plant mothballing or premature retire-
ment. System demand is inherently linked to wind output as both are heavily dependent on the
weather. Surrounding the main diagram are other factors, such as technology costs and investor
risk preferences. These play a crucial role, and although not explicitlylabelled with feedback
arrows (to avoid over-complicating the diagram), some of these factors will alter as a result of
power market conditions. For instance, economic growth could be harmed ifwholesale prices
rise too high (perhaps in response to increasing fuel and emissions costs) or, alternatively, in-
vestor cost of capital grows as a consequence of increased revenue uncertainty. The key point
here is that a great deal of information flows through the market and changes i one area will
propagate through the system, sometimes instantaneously and sometimes with delay. Th se
dynamics are of great interest in SD modelling.
4.1.3.6 Model validation
An important stage of any model aimed at simulating a real system is validation. Owi g to the
nature of liberalised energy markets, where commercial sensitivities typicallymean a limited
volume of data is available to call upon, this stage can be difficult. However many odels have
managed to perform some form of validation, which have enhanced the model results.
[131] produces 8 scenarios for the future development of the electricitysystem. Validation
against the past is included whereby the model is run against 1998-2006German market data
and found to match well against both investment and prices. It is argued that a dynamic ele-
ment of the model enables identification of time delays and market imperfections,which can
temporarily lead to the market being out of equilibrium [131]. A classic causal loop diagram
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Figure 4.1: Information flows in the generating capacity investment market. Inspired by [119].
is included, which encapsulates the feedback and information flows similarly toin Fig. 4.1.
Unlike the representation in Fig. 4.1, causal loop diagrams also highlight (using a double line
crossing an arrow) system time delays. An arrow between two variables, say, froma to b, indi-
cates that a relationship exists and a positive (or negative) sign at the endof ach arrow implies
that a small positive change ina subsequently leads to a positive (or negative) change inb [128].
A good example of this is seen in [121] and a version of this is shown in Fig. 4.2. Delayd1 oc-
curs before the investment decision due to the irreversibility of investment requiring sufficient
certainty about expected returns on investment. Delayd2 occurs after the investment decision
due to construction lead time. The circle arrow in the centre of Fig. 4.1 containing a negative
sign indicates negative feedback implying system balancing [128]. To avoid o er complicating
the diagram, much of the additional detail in Fig. 4.1 (including the impact of wind ge eration)
is omitted.
Another noteworthy example where an investment model has been applied to an existing sys-
tem is presented in [110]. A stochastic dynamic model of a liberalised energymarket using a
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Figure 4.2: Causal loop diagram for the generating capacity investment market after [121].
Cournot model is applied to the Finnish system. The goal is to replicate investment and pro-
duction trends over the period following liberalisation in 1995 by focusing onthe years 1996-
2006, and also to test the impact of varying key input parameters and modellogic. To reflect the
oligopolistic market structure over this period, three competing firms are modelled. These firms
must decide on production and investment in each year of the simulation time horizon. The au-
thors describe the market as“ egmented”, with load partitioned into base and peak periods
and firms make their decisions based on these. The motivation for this is basedon empirical
evidence of“interdependency between prices (or demands) in the base- and peak-load seg-
ments”. As a result, two inverse demand functions, which are calibrated to the Finnish system
using available data on“prices, quantities, and price elasticities”are considered when comput-
ing Cournot equilibrium. A sensitivity where market segments have“cross-price elasticities”
is included. Here base- and peak-load inverse demand functions containa positive cross-price
elasticity coefficient applied to quantity in the opposite market segment. Interestingly this has
little impact on investment trends. Other sensitivities included varying the depreciation rate of
capacity, price elasticities and investor planning horizon. A planning horizon of 6-7 years pro-
vided the best match with realised investment timings and volumes. The model predicted more
base-load investment than in reality but overall volumes and timings were reasonably well ap-
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proximated. Furthermore, lengthening the planning horizon from the base case of 5 years, led to
“more ambitious and earlier investments”. This could be due to simulated prices and produc-
tion needs further out being higher than in the near-term on account of positive demand growth
raising production requirements and prices (capacity depreciation rates ae held at zero for this
test); thus sending an earlier signal for investment. Varying demand elasticityhad only a minor
impact, whereas using a positive rate of capacity depreciation led to a delay ininvestment and
production was shifted toward peaking generators. The latter occurs asan increase in capacity
depreciation“increases the opportunity cost of the investment due to shorter life expectancy of
production capacity”. Results also showed that modelling production cost as a function of total
installed capacity (i.e., marginal cost of production varies in the economic dispatch), increases
the performance of the model in predicting overall investments and production costs. Interest-
ingly, all types of capacity considered were modelled with a one year construction delay. This
may explain why base-load capacity (e.g., hydro and nuclear), which have longer lead times
than peaking capacity, was a more popular choice for firms than in reality.
Other dynamic models which have been applied to real systems include [112, 120, 130]. In
[112] a dynamic simulation model was used to calculate the profitability of new plants. It ad-
dressed plant lead time and included a capacity payment calculated using the same method as
under the E&W Pool. It concluded that a market with this capacity payment leads to capac-
ity oscillations and highly volatile wholesale prices. In [120] a SD model is applied to the
NordPool market where there is a spot, futures and real-time market.
4.1.3.7 Answering policy questions
More recently, SD models have been applied to inform the debate on decarbonisati n in the
electricity sector. [132] focuses on investment dynamics in a system with carbon markets and
a view to reduce the emissions in the US Western Interconnection. Another example is given
in [133] where a Tradable Green Certificate (TGC) mechanism is tested andthe primary focus
of the model application is on price dynamics rather than investment. It is noted that “only
after some time does the system respond with enough new capacity to allow the price to decline
to values that one would expect from a fundamental analysis”. Moreover, the time lags of
construction can create highly volatile oscillations in the TGC price during the period when
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installed capacity is increasing.
The work of Pẽna [134] uses a SD model to look at regulatory policies to address generatio
adequacy and environmental targets. Here two capacity mechanisms are tested, 1) capacity
payments with a price equal to the average fixed cost not covered by selling nergy to the
energy market (25% of costs assumed to get covered in market), and 2) capacity market with
the sloped demand curve design described in [54]. The elastic demand curve is calibrated
such that the capacity market price matches the capacity payment price whenthe target reserve
level is met. In addition to capacity mechanisms, the effect of renewable subsidies are tested.
Over the 25 year time horizon of the model, the capacity market leads to a more stable reserve
margin, better efficiency and more peaking capacity investment.
4.1.4 Where this thesis fits in
A variety of modelling approaches have been discussed throughout this section along with a
number of applications. It it therefore worthwhile briefly pausing to reflect on where the work
presented in this thesis fits into the current literature and contributes to the fieldof knowledge.
Firstly, this thesis looks to build on existing dynamic investment models by applying thetec -
niques covered in sub-section 4.1.3 to create an investment market model for the GB energy
market. Furthermore, taking inspiration from models that have been applied toexis ing markets
such as Ford [135], Bunn [112], and others discussed earlier, this thesis can extend the field of
knowledge of applied system modelling. In addition, it addresses the issue of high penetrations
of wind power in such models and how this impacts on investment dynamics, whichremains an
active, but not yet fully understood, area of research. For instance, this work will compliment
studies such as [17] where the impact on market prices and investor revenues of a high wind
system is considered. Finally, like the models discussed in sub-section 4.1.3.7(and in the case
of GB, Section 3.7) this work can inform policy makers interested in the response f energy
markets to policies promoting wind generation.
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4.2 Uncertainty modelling
“There is nothing more certain and unchanging than uncertainty and change.” - JFK.
The future is uncertain, we can be sure about that. System modellers must make judgments
about what the future might hold in order to inform the debate about the best course of action
for today. In the case of electricity market modelling a number of techniques and philosophies
have been developed. In the following sections some of the methods influencing this work will
be discussed.
4.2.1 Monte Carlo method
In situations where there is a high degree of uncertainty about the model inputs, then the Monte
Carlo (MC) method is a common approach. With modern computing power, repeated random
sampling within a model of a large and complex system can be achieved. This sampling pro-
vides a method to reduce model error. Further, the larger the sample, the closer the sample
average will be to the expected value (law of large numbers), therefore ahigh number of MC
simulations is recommended. Examples of studies which have incorporated the MC method in-
clude [54] where 25 simulations of a 100 year time horizon are run becausethe model randomly
samples economic growth and weather. Also Pöyry [98] used this method to simulate future
GB wholesale market prices based on random sampling of wind speeds andother uncertain
variables.
4.2.2 Stochastic processes
A stochastic processi a set of random variables ordered according to some index, typically
time. Using stochastic processes within a model is useful when there is belief about how a
variable will evolve over time but it is in part random and unpredictable. Theevolution of such
a process may also be referred to as arandom walk. The field of stochastic processes is vast,
and a detailed discussion of the mathematics underpinning it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
However the interested reader could consult Chapter 2 of [32] for a comprehensive introduction
to the subject.
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The type of stochastic process of interest here is theWi ner process(or Brownian motion),
which provides a basis for modelling a broad range of stochastic processes. These are continuous-
time Markov processes (where only the current value is required to forecast the next value of
the process), and have independent increments. Many of these properties can be visualised by
inspection if the generalised formula for a one-dimensional Brownian motion or Itô process:
dXt = m(Xt)dt+ v(Xt)dWt, X0 = x > 0, (4.1)
whereX is the state process,W is a one-dimensional standard Wiener process,m andv are
given deterministic functions. In plain terms, the functionm is the expectation (or drift) andv
is the volatility (or “noise”). By definitionWs−Wt ∼ N(0, s− t), wheres− t is the length of
the time-step. That is, the expectation of the volatility component is zero. Or putanother way,
the expected change,dXt, is precisely the result ofm(Xt). Furthermore, if the functionsm
andv are unchanging overtime (i.e., the process has constant statistical properties), this is then
termed astationary process.
Examples of the use of stochastic processes in electricity generation investment modelling
abound. This is because it underpins real options analysis and can be employ d to forecast
uncertain parameters such as future demand and wholesale market prices(e.g., [136]).
4.2.3 Real options analysis
Although not employed in this thesis, real options analysis is a popular approch t modelling
uncertainty in generation investment. Therefore it is worthwhile discussing anumber of key
examples from the literature. The basic principle of real options is that the valu of investment
can be maximised by choosing the optimal time to invest, i.e., there can be value in waiting.
Perhaps the best-known text on this field is that of [32] where the mathematical ba kground
along with a firm’s decision process in the face of uncertainty are discussed.
In [137] a dynamic model incorporating real options theory is presented.The underlying value
of a project is modelled as a stochastic process. It is argued that models of thi type are devel-
oped to represent the whole life of an investment: of initiation, running and abandonment, not
just the net present value (NPV) [137]. The objective of the investmentd cision can be to max-
imise social welfare (centralised decision) or maximise profit (generating firm decision). The
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paper discusses the introduction of price feedback in the decentralised ca and finds that a price
cap below the VOLL leads to under-investment (or in the context of real options, project delay).
Capacity payments lead to earlier investments but also over-investment in peakg c pacity.
In the follow-up work described in [138] a stochastic dynamic model is present d. The model
is stochastic owing to uncertainties such as load growth. Wholesale prices are modelled as
stochastic processes with fuel prices deterministic. These dynamic and stocha tic characteris-
tics are the key motivations for choosing real options over a static NPV appro ch. The benefit
of not having to determine a risk-adjusted discount rate is mentioned, althoughan estimated
risk-adjusted discount rate is required for the simulations.
Investment in CCGT plant with either flexible or constant generation profile iscon idered (the
study example is the Nordic market) and the influence of a market with and without capacity
payments is analysed. The model works backwards from the last year ofthe planning horizon
(10 years out) with the decision in each year being the optimal one, given thestochastic inputs
of demand and available generation. The decision to invest is taken annuallyand is limited to
a single CCGT plant over the planning horizon (the purpose of this analysisis to establish the
effect of market structure on investment thresholds, not on total levels of investments). The
agent is assumed to be a price taker and the influence of a new investment onan existing port-
folio is not considered. As the wholesale price is a function of installed capacity nd demand,
they take the logical step to constrain off the influence of the price processbeyond the end of
the time-horizon (i.e., assume that at some point before then, new capacity willenter to lower
prices in the long-run).
Two types of capacity payment were considered: fixed payments or a simplefunction of peak
load and available capacity. In the second case, the payment only occursif the capacity margin
falls below 7%. Capacity payments increase expected profits for both the disapatchable and
non-dispatchable technology options. Furthermore, optimal investment thresholds are reduced
(i.e., investments will be triggered earlier). Interestingly, investors wait forthe variable capacity
payment to grow until they trigger investments and therefore a higher payment is required in
order to enduce more timely investment.
Incorporating uncertainty into systems modelling is a challenge faced by all disciplines. For
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power market modellers, the methods discussed above provide a means of addressing uncer-
tainty in a simulation environment. Stochastic modelling is a well-established methodology
which bestows both confidence when applied in a simulation environment and adegree of re-
alism when interpreting the results. It allows foresight, but like any system with a high degree
of uncertainty, these predictions must be communicated and interpreted accor ingly.
4.3 Scenario modelling
An alternative to tackling uncertainty using the simulation methods outlined above isto take a
scenario approach to modelling. This approach was originally established inthe early 1970s
by Royal Dutch/Shell as part of development and testing of its strategic planning [139]. These
types of models can incorporate multiple pathways by using scenarios to analyse alternative
futures. Traditionally, this approach seems to be favoured by policy makers because, owing
to the largely deterministic and hence uncomplicated modelling framework, they are able to
visualise the different futures over a range of input and policy scenarios (e.g., [96]).
When building dynamic models, a typical approach taken is to incorporate a number of scenar-
ios pertaining to “core” inputs with other inputs either modelled deterministically or stochasti-
cally. For example in [65] a number of policy scenarios are analysed in a dymic GB electric-
ity investment market model and their impacts on carbon intensity reduction, security of supply
and consumer welfare are assessed. In [21] medium and long-term levelised costs projections
for a range of generating technologies available in GB are analysed against a number of sce-
narios for key cost drivers. More precisely, the common style of low, medium and high cost
scenarios for commodity prices, build timings, technical data, capital costs and technological
maturity is employed.
A similar method to scenario analysis is sensitivity analysis, and broadly speaking the objec-
tives of both are analogous. A sensitivity analysis is usually used to test therobustness of a
model under a range of values for its input variables. In contrast scenarios are typically con-
structed prior to implementation and consist of only a small number of discrete valu s for the
inputs being varied (e.g., with low, medium and high fuel price or demand growth scenarios
commonplace).
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4.4 Agent modelling
Market environments facilitate competition between participants (i.e., generatingfirms). De-
pending on the number of effective sellers in the market (monopoly, duopoly r oligopoly for
example) the actions of individual firms play a key role in market outcomes. Inmodelling terms,
these firms are commonly referred to as ‘agents’. Each agent will have their own attitude toward
risk and expectations about the future state of the system. When modelling a liberalised energy
market environment and the investments therein, the aggregated decisions of the agents directly
influence the evolution of the system. The methodology chosen to model these int ractions and
decision processes relies heavily on the model scope; for example whether a single agent or the
interaction between multiple agents is being investigated.
For example in [135] three types of investor are modelled within an SD model ofa generation
investment in California, namelybelievers, pre countersandfollowers. Believers only include
plant under construction once it comes online (i.e., they do not forecast itsrrival earlier in the
simulation when it is under construction).Pre countersassume all plant under construction will
complete and include it in the simulation as soon as construction commences.Followershave a
“herd mentality”; they will not begin building new plant, even if a it is deemed profitable, until
others have begun construction elsewhere. The results of the interactions between these investor
types is quite interesting. Under a scenario with justbelievers, a boom-and-bust investment
cycle is witnessed, this can be attributed to investors continuing to initiate construction when
there is adequate capacity in the pipeline to meet demand growth. This behaviour leads to prices
being significantly damped owing to a large capacity margin when the excess new co struction
comes online. A simulation with solelypre countersleads to investment that just keeps pace
with demand growth and the pattern of prices is more oscillatory; high prices in peak eriods
when supply and demand margins are tight and lower in low demand periods when there is
excess capacity available. In a mixture of all three cases, a construction boom occurs early
in the simulation involving all three investors. Thepre counterswithdraw early in the boom
(owing to their forecast of new build), withbelieversand followerscontinuing to invest. As
a result, the installed capacity surpasses the level necessary to meet demand growth. In fact,
out of all the simulations only the purelypre countersrun does not display boom and bust
investment characteristics.
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Other SD models which implement a multiple agent investment market include [129] where
credit risk theory is used to differentiate between agents; more precisely an NPV is calculated
for each investor based on“a different endogenously-calculated discount rate”. [127] presents
a SD model with a duopoly investment policy based on a desired market sharetogether with
IPPs who invest based on“managerial optimism”about market share and expected investment
by rivals.
Another notable multi-agent model is presented in [118]. The model pays particul r attention
to the trading of plant between agents, i.e., purchase or dispose. The markt is deemed in
equilibrium when no plant trading occurs. The model is constructed basedon a Cournot game,
whereby agents decide on quantities to bid based on what they expect other agents to submit.
The second stage is then a Bertrand game which is analogous to a balancing mehanism and
day-ahead market; here agents set prices and the demand-side decidesthe quantities at that
price. A number of “markets” are simulated, namely base, shoulder and peak, to which each
agent (there are 24 in total) must determine (via a profit maximisation optimisation) how much
capacity they will bid into each market.
The studies cited above are designed to model multiple agents. However thereare many models
which model a single agent under the assumption that the behaviour of this agent is a good
representation of the market, and investment decisions are modelled as aggregated. Many SD
models take this approach including [119, 121–123, 128]. The issue of modelling aggregated
investor behaviour where, in reality, there are many agents competing with one another and
each agent has his own expectations about the future must be addresse. The next section
describes two different approaches which do this.
4.4.1 Expectations hypothesis
In addition to the attitude of market participants toward uncertainty and the risk associated
with it, the manner in which participants gather and use information to form their expectations
about future market conditions is an important consideration. In particular, for a model where
price signals drive investment in capacity, expectations about future pricand its distribution
must be considered [121]. This phenomenon was investigated in [125] where an interactive
computer simulation model of a simple electricity market, with users acting as generating firms
101
Modelling Generation Capacity Investment in Electricity Markets
undertaking strategic investment decisions, was used to determine the rationality f capacity
investment decisions. As highlighted in [20], results showed there was a tendency for users to
1. initiate investments during high price periods, and 2. ignore capacity under construction and
construction time lags, thus leading to periods of surplus capacity and low prices.
A key element of commodity cycle theory is the expectations of participating agents. A umber
of expectation hypotheses have been developed, and perhaps the mosthotly debated is that of
rational expectations. The development of this hypothesis removed the possibility of cycles de-
scribed by the cobweb theorem [20]. Followers of rational expectationsbelieve that it may not
be possible to design stabilising policies to influence individual agent behaviour, which when
aggregated, dampen cycles and achieve market equilibrium. Further, the hypothesis argues that
economic models of commodity markets do not assume enough rationality [140] and therefore
cannot be used as a policy tool. Thenatural rate hypothesis[141] states that there is a fixed
relationship between the aggregated supply and the difference between the xpected and the
actual market prices. This implies that in order to change the level of installedcapacity in rela-
tion to natural levels, policy must influence the difference between actual and expected prices
[141]. For rational expectations to apply, a number of critical factors must be present. These
are not discussed here, but details are provided in [141]. Connectedto his is the argument that
central predictions about market outcomes (e.g., [67, 96]) affect agents’ forecasts and therefore
influence the course of events, as summarised in [142]:
“The problem of invalidation of a public prediction arises because the publicprediction may
affect the agents’ expectations and thus become a determinant of their beavior. Under these
conditions the public prediction becomes itself one of the factors which determine the future
course of events: because a public prediction has been made, the event which occurs at the
specified time is different from the one which has been predicted and which would actually
have occurred if the prediction had remained private.”
Therefore results from any economic forecast model entering the publicdomain must bear these
implications in mind.
Plainly boom and bust type dynamics will be less severe if investors have rational expectations.
For instance in [135], under the exclusivelypre counterssituation investment keeps pace with
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demand growth because investors take into account new builds in the pipeline. In general they
require an intimate understanding of the market and consequently take time to form. This is
arguably not possible in most electricity markets owing to their relative infancyd ongoing
modification [54].
In light of this, bounded expectationsi perhaps a more appropriate model to consider; this
theory assumes that agents are rational, but only within the limits of the informationavailable
to them. Because their information may be bounded they can sometimes take decisions that
appear to be irrational according to traditional theories [143]. Boundedrationality is used in
[114], where two SD models are presented, one with an annual generatioc pacity investment
decision and the other with a capacity utilisation decision (i.e., how much capacity torelease to
the market). The models“rely on simplifications that differ from reality”, although they high-
light the cyclical nature of prices and the SD formulation allows program users (actually a class
of final year undergraduate Engineering and Economics students) to make active investment
decisions during the simulation. They propose that users use a heuristic investment decision
process, which is bounded and based on experience. The“decision function” assumes agents
“use a feedback strategy to adjust their capacity towards a desired capacity.”
Other contrasting theories to rational expectations includesa aptive expectations. This theory
assumes that agents form expectations using past trends and any errors in their earlier pre-
dictions will continue. In [121], it is argued that“adaptive expectation formulations based on
exponential smoothing of past values and trend extrapolation can well replicate aggregate fore-
casting behaviour.” Here a similar argument to [54] is used to discard the rational expectations
hypothesis“based on the fact that firms do not know the exact specification of the syst m, and
therefore, the structure of forecasting models and many parameters must often be judgmentally
estimated”.
4.4.2 Risk aversion
Investors attitudes to risk play a large role in behaviour and investment outcomes. A risk averse
agent would rather receive a given amount of wealth with certainty than thesam amount of
wealth, or perhaps higher, on average but with variance around this quantity [54]. In this section
some of the techniques used to model risk preferences within decision processes are discussed.
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4.4.2.1 Utility functions
Risk aversion can be described by autility functionwhich maps wealth to utility (or satisfac-
tion). Investors who have a diminishing marginal utility are termed risk averse;if investors
have a linear marginal utility then this is termed risk neutral (Fig. 4.3). The most common form
used to represent risk averse investment is an exponential curve owingto its downward sloping
(concave) property [54]:
U(x) = a− be−Rx, (4.2)
whereR is the risk tolerance (the largerR, the more risk averse),x is the expected monetary
value, anda andb are calibrated so zero results if expected wealth is zero and utility above
a certain wealth is 1 (i.e., full satisfaction). So for example, consider a situation, s, where
you can win£10 with probability 0.5 and win nothing with probability0.5. The expected
outcome isE(s) = 0.5 ·£10 + 0.5 · 0 = £5, however a risk averse participant may opt to take
£x (< £5) with certainty. Thisx is thecertainty equivalent. In (4.2), ifx = 3, thenR = 0.18
can be obtained by solvingU(3) = 0.5, U(0) = 0 andU(10) = 1, and the utility function’s
concave form is achieved. Under a risk averse utility, the expectation of the utility for a given
expected wealth is less than the utility of the expected wealth. This is the reversein quality
of Jensen’s inequality applied to a convex function. Jensen’s inequality states [144]: iff is a
convex function over the intervalI andx1, x2, . . . , xn are inI, then
f
(
x1 + x2 + . . .+ xn
n
)
≤ f(x1) + f(x2) + . . .+ f(xn)
n
. (4.3)
An example exponential utility function is shown in Fig. 4.3. In this case, the functio has
been calibrated by forcingU(5) = 0.7, U(0) = 0 andU(10) = 1.“indicating somewhat but
not extreme risk aversion”[54]. The two black dots show an example of the function obeying
Jensen’s inequality.
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Figure 4.3: Example of expected utility function. Function is calibrated soU(5) = 0.7 (in
(4.2)). This yieldsa = b = 1.225 andR = 0.17. Inspired by version presented in
[54].
4.4.2.2 Prospect theory and risk seeking behaviour
Prospect theory [145] is an alternative to expected utility criteria. It argues that the positive
utility function does not tell the whole story, and there is actually a negative utilityfunction to
consider. When investors stand to lose money they take bigger risks in the hope of recovering
their losses. In the context of power markets, this could be the differencebetween a firm
mothballing a plant as soon as it starts losing money, or keeping it available in thehope that
prices will improve. This is an important consideration in an investment market model that
considers price feedback as the main driver of boom and bust cycles.If this type of behaviour
is present, it will depend heavily on the financial stability of the firm; wealthy generating firms
can afford to take risks but new entrants and small players cannot. The middle ground contains
participants who are concerned with the reference point, or point of inflection, which is where
the utility function changes from positive to negative.
An example of a utility function with a reference point at zero is shown in Fig. 4.4; investors
are risk-seeking when expected wealth is below the point of inflection and risk averse above it.
By moving the reference point above zero the more likely the participant is to be risk-seeking.
This behaviour is perhaps best summarised in [146]:“the higher the reference point the more
likely the agent is to be a risk-taker (think of the notorious cases of Barings’ Nick Leeson and
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Socíet́e Géńerale’s J́eróme Kerviel), and hence the greedier she is.”.
Figure 4.4: Example of utility function with reference point at zero. For expected utilities
greater than zero the graph is as in Fig. 4.3. For negative wealth the function
is calibrated soU(−5) = −0.7 in (4.2), givinga = b = −1.225 andR = −0.17
(i.e, an exact reflection of the positive utility function in thex andy axis).
4.4.2.3 VaR criteria
Value at Risk (VaR) is a common criterion used in finance when investors areconc rned with the
extremity of realised returns below expected values (i.e., they are risk averse) [147]. Generally
speaking, given a distribution for project valueV (the random variable), and defining the level
of risk aversion byq, the VaR is defined as the valuevq such thatp(V ≤ vq) = 1− q, i.e.,vq is
the value of theqth percentile. An example of this concept is shown in Fig. 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Example of VaR decision criterion acting on a distribution of expected project val-
ues.
Despite their popularity, VaR models do have a limitation relative to other risk criteria (such as
Min Max Regret) as VaR analysis must consider probabilities of outcomes, but typically these
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probabilities are not well known. An alternative approach would be to useMin Max Regret
whereby an investment decision for a particular realisation of the system is analysed. Regret
is defined as the difference between the net benefit incurred when an investment decision is
made for a realised state of nature, and the maximum net benefit across all feasible strategies
that can be obtained under that realised state. For instance, investing in nuclear generation for
a realised carbon price that is lower than expected might have a higher regr t than investing
in gas-fired generation under the same price. However, the Min Max Regret criterion only
considers the worst regret for each alternative, which makes its resultsvery sensitive to the
exact set of scenarios that are considered.
The Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) test is more sensitive to the shape of the distribution
for V . It is said to provide a more coherent measure of risk than VaR as VaR is incoherent as
regards to the addition of risks [147]. Ifq is the CVaR level, then the expected shortfall at the
q level is the expected value in the worstq · 100% of cases. So for highq the most profitable
but unlikely values are ignored, but for lowq only the worst cases are considered. In the latter
case, an investment is made if the expected project value is positive conditional on the revenue
being belowvq, with q the confidence level, and investment is triggered ifE [V |V < vq] > 0.
4.5 Modelling market power
The opportunity for firms to abuse their position in the market and perform strategic or anti-
competitive actions in order to increase profits must be avoided (cf. sub-section 2.3.6). A
number of models have looked at this element of power markets (e.g., [77, 78, 118, 148–150])
with the aim of assessing market power in current markets (e.g., [78, 148,149]) or looking at
methods to mitigate against it (e.g., [3, 13]). Market power can be assessed in a number of
ways. Perhaps the most standardised method used is by inspection of the industry Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). HHI is the market concentration calculated as the sum of squares of







whereN is the number of firms andsi is the market share of firmi. Depending on whether
the proportionsi is expressed as a decimal or whole number, the HHI can range from1/N
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to 1 or 100 to 10,000. Typical guidelines suggest that a HHI above 0.18 indicates a highly
concentrated market and above 0.1 indicates a concentrated market (e.g.,Office of Fair Trading
merger guidelines [151]). The inverse of the HHI gives the effective number of competing firms.
A rough calculation for the total installed capacity in GB market, which in 2011 consisted
of around 44 firms, shows a HHI of 0.095, with inverse 10.5, indicating a concentrated (or
oligopoly) market. Comparatively, the HHI for Sweden and Singapore arereported as 0.32 (8
firms) and 0.27 respectively [148]. Moreover, a cross-country comparison study for Europe
for 2003-05 [152] concluded that the GB market compared favourablywith other European
countries such as Germany and Spain. The report states that“the market structure in Great
Britain can be seen to be the only one largely conducive to competitive outcomes” [152]. For
instance, the average HHI values based on available installed capacity were 0.107, 0.191 and
0.279, for GB, Germany and Spain, respectively.
The classical definition of market share,si is “output of supplier divided by total market out-
put” . Therefore the HHI calculated above is not the classical definition becaus it has been
determined using total installed capacity, which is different from total output,yet it is popular
with regulators as it is easy to calculate. In order to determine the true HHI index, on would
have to calculate the total output (demand met) at each market settlement period(or average
over all periods) and determine each supplier’s contribution. A method to calculate this Dy-
namic HHI (DHHI), is described in [153]. This paper also provides a measure of “gaming
incentives”in a uniform spot market. The incentive depends on the shape of the supply curve,
the market share of participating generators and demand elasticity. The formula calculates the
benefit from withdrawing plant; namely the increase in profit for the firms remaining plants
from pricemark-upplus the fixed cost savings as a result of plant withdrawal.
Some other market power detection methods are listed below. This is by no meansa complete
review of market power indicators and the interested reader should consult [13] for a review of
the subject:
• The Lerner index(LI) measures a firm’s ability to exercise market power by calcu-
lating the level of pricemark-up they can induce. If the price set by generatorx is
P , then the LI is given byLI = (P − SRMCx)/P whereSRMCx is the gener-
ator’s true SRMC. Note that theprice-cost margin index(PCMI) is a similar metric,
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PCMI = (P − SRMC)/SRMC. If the market is perfectly competitive, then both
metrics will be zero for the generator producing the last unit of productionneeded to
meet demand. However the use of LI or PCMI is problematic given the difficulty in
determining generator marginal costs [13].
• Thesupply margin assessment(SMA) is a type ofpivotal supplier indicator(PSI). PSIs,
which are 0/1 binary variables, attempt to incorporate both supply and demanconditions
to assess whether a particular generator is ‘pivotal’ in serving demand [13]. The SMA
for generatorx is made at peak demand and is given bySMAx = (D −
∑N
i=1|i6=xCi,
which is demand (D) net supply from all other generators’ capacity,Ci in the market.
If this value is positive then generatorx is a pivotal supplier andPSI = 1, otherwise
PSI = 0. The SMA has been criticised for a number of reasons, one of which is thatit
is calculated for a single demand hour only [13].
• The residual supply index(RSI) is like a PSI but operates on a continuous scale and is
more expressive of actual market conditions. It is defined as the ratio oftotal ICAP less
the generator’s relevant capacity,RCx, over demand (D): RSI = (ICAP − RCx)/D
(as a percentage). Note thatD is the sum of full load plus purchased ancillary services
andRCx is the generator’s capacity minus it’s contracted obligations. This value can
be calculated for all load hours and provides a more complete assessment than SMA. A
value below 100% indicates a pivotal supplier, and a value greater than orequal 100%,
indicates a non-pivotal supplier. [13] states“that on average an RSI of about 120% will
result in a market price outcome close to the competitive market bench-mark” . Here the
“bench-mark” is the estimate of the market price in a perfectly competitive market.
• Theconcentration ratio(CR) is a measure of total output produced by a given number of
firms relative to the size of the market. For example, the CR capacity ownershipin the
GB market for the ‘big six’ generators is around 70%, which again indicates n oligopoly
market.
When modelling market power, or perhaps more precisely, detecting marketpower in exist-
ing markets, monitoring can occur at one of three periods. That is, either inadvance, close to
real-time or retrospectively. The choice depends largely on the metric beingused and hence
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data requirements. For instance, those that require data on realised prices (e.g., price trends or
congestion analysis) can only be carried outex-post, whereas those looking purely at market
structure (e.g., HHI) are largely dependent on generating capacity dataand can be carried out
ex-ante. Supplier type indices (e.g., LI) can be carried out during all three time periods although
the degree of realism will vary because sometimes data estimation is required. Furthermore,
the degree of monitoring ease depends on market structure. For instance, mark ts where the
majority of trades occur bilaterally will be more difficult to monitor than those where the ma-
jority of trading occurs in a pool or exchange (although problems remain if this data is also not
in the public domain). An in depth discussion on this topic is beyond the scope ofthis thesis;
[13] provides an excellent discussion on the need and design for effective market monitoring.
4.6 Timing and lumpiness of investment
A large volume of work has been carried out in the economic literature investigating the rela-
tionship that time lags (e.g., [154]) and lumpy investment (e.g., [155]) have oncommodity and
business cycles. The main cause of time delays are construction time or planning permission
hold-ups. Further, as discussed in Section 2.6, in a market situation they can be a result of strate-
gic actions by investors such as delaying investment until more information becomes available
and revenue uncertainty is reduced. There are many theories explainingwhy investors tend to
delay; on the one hand delays are costly because future revenues aredi counted andceteris
paribus investors would like to receive profits today. On the other, by making an investment,
there is a risk it will fail and thus the opportunity for future profit is lost andso there is an
incentive to delay [156].
In the case of power systems, lumpiness of capacity new build and retirementis unavoidable -
generating units traditionally come in sizes of the tens to hundreds of MWs range. I addition
when the cost of new capacity is weakly concave then economies of scale will encourage large-
scale investments which are few and far between [157]. Some assessmentshave reported that
underlying engineering procurement and construction costs are also cyclical [21], thus exacer-
bating the issue.
Strategic delays tend to be modelled (in the economic literature) in a real options setti g, where
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the primary focus is the optionvalueof waiting (sub-section 4.2.3). Early work focused on
instantaneous investment timing alone [32] but more recent literature has addresse the impact
of time delays [156–160]. In [156] a simple dynamic model based on real options theory shows
that build delays can amplify“the natural cyclical nature of the economy”. The work presented
in [158] examines the timing and intensity of investment in order to“shed some light on the
dynamics behaviour of investment”. The model presented builds upon the existing theory of
[32] by addressing two decisions for the firm; when to invest and how muchto invest, with
alternative lumpy or incremental investment models presented. It is argued that by“adding the
choice of investment intensity enriches the model”. An interesting conclusion is that investment
under uncertainty not only delays investment but also lowers intensity wheninv stment is in-
cremental. By comparison this is not necessarily the case for lumpy investment.This type of
work is relevant here because generation adequacy is not only relianton timely investment, but
also adequate investment. An important distinction between lumpy and incrementalinvestment
is made;“that new capacity is not compatible with old capacity”. More precisely, incremental
capacity is installed as an extension to existing capacity whereas lumpy investment is either a
replacement for retired capacity or separate from existing capacity. Under this definition, there
is scope for both incremental (e.g., wind farm extensions) and lumpy (e.g., nw CCGT plant)
investment in electricity generating capacity.
This work is extended in [157] to a situation where a firm is seeking to devise an optimal in-
vestment strategy in the face of uncertain demand growth. The formulations presented are more
representative of a dynamical system where equations defining installed cpacity, stochastic
demand and time-lagged new builds form a stochastic differential equation (SDE) of excess
capacity. This can be analytically solved in order to find a closed-form optimal investment
strategy for a given set of input parameters. More precisely the investor objective is to min-
imise capacity costs, which include maintaining current capacity and installing new capacity,
with demand being modelled as a stochastic process and the price of capacity constant. Inter-
estingly, retirements to existing capacity are not considered and are therefore not included in
the SDE. The price for capacity is constant regardless of system excess capacity (which can
be negative) and therefore a“trigger” excess capacity level determines project initialisation
rather than the usual trigger price. It is precisely the assumption of constant price that enables a
closed-form optimal control investment strategy to be derived. In electricity generation invest-
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ment, the price for capacity is not constant, although the work does present some interesting
results which help explain why time delays, investment lumps, uncertainty and theinteractions
between them can lead to suboptimal timing of investment. The authors seek to address a num-
ber of issues. Firstly, does uncertainty delay investment? Secondly, doesgreater uncertainty
raise the trigger price for investment and reduce the trigger price for abandonment? And finally,
does uncertainty“depress” investment activity? The two examples presented show some sur-
prising results. In the first test case, where the time delay for new build is set at one year, the
excess capacity trigger level decreases (investors wait longer) with demand uncertainty and also
increase the investment lump size. In the second example, where delays areset t eight years,
the trigger excess capacity level increases (i.e., investors move earlier) and in fact“decreases
the firms sensitivity to uncertainty”. This rather unexpected result that higher demand volatility
leads to accelerated investment is explained by the firm’s“de ire to contain the risk of capacity
shortage”. This is less easy to control with longer time delays.
[161] extends [160] to look at mitigating cycles in a endogenous growth model with time delays.
The structure of the model presented (a social planner problem similar to [160]) indicates that
some of the mathematical assumptions about the utility function described in [160]can be
relaxed and a“closed-loop policy” (CLP) developed. A CLP, like an open loop policy, is an
optimal policy to induce an desirable pathway for the control variable. However CLP uses
the feedback mechanisms present to gain a deeper understanding of the“economic implication
of these models”. Assumptions concerning utility function are relaxed compared with [160],
however the structure is still quite stylised - for instance, the production function is linear
and the utility function is homogeneous. The damping effect produced by theCLP is that
those investors who foresee future capacity coming online (rational expectation with perfect
foresight) and adding to supply will smooth oscillations.
Owing to the stylised nature of many of the models discussed above, it is difficult to se the
ideas directly in a generation investment market setting. That said, the concepts pr sented can
form a basis for formulating a dynamic model of the system, particularly the delay equation
formulations presented in [162] and [157]. These works will be referrd to again in Chapter 5,
when the dynamics of the investment model implemented in this thesis are formally defined.
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4.7 Applications of control theory
As the approach presented here is concerned with applying techniques from optimal control
theory to model power market investment dynamics, it is worthwhile exploring ifand how this
methodology has been applied in power systems economics modelling in the past.
Feedback control theory has been applied to power systems in the past, within the more recent,
but largely equivalent discipline of SD. To date, studies have addressed more short-term issues
concerning generation resource availability (e.g., [163–168]). In contrast nothing in the litera-
ture has used classical stability analysis in order to design an investment market controller with
the aim of mitigating investment cycles in the power market. This was the primary motivati n
for employing techniques from dynamic control in this thesis. That said, the concept of imple-
menting a control mechanism in an SD model is not new. For instance, in [169]a simple control
mechanism is implemented which uses a target level of installed capacity as the referenc sig-
nal. If the market is not expected to achieve this target level, thus leading to”extra required
capacity”, then an“incentive signal” is sent to generators in order to induce investment. The
extra required capacity is estimated by a central body at the planning timescale far enough in
advance to allow for construction delay (here time to build CCGTs). The incentive signal is
an amount of revenue paid to generators separate to market revenues (i.e., capacity payment),
designed to cover the expected proportion of investment costs of the extrar quired capacity not
provided by the wholesale market. This additional revenue can vary yearto year depending
on the amount of capacity required and expected revenues received from selling energy on the
wholesale market.
In [164] a control system model of an energy market with differential equations governing
supply and demand is presented. Suppliers can choose to expand production when the system
price is above production cost; equally demand can increase consumption when the system
price is below the marginal benefit to consumers. Both forms of expansion are not simultaneous,
which is reflected by the inclusion of a time delay constant in the differential equations. The
state variables are the quantities and so the imbalance between supply and demafor s a third
equation. In the base case, supply must equal demand at all times and in the second case the
supply-demand equation can be temporarily unbalanced which will be reflected in the system
price. Owing to the transparent nature of the differential equations (i.e., the production cost and
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marginal consumer benefit functions are known), the system can be analysed for its stability
characteristics using classical eigen analysis, with the system deemed stableif the igenvalues
lie in the left hand side of the complex plane. In fact, the system modelled is a linear first-
order so the eigenvalues (which are a function of time delays and linear coefficients of the cost
functions) have real parts only and therefore the system is stable if thesear n gative.
Both of the control models presented in [165] and [166] are concernedwith generator bidding
strategies in spot markets. Using a Cournot oligopolistic market model, [166]provides a num-
ber of strategic bidding strategies for producers with alternative market exp ctations. In [165]
a bidding system based on price and demand feedback is constructed anda optimal controller
is designed with the goal of modifying the SMP in order to induce the necessary bidding be-
haviour to meet system demand. This approach of modelling the electricity market as a closed
loop dynamic system leads to a deeper understanding of market dynamics and stability charac-
teristics. Furthermore the use of optimal control theory enables us to develop strategies which
can guide the system toward stability, which is not possible through the use ofstatic models
[170].
In [163] an SD model is presented where demand is modelled as a stochastic process and
the simulated market price is a function of demand and available reserve. An optimal control
problem is formulated with the goal of maximising the welfare (profits) for both the supply- and
demand-side, with system reserve being the control variable. Interestingly, although the optimal
control problem is designed to find the competitive equilibrium between supplyand demand,
the generator ramp constraints, or“supply-side friction”, led to prices fluctuating between the
maximum (or“choke-up”) price and zero with no convergence toward the SMP. This high price
volatility is seen as a fundamental part of competitive power markets. The supply-side friction
is similar to the problem of lumpiness of new build and time lags during capacity construction;
new capacity capable of meeting demand does not become available immediately and so there
is a wait,“which allows the firm to accrue a larger than the static competitive equilibrium profit
for a while” [163].
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4.8 Summary of influence of literature
Drawing on existing knowledge has formed a valuable part of this research. For instance,
the work in the field of system dynamics has heavily influenced project scoping and model
implementation. The processes used in system modelling when defining the information flows
and system time delays has provided a concise method of defining this particular dynamical
system. This is important for communicating the model framework in a manner that can be
understood by researchers across a variety of disciplines.
The concepts discussed in Section 4.2 can be used to address many of the key uncertainties
that arise in power market modelling, particularly those that attempt to predict thefutur and
influence policy. As will become clear later on, this has informed the approach to modelling
uncertainties such as fuel prices, carbon prices, demand growth and construction lead times
using well-established stochastic modelling techniques.
A review of agent-based models has highlighted some of the limitations of what can be learned
from a single “representative” agent models, but at the same time it has demonstrated that there
is value in exploring this case, and if performed in the right way, robust conclusions can be
made. As is a common theme running throughout the literature, the principle of Occam’s ra-
zor should be applied from the outset; elements such a multi-agent logic can perhaps be added
at a later date to increase the model’s scope. Furthermore, Section 4.5 on market power has
increased understanding of how market power is monitored in power markets, and more appro-
priately, replicated in a simulation environment. Many of the market power detection methods
are not used within the model, although indicators such as RSI and SMA giveconfidence that
linking the degree of price mark-up to available capacity margin is a credible appro ch.
The concepts of risk aversion have influenced the modelling of investor decisions. By reviewing
all available methods of representing attitudes toward risk, the most appropriate methodology
can be applied. Furthermore, taking the perceived value of investment and translating that into
an aggregated market response decision has been heavily informed by the topics covered here.
Timing and lumpiness form a crucial part of the investment cycle phenomenona d gaining
an understanding of this is vital in any model of long-term investment trends.The models
discussed have aided the formulations of the system (cf. sub-section 5.1.5) and have helped
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communicate the mathematics that underpin this model.
Finally, a review of existing applications of control theory has provided inspiration for the




Implementation of a GB Generation
Investment Market Model
In this chapter the methodologies used to address the research question poed in Chapter 1 are
presented. To begin, the fundamental model design concepts together with their application to
a dynamic investment model of the GB power market are presented. Included are details about
all elements of the first iteration of the model. The purpose of this iteration was tobuild on the
preliminary work carried out by Ḧani [123] and apply the model to the GB investment market.
Also included are the results and discussion accompanying this stage of the work. The model’s
ability to simulate the market trends witnessed in Britain since early 2001 are scruntinised. This
acted as a basis for extending the methodology to account for high penetrations of wind power,
which is the topic of Chapter 6.
5.1 Application of dynamic control to GB market
5.1.1 Basic concept
Under certain assumptions, fundamental economics dictates that market forces will match sup-
ply with demand in the most cost-effective way.1 As discussed in Chapter 2, ‘energy-only’
markets rely on price signals, in particular price spikes and increased scarcity rents, to provide
feedback to investors and incentivise the building of new capacity. To understand the effect
these characteristics have on market prices it is useful to consider plantinves ment as a nega-
tive feedback control mechanism with market conditions, which can be used to forecast energy
prices, acting as a feedback signal. This concept is depicted in Fig 5.1. Because the model is
dynamic, current prices and their predictions are fed back to the investment block modifying
1These assumptions relate to the market being perfectly competitive. This includes: 1) the market has many
participants, none of whom have market power; 2) demand is responsive; 3) there is perfect information flow; 4)
participants make rational decisions; and 5) there are no systematic externaliti s.
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the investment behaviour. The resulting investment decisions are then fed back to the pricing
mechanism, hence closing the loop.
Figure 5.1: Electricity investment as a control problem; investment can be viewed as anegative
feedback control mechanism with current and future energy prices (asa function
of generation capacity margin) acting as a feedback signal.
The elements of a classical control problem can be observed in Fig. 5.1: they are the reference
signal (capacity margin), the system gain (investment or retirements) and thefeedback signal
(market conditions, i.e., current and future prices). Further, the combination of inherent invest-
ment time lags, delays and uncertainty about the level of capacity coming onlinein th future
can lead to generation capacity oscillations. It is well known in control enginer g that time
lags and uncertainty worsen system stability and create undamped oscillations.
5.1.2 Following Häni [123]
The Diploma project of Ḧani [123] was carried out at the University Of Edinburgh in 2005 and
acted as a starting point for this research. It analyses how wholesale mark t prices impact on the
decisions made by investors to install new or disconnect (mothball/retire) existing capacity. The
electricity market is modelled as a dynamical system and the work by Visudhiphan[122] was
the foundation. The main approach is to consider the capacity margin as a proxy fo security
of supply risk and use different available market instruments to attempt to implement a model
that achieves long-term capacity margin stability (i.e., dampen oscillations).
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The model is summarised by Fig. 5.2. An aggregated approach is taken where individual
generators and consumers are merged into a single supply and demand component. The supply







x(m+ 1) = x(m) + u(m)








wherex(m) is the installed capacity at monthm, y(m) is the sum of the installed capacity and
exogenous inputs plus new generation, both of which are represented by u(m). By represent-
ing supply dynamics using a set of parallel difference equations, the implementation follows
classical control theory. This allows the system state (x) and output, (y), to be measured at
each time-step (m). Initial values of installed capacity for nuclear, coal, CCGT and OCGT
are included, meaning a separate dynamic block for each technology. These technology types
are then intrinsically connected in order to simulate the aggregate electricity investment mar-
ket. Nuclear and coal are considered base-load capacity and CCGT and OCGT are considered
peaking. Each technology experiences a time delay on account of the construction stage. The
exogenous input inu(m) is modelled by a random variable reflecting levels of uncertainty in
supply and project abandonment. The new generation element is endogenous a d represents
new capacity added to the system (i.e., as a result of the investment decision process) or dis-
connected. The sign on this element is unrestricted: positive for plant addition, or negative for
plant mothballing or retirement.
Figure 5.2: Summary of Ḧani model; an electricity market with capacity and demand as the
only variables influencing energy prices [123].
Häni’s spot market price formulation“does not reflect influences other than pure market rules”
[123] and the energy price is a function of only two parameters: total demand and total avail-
able capacity. The price model also reflects capacity shortages or excess s by producing an
infinitely high price when demand exceeds capacity and very low price whenthe capacity mar-
gin is large. The author states that“ realistic model has been constructed; it will not produce
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“nice” results, but rather credible results for the input data given”. This is an important point
and is discussed further later. Simulations start with reasonable parameters; for xample, a 20%
capacity margin along with a random combination of peaking and base-load plants, e ch with
different life expectancies. No assumptions about total system costs arestated explicitly, al-
though the fact that plant annual capacity factors are computed using screening curves suggests
an initial mix and amount of capacity consistent with the minimum cost of supply.
Only maximum monthly demand is considered in the simulation, which is reasonable asthis
is when the capacity margin will lessen and potentially induce price spikes. These prices may
lead to a systematic over-estimation of revenues by investors if used as the investment signal.
Fluctuations during a given month are well known and the detailed load patternis periodic and
seasonal. The scale of these fluctuations is similar throughout the year, thus enabling estimation
of the actual values of base and peak demand (via a simple, linearly decreasing, LDC). There
is a pre-defined pattern describing seasonal changes modelled using a region-typical demand
curve for one year. The simulated monthly demand also contains two random variables. The
first reflects uncertainties (e.g., weather and demand forecast error)and is sampled from a
Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance specified by a fixed volatility factor. The second
is a random variable which increases over time to reflect higher uncertainties for distant future
periods. Annual demand growth is included, with a constant rate of increase assumed. Demand
elasticity is considered to be virtually zero, although the final demand model includes elasticity
and a demand cap to simulate disconnection or“self-rationing” .
The model uses the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) method when calculating investment deci-
sions, i.e., the value of the discount rate which yields a NPV of expected revnu of zero. In-
formation on total demand, total operational capacity, generator life expectancies and expected
commissioning dates for capacity under construction are considered transpa e t and observ-
able. More precisely, the IRR for each technology type is calculated priorto model execution
for the full range of possible spot market prices. Then a minimal acceptabl IRR is used as a
trigger for investment. In fact, the market spot price is the only dynamic parameter in the model
and hence determines the investment decision. Depending on investor behaviour, expected rev-
enues can be calculated can be either“cu rent, past and maybe future market prices”[123]. In
the case of mothballing (and de-mothballing), a threshold market price, equal to the variable
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operating cost of the technology is used as the trigger price. Results showed that the outputs of
the model (i.e., installed capacity in Fig. 5.2) are very sensitive to the parameters of the pricing
mechanism, which is unsurprising given that revenues are inherently linked to this parameter.
The impact of investor behaviour is also tested in the Häni model. Taking inspiration from Ford
[135], ‘believers’ and ‘pre counters’were implemented, and an‘average investor’was also
constructed, which was a combination of the two. As with the work by Ford [135], the more
rational the investors expectations of new capacity coming online, the less ovr h ot dynamics
were witnessed.
The purpose of the Ḧani work was not to replicate a specific market, but to act as a proof of
concept for a dynamic control approach to modelling capacity margins in market environments.
The relative success of implementation in the Matlab/Simulink programming environment was
encouraging, although the model is quite stylised and in order to be applied to areal market
environment, further development is required. Furthermore, some problems w re encountered
when implementing (5.1). These mainly involved the transfer of state information tother
functions and blocks within the model (a crucial element of any state-spacemod l). As a
result, many of the aims, particularly those relating to the implementation of a controlsignal
(i.e., capacity mechanism) could not be fully investigated.
5.1.3 The GB investment market model
Having gained an understanding of the work of Häni, attention now turns to this model im-
plementation. It was decided that applying the concepts first considered by Häni to a particu-
lar energy market would prove extremely valuable and contribute significantly to this field of
knowledge. The GB investment market was chosen for the application. In theremainder of this
chapter, the first iteration of the model framework is presented together with preliminary results
achieved from a hindcast simulation against historic GB market trends. Thispart of the work
was carried out during the first 18 months of the research and allowed deeper understanding
of the complexities faced when modelling a real system in a simulation environment,and he
degree of realism that can be obtained from the results of such models.
When simulating a real system using a dynamic control model, one must rememberxactly
that; that it is not the real system but only a substitute for it. Using computer-based simulation
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models enables these complex systems to be studied in an academic environment, though the
outputs of such models must be interpreted accordingly. They are usually based on a number
of (typically simplifying) assumptions in order to keep the model tractable. Classical control
theory recommends taking three steps when analysing a system:
1. Model the behaviour of the real system.
2. Identify problems such as instability (e.g., boom and bust investment cycles).
3. Optimise the controller to meet performance specifications (e.g., reliability/riskc ite-
ria/target capacity margin).
To understand and control these systems a mathematical model is required. As the systems
under consideration are dynamic in nature, the input/output relationships are described by dif-
ferential (or difference) equations (e.g., (5.1)).
5.1.4 Data considerations
When using results from a simulation model to make a prediction about the investment and
generation adequacy dynamics under a particular market framework, it ishelpful if the validity
of the model can be tested, particularly if the outcomes of these models will directly influence
policy decisions. In order to simulate past trends, historic market data must be obtained. The
availability and quality of such data will determine firstly, the amount of validation that can be
carried out and secondly the level of confidence that can be taken when comparing with history.
Below is a list of the key data requirements for such a task together with resources:
• Market price data for the period before the introduction of NETA has proved difficult to
obtain, therefore the validation work is constrained to a comparison with market trends
post NETA (i.e., 2001 onwards). Historic Market Index Price (MIP) data is available
via the GB price reporter ELEXON [171]; this a reflection of the short termwholesale
price in GB and matches Reference Price Data obtained from the APX PowerGroup
[172]. More detailed wholesale market price data is available via subscription to the
power exchanges, but the prices charged are beyond the financial limitsof a postgraduate
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studentship. Further, industry regulator, OFGEM, can be called upon to provide pricing
data in its market liquidity reports (e.g., [8]).
• Databases such as the Economic and Social Data Service [90] can be called upon to
provide historic data for a number of countries, of particular interest arefigures on to-
tal installed capacity, generation by fuel type and peak demand. This data can lso be
obtained from NG’s Seven Year Statements [27], which includes informationon plant
capacities, commissioning year, retirements and mothballing. Further, information
on plant mothballing in response to market conditions is available from OFGEM [173].
As GB SO, National Grid (NG) publishes a Winter Outlook [66] in which it makesan
assessment of both the security of both gas and electricity supplies.
• Generating unit cost datacan be estimated using these and other published studies such
as the macro-level MARKAL model [174] and, more recently, the extensivin estigation
into generation costs published by Mott MacDonald [21]. In fact, the latter has been used
as input data for much of the recent modelling work commissioned by DECC (e.g., [65]).
These resources report technological characteristics such as generic thermal efficiencies
and annual plant availability.
• Details ofutility financial structures , such as cost of capital and gearing ratios can to
some extent be derived from company annual reports (e.g., [41–46])or independent firms
that have carried out generation investment modelling for government andh ve better
access to resources than the academic sector (e.g., [104]). It is not just inp t data that
is helpful in a model such as this, but also data about processes, in particular, how firms
carry out investment decisions. Some details can be obtained by conductinginterviews,
but by and large this information is kept secret and so must be estimated.
• Owing to the commercial nature of energy markets, limitations exist on the amount of
data that can be obtained. For instance, detailed information about thetec nical charac-
teristics of existing power plants, such as thermal efficiencies and forced outagerates is
not published, which makes calibration of the NG Winter Outlook estimates difficult.
• Electricity demand data for GB is readily available as far back as 2001.
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All forms of recorded data can be subject to errors. Missing or corrupt measurements can lead
to systematic errors in estimations. Therefore an important part of any process which involves
a lot of data gathering is quality assessment. Another issue surrounds dataconsistency. The
gathering of data inevitably leads to inconsistencies between resources (e.g., Fig. 3.5). This is
particularly problematic when comparing model output with historic trends; it maytch one
data set well but not another.
5.1.5 System dynamics
Modern control theory operates in the time domain and differential equationsinvolving state
variablesare used to represent the system. In this instance, the dynamics of the system tat
concerns the evolution of installed generation capacity and rate of demand growth. The rate of
change in capacity at a particular time-step is dependent on new plant comingnli e or being
de-mothballed together with any plant being retired or mothballed. Both are delaye signals
from some earlier time. In the case of new plant this delay is the lead time for construction,
and in the case of retiring plant, this delay is the design lifetime. Further delays are caused
by the need for investors to accumulate data in order to form their expectations about future
market conditions. Mothballing requires zero delay, whilst de-mothballing requi s a delay that
is significantly less than full construction. An aggregate approach is takenwh reby capacity is
combined into five categories of generator technology, namely nuclear, coal, wind, CCGT and
OCGT each with its own financial and technological characteristics. In this imple entation, all
generator types are endogenous with evolution depending largely on the investment decision
element of the model. Demand is modelled as exogenous using predefined growth scenarios.
The model does not consider the transmission network and is conceptually asingle bus system.
The elegant notation used in [157] is employed to define the state of the systemat “real-time”.
The state of the dynamic system holds crucial information and is defined by thevectors(Ix, ψBx )





j ), j = 1 . . . ωx
}
, (5.2)
is the vector of new builds (superscriptB). ξBj is the size of investment block andωx is the
number of capacity blocks of typex under construction.ηBj indicates the time at which the
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decision is taken, with−τx < ηB1 < ηB2 < . . . < ηBωx , whereτx is the expected build time and
j is the total number of non zero investment years since time zero. The ordering convention
ensures that the oldest investment block of sizeξB1 will be completed first at timeη
B
1 + τx














implies that investments of size
10 units where undertaken at time-steps 1, 4 and 7. The control system is now defined as the
volume of installed capacityI(t), which is a parallel cascade of the five technology categories
(nuclear, coal, wind, CCGT, OCGT). Each single category is defined bya Delay Differential















ξBj δ(t− ηBj − τx − αx), (5.3)
whereδ(t) is the Dirac delta function. This function has zero width and infinite amplitude
with
∫ ∞
∞ δ(t)dt = 1, and is zero everywhere except at the origin [175]. The first term in (5.3)
accounts for the addition of capacityξBj installed at timeη
B
j + τx. The second term accounts
for deletion of capacityξBj built at timeη
B
j + τx and retired at timeη
B
j + τx + αx, whereαx
is the expected lifetime. This is described in Fig. 5.3. Reading from left to right,the diagram
demonstrates how new capacity builds are represented by nonzero impulses of magnitudeξBj .
In this example, impulses at timesηB1 andη
B
4 contribute to the change in installed capacity at
time t due to one of the two Dirac delta functions in (5.3) evaluating to zero. This demonstrates
how time delays due to capacity construction (blockξB4 ) and lifetime (blockξ
B
1 ) are captured.
Note that neither of the Dirac delta functions forξB2 andξ
B
3 evaluate to zero. Therefore they do
not contribute to the change in capacity at timet, however they will contribute to the measured
change in installed capacity at some other time.
(5.3) can be extended to include mothballing or premature retirement of capacity. This is de-








i ), i = 1 . . . ωx
}
is
the vector of mothballed and de-mothballed capacity (superscriptM ). The indexi provides
























ξMi δ(t− ηMi − τMx ). (5.4)
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Figure 5.3: Breakdown of DDE (5.3) at timet (indicated by a circle on the timeline) for plant
typex where non zero impulses (scaled Dirac delta function) at timesηB1 andη
B
4
contribute to the measured change in installed capacityIx(t).
This includes all mothballed and de-mothballed plant becauseξMx is free to be positive or neg-
ative and the delayτMx = max
{
0, τDx · sgn(ξMi )
}
, i.e., zero if mothballing andτDx otherwise,
whereτDx is the lead time to de-mothball plant typex. Note that any mothballed capacity
must continue to age whilst it is “disconnected” from the system to ensure it ispermanently
retired once it reaches the end of its design lifetime. It is noted that by assuminga fixed design
lifetime, the model overlooks the option for generators to repower their existing plant (e.g.,
refurbishment, systems upgrade and equipment retrofit [176]). The implication in a model such
as this is that the simulated investment dynamics may alter due to perhaps: 1) smoother exit of
existing plant and 2) a lower capital intensive option for generators relativ to full replacement.
However representing this additional choice for investors would add significa t complexity to
the model and increase computational burdens. Moreover, the factors inv lved in a repower-
ing decision are very complex (e.g., see [176]) and the costs are site- andtechnology-specific.
Due to the lack of publicly available data, these costs would likely need to be estimated, and
if included in the simulation model would reduce the credibility of the results present d. Each
capacity block in (5.3) and (5.4) consists of a number of smaller components that represent
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individual plants. These are 500 MW for nuclear and coal, 100 MW for CCGT and wind, and
50 MW for OCGT.
The total installed capacity can be obtained by integrating the DDEs in (5.4)











and summing over the five technology types, i.e.I(t) =
∑4
x=1 Ix(t). Ix(0) is the initial
installed capacity,Ax is the set of all built plantAx =
{
j|t ≥ ηBj + τx
}
, andRx is the set of
all retired plantRx =
{
j|t ≥ ηBj + τx + αx
}
.
5.2 Modelling the “real-time” GB wholesale energy market
Simulating wholesale energy prices is an important aspect of any model that addresses invest-
ment in generating capacity under a liberalised market framework. Furthermor , the wholesale
price trends witnessed can indicate to observers how well the system is functioni g and whether
there has been adequate investment in capacity. For example, as discussed in sub-section 2.4.5,
there is a tendency for over-investment to lead to periods of low energy prices and conversely
under-investment leads to periods of high prices. Further, investors must also make market
price expectations and much of the logic presented in this section is used to anticipate future
revenues for generators during the forward-looking investment decision process described in
Section 5.3.
It is assumed that in a competitive energy market, generators will bid to produce electricity
at or around their marginal cost. The rules of the GB market allow for generators to trade
freely, i.e., there is no marginal cost bid rule in place. However there is anecdotal evidence to
suggest that prices are typically close enough to theoretical marginal cost, so it appears valid to
assume generators bid in this way. That said, recent analyses of the GB market [98] showed a
tendency for prices in the balancing mechanism (BM) to rise above the estimated rginal cost
of the last generator dispatched in peak demand hours. Other examples ofempirical analyses
which support this claim include [177, 178]. In [177], an analysis of theTexas BM revealed
evidence of bidders, particularly smaller firms, submitting supply curves in excess of their
theoretical optimal supply function. [178] found that a Cournot oligopolymodel provided a
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better representation of the California, Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Marland (PJM) and New
England wholesale markets than a perfectly competitive model during peak hours, and it was
during these hours that the presence of price mark-ups was detected. In this case the market
does not necessarily clear at the marginal cost of production. Consequently, it was decided to
include a price mark-up function, which is driven by the system capacity margin. This is also
consistent with the Ḧani model. This also agrees with the methodology used in [98] to simulate
GB system marginal prices. Details of each element together with how the full who esale price
is simulated is covered below.
5.2.1 The marginal cost element
This is computed using the aggregate system supply curve under the assumption of erfect com-
petition. More precisely, variable operating costs are estimated for each ofthe five technology
types and an aggregate supply curve based on the entire generation setis constructed.
5.2.1.1 Fuel
Firstly, wind variable operating costs are assumed to be zero. In the case of the f ur thermal
generator types, variable operating costs are based on the common (convex) cubic function of
power output [179]:
C(P ) = a+ bP + cP 2 + dP 3 + V. (5.6)
wherea is the no load cost inMBTu, b is the average heat rate (MBTu/MWh), c andd
are incremental heat rates, andV is the variable operation and maintenance cost (£/MWh). To
keep things simple, the cubic function (5.6) is simplified. More precisely, no start up or no-load
costs are considered and linear variable operating costs are assumed for all generators, i.e., total
variable operating costs for generator typex are given byCx(P ) = bxP + Vx, which leads to
a stepped aggregate supply function in the short-run (if bids are assumedto equal generator
marginal cost,SRMCx = bx) based on the marginal costs of the entire generation set.bx can
be derived from the generator type thermal efficiency,νx (∈ [0..1]) and fuel cost,F (£/MWh).
Note that the fuel costs must be expressed in standardised units, so theb in (5.6) is different
from thebx used to estimate total variable operating costs, though using the fact that there are
3.413 MBTu in a MWh, either form can be derived.
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Note that the following conversion factors are used when converting fuel prices into costs per
unit of energy produced: 1 GJ = 9.48 therms (for gas), 1 MWh = 3.6 GJ = 3.413 MBTu [180].
For coal, the rate of conversion used from£/tonne to£/GJ is 25.12 (i.e.,£100/tonne is equivalent
to £3.98/GJ) [181].
5.2.1.2 Emissions
To account for the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) in operation across Europe since 2005, the
additional cost incurred by generator types who produce GHG emissionsmust be accounted
for. This is estimated by altering the variable operating cost function:




whereϑx is the carbon produced by burning the particular fuel type at 100% efficiency (kg/MWh)
andFcar is the ETS (or carbon) price (£/kg). The emissions output from each fuel source is
given by: gas - 185 (kg/MWh) and coal - 330 (kg/MWh) [180]. Therefo based on the thermal
efficiencies in Table 5.6, CCGT generator types emit 349 kg/MWh, OCGT 474kg/MWh and
coal 943 kg/MWh. These figures are broadly in line with DECC estimates of 910 kg/MWh for
coal and 400 kg/MWh for gas [182]. All other technology types are modelle with zero carbon
emissions. Using these conversion factors together with the thermal efficiencies i Table 5.6,
allow standardised formulas for marginal costs (£/MWh) for the five conventional plant types
to be derived. These equations, along with a numerical example, are given in Appendix A.2.
5.2.2 Price mark-up
In this study the market price includes an additionalm rk-upterm that alters the shape of the
aggregate supply curve as the system approaches scarcity. Some studies (e.g., [105]) have found
the presence of negative mark-up in very low demand hours. One reason for this phenomenon
in the current GB system could, for example, be on account of CHP plantsneeding to continue
(or start) generating because of heat commitments. However such a function is n t considered
here. Two forms ofmark-upfunction were considered; an exponential (variation of [122]):
w1(L,G
∗
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wherea, b, andg are scalar factors to be set in order to induce the desired price behaviour nd
L andG∗N =
∑N
i=1Gi are the load and total realised available capacity from all generators,
respectively (GWs). NoteN = 5 in this application. Note that the parametersa andb are
calibrated so that a capacity margin of zero provides a mark-up equal to theVOLL. For instance,
for a VOLL of £10,000/MWh,a = 10, 000 andb = −1.123, and for£2,000/MWh,a = 2, 000
andb = −1.101. Note that both (5.8) and (5.9) are set to zero for negative capacity margins;
the situation when there is inadequate available capacity to meet load is dealt with in(5.11).
To illustrate, a selection of functions are plotted in Fig. 5.4. Both (5.8) and (5.9) were used in
the Ḧani model [123]; results showed dependence of the model output on thefunction scalar
factors. As it is impossible to determine the “real” pricing mechanism for the GB market, it
seems sensible to tune the pricing mechanism to produce credible results for the GB market.
This is the subject of sub-section 5.5.5.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.4: (a) Price mark-up for different values of capacity margin (1 GW intervals) nd
calibrations for (5.8) (labelled “Expo.”) fora = 10, 000, 2, 000 and 1, 000 and
(5.9) (labelled “Hyper.”) for g = 5.9, g = 10.9 andg = 16.0. (b) Same plot on a
logarithmic scale.
The hyperbolic function was used under reasonably healthy system conditions when an ade-
quate capacity margin is present (range 50-20%) and the risk is low, yet itdoes not increase
sufficiently quickly as the system approaches scarcity. Under these conditions, the exponential
function is better. Therefore a thirdmark-upfunction was constructed as a max of (5.8) and
(5.9):
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w3(L,G
∗
N ) = max {w1(L,G∗N ), w2(L,G∗N )} (5.10)
5.2.3 Price setting procedure
The price is set by performing an economic dispatch and the marginal cost (5.7) of the last
generator to be dispatched sets the system marginal production cost. By assuming a linear cost
curve, the speed of the economic dispatch optimisation model is greatly increased; the supply
curve is simply a piecewise step function where each piecewise constant segment is given by
the SRMC of each generator typex. The full pricing function is defined as:
π(L,G1, G2, . . . , GN ) = mc(L,G1, G2, . . . , GN ) + w(L,G
∗
N ) (5.11)
wheremc(L,G1, G2, . . . , GN ) is the marginal production cost of meeting the load,L, given
realised total available generationG∗N , andw(L,G
∗
N ) is the price mark-up function. If there
is inadequate available generation to meet load, i.e.,L > G∗N , then (5.11) is set at the VOLL.
The time-step in the “real-time” energy market can be lengthened to a minimum frequency of
hourly. This is included so that wholesale price movements can be simulated throughout the
year, which is particularly useful for model validation.
5.3 Modelling investment decisions
In this implementation, investment decisions are taken annually. Market conditions in the “real-
time” energy market simulation are taken as initial conditions for predictions of the future
state of the system during the lifetime of a potential investment. Crucial uncertainties such
as future demand, fuel prices and wholesale energy prices are all simulated. There would be
little value in listing each difference between the investment model logic in [123] and this
work. It is important to note that some similarities do remain, but overall the logic has c anged
substantially. For instance, IRR is not used for the investment decision andthe specifics of the
NPV calculations have been altered. This was motivated by a need to avoid thepitfalls of IRR
[36] and to allow the capacity factors of investments to be dynamic.
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5.3.1 Investment logic
As Fig. 5.1 suggests, the investment block is key to determining the response of the dynamic
system to changes in price and underlying levels of capacity. The arrowsfeeding out of the
investment block to“forward-looking models”represents any forecasting the investor carries
out in order to determine an investment strategy (i.e., invest in new capacity, withdraw existing
capacity or do nothing). The “real-time” model can have up to a hourly time-step. Owing to
computational burdens, the investment block executes with minimum frequencyone ear, with
mothballing decisions carried out up to every six months. In this model the annual investment
decision is considered an irreversible decision. It is based on the Net Present Value (NPV)
of anticipated future profits. These profits are calculated in the standard way, that is profit is
revenue received from selling power minus the costs incurred producing it.
For simplicity, a single investor who is well acquainted with the structure of the market nd
capable of securing the necessary debt to finance large-scale capacity investment is modelled.
This representative agent approach has been used by other dynamic capacity market models
(e.g., [54]). Furthermore, this design follows the adaptive expectations hypot esis discussed
earlier and has been applied in other dynamic models (e.g., [34, 119, 121, 135]). When estimat-
ing the profitability of an investment, a Monte Carlo approach is taken to obtain a probability
distribution of profitability whereby estimates for capacity already under construction (includ-
ing delays), demand growth, and fuel prices are considered stochastic.
The representative (or aggregate) agent is aware of capacity already under construction at the
start of each decision process. However there is uncertainty about a)the time remaining to
build each unit; b) whether they will in fact make it to operation; and c) if rivals will jump
in and invest in response to increases in expected profits. In the base case, generators assume
all units will come online with 100% certainty, and remaining build time is stochastic. This is
modelled as the sum of the expected build time (minus one year) plus a random variable that
is sampled from a lognormal distribution,lnN(µ, σ2), whereµ andσ are the mean (one year)
and standard deviation (six months) of the distribution, respectively. This distribution is shown
in Fig 5.5. A lognormal distribution was chosen due to the fat-tailed property not present in
other more “well-behaved” distributions commonly used to sample random variability about a
mean (e.g., a Normal distribution). This captures investor uncertainty aboutdditional (e.g.,
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planning and licensing) delays: on average they last one year, though extrem ly long and costly
delays may also be experienced. Decision making under uncertainty is modelled by taking
a risk averse attitude to investment; this is discussed in the next sub-section. Investors also
assume that currently operational units will generate for the duration of their design lifetime.
Figure 5.5: Additional delay (months) for projects under construction. This value is added to
each technology’s expected build time (minus one year).
The investor models expected price of each fuel type and the carbon price in the system as a
stochastic process. More precisely a Geometric Brownian motion:
dFt = m(Ft)dt+ v(Ft)dWt, F0 = f > 0, (5.12)
is constructed for each fuel type and the parameters are defined basedon p rceived drift (ex-
pected change), (m) and volatility (v) characteristics. The initial values (F0) are taken to be the
average of prices witnessed over the previous year (Fig. 5.10).m is 4% per year for gas and
carbon, and 1% for coal and uranium.v is 0.3% for gas, 0.2% for coal, 0.05% for uranium and
0.2% for carbon. These parameters were chosen based on anecdotalvidence about the relative
volatility and rate of price increases for each commodity. Forward curves are not included in
this initial iteration of the model. It should be noted that the volatility of each fuel type are
not modelled as correlated random variables. The implication of this is that the mod l ay
under-estimate the relative volatility in profits between technologies, howeverthe model is able
to capture the correlation between gas and electricity prices on account ofsimulated electricity
prices being a function of generator production costs (5.11). An exampleof a model that does
include correlated fuel prices is [183], here a calibrated (to UK governm nt data) SFE simula-
tion model where oil prices are“taken to be the underlying random variable, while the prices
of gas and coal are linked to it”is presented. The correlation coefficients used match well with
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empirical data for the period 1996-2005 (e.g., gas correlation with coal is 0.63). The simulation
showed that predicted profits for gas-fired generators were highestand had the lowest variance,
while nuclear generators profits were found to be lower and more volatile.
The yearly utilisation factor of a potential investment is based on simulated daily peak and
base loads. The simulated loads use a base demand profile, which is precalculated using 2006
‘IO14 DEM’ load data from NG [19], plus a random variable to account for uncertainty in
the forecast. This random variable follows a Normal distribution with mean 0 and standard
deviation 100 MW. To model increasing uncertainty into the future, this standard eviation
increases at a rate of 10% per annum throughout the forecast, i.e.,∼ N(0, 102 · (1.1)y−1)
wherey is the forecast year. In addition, the investor assumes an annual growthrate of the base
demand profile of 1.2%, this is applied by scaling each simulated load by 1.012. To illustrate,
the base demand profile for January is plotted in Fig. 5.6.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.6: (a) Example daily load profile (January) and (b) annual LDC (solid line)with fitted
polynomial functione(t) (dashed line).
For each year in the forecast, an annual LDC is constructed from the predicted daily loads (Fig.
5.6(b)). A 5th order polynomial function,e(t), is fitted to each LDC (using Matlabpolyfit) and
the required base-load and peak energy is computed. For simplicity, the required base-load
power is assumed to be the value of the LDC at 100% duration,B, and the required base-load
energy (MWh) is given byeB = 8760·B, i.e., the rectangular block in Fig. 5.6(b). The required
peak-load energy (MWh) is then given byeP =
∫ 8760
0 e(t)dt− eB, i.e., the area above the line
markedB in Fig. 5.6(b). eB andeP are then used to assess expected unit utilisation. Wind,
coal and nuclear units are restricted to serving base-load energy and CCGT and OCGT are
restricted to peak-load energy. It is noted that by forcing units to be in a particul r load segment
the investor does not account for 1) the fact that CCGT and OCGT units may provide residual
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base-load energy (i.e., remaining base-load energy once available energy from base-load units
has been used), and 2) that the merit order may change over the courseof the simulation time
horizon. However this approach was made possible by the fact that in no simulated year in
the historic GB case study was either 1) available energy from base-load cap city significantly
below eB or 2) CCGT below coal in the merit order. In an application where these factors
are an issue, an alternative approach would need to be devised. Note that the improved model
presented in Chapter 7 does not suffer from this imperfection.
To keep things simple, the total available energy (TAE) for each unit(unit sizes given in
sub-section 5.1.5) is calculated using expected available capacity:
TAE[eu] = 8760E(Gu) = 8760cu(1 − ρu), (5.13)
whereρu is the unit FOR. This is subtracted fromeB or eP following the generator type merit
order (i.e., stack the units in increasing marginal cost, and call on the lowest-cost units first).
The expected energy served for each unitwhich is considered base-load is given by





whereNB is the total number of base-load units belowu in the merit order. Similarly for a
peak-load generator





whereNP is the total number of peaking units belowu in the merit order. Utilisation factors
can be obtained by dividing (5.14) or (5.15) (depending on generator type) by (5.13). Once
the TAE from existing units has been computed and subtracted from total energy d mand, any
remaining energy is considered available for the potential investments (categorised as base or
peak), with utilisation factors,uf iu, calculated similarly.
Expected competitive market prices are calculated by stacking the plants in merit ord of in-
creasing marginal cost until each predicted daily load is met. As the generators wi hin a tech-
nology type share the same capacity and FOR characteristics, and are assumed to be subjected
to independent forced outages, the expected total available generation ineach period (day) is
given byE(G∗N ) =
∑N
i=1E(Gi), where eachE(Gi) (one for each generator type) is estimated
using (2.16). An example of this is depicted in Fig 5.7.
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Anticipated price mark-ups are calculated by substitutingE(G∗N ) and the simulated loads into
(5.10). The averages of the competitive peak prices (prices in those periods where load is greater
than available base-load capacity) and anticipated peak mark-ups are used to calculate CCGT
and OCGT gross margins (GMs, defined here as revenue minus variable cost). Similarly, the
averages of the competitive base prices (prices in those periods where load is equal to, or less
than, available base-load capacity) and anticipated base mark-ups are used to calculate wind,
nuclear and coal GMs, although price mark-up is virtually zero in these periods due to a surplus
of available resource. Thus expected GM (£) for unit u of generator typex in yeari is given
by:
GM ix = 8760cx · uf iu(E(πi) − E(SRMCix) + E(w3(L,E(G∗N )))) (5.16)
wherecx is the unit capacity,uf iu is the expected utilisation in yeari, E(π
i) is the expected
system marginal price (e.g., Fig. 5.7),E(SRMCix) is unitu’s average SRMC (calculated using
annual average fuel costs from (5.12)), andE(w3(L,E(G∗N ))) is the expected price mark-up
for each of the daily loads,L. Note that ifE(πi) < E(SRMCix) thenuf
i
u will be zero (i.e.,
the unit is not anticipated to be called upon when meeting the annual load).
Figure 5.7: Plot demonstrating how expected perfectly competitive market prices are calcu-
lated based on the intersection of the stepped aggregate supply function for ex-
pected available conventional generation and demand.
This method for calculating expected output, costs and revenue is quite simplistic.It is likely
to under-estimate average scarcity rent,πi − SRMCix, due to Jensen’s inequality, i.e., the
expectation of GMs for a given expected price, SRMC and price mark-up(5.16) is less than
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the GM of the expected scarcity rents,E(πi − SRMCix), plus expected price mark-up. This
methodology of calculating GMs was used for the preliminary implementation only, and a more
robust approach is developed in Section 7.3.
In the case of OCGT peaking units, revenue from the STOR market is also considered. Based
on the data at [184], a 2 GW annual tender with an availability price of 2£/MW/h with a
utilisation (estimated at 3% of hours) price of 100£/MWh was included.
5.3.2 Present value of an investment





GM ix − FCx
(1 + r)i−τx
− (ICx +DCx) (5.17)
wherer is the firm’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC) (2.9). The expected bond return,
γ, in (2.9) is set at 8% for all technologies. The remaining WACC parameters ar defined in
Table 5.6.GM ix is the gross margin (5.16) for yeari,FCx is the generator fixed operating costs,
andτx andαx are both expressed in years. Although the investor randomly samples capacity
construction times for plant already in the build stage, for simplicity it is assumed that investors
consider only fixed build times when assessing the present value of an investment (5.17). In the
case of plant lifetimes, the investor assumes that capacity will close at the endof its esign life.
A more sophisticated representation would have the investor consider the possibility of random






Mxi cxpx(1 + r)
−(i−τx), (5.18)





i = 1. The expenditure schedules used are given in Appendix A.3, e.g., nuclear
is spread over 7 years with 10% of construction costs incurred in years 1-2, with 20% in years
3-6. Total interest accumulated during construction is given byTIACx = ICx−cxpx. Finally,







M qi dxqx(1 + r)
−i, (5.19)
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wheredx is the cost (£/MW) of decommissioning,δx is the number of years required, andM
q
i is
the capital expenditure vector. Only nuclear projects have considerabledecommissioning costs
(estimated at 12% ofpx; estimated to be between 9-12% by the World Nuclear Association
[29]); in the case of other plant types the decommissioning liabilities are assumed to b offset
by the salvage value of the assets [21]. Nuclear decommissioning is assumedto take 150 years
and the incidence of capital outlay matrix contains 0.05 for the first 10 entriesand (i.e., 50%
of total decommissioning coming in first 10 years after closure) and the remaining e tries are
1/140 (i.e., 50% of cost spread over 140 years). All cashflows are discounted to the start of the
first year of operation.
The total annualised (or amortised) fixed costs per unforced MW (TAFC)(£/unfor.MW/yr)
discounted to the start of the first year of operation are given by:
TAFCx =
DCRFx(ICx +DCx) + FCx
1 − ρx
, (5.20)
whereDCRFx is the deferred CRF (2.3) andρx is the generator FOR.
Only the firstn years of expected revenues are stochastically simulated by the investor (here
n = 15), in contrast expected costs incurred are included for the lifetime of the plant. Investors
are aware of the ROCs scheme and assume all renewable capacity (in this case wind) built after
2002 will be eligible for this subsidy.
Because the MC model randomly samples capacities, fuel prices and load growth, a large sam-
ple is required in order for investors to obtain reliable estimate of expected project value (5.17).
Therefore 100 MC simulation runs are carried out for each plant type in each decision year.
5.3.3 VaR criteria
In this model, the distribution of potential profits are constructed from the MC simulations
of the stochastic variables and a risk averse investor with Value at Risk decision riteria with
q = 5% is assumed. The distribution ofVx in (5.17) is computed by MC simulation for each
plant type and an investment is deemed attractive ifp(Vx > V
opt
x ) ≥ (100 − q)%, whereV optx
is the minimal acceptableVx; i.e.,V
opt
x is a lower bound for the project value used in the VaR
criterion. This is assumed to be zero as investors recover initial investment and receive adequate
return on investment on account of the WACC applied in (5.17). An example of this concept
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is shown in Fig 5.8: the VaR forq = 0.01 is negative (investment is deemed nonprofitable),
by comparison the VaR forq = 0.05 andq = 0.5 are both positive (investment is deemed
profitable).
Figure 5.8: Example of critical values,vq, for different values ofq.
At each decision moment, the investment decision continues iteratively, whereby th decision
is to 1) invest in a block of the most profitable technology (if any), followed by 2) a re-run
of the investment decision with all new investments accounted for. Steps 1 and2 re then
repeated until no plant additions are profitable. There is also a secondary logical check that
the expected utilisation factor for all thermal generation is greater than zeroin the first year of
operation (uf1x > 0), otherwise the investment is delayed. When a number of technology types
are optimal in terms of the above criteria, those projects are ranked by their Profitability Index






i.e., critical (q%) Vx divided by total investment cost.
5.3.4 Mothballing
The mothballing of existing capacity is a direct consequence of the market feedback mecha-
nism; if a generator believes that a particular plant will not be able to cover itsfixed costs from
revenues in the energy-only market (and assuming it has not establisheda contract with the SO
to provide reserve), then mothballing the plant until the price rises sufficiently is an option. It
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Plant name Unit(s) Type Capacity (MW) Year
Drakelow C 9 10 12 Coal 999 2003
Grain 1,4 Oil 1350 2003a
High Marnham 1-5 Coal 945 2003
Killingholme 2A/B/S CCGT 450 2002b
Killingholme 1A/B/S CCGT 450 2003
TOTAL 4194
aMothballed due to low prices and de-mothballed same year (one unit in September and the other in December)
in response to security of supply concerns [185]. See Fig. 5.9.
bBoth 1x and 2x sets closed due to low prices. 600 MW of capacity at Killingholme was returned to meet the
needs of a National Grid STOR [185]. Returned to full service (900 MW)in August 2005.
Table 5.1: Plant retirements or mothballing shortly after introduction of NETA [27] (does not
include nuclear retirements).
is well documented that after the introduction of NETA, a large volume of old and inefficient
plant was retired or mothballed (Table 5.1 and Fig. 5.9). This was attributed to falling wholesale
prices making inefficient plant uneconomical. However some plant was retired purely based on
lifetime. In line with the formulations earlier, plant closures as a result of reaching the end of
design lifetime is exogenous, in contrast retirements due to economic conditionsare left to the
model.
Figure 5.9: Historic mothballing and de-mothballing in GB during 2002-4 (x-axis labels
shown below plot) [173].
140
Implementation of a GB Generation Investment Market Model
Once capacity is mothballed (of which there is currently 1.25 GW in GB [66]) then it remains
connected to the system but no longer contributes to short-term security ofsupply risk calcu-
lations (as it would take a number of months to get the plant ready to generate again from the
mothballed state). It is assumed here that any mothballed capacity can be brought back at any-
time up until 5 years after if was initially mothballed. If the 5 year threshold is exceded then
the capacity is permanently retired.
This model considers coal, CCGT and OCGT plant eligible for mothballing. All nuc ear and
wind operational fixed costs are considered sunk. The decision is takenevery six months and is
based onAGMx < 0 whereAGMx is the average expected gross margin over fixed operating










wherej represents the Monte Carlo simulations (100 in total). Therefore only generator fixed
and variable operating costs are relevant for this decision.
Choosing six months as the decision time-step was chosen based on historic frequency of moth-
balling in GB (Fig. 5.9). The iterative characteristic described above is alsoused, whereby plant
is mothballed (or de-mothballed) until it is no longer economical to do so. Or altern tively, in
an extreme case, there is no more plant left of the technology being assessed to mothball or
de-mothball.
5.4 Historic GB case study assumptions
To verify the approach and model formulation, it was attempted to simulate the market dy-
namics in GB since the introduction of NETA in 2001. The dynamic model is appliedto an
‘energy-only’ market setting with a initial capacity mix comparable to the GB power system
and a VOLL of£10,000/MWh. To mirror UK policy held at the time, nuclear is not considered
for investment before 2006. ROCs became active at the end of 2002 andare paid to all opera-
tional wind generation at the rate of 47£/MWh (based on average ROC auction price in 2002
[186]).
Using available data on capacity, demand, prices and fuel costs, the modelwas set-up to simu-
141
Implementation of a GB Generation Investment Market Model
late GB investment market conditions from 2001 onwards. The system capacity h s been tuned
to reflect the situation just prior to the introduction of NETA. The initial plant mix used the
simulation is based on total transmission connected capacity in GB around that timeshown in
Table 5.2. To keep the model simple, minor sources of peaking capacity sucha oil and pumped
storage are combined with OCGT. Other base-load such as run-of-river hydro is included with
coal. By taking this approach, model complexity is kept to a minimum and computational me
is reduced. The capacities of each technology type is shown in Table 5.7. To get a complete
GB picture, the E&W and Scotland systems are combined into a single energy market.2
Plant type Capacity (GW) # stations # unit sets
Coal 30.5 19 70
CCGT 19.4 30 101
CHP 0.8 6 14
Hydro 1.1 34 8a
Nuclear 12.5 13 42
Oil 3.7 3 6
Onshore wind 0.12
OCGT 1.2 19 34
Pumped storage 2.1 4 13
Total 71.4 128 288
aIndependent sets (i.e., not part of same hydro scheme, cf. Table3.3).
Table 5.2: Approximate GB installed transmission entry capacity in 2000. Source: [27, 90].
To reflect capacity already under construction in GB in 2001, 4.3 GW of CCGT capacity comes
online during the first (1.2 GW), second (1.3 GW) and third (1.8 GW) year of the simulation.
2As mentioned earlier, this actually became the case in April 2005 with the introducti n of the British Electricity
Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) in GB.
Technology Capex FC Var. O&M Equity Gearing WACC WACC
x in (5.17) £/kW £/kW/yr £/MWh return κ χ rn (nom.) rr (real)a
Nuclear 1,485 43 0.18 0.15 0.5 0.115 0.089
Coal 900 21 1.01 0.12 0.6 0.096 0.069
CCGT 410 8 2.00 0.12 0.6 0.096 0.069
OCGT 300 9 2.70 0.12 0.6 0.096 0.069
aAssuming a 2.5% rate of inflation.
Table 5.3: Generator financial assumptions with symbols defined in Section 5.3. Sources: [26,
39, 104].
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Station Capacity Final year Model cap.
(MW) of oper. (MW)
Cockenzie 1104 2011 1000
Didcot A 2108 2012 2000
Kingsnorth 1940 2012 2000
Tilbury 1104 2012 1000
Ferrybridge 1/2 980 2015 1000
Ironbridge 964 2015 1000
TOTAL 8200 8000
Table 5.4: Assumed coal LCPD opt-out stations closure dates “under current running pat-
terns”, National Grid Winter Outlook 2009/10 [187].
Station Capacity Final year Model cap.
(MW) of oper. (MW)
Bradwell 240 2003 500
Chapelcross 150 2003 500
Dungeness A 440 2006 500
Sizewell A 458 2006 500
Oldbury 470 2009 500
Wylfa 980 2011 1000
Hartlepool 1208 2014 1000
Heysham 1 1213 2014 1000
Hinkley Point B 1261 2016 1000
Hunterson 1090 2016 1000
Dungeness B 1082 2018 1000
Heysham 2 1204 2023 1500
Torness 1200 2023 1500
Sizewell B 1200 2035 1500
TOTAL 12470 13000
Table 5.5: Assumed nuclear station closure dates. Sources [30, 188].
Existing coal plant included in the LCPD is modelled with the reduced lifetimes shown in Table
5.4. The oil plants at Grain (1300 MW), Fawley (1000 MW) and Littlebrook D(1370 MW)
are assumed to close at the end of 2015. This model assumes a fixed lifetime for all LCPD
exempt and opt-in plant (Table 5.7) and that “sweating the assets” in times of tight supply
conditions is not an option. Nuclear closures are consistent with those in Table 5.5. All other
existing units are given retirement dates consistent with the lifetime assumptions inTable 5.6
and commissioning dates in Appendix F of [27].
Note that the build times shown in Table 5.6 are base times only; a random variablerepresenting
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Technology Therm. FOR Lifetime Build De-mothball Initial No. of Unit
x in (5.17) eff. ρ α (yrs) τ (yrs) τD (months) (GW) units size
Nuclear 0.36 0.10a 40 7 - 12.5 25 500
Coal 0.35 0.14 40 5 6 31 62 500
CCGT 0.53 0.13 25 3 2 19.1 191 100
OCGT 0.39 0.10 40 2 2 8.35 167 50
aRecent years have shown a decline in the annual availability of the GB nuclear fle t (likely due to age), therefore
this value is reduced to 75% for existing nuclear capacity. This estimate is the average of the aggregated energy
output from installed GB nuclear capacity 02-09 [190]. New nuclear builds are expected 90% availability.
Table 5.6: Generator technical assumptions and initial system capacity with symbols define
in Section 5.3. Sources: [26, 39, 104].
Technology Annualised Total interest acc.






Table 5.7: Generator (real) total fixed and interest cost assumptions for historic simulation.
unforeseen delays (e.g., in the planning process) is added to the build time,τx, after the build
decision is taken (as in the Häni model [123]). Like the investment model, delays are sampled
from a lognormal distribution with mean 1 year and standard deviation six months(Fig. 5.5).
Furthermore, the number of projects that are abandoned is modelled using aimple discrete
probability distribution such that on averagex% of projects are abandoned. In the base case,
x = 0 for coal, nuclear, CCGT and OCGT. The logic here being that traditionally,new thermal
capacity is usually built on an exisiting site with a grid connection so will not come up against
planning resistance. Owing to its poor record at gaining planning permission, x = 50% for
wind. For instance, a basic analysis of renewableUK data [189] revealed that from 2004 to
2008, 495 applications were submitted and only 258 had been approved bysummer 2009.
Table 5.3 shows the costs and financial assumptions used. The total annualised fixed costs per
unforced MW and total interest accumulated during construction are shown in Table 5.7.
In this implementation, wind was included in the investment decision. Its annual maximum
utilisation was assumed to be 0.28, with nominal WACC,rn = 0.15, capexp = 1, 000 (£/kW),
FC = 27 (£/kW/y), variable O&Mv = 0 (£/MWh), lifetime α = 25 years and build time
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τ = 4 years [26].
The data shown in Fig. 5.10 was used to model generator fuel and emissionsprice at “real-
time”. The gas price is modelled with a greater degree of accuracy than the other fuel prices
for a number of reasons: firstly, only detailed historical data of gas prices was obtainable, sec-
ondly by having a detailed model for gas, the characteristic of electricity prices being strongly
correlated with gas prices can also be checked and verified.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5.10: Plots of model real-time fuel and ETS prices: (a) gas [191], (b) coal [192], (c)
carbon [191] and (d) uranium [193].
The “real-time” model can be used to test the realism of the pricing mechanism against re-
alised prices. Therefore, the model time-step is set to hourly (investment decision frequency
annual) and demand is modelled based on historic half-hourly GB demand datataken from [27].
Generally speaking, the choice of time-step in models such as this is made by considering the
trade-offs between computational tractability and speed, and the granularity of model outputs;
the finer the time-step the more information can be observed.
The model has been implemented using in the Matlab/Simulink 2008 environment. Using an
Intel dual-core 2.40GHz processor (note that Matlab versions before2011 will only execute
145
Implementation of a GB Generation Investment Market Model
using a single processor) with 3.12GB RAM with 100 Monte Carlo simulations foreach in-
vestment decision and a hourly time-step simulation period of 8 years takes manyhours to
complete.
5.5 Simulation results
5.5.1 Base case results
Fig. 5.11 shows the model simulation of capacity margin against reality. Plainly thenegative
response after 2001 of the solid line is deeper than in reality but the frequency of oscillation in
the two lines is very similar (which is not surprising given that the frequencyof investment and
peak demand is annual) and the margin also seems to be better damped than in reality. However
considering the model is based on a number of assumptions and simplifications,these results
show a good agreement with this data. This comparison of capacity margins is clearly motivated
by the goal of using this ‘signal’ as the control system reference signal.Given that it is made up
of both an exogenous and endogenous model parameter, i.e., demand andcap city, respectively,
this match must be interpreted accordingly. For instance, the dynamics in underlyi g peak
demand shown in Fig. 5.12 have a significant influence on the capacity margin.
Figure 5.11: Generation capacity margin oscillations witnessed since market liberalisation
(solid line) and simulation results from 2000 (dashed line).
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Figure 5.12: Evolution of total installed capacity in GB in reality and in the simulation. GB
maximum demand also shown.
Figure 5.13: Approximate evolution of installed capacity for each generator type in GB (solid
lines) and in the simulation (dotted lines).
Fig. 5.12 shows the evolution of total installed capacity (ICAP) in the simulation versus reality
(using the ESDS [90]) in the base case (where the investment decision in anual). Both lines
in Fig. 5.12 follow a similar trajectory however the simulation is smoother. Total capacity is
broken down by technology types in Fig 5.13, again the match is reasonable although these
comparisons depend on the approximations used (in this case according to DUKES [190]).
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5.5.2 Investments
Figure 5.14: Wind and CCGT capacity investment triggered during the simulation that actually
completes the build stage, and actual investments announced in GB. Triggered
wind investments have been scaled by the probability of project abandonment,
i.e., 0.5. Data on wind from renewableUK [189] and CCGT builds estimated
from NGC seven year statements [27] assuming 3 year build time.
Fig. 5.14 shows the volume and type of investment triggered during the simulation.There is
little investment in the early years owing to the capacity already under construction when the
simulation starts (Section 5.4).
Wind power investment is also another key area of interest and was modelledas an endogenous
model parameter in this case. Fig. 5.14 shows that in the simulation no significantnvestment
in wind occurs until after 2005. After this, not only does the ROC subsidy become active,
but also there are significant extra costs incurred for other projects: for CCGT the cost of gas
increases by 60% from 24 p/therm to 39 p/therm and coal generators have the additional cost of
emissions to consider. Fig. 5.14 also shows renewableUK data [189] on applications received
for new wind farms received in GB. The main points to note here are althoughwind power
investment is delayed until 2005, perhaps owing to the high WACC for this technology, there
seems to be an over-investment in later years. Recalling that as the model does not consider
grid connection arguably this trend is quite plausible in this model where wind is anticipated to
be heavily subsidised and grid connection straightforward. Of course much of this investment
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will not make it to the build stage owing to the high probability (0.5) of project abandonment
for reasons outside pure market rules.
Figure 5.15: Cumulative CCGT capacity added to the system in the simulation (dotted-line)
and according to the DUKES/ESDS data [190] (solid line).
Also of interest is the cumulative CCGT capacity added to the system, which canbe see in Fig.
5.15. The new builds initialised in Fig. 5.14 can be seen coming online after the 3 year lead
time (contributing to capacity in the following year). The pattern does not match perfectly, with
the minor increase in 2005 not captured. By comparison the ramping up of investment in the
later years, together with the relative lump sizes in, say 2006 and 2009, is encouraging, given
that project lead times and precise retirement data are being estimated.
5.5.3 Mothballing
Although in reality CCGT capacity growth remains constant throughout the simulation (Fig.
5.15), the same cannot be said of OCGT plant: inspection of Fig. 5.13 showsa downturn in
OCGT capacity in 2005 that does not match with reality. This downturn can be explained by a
sharp increase in mothballed plant in 2005 (Fig. 5.16) in the simulation and thus the installed
capacity also falls behind reality. The likely cause of this behaviour stems froa combination
of an increase in installed CCGT capacity, which reduce OCGT revenues from the energy
market, together with a 60% increase in gas prices. Limited information is availablepertaining
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to when exactly GB’s (current) 1.25 GW [66] of plant was mothballed. The information that
was available concerned the mothballing of plant in early 2003, with much of it returning
to the system in the winter of the same year (Fig. 5.9). Owing to the reduced complexity
of the model compared with reality, it is difficult to capture this response becaus individual
plant characteristics are not included in this aggregated model. Thereforalthough some of the
preliminary simulation results were quite encouraging, the model was not able toreplicate all
forms of market response.
Figure 5.16: Volume of capacity in mothballed state during the simulation.
5.5.4 Importance of the reserve market
A sensitivity test was carried out whereby a weighting coefficient,w, in the range 0 to 1 was
applied to the additional revenue received by OCGT plant for participationin the STOR market.
For example,w = 1 represents the base case discussed above where OCGT participates in
STOR, andw = 0 represents a complete removal of the STOR market. Fig. 5.17 shows the
importance of having a separate market for reserve (which is essentially acapacity payment
for OCGT plant); without it the initial capacity margin slump is deeper owing to intensified
withdrawal of OCGT plant from the system. Owing to greater CCGT investmentin the early
years than in the base case, the margin does recover after 2005, although CCGTs are not well
suited to providing reserve and hence the level of security of supply riskis greatly increased.
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Interestingly the introduction ofw leads to a better initial downturn in capacity at the start of
the simulation (w = 0.5) and although the margin remains below reality in subsequent years,
the difference is constant implying that this payment is a key parameter in the modl. This can
be interpreted as the inclusion of a steady revenue stream for peaking plant removes much of
the uncertainty surrounding utilisation and price, reducing the volume of mothballed OCGT in
the model.
Figure 5.17: Plot of GB generation capacity margin (solid line) with reserve market sensitivi-
ties (dashed lines) for various coefficient weightings (w).
5.5.5 Wholesale energy prices
Another key area of analysis was the ability of the model to simulate wholesale energy prices.
Using the pricing mechanism described in sub-section 5.2.3 with price mark-up(5.10), with
parameters set ata = 10, 000, b = −1.123, g = 5.4, s = 1 [123] (Fig. 5.4), simulated
average monthly wholesale prices were compared with the monthly average forward Market
Index Price (MIP, reflection of the short term wholesale price) [191].Fig. 5.18 shows a good
overall matching of trend. The loss of precision after April 2008 can be explained by recalling
that detailed gas price data for these years was not available (Fig. 5.10).The ability to push
through high fuel costs is demonstrated when the simulated prices for April 2001 to April
2007 are viewed in isolation. The mean difference between the MIP and simulated prices was
4.0 £/MWh with standard deviation 9.6£/MWh. By comparison over the range using more
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accurate fuel price data (up to time indicated by horizontal line in Fig. 5.18) was 0.70£/MWh
with standard deviation 4.35£/MWh.
It should be emphasised that the main aim of the model is not to predict the electricity p ices
but to investigate whether or not an ‘energy-only’ market is susceptible toexcessive capacity
oscillations. Hence the main aim is to investigate the dynamics of aggregate investment what-
ever happens to the primary fuel prices. Obviously as the absolute level of electricity prices
depends strongly on the primary fuel prices, predicting future electricity prices would require
a sophisticated gas and coal price prediction model and that would be beyond the scope of this
research. Any changes in primary fuel prices have the effect of shifting the level of prices up
or down, assuming constant GMs for gas-fired (“spark spread”) and coal-fired (“dark spread”)
generators when selling electricity. Further, it could cause a switch in primary investment from
one technology to another (e.g., from coal to gas as has been the trend in recent years). This is
justified by inspection of Fig. 5.19 and 5.20 which show results from a simulation using pre-
dicted gas and coal prices from OFGEM [96] and not actual data from 2001- 007. Plainly the
price graph is different (influence of demand profile is more noticeable) incontrast the capacity
graph is only mildly affected.
Figure 5.18: Average monthly wholesale energy prices in the simulation (dashed line) and in
GB wholesale market (solid line) [191].
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Figure 5.19: Average monthly wholesale energy prices in the simulation when using fuel pric
predictions (dashed line). Actual GB wholesale market data is included fora
comparison with Fig. 5.18 (solid line).
Figure 5.20: Generation capacity margin oscillations witnessed since market liberalisation
(solid line) and simulation results from 2000 with actual prices (dashed line, as
in Fig. 5.11) and predicted prices (dotted line).
5.5.6 Summary
There is no economic model that has been able to simulate past events with 100%accuracy.
Attempting to replicate historic market dynamics in GB, particularly plant response to market
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conditions, has proved to be a challenge. The preliminary results are encouraging, although it is
clear that this iteration of the model is unable to replicate the events of the GB market entirely.
This is hardly surprising given the simplified nature of this model, which was necessary in order
to keep the model tractable within the duration of a 3 year project.
There is scope to improve the model. It was discussed earlier that the dynamics in underlying
peak demand have a significant influence on the capacity margin. Further,the results shown in
Fig. 5.11 use realised peak demand. In hindsight, for the results presented here, the historic
simulation should have been compared in a way that minimises the significance of this variable
whilst still reflecting the security of supply risk. The realised ACS peak considers underly-
ing demand patterns and“typical” winter peak weather conditions and is therefore a better
measurement to use. Therefore, using the data in Fig. 3.6, the capacity margin comparison
is re-plotted in Fig 5.21. While much of the oscillation is removed as a result of the use of
ACS peak, the signals compare less well, with the winters 01/02 - 03/04 and 06/07 particularly
poor. Also shown is the realised capacity margin using the DUKES [190] forICAP instead of
the ESDS [90], the simulation compares better with the DUKES data, with an increasing trend
after 03/04 present in both signals. Furthermore, to provide more robustconclusions, a longer
period of history should have been analysed, though data before the introduc ion of NETA
could not be obtained. Data for E&W pool prices and what was believed to be aggregate E&W
demand, was eventually located 3 years into the work. It could therefore not be realistically
included.
That said, this stage of the work formed a vital part of the process and highlights why these (and
subsequent) results should be interpreted with a degree of care. That is, repl cating absolute
levels of, e.g., capacity margin is difficult, yet by considering overall trends i response to
different policies, participant behaviour, capacity mixes and underlyingdata assumptions can
be considered. Furthermore, given the short duration of the validation period, where the impact
of many triggered investments are not realised within the simulation time horizon, a loger
simulation period must be considered to allow robust conclusions about model performance to
be drawn.
As a result of feedback from the publication of the paper version of this chapter [194] and sub-
sequent collaboration with Prof. Benjamin Hobbs of Johns Hopkins University, it was decided
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Figure 5.21: Generation capacity margin in GB using ACS peak demand. Using historic data
on ICAP from the ESDS [90] (black, solid line), and the DUKES [190] (bluelin )
and simulation results (dashed line) shown.
to consider investment in wind capacity as a exogenous model parameter andfocus on devel-
oping a more robust modelling technique to estimate thermal generation investmentdynamics.
Justification for this approach to modelling wind is the topic of Chapter 6 and the updated
model, including the new method of calculating expected output, costs and revenue of thermal
generation is presented in Chapter 7.
5.6 Chapter summary
In this chapter the dynamic simulation model has been presented. The basic concept f the mod-
elling approach with a description of the feedback mechanism being investigat d w s given. A
review of the work of Ḧani [123] showed that although this concept had been implemented in
a simple model it had not yet been applied to an existing system. By describing the dynam-
ics of the model mathematically and its application to the GB investment market the intended
direction of the work was introduced. Next, the methods used to model generator SRMC and
price mark-ups due to market power within the modelling environment were describ d. Section
5.3 provided details about investor logic, that is a single investor who uses NPV of expected
future profits and VaR as the decision criterion. Section 5.4 described the input assumptions
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for GB case study, in particular the application of the model to an historic simulationof market
dynamics in the period post NETA in order to achieve the goal of model verification. Section
5.5 provided the preliminary results for the model application, which showed some agreement
with reality. A summary of the work demonstrated the limitations of the model and challenges
encountered. This sets the scene for the next two chapters where substantial improvements to
the model are undertaken in a second phase of the work.
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Modelling High Penetrations of Wind
Investigating how best to model increasing penetrations of wind in a dynamic investment sim-
ulation model has formed a substantial part of this work. In its own right it has provided a
contribution to knowledge beyond that of the dynamic investment model work.In this chapter,
the cutting-edge techniques used to model production from high penetrations of wind power
are described. The results from this chapter are employed in Chapter 7 to update the invest-
ment market simulation model for assumed levels of installed wind. The work present d helps
answer the following questions: 1) given historic wind resource availabilityin GB, what would
have been the hourly production for a higher level of installed wind capacity, nd 2) what is the
likely contribution from wind to meeting peak demand?
6.1 Motivation
In GB, the installed capacity of wind generation is expected to increase dramatic lly in the
coming years. Inspection of the latest renewableUK data [189] on wind projects in operation,
construction, or consented there could be a capacity in excess of 15 GW onshore and up to
40 GW offshore by mid 2020, which is a significant change from today’s level of ∼5 GW
(with ∼2.2 GW and∼2.8 GW at the transmission and distribution level, respectively [27]).
This magnitude of increase in total installed wind capacity in a system with around75 GW
of total transmission connected capacity and a maximum and minimum annual demand of 60
GW and 20 GW, respectively, transforms the GB system from a low to high wind pe etration.
High penetrations of wind power introduce a number of challenges in powersystem operation
and planning. There is a statistical relationship between wind availability and demand (via the
dependence of both on the weather) and, unlike conventional thermal generation units whose
individual availabilities are assumed independent, wind power output is related to hat at other
geographical locations.
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6.2 Approach taken
Rather than treat wind as an endogenous parameter in the model, investment inwind capacity
is now considered exogenous to the model (Fig. 5.1). This approach is justified by the fact that,
to date, large-scale investment in wind capacity is driven by political, rather than economic
considerations. It is therefore assumed that policies promoting investment inwind generation
(e.g., ROCs) are successful in meeting renewables targets and the purpose of this work is to
provide insights into the response of investment in thermal generation and subsequent levels of
security of supply risk. This also seems reasonable given the results in sub-section 5.5.2 where
a high level of profitability of wind led to large volumes of wind investment, thus suggesting
that factors beyond pure market rules influence the growth in this technology. That said, the
contribution of wind generation to meeting demand must still be considered.
In most circumstances, it is reasonable to consider wind as a “must-run” ornon-dispatchable
form of generation, where if the turbines are available (in the technical sense) and generating,
then they will be dispatched. Network constraints may limit the amount of generation that
can be exported from a particular region, and there is a large volume of work concerned with
the best approach to network operation and planning in GB with large penetrations of variable
wind (e.g., [68, 195]). In contrast because this work conceptually uses a ingle bus system, these
issues are beyond the scope of this study. As a result, the residual load for thermal generation is
of interest. The residual load is simply the expected load minus the expected output from wind
power at each hour. By taking this approach, the analysis naturally takesinto account spatial
relationships in wind availability and its relationship with demand.
Measured wind output data is hard to obtain in GB and even when available (e.g., aggregate
transmission connected wind output is available from bmreports [102]), these measurements
do not fully represent the long-term contribution of wind, particularly offshore. Therefore, a
simulation of wind output, or more precisely aggregated wind capacity factors(CF ), is the
approach chosen. Two similar methods are employed when simulating onshoreand offshore
wind CFs, the details of which are described in the following sections.
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6.2.1 Onshore wind (after [61])
Simulated hourly onshore wind output is calculated using the technique described by Olmos
[61]. The Olmos study takes hourly UK Meteorological Office wind speed data1 for 2001-
07 and firstly extrapolates to adjust for hub height (10m to 60m), and secondly performs a
transformation to account for the turbine design (Bonus 2 MW wind turbine power curve).
Aggregate hourly GB CFs are simulated by taking a weighted average of regi nal CFs, based
on the aggregated wind capacity in operation, construction, or consentedin each region [197].







wherewi are the weights,xi are the regional CFs andR is the total number of regions. These
regions are shown in Fig. 6.1 and weightings in Table 6.1. This approach is justified by the fact
that although the current penetration of wind generation in GB is small relativto long-term
expectations, the geographical dispersion is broadly in line with “long-term”xpectations for
each region.
In this study the same approach is applied to wind speeds extracted for 2005-09. The reason for
choosing these five years to perform the analysis is to compliment the data thatwas vailable
from a unique offshore simulation model described next. The main justifications for using wind
speed measurement data when simulating aggregate onshore wind production are: 1) there is
the lack of extensive time series data with adequate temporal resolution for currently operational
farms in GB; and 2) the amount and geographical dispersion of onshorewind farms will grow
over time, and will include production from regions where CFs and correlations with loads and
wind from other areas are not currently known.
As with any expansive data set, there were issues with missing or corrupt data points. Although
minimal, those that were missing or erroneous were filled by simply taking the average of the
two adjacent readings in the time series. A Vestas V80-2 MW power curve is used [198] with









1In fact, the wind speeds are the mean wind speed over 10 minutes measured from minute 40 to minute 50 of
the hour [196].
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Figure 6.1: Diagram showing onshore regions used when simulating aggregate GB CFs. Ovals
positioned offshore indicate location of farms listed in Table 6.2.
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wherevz is the wind speed at heightz, vzr is the reference wind speed at heightzr andα is
the power law (or wind shear) exponent, commonly assumed to beα = 1/7 [199]. Note that
issues concerning diurnal variation of expected onshore wind output derive from wind speed,
versus wind power derived from real wind farm data are not considered here. For instance, it is
necessary to decrease the wind shear exponent in (6.2) when it is sunny, because the boundary

















Table 6.1: Onshore regional weights (MWs).
6.2.2 Offshore wind
For GB offshore wind, the expected hourly CFs are calculated using the wind speed data from
the fully compressible, non-hydrostatic mesoscale weather forecast model developed at The
University of Edinburgh [201, 202]. This is a atmospheric model similar to theMet Office
Unified Model [203]. The 3 km resolution (other studies have used a muchlower resolution,
e.g., [98] used wind speeds at a 12 km resolution) provides a good levelof d tail in the resource
approximation. The simulated wind speeds have been validated against measured offshore
wind speed data for a number of sites [204], and in the absence of extensive measurement data,
provides credible estimates in time and space for the GB offshore wind resourc . Simulated
hourly data (average of 10 minute resolution wind speeds during the hour)was extracted for
2005-09 and the offshore locations displayed in Table 6.2. These are displayed in Fig 6.1 as
numbered ovals.
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The simulated wind speeds are transformed to site level CFs using the same techniqu s as [61]
but instead using a Vestas V90-3 MW power curve and a hub height of 100m (on account of
the relative increase in turbine size witnessed offshore). The weighted offshore GB CFs (6.1)
are then calculated based on the results from the Round 1 to 3 Crown Estate Round auctions
[197]. This data is displayed in Table 6.2; the weightswi are displayed in right-most column,
xi are the site (not regional averages as for onshore) CFs andR = 39.
This approach takes a “long-term” view about the offshore wind resource. More precisely, a
fully diverse offshore wind resource is available for each level of installed capacity (i.e., each
additional MW is spread evenly across all sites). Using the long-term aggregate CFs may
overestimate the contribution from offshore wind in the years leading up to 2020 (when large
round 3 sites expected to come online). Accounting for all the issues in a model such as this
would take a lot of time to implement and may not add sufficient value to the results inlight
of simplifications made elsewhere. It has been examined in a preliminary mannerin a recent
paper [204].
6.3 Calibration
Simply scaling 10m wind speed to hub height and transforming to CF using a manufacturers’
power curve without calibration will probably not give a realistic long-termCFs on account of
inaccuracies in scaling, turbine outages and topographic effects. For instance, wake losses and
gusts (particularly for wind speeds approaching full power output) arenot accounted for and so
some form of calibration against measured power outputs must occur.
The approach taken here is to scale the aggregated annual CFs for onsh e and offshore wind
to match published data on annual capacity factors [190]. More precisely, a minimisation of
the sum of squares of the residuals, i.e, the difference between observed CFs and simulated
CFs (averaged across the year), is used to obtain the scaling factors. This was computed using
the MS Excel 2003 Solver add-in. This method is reasonable for onshorewind because the
diversity of the current resource is fairly reflective of the future (Table 6.1 and Fig. 6.1). In
contrast this is not the case for the current offshore wind resource.The 1.3 GW of offshore wind
currently operational [197] in GB does not fully represent the future geographical diversity of
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Map Name Auction Turbine Turbine No. of Total MW
No. round type capacity (MW) turbines wi’s
1 North Hoyle* 1 Vestas V80 2 30 60
2 Gunfleet Sands II 1 Siemens 3.6 18 64.8
3 Rhyl Flats 1 Siemens 3.6 25 90
4 Burbo Bank 1 Siemens 3.6 25 90
5 Barrow* 1 Vestas V90 3 30 90
6 Teesside 1 3 30 90
7 Kentish Flats* 1 Vestas V90 3 30 90
8 Lynn - Inner Dowsing 1 Siemens 3.6 27 97.2
9 Lynn 1 Siemens 3.6 27 97.2
10 Robin Rigg - East 1 Vestas V90 3 30 90
11 Robin Rigg - West 1 Vestas V90 3 30 90
12 Gunfleet Sands I 1 Siemens 3.6 30 108
13 Ormonde 1 5 30 150
14 Scroby Sands* 2 Vestas V80 2 30 60
15 Greater Gabbard - Galloper 2 3.6 40 144
16 Walney I 2 3.6 51 183.6
17 Walney II 2 3.6 51 183.6
18 Westernmost Rough 2 3 80 240
19 Lincs 2 3.6 75 270
20 Humber Gateway 2 3.6 83 300
21 Thanet 2 3 100 300
22 Sheringham Shoal 2 3.6 88 315
23 Greater Gabbard - Inner 2 3.6 100 360
24 West Duddon 2 3.6 160 500
25 Docking Shoal 2 100 540
26 Dudgeon 2 168 560
27 Race Bank 2 5 88 620
28 Gwynt Y Mor 2 3.6 160 576
29 London Array I 2 3.6 175 630
29 London Array II 2 166 370
30 Triton Knoll 2 1200
31 Hastings 3 600
32 West Isle of Wight 3 900
33 Moray Firth 3 1300
34 Bristol Channel 3 1500
35 Firth of Forth 3 3500
36 Hornsea 3 4000
37 Irish Sea 3 4200
38 Norfolk 3 7200
39 Dogger Bank 3 9000
TOTAL 40759.4
Table 6.2: Assumed offshore wind farm developments based on data from Crown Estate auc-
tions [197]. Sites highlighted with * indicate technical availability data has been
located [205].
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the system (Table 6.3). Therefore scaling the simulated CFs by the publishedannual CFs would
ignore increases in resource availability as a result of diversification. Csequently, the scaling
factor is applied to the simulated aggregate CFs that include operational (at the time of writing)
offshore farms only. These locations are highlighted in bold font in Table 6.2. Thus the GB
CFs are computed for the existing 13 sites (R = 13 in (6.1)) and the annual average CFs from
this time series are used to calculate the scaling factor. This gives a scaling of0.928 for onshore
and 0.918 for offshore. The results of the scaling are presented in Table 6.3.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Long-term
average
DUKES (Table 7.4)
Onshore 0.264 0.272 0.275 0.270 0.274
Offshore 0.272 0.287 0.256 0.304 0.260
Simulated GB CFs (unscaled)
Onshore 0.297 0.282 0.288 0.301 0.290
Offshore (existing farms) 0.301 0.299 0.288 0.320 0.268
Offshore (long-term) 0.474 0.447 0.457 0.495 0.442
Scaling factor onshore 0.928
Scaling factor offshore 0.919
Simulated GB CFs (scaled)
Onshore 0.276 0.261 0.267 0.280 0.269 0.271
Offshore (existing farms) 0.277 0.275 0.265 0.294 0.247
Offshore (long-term) 0.436 0.410 0.420 0.455 0.406 0.425
Table 6.3: Simulated and calibrated CFs for on and offshore wind. The ‘long-term’ offsh re
CFs are calculated using all weights in Table 6.2 and the ‘existing farms’ only use
those farms currently operational (highlighted in bold in Table 6.2).
6.4 Validation
To check the validity of the wind modelling, a comparison between simulated and actual historic
outputs was undertaken. Sadly data on individual wind farm output, or indeed high resolution
(i.e, half-hourly) aggregated output was not available at the time this analysis wa undertaken,
although monthly resolution output data for GB can be extracted from OFGEM’s ROC register
[206]. Monthly CFs were derived from historic data on ROC certificate alloc ti n for January
2005 - March 2009 by dividing the‘Number of certificates’by ’Capacity’. This data contains
the ROC certificate data for over 700 wind farms throughout GB. Each windfarm was allocated
to a region according to the polygonal regions in Fig. 6.1. Simulated monthly CFscould then
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be compared with both aggregate and regional CFs. Note that not all wind farms on the ROC
register have been generating for the same length of time, therefore each month’s aggregate CF
includes only the sites that were in operation at that time.
A selection of onshore regional comparisons is provided in Appendix A.6 with the aggregate
comparisons shown in Fig 6.2. The profile for aggregate onshore GB CFsshows a over-
estimation in most periods. However applying the 0.919 scaling factor in Table 6.3 provides a
better match.
Figure 6.2: Plot of comparison of simulated monthly aggregate GB onshore CFs (dashe lines)
versus actual GB CFs estimated from ROC register data (sold line).
Figure 6.3: Plot of comparison of simulated monthly aggregate GB offshore CFs (dashe line)
versus actual GB CFs estimated from ROC register data (sold line).
The aggregated and scaled offshore GB CFs are compared for all 13 wind farms in operation in
Fig. 6.3. The graph shows a reasonable match in terms of pattern, although an over-prediction
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in winter and under-prediction in summer is witnessed in some years. This over-prediction
can largely be attributed to technical availability. For instance, of the four ope ational offshore
wind farms analysed (highlighted with a ‘*’ in Table 6.2), the average technical availability
for the winter of 2007 was 69.8% [205]. There is major uncertainty surrounding the technical
availability of offshore wind, particularly during winter months when much of the North Sea
is closed to shipping and so farm access may be restricted. Due to lack of data, this issue
cannot be addressed further here, yet it is an important caveat for these results and must be
considered when assessing levels of generation adequacy risk for particular investment scenario
(cf. Section 7.5).
6.5 GB hourly wind production
Once the time series for for GB onshore and offshore CFs for the period2005-09 have been ob-
tained (43,824 load hours), the expected installed capacity must be allocatedbetween onshore
and offshore and the aggregated hourly GB wind production computed. For instance, given an
assumed onshore wind capacity,won, and offshore capacity,woff , the simulated hourly wind
production (WP) in houri is given by:
WPi = GBCF
on
i · won +GBCF offi · woff , (6.3)
whereGBCF oni andGBCF
off
i have been calculated using (6.1) for the onshore and offshore
resource, respectively.
To begin, a base case wind capacity growth profile is constructed. Here total installed wind
capacity is expected to increase linearly from 2010 levels up to 30 GW by 2020 with a max-
imum of 35 GW in 2025, after which it levels off, as shown in Fig. 6.5. The plota so shows
the onshore and offshore penetrations. Onshore wind is increasing ata rate of 1 GW per year
with a maximum of 13 GW while offshore is increasing at 1 GW per year until 2015 and then
increasing to 2 GW after that. The allocation between onshore and offshore areas is consistent
with the data in [61] and [197].
Fig. 6.4 shows how the relative levels of installed capacity within the fully aggregated GB
capacity factors (6.1) increase throughout the simulation. This provides avisu l representation
of the ‘contribution’ from each region to the weighted CFs and overall GB wind production.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.4: Diagrams showing effective regional contributions to total wind capacity for (a)
2010 (no offshore wind); (b) 2015; (c) 2020; and (d) 2025.
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For instance, taking 2015 as an example, the total installed capacity of wind is 12 GW. This
is split between 7 GW onshore and 5 GW offshore. Using (6.3), the simulatedhourly onshore
wind CFs (6.1) are multiplied by 7 GW to provide hourly onshore wind production, and the
simulated hourly offshore wind CFs are multiplied by 5 GW to provide hourly offshore wind
production. Thus, the absolute levels of installed capacity vary, but the simulated hourly CFs
remain unchanged.
Figure 6.5: Plot of total installed wind capacity growth assumptions. Distribution between
onshore and offshore also shown.
With this build schedule defined, an hourly residual load calculation using empirical load and
simulated wind data can now be performed. The residual load in each hour isthe hourly em-
pirical load net of estimated hourly wind production (6.3). Fig. 6.6 providesa visualisation of
the impact on the 2005-09 residual load histograms (considering 43,824 residual load hours for
2005-09) as penetration of wind increases. These histograms provide agraphical representation
of the distribution of residual loads for a particular level of installed wind capa ity. Note that
the GB hourly loads for the period 2005-09 have been normalised by the year’s average demand
when constructing the histograms. A normalisation of the data is necessary when comparing
multiple years to account for demand growth. These plots (penetration increasing in increments
of 10 GW) do not match exactly the four diagrams in Fig. 6.4 (increasing in 5 year increments
in line with Fig. 6.5), yet they demonstrate the change in residual load better than the equivalent
5 year incremental histograms.
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Figure 6.6: Result of increasing installed wind capacity from (a) 2 GW to (b) 10 GW to (c) 20
GW to (d) 30 GW on residual load histograms. Also shown in (e) are some exam-
ple residual LDCs. Numbers in brackets indicate volume of onshore andoffshore
capacity respectively.
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Interestingly, the residual load histograms become more ‘Normal looking’ asthe penetration of
wind increases. This phenomenon can perhaps be explained by considering th changes in the
underlying data when moving from full to residual load at high wind penetrations. To illustrate
this point, Fig 6.7 shows the normalised full load over time for January-March2009 (blue).
There is a distinct pattern to the full hourly load with daily peaks and troughs (a typical daily
example is shown at the top of Fig. 6.7), although maximum and minimum daily loads chnge
in relation to the season and day of week. These characteristics are reflected in the histogram
in Fig. 6.6(a) by a high frequency of similar load levels (distinct peaks). Bycomparison hourly
wind production is an independent random variable. So when deducting production from 30
GW from the full load at each hour, the profile is transformed into a seeminglyrandom process
with almost all of the distinct daily pattern removed. The Central Limit Theorem state that
the distribution of the sum of a large number of independent random variables, each with finite
mean and variance, will approach normality. This explains the migration from the distribution
in Fig. 6.6(a) to the more “Normal” looking Fig. 6.6(d).
Figure 6.7: Plot of normalised hourly full load, simulated wind production and residuallo d
for 2009 with an installed wind capacity of 30 GW (13 GW onshore, 17 GW off-
shore).
In addition, the standard deviation of the distributions increase substantially,with negative
residual demands experienced at high penetrations. These observations are further highlighted
in the residual LDC plots shown in Fig. 6.6(e); the negative loads occur for penetrations of
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30 GW and above, though the peak load remains largely unchanged. In plain terms, these
residual load histograms provide an approximation of what thermal generation production re-
quirements (ignoring network issues) would have been for 2010-25 levels of installed wind
under the assumption that simulated wind production and load for 2005-09 are representative
of future patterns.
6.6 Capacity credit of wind
In this section the results of a capacity credit (CC) calculation for the simulatedwind data is
presented. CCs are an important addition to this wind analysis chapter and willbe used in
Section 7.5 to de-rate wind capacity at system peak in order to make projections ab ut future
levels of generation adequacy risk via the de-rated capacity margin.
In this study, the “long-term” weighted GB CFs calculated above are used to calculate the
ELCC, i.e., the amount of additional demand that can be supported after the wind is added
whilst keeping the level of risk the same. In mathematical terms, this involves solving the
following optimisation [93]:
p(X < d) = p(X < d− g+ + [ELCC]), (6.4)
whereX is available conventional generation (not including additional wind generation), d
is demand andg+ is the wind generation. Following [61], the hourly simulated CFs for those
hours within 10% of peak demand are used to represent the availability of theGB wind resource
at peak demand (as in [61]). Over the period analysed (2005-09), thisincludes 1,045 demand
hours. To illustrate, the probability mass function (pmf) for the weighted onshre and offshore
wind CFs during these hours are plotted in Fig. 6.8. To compare, the pmf for entire 5 year
period is given in Fig. 6.9. Plainly the shape, mean and standard deviation ofthe distributions
are different in both cases, thus highlighting the difference in resourceavailability at peak
compared with year-round. The plots also demonstrate the well known characteristic that the
offshore wind resource is higher than onshore.
Using these probability distribution for wind availability, (6.4) becomes
p(X < d) =
∑
j
p(CF = j)p(X < d− j ·W + [ELCC]), (6.5)
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.8: Plot of probability mass function for available CF from GB (a) onshore (mean
0.307, SD 0.236) and (b) offshore (mean 0.493, SD 0.309) wind generation, based
on simulated hours withing 10% of winter peak. If the CF falls in a particular
range, it is deemed to be at the middle of that range (i.e. load capacity in the range
0-4% are deemed to be 2%.).
(a) (b)
Figure 6.9: Plot of probability mass function for available CF from GB (a) onshore (mean
0.291, SD 0.219) and (b) offshore (mean 0.416, SD 0.295) wind generation, based
on all hours 2005-09.
wherej = {0.02, 0.06, . . . 0.94} is the midpoint of each CF “bin” (e.g., Fig. 6.8),W is the
installed wind capacity (1-13 GW onshore, 1-22 GW offshore, cf. Section 6.5). For eachj,
the LOLP is calculated using the probability distribution for conventional generation,X, and
demand leveld (left hand side) ord − j ·W + [ELCC] (right hand side). A fixed level of 60
GW for demand is assumed.
The results of the ELCC calculation, expressed as a percentage of installed wind capacity, are
plotted in Fig. 6.10. The values range from 9-35% depending on level of installed capacity.
The graph shows the typical pattern witnessed with wind CCs; as the penetration increases
the CC value reduces. This demonstrates the dependence between sites due to “fuel” resource
availability.
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Figure 6.10: Capacity credit results based on long-term weighted load factors; used in simu-
lation model.
6.6.1 Caveats
In this section, a specific methodology has been applied to calculate CC, however it should be
noted this is not in itself cutting edge probability theory (e.g., see Dent [93]).For a superior
approximation of CC in GB, including credible estimates for offshore wind, see Hawkins [204].
For instance, using the 5 year LOLE (i.e., sum of hourly LOLPs (2.12)), as in [204], would
provide is more statistically robust estimate of the ELCC because it takes into account many
more demand hours (e.g., around 18,000 winter demand hours between 2005-09) and thus
provides a better representation of the relationship between demand and thewind resource
availability at periods of peak demand. Further, in order to be confident about the contribution
of wind generation to meeting peak demand, this would require an analysis based on more
than 5 years of empirical demand and simulated wind data. For the purposes of th l ng-term
dynamic simulation model presented here, these values provide a reasonable approximation.
6.7 Chapter summary
In this chapter the techniques used to estimate hourly wind production and resourc reliability in
GB have been presented. This began with the motives for developing a model that uses a hind-
cast simulation in order to estimate the contribution of wind generation to serving load. This
was followed by a description of the approach taken to model the GB onshore and offshore
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wind resource. Section 6.3 presented the wind model calibration against available published
annual statistics, followed by validation against available wind generation output records. The
results showed that simulated wind production provided a reasonable match with istoric data,
however mild scaling was required. Section 6.5 showed how for an assumedpen tration of
wind generation, hourly wind production and subsequent residual loadis simulated. The shape
of the residual load histograms changed significantly as the penetration of wi d increased: they
became more ‘Normal looking’, which was explained by the change from a distinct daily load
over time profile to a more random profile due to wind variability. In addition, the sandard de-
viation of the distributions increased substantially, with negative residual demands experienced
at high penetrations. Finally, Section 6.6 explained how capacity credits forwind generation
were estimated. The capacity credits results were 9-35% depending on level of installed capac-
ity. The outputs from this stage of the work are taken forward into the next chapter where the




Improving the Investment Model
This chapter provides details of the changes made to the model logic on account of high pen-
etrations of wind generation and increased uncertainty surrounding utilisation and prices. In
summary, these changes were to 1) consider growth in wind capacity to be exog nous and 2)
improve the method of calculating expected output, costs and revenue of thermal generation
subject to varying load and random independent thermal outages, i.e., use a probabilistic calcu-
lation method for gross margins instead of a deterministic approach (5.16). Inaddition, a new
probabilistic method for including price mark-ups due to market power in the gross margin cal-
culation is included. Maintaining a GB focus, an application of the model to the GBinvestment
market is provided, with particular attention paid to the evolution of generation adequacy risk
over the next 30 years.
A sensitivity analyses on a number of key model assumptions provides insight into factors af-
fecting the simulated timing and level of generation investment. This is achieved byconsidering
the relative change in simulated levels of security of supply risk metric such asde-rated capac-
ity margins and expected energy unserved. These results provide insights into the increased
‘energy-only’ market revenue risk facing thermal generating units, particularly peaking units
that rely on a small number of high price periods in order to recover fixed costs and make an
adequate return on investment.
7.1 Introduction
When making an economic assessment of the potential for generating capacity investments,
there is a need to model varying loads (e.g., in the form of the LDC), the expected contribu-
tion of generating units to serving these loads, and the revenues they receive by doing so. It
is helpful if the technique used is computationally fast, accurate and robust,especially when
multi-year simulations of a market are to be repeatedly run. One approach is touse probabilis-
tic production costing, a long established method for calculating the expected output and costs
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of a thermal generation system subject to varying load and random and indepe ent forced
outages [207, 208]. The first focus of this chapter is the integration of aprobabilistic produc-
tion costing method into the dynamic simulation model. The method considers the annual load
curve and convolves it with generator outages using the Mix of Normals distribution (MOND)
approximation. This production costing method was first described in [209]and then extended
and used for the calculation of equilibrium capacity investment in a power market in [210] and
[211], respectively. In this study, the method is applied for the first time to a nnequilibrium
setting as part of the dynamic market simulation. Furthermore, the production costi g methods
used in previous dynamic models are deterministic, and therefore underestimat average costs
(due to Jensen’s inequality [212]). This can also be said for the calculation of gross margins
used in the preliminary model implementation.
This chapter also calls on the wind modelling work of Chapter 6 to assess the impact of high
penetrations of wind power on the investment risks associated with conventional thermal gener-
ation. Therefore the method above is extended to include results of the residual load calculation
(load net of wind output) from Chapter 6. This residual load data is then usd in the MOND
production costing model in a new way. Finally, the MOND model is incorporated in the dy-
namic investment model and again applied to a simplified GB power system, this time foran
assumed (exogenously increasing) installed wind capacity. Fig. 7.1 summarises thi version of
investment market model via a bull’s eye diagram (see [115]) depicting endogenous, exogenous
and excluded model parameters.
7.2 Updates to general investor logic assumptions
There are several adaptions to the model in terms of the investment logic. Investors are assumed
to have the modelling capabilities available to formulate a reasonable approximationof the
effect of wind generation on residual demand, thus the simulated hourly wind production data
presented in Section 6.5 is employed. This maintains the adaptive expectations hypothesis
design introduced in sub-section 5.3.1. Note that variations in weather patterns are likely to
average out to zero over the economic lifetime of an investment and thus do not affect decisions
about capacity expansion. Again, this makes the same assumption as in sub-section 6.5 that
climate change does not impact on future weather.
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Figure 7.1: Bull’s-eye diagram of investment market model. Inspired by [115].
In light of the recent government estimates, which were released after theini ial model im-
plementation, fuel and carbon prices are estimated using the DECC central case estimates
[181, 213]. Assuming investor price forecasts are similar to these estimates,1 th investor model
uses the DECC estimate plus a random variable to estimate future fuel prices. This random
variable is modelled as a mean reverting stochastic process with seasonality [136]:







whereFt is the fuel cost at timet, q(t) is the DECC estimate (i.e., the ‘seasonal’ element),
MR(t) is the time dependent mean reverting level which depends on the DECC estimate,v is
the volatility, λ is the speed of mean reversion andW is a standard one-dimensional Wiener
process [32]. Initially,λ = 0.7 in all cases (indicating a reasonably short excursion length) and
v is 5%, 7%, 10% and 20% for uranium, coal, gas and carbon prices, respectively to reflect
1Which in the case of natural gas match quite well with available future prices from ICE Futures Europe (out
to 2017) but are arguably a little low for coal. At the time of writing, Newcastle futures were rising at about 1.5%
annually not falling by 6% as suggested by DECC [214].
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the relative price volatilities. An example of each random walk for 100 MC simulations for
gas price is shown in Fig. 7.2. Note that although DECC provide estimates for future fuel and
carbon prices, these should not be treated as a definitive answer; this would imply that DECC
is able to fix markets, which is possible only for carbon, e.g., the UK Government recently
announced a minimum floor price on carbon of 16£/T in 2013, rising to 30£/T by 2020 [215].
Note that, simlarly to the preliminary implmentation, no correlation between fuel prices was
considered here.
Figure 7.2: Example of simulated random walks for gas (right y-axis) and ETS prices(left
y-axis). DECC estimates are the solid thicker lines.
Investors consider annual demand growth to be stochastic and this is sampled from a Normal
distribution. Here a mean of 0% and standard deviation of 1% is assumed. Thisis ba ed
on variations in demand growth [54] as well as the perception that economic growth could be
offset by increased energy efficiency, e.g., [68], thus allowing for small or even negative demand
growth. This is consistent with recent government and GB System Operator (SO) projections
about future electrical demand in GB [27, 216].
Only the firstn years of expected revenues are stochastically simulated by the investor (here
n = 7, previouslyn = 15); for the remaining years the (discounted) average of the simulated
revenues are used (e.g., similar to [54, 65]). This assumes that simulated pric s for the first
7 years of plant operation are representative of the total expected plant lifetime. Furthermore,
investors cap the total expected annual revenues received from scarcity rents (sub-section 7.3.3)
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at the annualised cost of an OCGT. These actions ensure that expectations about future revenues
are not unduly influenced by high forward simulated wholesale prices owing to generation
retirements far out into the future. Note that no regulatory price caps are impl mented in the
real-time simulation. The decision to reduce the 15 year forward simulation time horizon (n =
15; sub-section 5.3.1) was also informed by the need to achieve a reasonableexecution time,
an issue that arises when moving from a 9 to a 30-year simulation time horizon.
To keep the model simple, revenue from STOR is simplified; here investors in peaking capacity
(i.e., OCGT) assume an additional revenue of£10,000/unforced MW/yr can be obtained from
the ancillary services (AS) market. As the results in sub-section 5.5.4 showed, AS revenues
form a critical component of peaking capacity profitability, yet they are not sufficient by them-
selves to trigger investment and a combination of energy market and AS revenue is required in
order to obtain adequate gross margins. Similar models applied in the US (e.g., [54]) also do not
treat the AS market explicitly, and instead assume a fixed (and relatively modest) contribution
of AS to peaking unit gross margins. Furthermore these are likely to be a second order effect
when considering generation investments on a decadal time scale and are likely to b relatively
unimportant for cycling and base load capacity, given their relatively large capital costs. Here
investors will not include AS revenues in the profitability calculation if OCGT capacity exceeds
8 GW (i.e., volume of installed OCGT capacity at the start of the simulation, Table 7.5), which
essentially limits the total obtainable revenue from AS if the volume of peaking capacity be-
comes large. On account of the point made above, this limit should not undulydampen peaking
capacity investment.
As already demonstrated in Section 6.5, residual load (load net of wind output) is likely to
become more volatile as the penetration of wind increases (e.g., Fig. 6.7). A consequence of
this is that more ancillary services will be needed. For instance, the GB System Op rator (SO)
recently forecast that operating reserve requirements will increase by53% from 4,777 MW to
7,335 MW, between 2010/11 and 2020/21 [217] to compliment an increase in installed wind
capacity from 5,795 MW to 24,599 MW over the same period (a growth pattern not too dis-
similar from the one considered here). Securing adequate flexible capacity is addressed during
operational timescales through the GB System Operator’s reserve services (e.g., fast reserve,
fast start, demand management and short-term operating reserve). Theprinciple concern here is
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to determine whether sufficient capacity is built in order to meet periods of high demand and/or
low available wind generation, so increases in these services and their impact on peaking ca-
pacity profitability are beyond the scope of this thesis.
Once again, because the model randomly samples capacity construction times,fuel prices and
load growth, a large sample is required in order for investors to obtain reliable estimate of
expected project value (5.17). Here, 100 MC simulation runs are carriedout for each plant
type in each decision year. If used for an actual policy analysis, the impact th t the number
of Monte Carlo runs has on the model outcomes should be evaluated and, if poss ble, larger
sample sizes used. Here extensive testing of the effect of the number of simulations was not
undertaken. An indication of the importance of sample size is given by the standard error
of the expected revenues. The samples are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d), so
this error is proportional to 1/
√
N (hereN = 100) [218]. For instance, for the base case
results presented in Section 7.5.1 for nuclear in 2020 in one run, the standard error was about
5% of the average revenue, which is reasonably precise. If the sample size was increased
ten-fold to 1000 samples, one would expect an error of 5%/
√
10, or about 1.5%. Moreover,
application of variance reduction methods (e.g., [219]) can result in smallerstandard errors
than i.i.d. sampling; however this is left for future research.
7.2.1 Mothballing
The decision to mothball (or de-mothball) is now taken annually and is based onthe predicted
gross margins over fixed operational costs (AGM) (£/MW) for the next three years of operation










GM ix − FCx
(1 + r)i
. (7.3)
If this is negative (or positive) then some currently operational (or mothballed) plant will be
mothballed (or de-mothballed). Note that no additional costs incurred as a result of mothballing
or de-mothballing are considered here.
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7.2.2 Modelling aggregate investment response
In some circumstances the expected profitability of new investments is extremely high, t us
triggering a wave of new builds. Under these circumstances the investment rat will be limited
by: 1) the firm’s beliefs about how many other market participants will move to invest; 2)
the impact of new investment on the profitability of their existing plant; and 3) on the ability
of the firm to secure the debt required to fund multiple projects [121]. Usingan aggregate
investor response curve is useful in models of this type. For instance, in [54], the aggregate
investment rate is increasing with the“risk-adjusted forecast profit”, which is derived from
the investor’s (risk averse, concave) utility function. Also in [121], an S-shaped nonlinear
function of Profitability Index is used and various profitability functions areus d in [127] to
model investment rates based on managerial optimism concerning economic (i.e., exp cted
profitability) and strategic (i.e., retaining market share) considerations.
In this model, a function is applied to the outcome of the VaR decision rule in orderto estimate
the aggregate investment response of the market. This function is increasing with the expected








wherePIx is as in (5.21),ξmax is the maximum yearly investment lump per technologyx.
ξmax and shape parameterβ are calibrated using the fixed assumptions that 1) zero investment
is made ifPIqx < 0 and 2)ξi = ix volume of investment is made ifPIx = 1, whereix is a
chosen fixed constant. Note thatξi provides the link to the state equation (5.3).
The function used in the base case is shown in Fig. 7.3 with fixedix = 2 GW andξmax = 4
GW, andβ = 0.7 resulting from the calibration. Changingβ alters the aggregate response, as
shown by the dotted lines. There is the potential to include different response curves within each
fuel or peak/base generator type (e.g., as in [121]). There is also an additional step whereby
after each 2 GW of capacity of investment is triggered, the investor decisionis re-run to ensure
that no other plant types become more attractive in relation to other options as aresult of this
addition. This maintains the iterative adding characteristic described in sub-section 5.3.3. For
multiple investments withPIx > 0, the option with the highestPIx is chosen. Finally, total
annual investments are limited to 10% of total installed capacity.
181
Improving the Investment Model
Figure 7.3: Plot of model aggregate investment response curve defined by (7.4)(solid line)
whereix = 2 GW andξmax = 4 GW . Also shown are the minimum investment
lump sizes along with curves for different values ofβ.
The degree of heterogeneous investment response is not modelled directly, however the invest-
ment response of the model is a smooth function of prices and costs, reflecting how a hetero-
geneous group of market participants would likely respond to changes in market conditions.
In particular, the amount of investment is a smooth monotonic function of expected returns, as
reflected in the AIRC (7.4), i.e., it is not a type of response where if profitsexceed a threshold,
a large amount of investment occurs.
Furthermore, forward and bilateral contracting between generators and uppliers is also not
modelled explicitly, however both forward prices and investors’ expectations are driven by
the same market factors. Moreover those contracting are implicit in the way investor price
expectations are modelled. In a commodity market, forward price expectationsw ll be driven
by the same economics as short-term prices. For instance, in the face of capacity retirement
and demand growth, forward prices will rise. The investor simulates prices7 y ars out, which
is further ahead than most forward electricity markets go. Moreover explicitly representing
contracts and forward price expectations would make the model significantlymore complicated.
For instance, [220] presents a single stage investment problem in the presence of endogenous
contract and physical markets. Even in that very simple circumstance, the model and its analysis
is very complex. The effect of more long-term forward and bilateral contracts would be to
reduce revenue risk for investors, i.e., lowering risk aversion, thus making them more willing
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to invest for a given distribution of energy prices. Therefore the effect of more or less forward
contracting can be implicitly considered by adjusting the risk aversion parameter of the VaR
model (i.e., the level of risk aversion,q, or the WACC,r, in (5.17)).
The volume (GW) of plant mothballed or de-mothballed is determined simplistically using the
linear functionξi = min(M,AGMx/104), i.e., decreasing or increasing withAGMx (7.3) up
to a maximum ofM GW (Fig. 7.4). In this caseM is chosen to be 2 GW. This was inspired by
the literature review of Prospect Theory.
Figure 7.4: Plot of model aggregate mothballing response curve. Note that the x-axis h s been
rescaled to (£/kW).
7.3 Production costing by Mix of Normals
When estimating expected long-run production costs, there is a need for a reasonably accurate
approximation of the LDC. In section 5.3.1, a 5th order polynomial function was fitted to the
simulated annual LDC. This approach, along with the method of calculating plant output was
quite simplistic, and therefore it was decided to develop a more accurate methodof approxima-
tion. A Mix of Normals distribution (MOND) approximation meets this requirement and is also
very easy to convolve with plant outages for the expected output calculations. This motivated
the decision to integrate this technique into the dynamic investment market model.
A MOND is described as follows: consider a set,Y = {y1, . . . , yn}, of Normally distributed
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random variables with theith element having meanµi and varianceσi. Let Φ(x|µi, σi) be the
cumulative distribution function (cdf) ofyi. A MOND is a convex combination of the Normal








i=1 pi = 1 andpi ≥ 0, wherepi is the weight of the componentyi [209]. Letµ andσ be
the mean and standard deviation respectively of the cdf described by (7.5). These parameters














i ) − µ2. (7.7)
Note that ifX andY are two independent random variables each with MONDFX(x) and
FY (y) given by (7.5), thenX+Y is a MOND. The proof of this property is given in appendix A
of [209]. In this application the distribution of load (a MOND) is convolved withthe distribution
for available conventional thermal generation (cf. Section 7.3.1). It is a standard assumption in
probabilistic costing and loss-of-load probability models that the outages of different generating
units are independent of each other, and independent of load [64, 221]. The process starts by
splitting the time horizon over which costs are calculated into periods. In this case, the duration
of each period is one year; although shorter periods can also be used toaccount, e.g., for
seasonal capacity. The expected load at each hour is a random variable.
A MOND fit for approximating the annual LDC (MW) is required. For example, if fL(x) is
the probability density function of load andFL(x) is the cumulative distribution function of
fL(x), then the LDC is simply the rotated and rescaled loadexceedencedistribution.2 This is






which is a mixture ofK Normals (Φk) with the same properties as (7.5). For a particularK,
the best fitting value of eachµk, σk andpk can be found by solving an optimisation problem
2The exceedence distribution givesp(X > x), that is the probability that the random variableX (in this case
load) is greater thanx.
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µ1 µ2 µ3 µ4
43802 41649 33971 26089
σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4
5743 1410 3372 1771
p1 p2 p3 p4
0.427 0.120 0.329 0.126
Table 7.1: MOND fitted values for normalised 2005-2009 demand data, i.e., Fig. 6.6(a).









Le(qi) − Lf (qi)
]2
(7.9)












µj ≥ 0, σj ≥ 0, pk ≥ 0.
where theqi are the rank ordered loads for the year,Le(qi) is known as theplotting positionof
qi (formula chosen to ensureLe(qi) 6= 0 or 1) [222]. In this application,K = 4 and in most
casesI = 8760.
These results were computed using the MS Excel 2003 Solver add-in and for a mix of 4 Normal
distributionsSSerr = 0.040, compared withSSerr = 11.499 for a single Normal distribution.
Plainly the objective function value forK = 4 is very good (at least a102 improvement on the
single normal case). As a result, a mix of 4 Normals is used.
To illustrate the accuracy of this technique at approximating a LDC, Fig. 7.5 shows the distribu-
tion of the GB hourly loads for the period 2005-09 (normalised by the year’s average demand)
and the fitted distribution. The distribution parameters displayed in Table 7.1 areused to fit the
MOND. The improvement in fit when moving from one Normal distribution (Fig. 7.5(a)) to a
mix of 4 Normal distributions (Fig. 7.5(e)) is clearly visible. In fact the difference between the
two LDC plots (Fig. 7.5(f)) is not visible at this scale owing to the excellent fit provided by the
MOND.
185




Figure 7.5: (a) Histogram plot of normalised (by annual average demand) hourlyload data
and single Normal distribution fit, (b) Fitted cdf (dashed line) against normalised
load data cdf (solid line), (c) Plot of each pdf for the 4 normals, 7.5(d) Pdfs scaled
and labelled bypi weights, (e) MOND pdf (4 Normal components clearly visible
by their distinct peaks) and (f) LDC fit with negligible visible difference between
mix of 4 Normals and empirical data.
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At this point it is worthwhile highlighting the key benefits of using a Mix of Normalsdi tri-
bution rather than the actual load duration curve. These are: 1) a MOND provides an accu-
rate method of approximating load (see above); and 2) the concept of equivalent (or effective)
load, that is the sum of the load (which is a MOND) and the outage capacity of conventional
generators, can be approximated by performing a convolution of (Normal)distributions (see
next sub-section). This concept of equivalent load plays a key role inprobabilistic production
costing [209]. Moreover this convolution technique offers computationallyf st calculation of
generator outputs, costs and revenues (see Section 7.5.1).
7.3.1 MOND with conventional thermal generation (after [209])
The next step is to estimate the available capacity for a set of generating units.Recall that the
available capacity at each hour from a particular unit is a random variablewhich is characterised
by the unit’s forced outage rate (FOR). Ifmu units of typen share the same capacity and
FOR characteristics and are subject to independent forced outages, they can be treated as a
single pseudo-unit (or generator) with a distribution with the moments (2.16) and (2.17) (sub-
section 2.8.4), where each (pseudo-) generator,Gn, has capacitycn = mucu. To simplify the
presentation for the remainder of the chapter, the convention will be to use ‘gen rator’ when
referring to a ‘pseudo-generator’ (collection of units of a given type), andcn when referring to
the capacity of that generator, because this is the last time individual units willbe discussed.
Now the convolution property of the MOND is used to determine the distribution for the ex-
pected load still to be served after each generator is dispatched (in merit ord r). This distribution
is called theeffective load duration curve(ELDC) facing the next generator to be dispatched










is defined as the load minus the available capacity of generator types1 . . . n (1 ≤ n ≤ N )
[209]. If Fn(x) = 1 − Ln(x) is the cumulative probability of effective loadx = L−
∑n
i=1Gi
3Note that Gross [209] uses the equivalent terminology:equivalent load duration curve.
4The more units in a group, the closer the Binomial distribution is to Normal.
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Ln(x) = 1 − Fn(x), (7.10)
wherefn(y) is the pdf of the Normal that approximates the Binomial distribution describing
the available capacity of thenth type of generation with installed capacitycn. Technically for
a Normal distribution, the bounds in (7.10) should be−∞ to ∞, but it is assumed here that
the probability of falling outside the physically possible range[0, cn] is negligible owing to the
Binomial distribution being rescaled to 0/cu. Fn(x) is computed by performing the convolution
of the Normal distributions for load (which is a MOND) and available capacity.
The convolution property of a MOND [209] is applied, with generator loadingcarried out by









whereLn−1(x) is the load still to be met after adding generator typen−1 andLn(x) is the load
still to be met after adding generatorn, which at the start of the convolution process (n = 0)
is obtained from (7.8). The distribution for the ELDC after convolving inn generators is given
by:



















Thus, the ELDC is described by a MOND with the same number of component Normals as
the original LDC. An example of the iterative convolution process is shown inFig. 7.6. The
diagram depicts how the remaining expected load to be served is reduced each time a group of
generators is convolved with the ELDC.
Given eachLn(x) (n = 1 . . . N ), the probability that generatorn or higher (in the merit order)
is the marginal source of energy (and so sets the price) is given byLn(0), i.e., the point where
the function crosses the vertical axis in Fig. 7.6. Further,
hn = Ln−1(0) − Ln(0) (7.13)
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Figure 7.6: Example of the convolution process. Shaded region is the expected energy served
by the first unit dispatched (i.e., the result of (7.11) withn = 1).
is the probability that generatorn is on the margin. This result is used in sub-section 7.3.3
to calculate expected revenues per MW for a generator belonging to this generator type in an
‘energy-only’ market setting.
The unserved energy (MW) is then simply any positive remaining load once all N generators





and the Loss-of-Load Expectation (LOLE) (hrs/yr) for the period is determined by [64]
8760 · LN+1(0). (7.15)
7.3.2 MOND with a thermal-wind system
The interdependency between wind plants means that the convolution technique used to model
thermal generation in [209] cannot be directly used to account for wind power generation. To
address this issue, it is possible to construct an LDC that is net of wind producti n. An ex-
ogenous wind capacity is assumed and the resulting residual LDC facing thermal generation is
computed and the MOND approximation is applied to this wind-adjusted data set. The residual
load is simply the load minus the output from all wind plants at each hour, as describ d in sub-
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section 6.5. By taking this approach, the analysis can take into account bothspatial correlations
and seasonal (e.g., monthly and diurnal) trends in wind availability and their relationship with
demand. This is believed to be the first time the MOND production costing technique has been
applied using credible estimates in time and space for production from the combined on and
offshore GB wind resource.
Furthermore the residual load approach allows us to calculate the number ofhours that avail-
able wind generation is greater than aggregated demand, i.e., those hours wen wind sets the
system marginal price. This is computed using the residual load exceedence istribution before
convolving any of the available thermal generation, i.e., the inverse of8760(1 − FL(0)) where
FL(x)) is given by (7.8). This is of particular interest in systems with high penetrations of wind
when direct wind dispatch may be required to curtail production at times whenavailable wind
exceeds demand.
Wind production may need to be curtailed under other circumstances. In particul r, this imple-
mentation of the MOND technique does not consider the possibility of available wind gener-
ation exceeding either 1) available export capacity in a generation pocketdue to transmission
congestion or 2) raw demand net of inflexible base load (e.g., nuclear). No can the load dura-
tion curve method (of which the MOND is a particular case) consider the possibility that ramp
rate limitations could also result in wind spill. Considering each in turn, given that the model is
single bus, number 1) cannot be addressed here and is left for futureresearch.5 In this applica-
tion, it is assumed that UK Government policy will ensure that the amount of congestion in the
future will not be so large as to affect the basic economics of thermal generation investment.
This is consistent with the GB regulator’s ‘connect and manage’ transmission access policy
[223]. In the case of number 2), if inflexible base load generation needsto be kept running then
this will affect the economics of the wind generator being constrained (i.e., the wind generator
is given a congestion payment by the System Operator). This is not considered in this analysis
as installed wind capacity is an exogenous model parameter. The presenceof i fl xible gener-
ation can also affect the economics of baseload generation by increasingthe umber of hours
of zero or negative prices. However the amount of hours when this occurs is small relative to
5If a representation of the load and available wind production in each regionof the network is available, then
curtailment of wind production due to transmission congestion could in theory be assessed by multi-area production
costing methods.
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the total number of running hours across the lifetime of the plant. For instance, for the GB case
study presented in Sections 7.4-7.5, under the assumption that all plants canbe turned down
except nuclear, in no year and in no scenario is the probability of the net demand being below
the expected available nuclear capacity greater than 7%. Future applications of this method
could approximate the effect of inflexible generation by dispatching its must run capacity first
and assuming a zero or negative price for the portion of the time that this capacity is on the
margin.
It is important to note that the residual LDC approach removes the chronologica issues that
arise in the wind and load time series. This is particularly important in the presencof large
amounts of hydro and pumped hydro generation where chronological production costing meth-
ods may be preferred to load duration curve methods. However this implementation of the
MOND technique is applied to the GB power system where the amount of hydroand pumped
hydro is relatively small (about 4% of capacity), so the use of a load duration curve approach is
reasonable.6
7.3.3 Expected revenues from the energy market
In the absence of market power and unless there is a capacity shortage,the market price for
energy will equal the marginal cost of the last generator to be dispatched. If there is a capacity
shortage, and assuming there is no price cap, the price will clear at the level necessary to ration
demand to the available capacity. More precisely, because consumers arenot generally exposed
to the real-time price, there is a willingness of suppliers to pay up to the VOLL when there is a
shortage. In a more general case, some or all customers are exposed toth real-time price. This
methodology is applied in [210] in a long-run equilibrium model; that approachis extended
here to a dynamic long run nonequilibrium setting.
During a particular year, the probability that generatorn will be at the margin is given by (7.13)
and the price in that event will be the SRMC of the generator,SRMCn, assuming price-taking
(competitive) behaviour. Furthermore, once the convolution process has been completed for all
N generators, the probability that there will be insufficient generation to meetdemand is given
6Note that there is little scope for new build of hydro technologies in GB due to thelack of suitable sites.
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by LN+1(0) and under this condition the price is assumed to reach VOLL. Using the result
in (7.13), the expected gross margin for a particular MW of capacity belonging to generatorn
when generatori is at the margin is given by (£/MWh):
Rin = max {hi(πi − SRMCn), 0} (7.16)
whereπi is the wholesale price when generatori is at the margin, which in the absence of market
power is given bySRMCi. Using (7.13) to calculate (7.16), the expected annual perfectly
competitive gross margin used in (5.17) can be calculated by (£/MW/yr):





Rin + (hN+1(V OLL− SRMCn))
]
. (7.17)
These are precisely the scarcity rents described in Chapter 2, which in a simple long-run com-
petitive ‘energy-only’ market model, are just high enough to cover fixedcosts and trigger in-
vestment [3]. The main numerical work here is in computing theLn(x) in (7.11); once these
are known, the revenues are calculated easily by multiplying by the price - marginal cost dif-
ferentials. Recall thatρn in (7.17) is generatorn’s FOR, hence the impact of generator outages
on their expected gross margins is properly accounted for. Once again,no start-up or no-load
costs are considered here.
Here the new probabilistic method for calculating revenues from price mark-up us presented.
Recall that the use of the price mark-up function (5.10) was justified basedon comparisons of
the GB forward market index price (sub-section 5.1.4) and simulated prices. By comparison




) (5.8) is used. Fig. 7.7 shows an example of the price function given by (5.11) when
w(L,G∗N ) is modelled using the exponential (5.8); the curve behaves like a classical line r
step-wise marginal cost supply function for small loads, but as the systemapproaches scarcity,
the mark-up function becomes evident and soon dominates the pricing mechanism.
Now the market price (5.11) no longer just depends on which generator ison the margin, which
is the case under the classic perfectly competitive market case (7.17); it now depends on the
overall margin,G∗N − L as well. Furthermore, since the price can exceedSRMCn if n is on
the margin, the question of whether a particular incremental MW of capacity within n is called
upon or not must be considered. This is because marginal generatorn can still earn a positive
gross margin. Thus, when generatorn is on the margin, (5.11) must be calculated considering
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Figure 7.7: Supply function for a given realised available capacity for generatorsN−2,N−1
andN with mark-up function defined byw(L,GN ) = aeb(L−G
∗
N
) (shown as black
line). Marginal cost dashed, price is solid line.
the probability that a particular MW belonging to generatorn is dispatched or not. This is




n is the gross margin received by a MW of capacity from generatorn f r loadL and
total available generationG∗N , thenR
L,G∗
N
n will be calculated by one of the following means:
1. If the marginal generator, sayi, is belown in the merit order (i.e., has a lower marginal




2. Else if the marginal generator has a higher marginal cost thann, then the probability of
dispatch is 1 andR
L,G∗
N
n = mc(L,G1, G2, . . . , GN ) + w(L,G
∗
N ) − SRMCn.














7Thus it is assumed for simplicity that dispatch is still in merit order, despite thepresence of market power.
However in oligopolies with asymmetric generating companies, a small high cost generator might produce power
before a large low cost generator, as the latter is more likely to withhold capacity. This possibility is not considered
here.
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wherepdispn is the probability that a MW belonging to generatorn is dispatched.














i=1 Gi − L is the surplus margin afterL has been met using all available
generation lower in the merit order thann (e.g., Fig. 7.8). In plain terms, (7.19) is the ratio
of the MWs of generatorn that are dispatched to the average total MW ofn that are available
(which differs from the actual available MWs ofn). In the event that this margin is negative,
the fractional term in (7.19) will be greater than 1, therefore the min{ } function is required in
order to eliminate this possibility. This method of calculating dispatch probabilities is rquired
to account for market price mark-up in (5.11).
(a) (b)
Figure 7.8: (a) Aggregate supply curve showing price (solid upper line) for loadL and revenue
for generator of typeN − 1. Mark-up function also shown (dashed line). (b)
Shows price mark-up for different values of capacity margin and calibrations for
a = 10, 000, 2, 000 and1, 000.
The expected gross margin (7.17) must now be extended to consider the price function (5.11)
and merit order operation. This is less straight-forward than under marginal cost-based pricing
(7.16) because the price mark-up requires consideration of the total (generation-load) mar-
gin, MN , as well as the marginal unit. By assuming that price mark-up is non-zero (i.e.,
w(L,G∗N ) > 0) only when generatorN orN−1 is on the margin, calculation of the probability
distribution ofw(L,G∗N ) can be achieved by considering the joint probability distribution of
just the capacity marginsMN−1 andMN . This assumption is reasonable in an aggregated ca-
pacity model where the generator size is large. As already discussed, empirical evidence from
the GB market (e.g., [98]) is that mark-up tends to occur predominately during peak periods
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when surplus margins are relatively small, and where the surplus of available resource in other
periods means the presence of market power is unlikely. Therefore, it isreasonable to assume
that price mark-up is significant only when peaking plantsN orN − 1 are on the margin.
7.3.4 Expected price mark-up calculation
Firstly, for each component of the MOND (7.5), the joint distribution of capacity margins













The proof of this property is standard and provided in Appendix A.7.
Fig. 7.9 shows a plot of theisoquantsof the bivariate Normal density for{MN−1,MN}, which
are highly positively correlated owing to increases inMN−1 increasingMN ; these show the
combinations ofMN−1 andMN that yield the same price mark-up. For a particular point
(MN−1,MN ), the diagram shows the value of the joint pdf (ellipses) and price mark-up iso-
quants (dotted lines in each quadrant centred(0, 0)). By splitting the space into four quadrants
and sketching the isoquant maps, the effect of available capacity margins on plant revenues
can be assessed. For instance, when plant typeN is not dispatched (north-east quadrant), in-
creases inMN result in a decrease in mark-up (indicated by parallel horizontal lines, three
example mark-ups shown). Likewise, whenN is dispatched (north-west quadrant,MN−1 is
in shortage). IfMN is in shortage (south-west quadrant), the mark-up is zero for all combina-
tions ofMN andMN−1 (i.e., system is short of resource and the price will reach the VOLL).
Note that the south-east quadrant is assumed to have zero probability; it would be calculated as
having a nonzero probability only because the Normal approximation will give an unrealistic
nonzero probability for negative availability capacity for generatorN − 1. In the application,
this probability is negligible.
The ellipses in Fig. 7.9 are centred at(E(MN−1), E(MN ) = E(MN−1) + (1− ρN ) · cN ). On
the x-axis is the surplus margin after the load has been met using all available generation lower
in the merit order thanN , namelyMN−1 (the expectation of which is 10 GW). On the y-axis
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is (for a correspondingMN − 1 on the x-axis) the expected surplus margin after the load has
been met using all available generation, namelyMN (the expectation of which is 15 GW). So in
this example, given thatE(MN−1) is positive, the expectation here is that the load can be met
without generatorN being dispatched. Furthermore, the differenceE(MN ) − E(MN−1) =
(1 − ρN ) · cN ) (5 GW) gives the expected available capacity of generatorN .
Figure 7.9: 3-D plot of bivariate Normal of{MN−1,MN} (right) and its image on a 2-D plane
(left) with isoquant maps for the price mark-up element of (5.11).
Next, for each component of the MOND (7.5), the revenue that a MW belonging to generator
n ≤ N earns from price mark-up,RPMn (£/MWh), is considered for the following cases:
1. If n < N − 1 (i.e.,n is lower in merit order thanN − 1), then the expected revenue from




(1 − ρn)f(MN )w(MN )dMN , (7.21)
wheref(MN ) is the pdf of the surplus marginMN = G∗N − L. This assumes that
w(MN ) is a function ofMN only, i.e., the overall system margin, and that generators
N − 2 andN − 3, etc are all fully dispatched when mark-up is nonzero. The integral
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lower bound is zero due to price mark-up being zero ifMN < 0. More precisely, if the
overall margin is negative then there is no mark-up and the price is set by themarginal
cost of demand (i.e., VOLL). The integral upper bound in (7.21) is some value,v, above
which the price mark-up is negligible owing to the large surplus margin (e.g., 7 GWin
Fig. 7.8(b)).
2. Else ifn = N − 1, thenRPMn is broken down into two sub-cases:






(1 − ρn)f(MN ,MN−1)w(MN )dMNdMN−1, (7.22)
which is the case where all of generatorN−1’s available capacity will be dispatched
because load exceeds the available capacity of generators 1 throughN − 1. Again,
the inner integral lower bound is0 becauseMN ≤ 0 results in zero price mark-up
(south-west quadrant of Fig. 7.9).







pdispN−1f(MN ,MN−1)w(MN )dMNdMN−1, (7.23)
wherepdispN−1 is the probability of dispatch of generatorN − 1, given by:
pdispN−1 =
(1 − ρN−1)MN−2
−1 · (MN−1 −MN−2)
(7.24)
whereMN−2 is the surplus margin after all available generation lower in the merit
order thanN − 1 has been dispatched.8 MN−2 is a random variable and compu-
tation of its pdf is awkward; however it can be approximated as follows:MN−2 ≈
(E(GN−1) − MN−1). This is achieved by approximating the realised value of
GN−1 by its expectation:E(GN−1) = cN−1(1 − ρN−1).9 Leading to:
pdispN−1 ≈
(1 − ρN−1)(cN−1(1 − ρN−1) −MN−1)
−1 · (MN−1 − (cN−1(1 − ρN−1) −MN−1))
, (7.25)
8The−1 scalar is applied to the denominator of (7.24) on account ofMN−2 being negative. If it was positive,
thenGN−1 would not be dispatched (i.e.,p
disp
N−1 = 0), which is not considered in (7.23).
9Note here thatcN−1 is the capacity of the generator typeN − 1, which is the sum of a number of individual
units who share the same capacity and FOR characteristics.
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i.e., the expected surplus margin over generatorn’s expected available capacity.
Note thatMN−1 > 0, soMN−2 < 0,10 and thus0 ≤ pdispN−1 ≤ 1.






pdispN f(MN ,MN−1)w(MN )dMNdMN−1, (7.26)
where
pdispN =
(1 − ρN )MN−1
−1 · (MN −MN−1)
, (7.27)
i.e., the case whereMN−1 is in shortage and some volume of capacity from generatorn
(= N ) will be required to meetL.12
Finally, by integrating over the subregions of the{MN−1,MN} space in Fig. 7.9 (i.e., using
one of the cases 1-3 above), the expected annual gross margin, whichis used in (5.17), for
generatorn can be calculated as
GMn = CGMn + E[en] ·RPMn. (7.28)
This is repeated for each component of the MOND for each decision year(suffix i in (5.17)).
This is an important extension to calculating the competitive gross margin (7.17);by exploiting
the properties of the probability distribution of capacity margins, this allows forthe anticipated
additional revenue received from market price mark-up to be calculatedduring the production
costing process. Procedures for calculating price mark-ups in probabilistic production cost-
ing models have been proposed (e.g., see [224]) but this is believed to be the firs time the
derivations (7.21) - (7.27) have been presented.
The MOND approximation technique is embedded within the dynamic investment model de-
picted in Fig. 5.1. More precisely, it is used to calculate the expected gross margin,GM ix, in
10In general,MN−2 could be positive, however the assumption here is that it is negative whenprice mark-up is
greater than zero.
11There is no second case here; only the case whereMN−1 < 0 is of interest (ifMN−1 > 0 thenGN is not
dispatched and mark-up revenue is zero).
12The pdf of capacity margin is Normal on account of both available generation and load (in fact, a MOND)
being Normal. ThereforeMN−1 andMN could conceivably be−∞, though practically speaking the outer integral
lower bound in (7.22) and (7.26) is set to−1 · [maximum value of load] (i.e., the highly unlikely situation when all
generation is unavailable).
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(5.17) and realised gross margins in the wholesale electricity market. In both cases these are
given by (7.17) or (7.28), depending on market bidding assumptions.
To speed up the computation of (7.22)-(7.26) during the simulation, the outer integral is car-
ried out using Gaussian quadrature (GQ), which requires fewer function evaluations than other








which after some manipulations, can be applied to the interval[a, b]. Heren = 100 is used.
7.3.5 Test of accuracy
To test the accuracy of this method, the results of a Monte Carlo (MC) simulationwere com-
pared with the MOND technique. That is, for the load (a MOND) and generator cost inputs
given in Table 7.2, capacity mix given in Table 7.5 and mark-up function (5.8)calibrated to
VOLL 10,000£/MWh, random samples for load and generator availability were taken. Using
these samples, the margin,MN , price (5.11), and energy market gross margins were calcu-
lated for each unit. Close attention was paid to the tail of the distribution by using importance
sampling. More precisely, high loads were oversampled using the component Normal of the
MOND with the largest mean (i.e., row 1 in Table 7.2) with corresponding meanµ1, stan-
dard deviationσ1, and pdff∗(x). Samples were then weighted using the weighting function
W (x) = f(x)/f∗(x), wheref(x) is the 4 component MOND pdf andx is the random sample
fromN(µ1, σ21).
The MC simulation was repeated106 times. The results of this test are displayed in Table 7.3.
“MOND” shows the results for the MOND technique including the methods and approxima-
tions of Section 7.3, above. “Monte Carlo” is for a Monte Carlo (MC) test where available
capacity is sampled from a Normal distribution with parameters defined by (2.16)-(2.17). Fi-
nally, “Bernoulli” samples available capacity from a Bernoulli distribution (i.e.,0 or full capac-
ity based on uniform random number generation for given FORs). The Bernoulli test makes
no approximations concerning the distribution of available capacity or its effects on prices and
mark-up, and so is the standard against which the new MOND model should be compared.
Comparing the MOND and Bernoulli tests shows the effect of using a Normalapproximation
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for available capacity rather than the Bernoulli distribution. Encouraginglythe MOND tech-
nique matched quite well to the MC simulation (with only a mild over-estimation of gross
margins by the MOND technique). Further, the Normal approximation for available capacity
also performs well. This test gives confidence that the MOND approximationis a good one.
Note that the “energy expected per generator” in Table 7.3 for the Monte Carlo and Bernoulli
tests is the result of multiplying the mean utilisation across the MC runs of each generator by
the total theoretical available energy of each generator. For instance, ifth capacity of gener-
atorN − 3 is 11 GW and the mean utilisation is, say 0.75, then energy expected is given by
8760*11*0.75=72,270 GWh. For the MOND test, this is calculated using (7.11).





N − 3 N − 2 N − 1 N
Generator SRMCs (£/MWh) 7 40 45 60
Table 7.2: Inputs for MOND test case.
Scarcity rent (£/MWh) Price mark-up (£/MWh) Energy expected per generator (TWh)
N−3 N−2 N−1 N N−3 N−2 N−1 N N−3 N−2 N−1 N
MOND 1.48 1.70 1.70 1.36 39.03 6.03 2.15 2.05 72.27 198.89 63.12 0.12
Monte Carlo 1.43 1.64 1.66 1.33 38.96 5.96 2.09 1.99 72.24 198.88 63.09 0.12
Bernoulli 1.41 1.61 1.63 1.30 38.91 5.92 2.04 1.94 72.24 199.40 63.11 0.12
Table 7.3: Summary of results for Monte Carlo test.
7.4 GB case study assumptions
The MOND technique is now applied within a simple dynamic investment model of the GB
power system with the aim of providing insight into the investment risks associated with higher
penetrations of wind power. Therefore the new dynamic model with 4 endogenous generator
types (nuclear, coal, CCGT and OCGT) is applied to an ‘energy-only’ market setting with an
initial capacity mix comparable to the GB power system and a VOLL of£10,000/MWh with a
simulation time horizon of 30 years (2010-40).
The residual load facing thermal units for a particular hour is calculated in Section 6.5, i.e.,
200
Improving the Investment Model
by calculating hourly wind production using the base case wind capacity growth profile (Fig.
6.5) and subtracting it from the full empirical 2005-09 load data to create 30residual load
probability distributions (e.g., Fig. 6.6), one for each year. Each of the 30year MOND residual
load curves are precalculated assuming fixed underlying demand patternsand are then scaled
over time in order to match the load growth assumptions. For instance, if average annual growth






Changes to the MOND standard deviation,σk are not considered here.
Data on initial 2010 system capacity in Table 7.5 is derived by aggregating GBcapacity data
in Table 7.4 into the now four generator types and unit sizes described earlier. Once again,
minor sources of peaking capacity such as oil and pumped storage are combined with OCGT
and CHP and hydro are aggregated with CCGT plant to obtain the unit totals shown in Table
7.5. To reflect capacity already under construction in GB, 10.7 GW of CCGT capacity is as-
sumed to come online during the first (1.5 GW), second (5 GW) and third (4.2 GW) years of the
simulation. Note that the random variable used to represent unforeseen delays in the construc-
tion period during the real-time simulation (sub-section 5.4) is removed for this applic tion.
Existing plant included in the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) is modelle with a
reduced lifetime based on the estimates of remaining generating hours given in[66]. All other
existing units are given retirement dates consistent with the lifetime assumptions inTable 7.5.
Table 7.6 shows the cost and financial input assumptions. The total annualised fixed costs per
unforced MW and total interest accumulated during construction are shown in Table 7.7. To
reflect restrictions on suitable sites for nuclear builds in GB, total installed nuclear capacity is
constrained to 30 GW.
Is is assumed that there will be no net load growth during 2010-20. This is broadly in line with
central Updated Energy Projections published by DECC [216] and baseforecast winter peak
demand figures from the GB SO [27]. Electricity demand after this point is assumed to grow at
1% per year.
Exchange rates are assumed to remain constant ate1.20/£ and $1.50/£. All calculations are
carried out in real pounds sterling. Real discount rates are used owing to the forward estimates
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Plant type Capacity (GW) # stations # unit sets
Biomass 0.1 2 2
Coal 28.6 17 62
CCGT 27.5 39 118
CHP 1.8 9 19
Hydro 1.1 34 8a
Nuclear 10.9 9 22
Offshore wind 0.8 - -
Oil 3.7 3 6
Onshore wind 2.2 - -
OCGT 1.2 19 34
Pumped storage 2.7 4 16
Total 80.6 136 287
aIndependent sets (i.e., not part of same hydro scheme).
Table 7.4: Approximate GB installed transmission entry capacity in 2009. Appendix F of[27].
Technology Therm. FOR Lifetime Build De-mothball Initial No. of Unit
x in (5.17) eff. ρ α (yrs) τ (yrs) τD (months) (GW) units size
Nuclear 0.36 0.10a 40 7 - 11 22 500
Coal 0.35 0.14 40 5 6 27.5 55 500
CCGT 0.53 0.13 25 3 2 28.6 143 100
OCGT 0.39 0.10 40 2 2 7.7 154 50
aRecent years have shown a decline in the annual availability of the GB nuclear fle t (likely due to age), therefore
this value is reduced to 75% for existing nuclear capacity. This estimate is the average of the aggregated energy
output from installed GB nuclear capacity 02-09 [190]. New nuclear builds are expected 90% availability.
Table 7.5: Generator technical assumptions and initial system capacity for GB case study with
symbols defined in Section 5.3. Sources: [21, 26, 39].
Technology Capex FC Var. O&M Equity Gearing WACC WACC
x in (5.17) £/kW £/kW/yr £/MWh return κ χ rn (nom.) rr (real)a
Nuclear 2,913 37.5 1.8 0.15 0.5 0.115 0.089
Coal 1,789 38.0 2.0 0.12 0.6 0.096 0.069
CCGT 718 15.0 2.2 0.12 0.6 0.096 0.069
OCGT 359 15.0 4.4 0.12 0.6 0.096 0.069
aAssuming a 2.5% rate of inflation.
Table 7.6: Generator financial assumptions for GB case study with symbols defined inSection
5.3. Sources: [21, 26, 39].
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Technology Annualised Total interest acc.






Table 7.7: Generator (real) total fixed and interest cost assumptions for GB case study.
for fuel and carbon prices being in real terms. All capital and operatingcosts are constant in
real terms (2010 prices).
7.4.1 Intermediate analysis
The projected SRMC of the four generator types for a number of example years are shown
in Table 7.8. Some example aggregate supply functions are shown in Fig 7.10 (without price
mark-up). Note that coal and CCGT switch places in the system merit order in2030 owing
to the sharp increase in the ETS price after 2020. The fuel cost data behind these graphs is
provided in Appendix A.4.
Figure 7.10: Plot of stepped aggregate market supply function for example available conven-
tional generation based on variable operating costs in Table 7.8.
A plot of the technology screening curves is shown in Fig. 7.11. SRMC assumptions were for
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£/MWh Nuclear Coal CCGT OCGT
2010 7 44 45 63
2015 7 37 49 68
2020 7 38 52 72
2025 7 64 64 88
Table 7.8: SRMC assumptions for selected years. Note that uranium is modelled as constant
at 70$/lb with a conversion of £1 =$1.5. Estimates in 2010 prices.
2010 (Table 7.8) and annualised FC shown in Table 7.7. The plots show howcoal is not optimal
in the least cost solution in relation to other technologies, this situation did not improve for all
levels of SRMC shown in Table 7.8. This is an important finding and will be highlighted again
during the results interpretation.
Figure 7.11: Screening curves for technologies for 2010 cost data. Solid line indicates op imal
(least cost) capacity mix.
The effect of demand and wind capacity growth on load distribution percentiles over the period
2011-2025 is shown in Fig. 7.12. The 99.9%, 99.99% and 99.999% percentiles are shown,
i.e., the loads which are exceeded approximately 9, 0.9 and 0.09 hours per year, espectively.
One interesting thing to note about these plots is that although the wind penetration increases to
over 30 GW, the reduction in residual peak demand percentiles is much less,which corresponds
with the lower values of wind CC for high penetrations (cf. Fig. 6.10). Further, the MOND
representation is less accurate for the tails of the distribution and so these deman levels should
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be interpreted with caution.
Figure 7.12: Plot in change in demand percentiles for full and residual 2005-09 load data with
demand growth described in section 7.2.
7.5 GB Case study results
7.5.1 Base case results
For a Gaussian quadrature (7.29) with 100 points, the computational efficiency of the MOND
technique allowed for each production costing run to execute in under 1.5 seconds. Thus the 7
stochastically simulated years and 100 MC simulations required 7x100x2=1400 seconds. Con-
sequently, for the 30 year simulation, execution took between 525 and 1575minutes, depend-
ing on the number of technologies chosen for investment. Plainly, reducing the number of GQ
points shortens the production costing execution time (e.g., 25 points provideda 0.7 second
saving per production costing run), though the accuracy of the MOND technique decreases.
For instance, for the example shown in Table 7.3, the estimated price mark-up for generator
N − 1, calculated using (7.22) or (7.23), increases by 1.29£/MWh. Likewise for generatorN ,
calculated using (7.26), the estimate increases by 1.28£/MWh.
Fig. 7.13 shows the evolution of total installed capacity in the simulation. New buildsan
plant retirements are shown in Fig. 7.14 along with the evolution of the mix and amount of
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generation over time in Fig. 7.15. Also shown in Fig. 7.13 is the simulated full and de-rated
capacity margin (2.14). The FORs in Table 7.5 are used to de-rate conventional capacity, and
for wind the long-term CC values plotted in Fig. 6.10. The forecast for peak d mand is obtained
from the 99.9% percentile of the year’s MOND cdf for full load (Fig. 7.12)
Figure 7.13: Plot of simulated capacity growth, de-rated and full capacity margins. Theoret-
ical historic GB capacity margin (2001-10) derived using data from [66] and
[90].
To compare the performance of the simulation against historic trends in GB, thehis oric simula-
tion (2001-08) was re-run and a comparison between the modelled and actual capacity margins
was performed (Tables 5.6 and 5.2 for cost and initial capacity data, respectively). The compar-
ison (Fig. 7.13) shows that simulated margins do not perfectly match historic trends in all years
(e.g., 2002/3 performs less well than in the initial implementation), yet there is a reasonably
good agreement of the model with reality, which gives a degree of confidence in the realism of
future projections. The average absolute difference between the historical theoretical de-rated
margin and the simulation was 1.6% with a standard deviation of 1.3%.
The “historical theoretical de-rated margin” is as in Fig. 3.9. Furthermore,the comparison
of available historical data on capacity additions plotted in Fig. 7.14 shows thatthe CCGT
investments triggered by the simulation (columns after 2003) do not correspond in all years
(e.g., 2008) but the volumes and timing are not unreasonably different. Further, 1.5 GW of coal-
fired generation was chosen for investment in 2005, which is not true to reality (no new coal-
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Figure 7.14: Plot of simulated new builds and retirements over time. Negative bars indicate
plant retirements and positive bars indicate new builds. Also shown are esti-
mates for historic new builds (all CCGT) for 2001-09 (columns labelled ‘CCGT
DUKES’ [190]).
fired stations have been commissioned since 2000). However given that at le st one generating
firm in GB announced an intention to build a new coal-fired station (i.e., EOn at Kingsnorth),
which was cancelled before construction began due to reasons beyondpure market rules (i.e.,
intense public and political lobbying), this result seems reasonable in a modelsuch as this.
The future trend shows an erosion of de-rated capacity margins after around 2015. This coin-
cides with the LCPD plant retirements and rapid offshore wind growth. Of the30 simulated
future years, the average de-rated margin is 5.6% with a standard deviationof 7.1%. De-rated
margins are negative in 4 years, below 5% in 15 years, and below 10% in 25years. For those
years where margins are below 10%, an average shortfall of 1 GW of capacity was projected.
The UK Government’s recent consultation and subsequent white paper (July 2011) on GB elec-
tricity market reform has stipulated that a peak de-rated margin of 10% provides an acceptable
level of generation adequacy risk [67]. Further, the GB SO has recently stipulated that a de-
rated capacity margin of 5 GW over expected peak demand is desirable (seeApp ndix to [66]).
By comparison these simulation results suggest that a lower than desirable level of adequacy
207
Improving the Investment Model
Figure 7.15: Plot of total installed capacity over time, i.e., the result of the mix and amount of
generation investment and retirements over time.
risk could potentially occur.
The annual LOLE (7.15) and EEU (7.14) was also calculated. The average annual LOLE across
the 30-year simulation was 0.03 hrs/yr (or 3 hours in 100 years) with a standard deviation of
0.05, and average annual EEU of 5.7 GWh (less than 0.002% of typical year’s total annual
energy demand). The yearly LOLE together with the volume of capacity required to meet a
5 GW de-rated capacity margin at peak is plotted in Fig. 7.16.13 The graph shows how the
LOLE is higher in some years, particularly in 2023-26, which is reflected in the de-rated peak
margin shortfall. To put these figures in context, results from the historic generation adequacy
risk calculation of Section 3.6 are recollected. The average 10 winter LOLEfor 2001-10 was
0.06 hrs/yr with a standard deviation of 0.01 hrs/yr. This suggests that overall levels of risk do
not appear to be significantly high relative to estimates of historic trends. However because the
MOND is less accurate in the tails of the distribution the values for LOLE and EEUare used
primarily to assess the changes in relative levels of risk over the simulation time horizon and
to benchmark the sensitivity analyses described below rather than to predict absolute levels of
system risk.
13A value of zero implies that de-rated margin is in excess of 5 GW.
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Figure 7.16: Plot of simulated LOLE (bars) and capacity shortfall over 5 GW de-rated capa ity
margin (solid line).
These projected risk and de-rated capacity margin figures suggest thatthe system may experi-
ence tight supply conditions at peak demand in some years. Some of these results can perhaps
be explained by inspection of the residual load histograms from Fig. 6.6(d); the shape of the
right-most tail suggests that even with very high penetrations, wind power does not contribute
in all high demands periods. Furthermore the frequency of these high-demand/low-wind peri-
ods is too low to justify investment by private investors. And it is these very high-demand hours
when the potential for a capacity shortfall is highest (excluding here SO actions such as voltage
reductions). From a policy perspective, it is arguably uneconomical to design policies aimed
at ensuring there is adequate generating resource available for these low-fr quency events; an
alternative approach could be to encourage demand-side participation through smart grids and
smart metering. However these mechanisms will introduce price dynamics not currently wit-
nessed in most liberalised energy markets and therefore careful consideration of the impact of
demand response on generator’s anticipated energy market revenuesis required (cf. Section
9.1.5).
Further, an analysis of generator revenues shows symptoms of a boom and bust investment cy-
cle. Simulated OCGT total gross margins, which include annualised capital coss (Table 7.7),
are plotted in Fig. 7.17. Also shown are the triggered investments in this technology. Recall
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Figure 7.17: Plot of simulated total gross margins for OCGT capacity (solid line, left axis).
Also shown are the OCGT investment and mothballing amounts over time (black
bars, right axis).
here that investors stochastically simulate 7 years of prices, so the largestinv tment years
(2017/18) include the forecast prices for (2023-25), the period when gross margins are high-
est. In contrast investment reduces in 2019-22 in response to expectations b ut prices being
dampened (although not sufficiently to prevent an overshoot) as new invstment in OCGT and
other technologies enter the system. It is easy to see the pattern of high gross margins corre-
sponding to those years where adequacy risk is highest (Fig. 7.16). The graph shows how the
boom in OCGT investment in expectation of the high gross margins after 2023 isfollowed by a
bust phase around 2026 when large volumes of new nuclear capacity begin entering the system
(Fig. 7.15). This increases the capacity margin but reduces profitability for peaking units. In
fact, a significant volume of plant is mothballed toward the end of the simulation time horizon
suggesting that generators expect energy market revenues to remain low. It could be argued
that this pattern of boom and bust investment would be less severe in a modelthat included an
explicit representation of diverse agent behaviour. However as discussed in Section 7.2.2, the
investment response of the model is smooth, as would be expected from a heterogeneous group
of investors. Moreover, a model that considers firms with a portfolio of generation who might
compute a joint revenue calculation across all their generation when consideri g a new invest-
ment may experience alternative investment dynamics than simulated here. Thefore, as with
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any simulation model that looks to the future, which is hugely uncertain, these results must be
viewed with a degree of realism and caution. If the model were to be used in an actual policy
analysis then extending the model to address these issues is a worthy topic for future research.
This is discussed in Section 9.3 when recommendations for further work arepres nted.
The mothballing of OCGT early in the simulation (2011) is likely to be a direct resultof ex-
pected high capacity margins out to 2014 (Fig. 7.13); the existing CCGT buildscome online
during these years in anticipation of LCPD-induced plant closures (Section 7.4). The profitabil-
ity of other technologies is shown in Fig. 7.18. The plot shows similar profitabilitytrends for
CCGT compared with OCGT. Further, investment in OCGT capacity begins around 2014 with
similar developments witnessed in CCGT and nuclear, in contrast no coal investments are made
after 2005 as the plot of technology screening curves in Fig. 7.11 explains.
Figure 7.18: Plot of simulated realised total gross margins for CCGT, coal and nuclearcapac-
ity.
After 2025, very little CCGT or OCGT investment is triggered and endogenous capacity growth
is minimal. Nuclear plants experience a sustained period of positive gross margins fter 2023
(Fig 7.18), which is attributed to the rising SRMCs projects for fossil-fuel technologies (Fig
7.10) and hence increasing scarcity rents. This results in a period of intense and prolonged in-
vestment in nuclear after 2019 in response to high forecast gross margins. Combining this with
the data presented in Fig. 7.14, implies a period of intense CCGT and OCGT investment for
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the 10 years after 2015 to offset retirements to existing capacity and respond to demand growth
during 2020-25. Average annual endogenous capacity growth is -2.2% between 2015-25 as a
result of 29.7 GW of new thermal build being offset by 42.2 GW of thermal plant retirements
(options for lifetime extension were not considered here). This suggeststhat thermal capacity
is not replaced on a like-for-like basis, which is hardly surprising giventhat average growth in
installed wind generation is 12% over the same period. The ten years after 2025 provide bet-
ter growth (average endogenous capacity growth 1.2% between 2026-35) on account of wind
capacity levelling off, demand remaining flat and retirements continuing. In fact, nuclear is
the only endogenous plant type to increase in terms of total installed capacity for the period
2025-40. This analysis suggests that new investments struggle to recoverfixed costs during the
period after 2026 owing to growth in nuclear capacity within a high wind systemda pening
energy market revenues for fossil-fuel generation.
An interesting analysis is to compare simulated real-time (annual) prices with investor expecta-
tions. This can be used to determine how well investors predictions of grossmargins track those
realised. Fig. 7.19 shows the average simulated competitive prices across the MC runs versus
realised competitive prices for 1 and 3 years ahead for each of the years 2010, 2015, 2020 and
2025. Choosing 2020 as an example, in Fig. 7.19(a) (x-axis), the average of expected simulated
competitive price for 2021 (1 year ahead) is higher than the realised pricefo 2021 (dashed line
with diamonds) by 12£/MWh. The degree of difference is also directly related to the volume of
plant under construction; the more plant being built, the greater the over-estimation of market
prices (and hence gross margins). Furthermore, the proportion of longlead time plant under
construction exacerbates this trait. For instance, in 2020 the volumes of OCGT, CCGT and nu-
clear capacity under construction are 3.9, 5.8 and 3 GW, respectively, where as in 2025 it is 0,
10 and 6.5 GW, respectively, which is the year with the biggest difference. Note that, although
mark-ups from market power are not shown here, precisely the same pattern occurs for simu-
lated revenues from mark-ups. This can be traced back to the degree ofuncertainty with which
plant under construction is treated by the investor; the exact timings of whennew plants will
arrive are modelled as stochastic (sub-section 5.3.1). To test this hypothesis, a sensitivity case
was modelled where investors have perfect foresight about investmentsin the pipeline, this is
described in the next section (Test case 2c).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 7.19: (a) Plot of expected competitive market prices 1 year ahead from decision year
(x-axis) and (b) expected competitive market prices 3 years ahead from decision
year. Volume of capacity under construction at time decision is taken also shown
in each case (columns).
7.6 Sensitivity analyses
In order to test the robustness of the model, extensive sensitivity analyses hav been performed
on a number of model assumptions. Those found to be the most critical, some ofwhich are
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plotted in Fig. 7.20 with key associated metrics shown in Tables 7.9 and 7.10, aredescribed in
the following sections.
Figure 7.20: Plot of simulated LOLE for selected sensitivities (test cases 1-6). Note the loga-
rithmic scale. Also note once again that the MOND is less accurate in the tails
of the distribution so the estimate for LOLE (7.15) and the forecast for peak de-
mand (obtained from the 99.9% percentile of the year’s MOND cdf for full load)
will combine to likely under-estimate the true values of LOLE. Therefore these
values are used primarily to assess the changes in relative levels of risk forthe
sensitivities listed.
Overall, the model’s qualitative behaviour was reasonable for the sensitivities listed and pro-
vided some useful insights, particularly when comparing the oligopolistic basecase to the per-
fectly competitive market results (i.e., zero price mark-up, see below). Each of the experiments
above is described in the following sub-sections.
7.6.1 Test case 1
Thelevel of expected scarcity price(i.e., VOLL). Here, the maximum value of 10,000£/MWh
is reduced and the price mark-up functionw(L,G∗N ) is altered (Fig. 7.8(b)). Experiments using








Security of supply risk metrics Total investment and mothballing
Average Average No. years Deepest LOLE EEU 2010-40
de-rated diff. in negative shortfall (hrs/yr) (GWh) (GW)
margin margins (%,yr)
2010-40 relative
Test (%) to base
case (%) Nuclear Coal CCGT OCGT
Base case 5.6 - 4 (-6.8, 2024) 0.03 5.7 30.5 0 34 12.1
(7.1) (0.05) (9.2) - (3.0) (1.2) (4.6)
VOLL 30000 6.5 1.2 1 (-1.3, 2025) 0.02 3.3 31.5 0 37 15
(5.0) (0.02) (3.1) - (2.5) (7.8) (10.9)
VOLL 2000 3.8 -3.0 10 (-9.0, 2022) 0.22 46.8 30.5 0 32.6 13.3
(7.8) (0.49) (116.7) - (3.0) (3.0) (5.0)
Believer 12.9 7.0 1 (-2.6, 2018) 0.01 1.9 30.5 0 34 32.4
(6.7) (0.02) (4.8) 0 (3.5) 0 (15.0)
Pre counter -5.1 -10.1 21 (-16.9, 2026) 0.71 158.7 30.5 0 27.6 12.0
(8.5) (0.70) (167.3) - (3.0) (3.6) (5.3)
Accurate 1.7 -3.9 15 (-5.9, 2030) 0.06 10.2 31.0 0 24.2 22.9
(4.5) (0.05) (8.3) - (1.5) (3.6) (6.2)
Resp. higher 6.3 0.8 6 (-4.7, 2024) 0.02 4.0 31.0 0 36.8 13.7
(5.2) (0.03) (5.3) - (3.0) (5.8) (6.6)
Resp. lower 5.0 -0.5 8 (-5.8, 2023) 0.05 8.9 29.0 0.5 35.2 19.8
(5.7) (0.08) (14.3) - (2.5) (1.0) (4.9)
No markup -8.3 -13.0 20 (-33.2, 2024) 3.9 1474 31.0 0 32.6 8.5























































Security of supply risk metrics Total investment and mothballing
Average Average No. years Deepest LOLE EEU 2010-40
de-rated diff. in negative shortfall (hrs/yr) (GWh) (GW)
margin margins (%,yr)
2010-40 relative
Test (%) to base
case (%) Nuclear Coal CCGT OCGT
Base case 5.6 4 (-6.8, 2024) 0.03 5.7 30.5 0 34 12.1
(7.1) (0.05) (9.2) - (3.0) (1.2) (4.6)
VaR higher 7.3 1.7 4 (-5.3, 2023) 0.02 3.4 29.5 0 30.6 18.2
(5.2) (0.03) (5.1) - (3.5) (2.8) (6.4)
VaR lower 6.2 0.9 5 (-5.7, 2023) 0.02 4.2 30 0 31 16.6
(5.0) (0.03) (6.1) - (3.0) (3.6) (7.1)
WACC lower 7.0 1.4 4 (-4.9, 2023) 0.02 3.3 30.5 0 28.4 7.8
(4.8) (0.03) (4.8) - (3.0) (1.0) (1.6)
WACC higher 4.8 -0.8 7 (-5.5, 2023) 0.03 5.8 31.5 0 39.2 19.1
(4.6) (0.04) (7.5) - (3.0) (1.4) (4.7)
Load SD 8.5 2.9 3 (-1.9, 2026) 0.01 2.0 30.5 0 32.4 22.6
(5.3) (0.01) (2.4) 0 (2.0) (0.8) (6.7)
AS reduce 3.9 -1.6 12 (-6.9, 2023) 0.05 9.3 31 0 39.2 9.9
(5.0) (0.07) (12.5) - (3.0) (5.0) (5.1)
FC increase 5.9 0.0 5 (-4.1, 2023) 0.04 7.4 30.5 0 38.8 12.8

















































Improving the Investment Model
For test case ‘VOLL 30000’:, by increasing the VOLL, the expectation would be to see more
investment as price spikes signals are stronger, which could potentially leadto a lower level
of risk and also more investment relative to the base case. For test case ‘VOLL 2000’:, by
reducing the VOLL, the expectation would be to see delays in investment as price s ikes are
dampened, which could potentially lead to a higher level of risk and also less investment relative
to the base case. For instance, in a perfectly competitive market, in order foan OCGT plant
to recover its fixed costs (47.25£/unforced kW/yr), the price must reach the VOLL (10,000
£/MWh) in at least 4.7 hrs/yr (actually more to account for SRMC of production), and reducing
the VOLL to 2,000£/MWh increases this duration to 23.6 hrs/yr (Fig 7.21). The simulation
results showed that increasing the VOLL to 30,000£/MWh leads to a small improvement in
average de-rated margins to 4.9% with a standard deviation of 5.0%. Furthermore, de-rated
margins are negative during only 2026/27. The average annual LOLE reduces to 0.02 hrs/yr
with average annaul EEU of 3.3 GWh. Interestingly, CCGT investment begins 1 year earlier
and has a smoother cumulative profile relative to the base case (standard deviation of year-on-
year volumes 0.8 GW versus 1.2 GW in base case). This displaces some OCGTinvestment
early on, but overall volume during 2015-25 increase by 2 GW. Reducingthe VOLL to 2,000
£/MWh alters investment timings, but overall volumes are only slightly reduced (3% lower
than base case). The average annual LOLE increases to 0.22 hrs/yr with average annaul EEU
of 46.8 GWh. CCGT investment starts 2 years later relative to the base case,which interestingly
increases nuclear investment by 2 GW during 2015-20. OCGT investment isl ss intense during
2015-18 but volumes are significantly higher during 2020-23 (4.7 GW compared with 1.1 GW).
This is in response to higher expected gross margins in 2022-26 as a result of less short lead
time plant investment early on.
7.6.2 Test case 2
Investor expectations about new builds. Taking inspiration from [135] for, test case a) the
‘believers’case; here the investor ignores plants under construction when making expectations
about revenues. The impact of new builds on prices are only considered once plants are fully
operational (i.e., will systematically over-predict market prices). Secondly, case b), the‘pre
counter’ is used where the investor views all plant under construction as operational (i.e., will
systematically under-predict market prices). Finally, case c), a‘accurate’ investor is modelled
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Figure 7.21: Plot of required number of load shedding (or ‘VOLL-priced’) hoursfor OCGT
generator to recover its fixed costs (assuming perfectly competitive market).
where estimates about construction lead times match the delays experienced in reality (i.e.,
lead times shown in Table 7.5). This last case can be used to test the hypothesis that differences
between realised and investor expectations about prices is due to the uncertainty surrounding
capacity under construction.
For test case‘believers’, the anticipation would be more investment relative to the base case due
to the investor now systematically over-estimating revenues because they do not account for the
impact of new builds when formulating price expectations. Results producedmore investment
than under the base case, with more severe over-shoot dynamics witnessed. A a result, average
annual LOLE falls to 0.01 hrs/yr with generators unable to recover fixed costs with significant
increases in the volume of mothballed OCGT capacity.
For test case‘pre counters’, the anticipation would be less investment relative to the base case
due to the investor now systematically under-estimating revenues because they include new
builds before they are operational when formulating their price expectations. Results showed
under-investment and average annual LOLE increases to 0.71 hrs/yr.As a result of less in-
vestment, overall profitability of existing plant improves, with some mothballing in theearly
part of the simulation in response to high forecast margins on account of plant already under
construction at the start of the simulation (Section 7.4).
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For test case‘accurate’, the expectation would be reduced over-shoot dynamics and better
prediction of realised prices relative to the base case. This is on accountof the investor making
a better prediction of the timing of capacity under construction, which is particularly important
when there is a lot of long lead time plant (e.g., nuclear) under construction.S mulation results
show that nuclear, CCGT and OCGT receive positive gross margins in almost all years after
2015, yet average LOLE doubles to 0.06 hrs/yr and with a noticeable oscillation of frequency
5 years and amplitude 0.12 hrs/yr (Fig. 7.20). Average EEU also increases to 10.2 GWh.
Fig. 7.19 shows a significant improvement in investor price expectations at the 1 year ahead
stage, with expectation 3 years ahead also more akin to reality. Expectations ab ut years 4-7
ahead performed better than the base case, though due to the possibility of new investments (or
mothballing) impacting on those years, significant differences remain.
7.6.3 Test case 3
Theaggregate investment response from the market. This is achieved by altering the con-
stant exponent,β, in the aggregate investment response function (7.4) to a) 0.9, ‘Resp. higher’
and b) 0.5,‘Resp. lower’ (Fig. 7.3).
For test case ‘Resp. lower’, the expectation would be that reductions to the exponentβ in
(7.4) to reduce investment, and increases under ‘Resp. higher’ to increase investment. This
could also impact on the timing of investments later in the simulation on account of changes
to investment levels early on. The results followed expectations; changes produced similar
investment timings to the base case for OCGT and CCGT early in the time horizon but the
reduced (resp. increased) levels of aggregate response lead to increases (resp. decreases) in
generation adequacy risk in the medium-term (out to 2020) but higher (resp. lower) levels of
investment later on in response to higher (resp. lower) forecast revenu s. In the case of nuclear,
a reduced response curve time-slipped the investment pattern by two yearsfrom 2020, whereas
for the increased response curve the patterns were broadly similar.
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7.6.4 Test case 4
Theability of plant owners to exercise market powerand volumes of revenues received by
doing so, reference ‘No markup’. This is achieved by calculating expected gross margins using
(7.17) instead of (7.28) (i.e., a perfectly competitive market versus the oligop listic market in
the base case).
For test case ‘No markup’, the perfectly competitive market case, the expctation would be
lower overall levels of investment on account of price mark-ups being remov d from the rev-
enue calculation. Here more sustained periods of high prices (and hencescarcity rents) are
required in order to recover invested capital and provide adequate return on investment. In-
deed, when limiting the ability to exercise market power by removal of price mark-up, CCGT
investments are most affected. Investment in this technology starts four years later than the
base case and cumulative investment is on average 4.4 GW lower. Nuclear inv stments are
also dampened, with investment during the first 15 years of the simulation 3 GW lower than
the base case. These dynamics led to an order of magnitude increase in average annual LOLE
and EEU to 3.9 hrs/yr and 1474 GWh, respectively. Of course these dynamics may differ in
a model representing more sophisticated firms who account for the effecto their investment
upon mark-ups for their existing fleet. In this case firms may deliberately not invest in order
to keep prices (including mark-ups) high, however this type of investor logic is not considered
here.
7.6.5 Test case 5
Investor risk preferences: achieved by case a) ‘VaR higher’: increasing criticalq to 0.5 in VaR
test (cf. sub-section 5.3.3), case b) ‘VaR lower’: lowering criticalq to 0.01, case c) ‘WACC
lower’: reducing investor WACC and case d) ‘WACC higher’: increasing investor WACC.
For test case ‘VaR higher’ and ‘VaR lower’, the expectation would be to se changes to the level
of investments, particularly early on when the threshold for investment, whichis onsidered
only if the VaR criterionp(Vx > 0) ≥ (100− q)% is met. This means that an investment could
be deemed attractive earlier (in the case whereq = 0.5) or later (in the case whereq = 0.01)
relative to the base case. Moreover, the VaR criterion relates to the degree of isk aversion
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(Section 5.3.3), thereforeq = 0.5 models a less risk averse investor, andq = 0.01 models a
more risk averse investor. Results of this experiment showed that modelling aess risk averse
investor leads to marginally earlier nuclear investment (typically viewed as highrisk due to high
investment costs and operational inflexibility), with peaking plant investment timings remaining
unchanged but volumes increasing in some years. Modelling a more risk averse investor leads
to OCGT investment timings remaining unchanged but volumes increasing and displacing some
CCGT (5.4 GW overall reduction in CCGT and 3.3 GW increase in OCGT); this isattributed to
a higher degree of certainty about prices in the near term, resulting in less variance in projected
revenues for short lead time plant. Hence the VaR criterion will tend to favour this type of plant
for low values ofq.
For test case ‘WACC lower’ and ‘WACC higher’, a similar expectation to thatof ‘VaR higher’
and ‘VaR lower’ were held. Results show that the degree of impact that changes to the WACC
had on investment timings was related to construction lead time. This is hardly surprising given
that investment costs for long lead time plant are highly sensitive to the discount rate used. For
instance, increasing the required rate of return on equity by 3% across alltechnologies delays
nuclear investment by 3 years and overall volume by 5.5 GW during 2010-25. This leads to
higher generation adequacy risk during 2018-22. Similarly, CCGT investments are delayed by
2 years although volumes are similar on account of the lower nuclear builds increasing expected
gross margins and triggering investment. Reducing the required rate of return on equity by 3%
leads to higher and earlier volumes of nuclear investment with annual average LOLE reduced,
though gross margins are reduced.
7.6.6 Test case 6
Increasing investor uncertainty about load growth. Investors still consider load growth to
be stochastic, however the standard deviation of the Normal distribution used to sample load
growth is increased from 1% to 3%, reference ‘Load SD’.
For test case ‘Load SD’, the expectation would be that an increase to the standard deviation
of load growth to lead to a higher standard deviation of the distribution of project value. This
increased uncertainty surrounding profitability would reduced and/or delay investment. In fact,
increasing investor load growth uncertainty leads to less CCGT and nuclearinv stment out to
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2020, by comparison OCGT investment increases by 10 GW over the base case for the period
2019-21 in anticipation of high market prices in 2022-26. This high volume ofinvestment
lowers the generation adequacy risk and serves to dampen market prices, and OCGT gross
margins are positive in 2026 only (the only year when de-rated margins arenegative).
7.6.7 Test case 7
Economics of peaking plants: achieved by case a) ‘AS reduce’: reducing the amount of ancil-
lary service (AS) revenue for OCGT plants and case b) ‘FC increase’: increasing total OCGT
fixed costs (i.e.,TAFCx).
For test case ‘AS reduce’, a reduction in AS revenues (and hence profitability) was expected
to reduce OCGT investments, although not massively on account of AS revenu s alone not
being sufficient to trigger investment (Section 7.2). In fact, reducing OCGT AS revenues from
10,000/MW/yr to 5,000/MW/yr alters investment timings and capacity choice early on in the
simulation, yet long-term overall volumes are only marginally affected. Moreprecisely, a re-
duction in OCGT investment during 2014-2018 (1.6 GW compared with 11 GW in base case)
is somewhat offset by increases in CCGT (8.8 GW compared with 4.6 in base case) and nuclear
(up 2.5 GW on base case) investment during this period. All three technologies were deemed
profitable during this period; the model chooses the technology with the highest PI (5.21) and
iterates until no additional plants are profitable (Section 7.2.2). A reduction inAS revenues for
OCGT means that other technologies have more favourable profitability in the first iteration of
the investment decision. OCGT is not chosen in subsequent iterations as a result of other capac-
ity additions reducing its profitability to suboptimal levels. By choosing to invest inlonger lead
time plant, total LOLE over 2019-2023 increases from 0.29 to 0.97 hrs. Interestingly, higher
volumes of OCGT investment occur in these later years (5.6 GW during 2019-20 compared
with 1.1 GW in base case). This is likely to be a consequence of the increasedvolumes of
longer lead time plant under construction during this period increasing the differences between
investor price predictions and reality (i.e., as discussed in sensitivity 2c).
Finally, for case ‘FC increase’, increasing OCGTTAFCx from 42.5 to 60£/MW/yr (achieved
by increasing capex from 359 to 510£/kW) was expected to produce similar dynamics to case
‘AS reduce’. This turned out to be the case, though the increase in LOLEis less severe (although
222
Improving the Investment Model
still higher than the base case).
7.6.8 Test case 8
In addition to the VaR criterion,Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) (cf. sub-section 4.4.2.3 )
with q = 0.05 is included as a sensitivity, reference ‘CVaR’.
For test case ‘CVaR’, the expectation would be similar to test case ‘VaR lower’ n account of
a more risk averse investor being modelled. Here investment is made if the expect d project
value is positive conditional on the revenue being belowvq, with q the confidence level, and
investment is triggered ifE [Vx|Vx < vq] > 0, i.e., the worseq% of the 100 Monte Carlo
simulated project NPVs determine the decision. The model produced some interesting results;
nuclear investment is delayed by two years (first triggered in 2012), with lower volumes in the
short-term (2.5 GW 2011-14, compared with 3.5 GW 2010-14 in base case)to medium-term
(5 GW 2020-23 compared with 6.5 GW 2019-23), i.e., 30% overall reduction. After 2026 both
timings and volumes were broadly in line with the base case. Further, OCGT investment was
reduced by 18% and delayed (9.9 GW 2015-24 compared with 12.1 GW 2014-22 in base case),
but CCGT investment experienced an increase of 14% (30.2 GW 2015-25compared with 26.4
GW in base case). The average de-rated margin for the 30 simulated futureyears fell to 2.5%.
The average annual LOLE across increased to 0.09 hrs/yr with a average annual EEU of 16.4
GWh. Again, 2023-28 was the period of highest risk.
7.6.9 Test case 9
To test theimportance of the primary fuel price projections, a sensitivity where the DECC
low coal (case a, reference ‘low coal’) and high (case b, referenc‘high gas’) and low (case
c, reference ‘low gas’) gas price assumptions was tested. These are shown relative to the base
case (central estimates) in Appendix A.4. Finally, a test (case d, reference ‘carbon floor’) with
a 40£/tCO2 minimum (or “floor”) ETS price was also tested.
For test case ‘low coal’, a reduction in the projected coal price (Fig. A.1(b)) would be expected
to impact coal investment in the short-term only on account of the carbon price remaining
high after 2020. Results showed this was indeed the case, yet the impact is less than expected
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with only 500 MW of coal triggered (in 2013), compared with zero in the basecase. An
unexpected result is that CCGT investment reduces to zero in 2015 and 2016 (1.4 GW and 0.2
GW, respectively, in base case), with OCGT increasing by 0.2 GW over thesam period. This
is largely unexplained, but is perhaps best attributed to the projected increase in the SRMC of
coal occurring later in the simulation (Fig. A.4). This increase causes coalgeneration to move
above CCGT in the merit order, thus increasing the projected scarcity rents(7.17) of CCGT
generation. In contrast with this occurring later here than for the base case, the result is a
reduction in CCGT investment early on in the simulation.
For test case ‘high gas’, a high gas price (Fig. A.1(a)) would be expected to delay CCGT
and OCGT investments and perhaps trigger some coal and more nuclear investment due to
increased forecast scarcity rents (7.17). Results show exactly this, although somewhat more
so than expected. A sustained period of nuclear investment is experienced during 2010-19,
with 15.5 GW of new investment triggered, compared with only 4.5 GW in the base c.
Further, 8.5 GW of coal generation is triggered during 2012-18 with OCGTinvestment reduced
significantly (5 GW 2013-23, compared with 12.1 GW in base case). Unsurpri ingly, CCGT
investment is also reduced, although some does still occur after 2017 (average 2.3 GW 2017-
23, compared with 2.7 GW in base case), with overall volumes during the first15 years of the
simulation 42 % less. These findings correspond to the change witnessed for the least-cost of
supply solution. More precisely, taking 2015 as an example, the technologyscreening curves
are plotted in Fig 7.22. Notice how coal is now part of the least cost solution,which is not
the case under any of the base case simulation years (e.g., Fig. 7.11). Interesti gly, there is
earlier and more intense mothballing of plants for both OCGT and CCGT; startingin 2027, 9
GW of CCGT and 6 GW of OCGT is mothballed. Some OCGT capacity is returned to service
after 2034, although CCGT is not owing to most of this capacity reaching the end of its design
lifetime before it is deemed profitable. The average de-rated margin for the 30 simulated future
years rises to 6.7% with negative margins experienced in only 2 years. Theaverage annual
LOLE reduces to 0.02 hrs/yr with a average annual EEU of 2.9 GWh. The period of highest
risk becomes 2018-20 (when negative margins occur), which is earlier than the base case. This
is due to more longer lead time plant (i.e., coal and nuclear) being chosen forinvestment and
hence the generation adequacy benefits of this capacity are experienced later in the simulation
(e.g., no occurences of negative margins during 2024-27).
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Figure 7.22: Screening curves for technologies for 2015 SRMC cost data with high gas price
sensitivity. Solid line indicates optimal (least cost) capacity mix.
For test case ‘low gas’, the expectation would be that lower gas prices (Fig. A.1(a)) would lead
to more gas-fired investment at the expense of nuclear generation. For abase-load generator,
such as nuclear, in order to recover high capital and fixed costs, this tecnology requires large
gross margins in the majority of hours. Therefore, reducing the SRMC of gas-fired generation
(in the absence of coal investment), will reduce nuclear projected profitability. The results of
the simulation show that no nuclear investment is triggered until 2027. Furthermor , 7.5 GW
of coal-fired generation is mothballed during the first 5 years of the simulation, by comparison
no OCGT mothballing occurs (Fig. 7.17). This leads to de-rated margins beingon average
3% lower during this period. The average de-rated margin for the 30 simulated future years
is 0.2% with negative margins experienced in a rather alarming 16/30 winters. The average
annual LOLE increases to 0.07 hrs/yr with a average annual EEU of 12.9GWh. The period of
highest risk becomes 2015-26, which is earlier but lasts longer than the base case. Interestingly,
CCGT investment remains largely unchanged, with only OCGT investments increasing (21 GW
during 2014-23 compared with 12.1 GW in the base case). Fig. 7.23 shows how the capacity
mix becomes dominated by gas-fired generation. By 2020, there is 36 GW and14 GW of
installed CCGT and OCGT capacity, respectively. This accounts for 53% of total installed
capacity (75% of total thermal generation). Further, absolute levels of capacity are lower than
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in the base case in some years (average -2.8 GW less total installed capacity per year than base
case during 2010-30), thus leading to more frequent and increased gen ration adequacy risk.
Figure 7.23: Plot of total installed capacity for 2010-30 for test case 9c, i.e., the result ofthe
mix and amount of generation investment and retirements over time.
For test case ‘carbon floor’, the expectation about a 40£/tCO2 minimum ETS price would be
that more nuclear investment occurs due to increasing gross margins (i.e., the opposite effect
of case ‘low gas’). This is indeed the case with levels of nuclear investmentsimilar to that
of test case ‘high gas’; a sustained period of nuclear investment is experi nc d during 2010-
21, with 13.5 GW of new investment triggered compared with only 4.5 GW in the basc e.
CCGT investment remains largely unchanged, in contrast OCGT investment reduces by 50%.
Further, as with test case ‘low gas’, 4 GW of coal capacity is mothballed in theearly part of
the simulation. This capacity is not returned to service and is permanently retired in 2012 on
account of the LCPD (cf. Table 5.4 for LCPD plant closure assumptions). A benefit of earlier
and sustained nuclear investment is that the generation adequacy risk is reduced, although de-
rated margins still remain low in 2023-26. The average annual LOLE reduces to 0.01 hrs/yr
with a average annual EEU of 2.3 GWh.
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7.6.10 Summary of test results
In summary, a pattern of increased levels of risk relative to the historic calculation nd erosion
of de-rated capacity margins was experienced during the 2020s to some degree in all cases.
Furthermore, the period of highest security of supply risk is 2023-28, thoug the magnitude of
the risk (measured by LOLE) differs between experiments, with the high gasprice sensitivity
bringing the riskiest period forward to 2018-20. A prolonged period ofincreased security
of supply risk is experienced throughout the 2020s for the perfectly competitive market case.
Also, providing investors with perfect foresight about capacity underconstruction produces
less investment; this leads to more frequent periods of relatively high LOLE and low de-rated
margins after 2020. However generators experience positive gross margins in more years on
account of reduced surplus margins, and hence higher prices.
The 2020s is the period of most intense change; during this decade over 40 GW of new capacity
is built with over 34 GW retiring; 14.5 GW of capacity leaves the system during the period
2023-26 alone. This further exacerbates the higher relative levels of ri k during this period.
Furthermore, no new coal investments are made, with the majority of new investment coming
from gas-fired generation. A sensitivity on the primary fuel prices showed that lower coal prices
(or indeed higher gas prices) may lead to different technology choice, with relative levels of
high generation adequacy risk shifting to earlier in the time horizon.
7.7 Chapter summary
This chapter provided details of the updated dynamic investment model. New features of the
investment decision element of the model are provided in Section 7.2, includinghow investors
account for an increasing wind penetration and the introduction of an aggregate investor re-
sponse curve. In Section 7.3 the MOND was formally defined and its application to a market
situation is given. This included a novel derivation to account for revenues from price mark-ups
and a test of MOND technique accuracy. In Section 7.4 described input ass mptions for the
GB market simulation and the wind models used from Chapter 6. Results from thedynamic
simulation of capacity investment in a system with an existing installed capacity similar tothat
of GB is given in Section 7.5, and an extensive sensitivity analysis followedin Section 7.6. Re-
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sults showed a pattern of increased levels of risk relative to the historic calculation and erosion
of de-rated capacity margins was experienced during the 2020s to some degree in all cases.
The topic of the next chapter will be to determine whether explicit capacity mechanisms can
be designed to alleviate resource shortfall and prevent investment oversh ot. The results here
indicate that such a mechanism may be desirable to improve reserve margins in the mid 2020s.
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Implementation of a Capacity
Mechanism
In this chapter, the scope for including a generation capacity investment control signal to
dampen investment cycles is explored. This begins with a discussion on the chall nges faced
when applying techniques from classical control theory in order to design a robust investment
market controller for the dynamic model, and how reverting to existing modelling methodolo-
gies can still provide new insights. These insights are underpinned by a discuss on on the need
and design for a capacity mechanism for the GB market test case based onthe results of Chapter
7. Two capacity mechanisms are tested, these are a strategic reserve tender and a market-wide
capacity market, and their impact on relative levels of risk is analysed.
8.1 Introduction
In dynamic control, arobust controlleris defined as a control mechanism that minimises the
effect of uncertainties whilst achieving the desired level of control over th system. For the
control system depicted in Fig. 5.1, the aim of the controller is to dampen investment cycles
and maintain the suitable level of security of supply risk. Initially, it was envisaged that the
measurement signal would be full or de-rated capacity margin, and the controller would behave
like a capacity mechanism by increasing (or reducing) additional generator revenue streams if
capacity margins (a proxy for security of supply risk) fall below (or riseabove) the reference
point, e.g., Fig. 8.1. In a system with a high wind penetration, this reference point would be a
target level of de-rated capacity margin, say 10%.
In order to design a robust controller, all elements of the system must be repr sented using
differential equations. This is termed thestate-spacerepresentation. An example of a state-
space representation for installed capacity is shown in (5.1). Here the statevariable,x, is the
installed capacity at monthm, andy is the system output, which is the sum of exogenous
(uncertainty in supply and project abandonment) and endogenous (newbuild or mothballed
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Figure 8.1: Electricity investment as a control problem with the proposed controller; theaim
of the controller is maintain a reference level capacity margin by making generator
revenues more predictable.
capacity) variables. In this case, a challenge arises for the system depicted F g. 8.1 due to the
investment block being a “black box”, i.e., it cannot be represented usingdifferential equations.
In plain terms, the aggregate response of investment to market conditions can be measured, yet
unlike the dynamics of capacity change (e.g., (5.3)), the exact method by which the decision is
carried out cannot be represented using differential equations.
In the absence of a state-space representation,system identificationcan be used to created
a mathematical model of a dynamic system with “black box” characteristics usingobserved
input-output data. For instance, the Matlab System Identification Toolbox [225] can be used
to fit linear and nonlinear models to observed data (e.g., in this application the simulated in-
vestment response or de-rated capacity margin). These model structures include state-space
models which could then be used to design a robust controller. However thisfunctionality was
only surveyed during the final stages of research and, given the limited timeavailable in which
to absorb and then apply these tools, it was decided to incorporate a capacity me hanism into
the dynamic model using more established methods of implementation. That said, theexact
specifications of the capacity mechanisms implemented here are unique. The approach taken to
including these elements in the dynamic model are outlined and tested in the followingsections.
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8.2 A GB market capacity mechanism
Broadly speaking, any debate about whether or not a capacity mechanism is required must be
informed by a robust generation adequacy risk measure. This permits assessment of the risk in
any given investment scenario, and also guides the design of energy and capacity markets by
setting a baseline for what the market should deliver (such as an adequate capacity mix con-
sistent with appropriate returns on investment). In the following sections, drawing on previous
model results and underlying input assumptions for generation reliability, theneed and design
for a capacity market in GB is explored.
8.2.1 Need
The results presented in Sections 7.5 and 7.6 suggest that the GB system mayexperience in-
creased generation adequacy risk during the mid to late 2020s. This motivates he consideration
of capacity mechanisms, which can be employed to make generator revenue streams more pre-
dictable and thus bring on more timely investment. Fig. 8.2 shows the social optimal level of
unserved load in terms of cost and reliability using the simple model of reliability (sub-section
2.4.3). The optimal level (circles) for each VOLL can be determined using (2.8). In the main
simulation, the average 30-year EEU in the base case was 5.7 GWh per year, suggesting the
system may fall below the optimal level of reliability for a VOLL of 10,000 and 30,00 £/MWh.
Furthermore, during the period of highest risk (2023-28), the maximum EEU was 33.4 GWh
per year, suggesting that this period is less reliable than even the optimal duration for a VOLL
of 2,000£/MWh. That said, these figures of EEU are calculated using the MOND technique
so cannot be considered altogether reliable in terms of absolute values. Threfore, when de-
signing a capacity mechanism, the EEU should be used to compare relative change between
experiments (Section 7.6), but owing to the possible inaccuracies of the estimate, cannot be
relied upon to produce a robust generation adequacy risk measure. Withthis in mind, attention
turns to a proxy for system risk, namely the de-rated capacity margin.
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Figure 8.2: Plot of optimal level of unserved energy for different levels of VOLL. Based on
incremental cost of an OCGT plant with FC of 47.25 £/unforced kW/yr (cf.Table
7.5). Note the £million scale applied to the y-axis.
8.2.1.1 De-rated capacity margin
The control problem formulation allows for the de-rated capacity margin (DRM) (2.14) to be
observed, yet this signal is dependent on the scaling factors (i.e., FORsfor conventional gen-
eration, and CC for wind) applied to each generator type. Owing to the lack of available data
on plant technical availability in GB, the FORs applied to de-rate capacity use best available
estimates (e.g., [26, 65]) and must be viewed with a degree of caution. Furthermore, following
the discussion on wind CC results in Chapter 6, the same can be said of the availability of the
wind resource at periods of highest demand. Therefore, before prceeding to the design of a
capacity mechanism, it is worthwhile considering the sensitivity of investment scarios to the
underlying input assumptions for expected generator reliability.
Fig. 8.3 shows the level of realised DRM for the base case investment scenario when the FORs
in Table 7.5 are reduced (values shown on legend). Also shown is a low-wind scenario where
the capacity credits for wind shown in Fig. 6.10 are calibrated in order to provide a capacity
credit of 5% for the high penetrations (Fig. 8.4). Plainly the DRM is on average 1.3% below
the base case measurement when nuclear FOR is increased from 0.1 to 0.2,5.9% below when
CCGT FOR is increased from 0.13 to 0.2, and 2.7% below when the CC of wind are reduced.
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For conventional generation, the reduction is dependent on the level ofinstalled capacity for
each tecnology. For instance, the reduction in de-rated margin is higher when increasing the
FOR of nuclear later on in the simulation because installed capacity is near to 30 GW, however
it has little impact during the period of lowest DRMs when installed nuclear capacity is low
(average of 6.6 GW over 2023-28).
Figure 8.3: Sensitivity of measured de-rated margin to assumptions about de-rating factors.
This simple analysis demonstrates the impact that the assumed availability of supplywill have
on measured de-rated margins, and although not explicitly included here, a simil r pattern
occurs when uncertainty surrounding peak demand is tested (e.g., samplingqua tiles in excess
of 99.9%; Fig 7.12). The importance of this analysis is further evident whenone considers
predicting the de-rated capacity margin in advance of realised levels of supply and demand,
which is particularly important for many of the capacity mechanisms that exist pre ently (e.g,
PJM’s capacity market).
8.2.2 Design and testing
Drawing on the observation in Section 7.5, that according to the UK Government, a peak de-
rated margin of 10% provides an acceptable level of generation adequacy risk [67], and further-
more, that views on the use of either a strategic reserve tender or market-wide mechanism in
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Figure 8.4: Altered wind capacity credit graph. Calibrated so CC is 5% for the highest capa -
ity penetration; calibration point highlighted with circles (onshore 13 GW, offshore
20 GW).
the form of a capacity market [226] are sought, two capacity mechanisms are tested within the
model. Each has the aim of achieving a 10% de-rated capacity margin. They are astrategic re-
serve tenderand amarket-wide capacity market. Note that both the mechanisms tested here are
quite simplistic compared with existing capacity markets, yet these implementations canpro-
vide insights into the effectiveness of capactiy mechanisms in mitigating generation adequacy
risk concerns in a system with a high wind penetration, an area of research whi h is much less
understood.
Before describing the details of each mechanism, the time horizon over which the capacity
mechanisms operate must be defined. Some capacity mechanisms involve real-timeoperation
(e.g., E&W Pool capacity payment) and others annual (e.g., PJM’s capacitymarket operates
from June 1 to May 31 [227]). Each of the mechanisms tested here are forward-looking, that
is a forecast of the de-rated margin a number of years into the future is madeand capacity is
procured, or a capacity price is determined, based on this projection.
Using the same notation as (5.3), the forecast for total installed capacity of plant typex for year
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t+ T , made at yeart, can be obtained by











whereAx is the set of all plant expected to be built by yeary+T : Ax =
{
j|t+ T ≥ ηBj + τx
}
,
and similarlyRx is the set of all expected retired plant:Rx =
{
j|t+ T ≥ ηBj + τx + αx
}
.
Thus the forecast expected de-rated margin (FDRM) for yeart+ T made at yeart is given by
FCDM(t, T ) =
∑4
x=1 Ix(t+ T ) +DRW (t+ T )
MPPD(t+ T )
− 1 (8.2)
whereMPPD(t + T ) is the forecast for most probable peak demand andDRW (t + T ) is
the forecast de-rated wind capacity (ELCC); both are exogenous parameters to the dynamic
investment model.DRW (t+ T ) is obtained from a combination of Fig. 6.5 (installed on and
offshore capacities) and Fig. 6.10 (capacity credits used to de-rate wind). The forecast for peak
demand,MPPD(t + T ), is obtained from the 99.9% percentile of yeart + T ’s MOND cdf
for full load (Fig. 7.12). Thus, the previous caveat on intepretation of absolute values applies
to the FCDM as well.
When planning a system, lead times due to engineering, procurement and constru tion must
be accounted for. For instance, in the GB case study presented in Section7.4, if a central
estimate for de-rated capacity margins taken at yeart, for delivery in yeart + 3 was required,
only new investments in OCGT plant currently under construction would impacton the level
of generation adequacy actually experienced in yeart + 3. By comparison if looking ahead to
yeart+ 8, all new investments in yeart will need to be considered.
8.2.3 Strategic reserve tender
The analysis begins with a strategic reserve tender (SRT). Taking the definition in [226], this
mechanism consists of a centrally-procured volume of capacity“which is removed from the
electricity market and only utilised in certain circumstances”. These circumstances are likely
to occur when either all other available resources have been exhaustedor the wholesale price
reaches a politically unacceptable level (i.e., above the perceived long-run marginal cost of the
most expensive plant type, but below the VOLL).
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To allow for construction lead time, capacity is procured three years aheadof required delivery
and is restricted to OCGT plant only. Three years is chosen on the basis that this will leave
sufficient time for any required OCGT capacity to be built and, if investments inother tech-
nologies are made in the meantime, they will not influence the level of generationadequacy
experienced three years out, but will contribute in later years.
Capacity is procured on the basis of meeting the 10% de-rated target reserve ma gin. If no
shortfall is expected, then no capacity is procured. To account for thefact that strategic reserve,
like all other OCGT capacity, is subject to forced outages,ρ, the required tender volume (RTV)
is determined by scaling the forecast required de-rated capacity in yeart+ T
RDC(t+ T ) = max [0,MPPD(t+ T ) · (0.1 − FCDM(t, T ))] , (8.3)
by the expected FOR of an OCGT plant, i.e.,RTV = RDC/(1 − ρOCGT ).
The modelled investor is aware of the reserve tender, but is unsure exactly what price will acti-
vate the reserve capacity. Further, the investor assumes that strategic res rve capacity will have
the same impact on wholesale prices as any other volume of capacity entering thsys em (i.e.,
it will dampen prices) with the additional SRT resource combined with other OCGT peaking
resources when calculating projected energy market revenues (7.28). This logic is extended to
the decision to mothball plant (7.3), though it is restricted to capacity which is built as a result
of energy market and AS gross margins alone, i.e., not part of the SRT. All SRT is assumed to
be paid an availability and utilisation price adequate to provide a reasonable rate of return on
investment. Finally, in each decision year, the investment decision is run firstand the required
SRT capacity calculated afterwards, thus giving the market every opportunity to provide the
required capacity in order to meet the 10% target de-rated margin.
8.2.3.1 Simulation results
Fig. 8.5 shows the evolution of de-rated capacity margin over the period 2016-4 and that the
period of highest adequacy risk in the base case was 2023-28. The graph shows how de-rated
margins improve significantly relative to the base case. Of the 30 simulated future yea s, the
average de-rated margin is 12.9% with a standard deviation of 4.5%, relativeto th base case
where equivalent figures of 5.6% and 7.1%, respectively, were observed. The 10% target DRM
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is achieved in 21 of 30 simulated years (compared with 5 of 30 years in the base case). The
average annual LOLE across the 30-year simulation was 0.002 hrs/yr witha standard deviation
of 0.003, and average annual EEU of 0.353 GWh per year. These figures are an order of
magnitude lower relative to the base case projections.
Figure 8.5: Plot of de-rated capacity margins for strategic reserve against the basec during
2016-40.
Fig. 8.6 compares the SRT tender OCGT capacity to the base case (i.e., in respo s to expected
energy market and ancillary services revenues only) OCGT investment and mothballing. Also
shown are the base case OCGT investments and mothballing (striped blocks).Introduction of
the SRT was expected to prevent investment in OCGT capacity on account of te dered OCGT
capacity damping expected market prices, and hence gross margins. Unexpectedly, the model
results show that some OCGT capacity is still triggered as a result of expected nergy market
revenues, yet this is delayed by 2 years relative to the base case, and only occurs in 2017 and
2019 (Fig 7.17). This occurrence of investment in OCGT being driven byenergy market rev-
enues can perhaps be explained by the fact that, during 2017-19 high ant cip ted gross margins
are still forecast due to the capacity retirements and demand growth after 2020. However as
in the base case, energy market induced investment is not enough to meet the target de-rated
margin. Consequently, large volumes of OCGT capacity are tendered in the run-up to 2025. In
total, 28.1 GW of new build OCGT plant is tendered during 2013-25, with an average volume
of 2.2 GW per year, although the variation in tendered volumes is remarkable.For instance, as
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little as 100 MW is tendered in 2014 with a massive 5.3 GW tendered in 2021, whichindicates
that procured volumes are quite volatile. Interestingly, after 2024 OCGT plant not included
in the SRT begins to be mothballed. A small volume of capacity is de-mothballed in 2026,
only to be mothballed again in 2027. In fact, by 2030, 6 GW of OCGT capacity has been
mothballed. This can be attributed to de-rated margins climbing after 2030 (Fig. 8.5) and thus
damping energy market prices, which has a negative impact on gross margins causing genera-
tors to mothball OCGT capacity. When generators take the decision to mothball, this results in
the instantaneous removal of capacity. This explains why the SRT performsbadly in 2025 (i.e.,
the target de-rated margin of 10% is not met). In the run-up to 2025, 850 MWand 2 GW of
OCGT capacity is mothballed in 2024 and 2025, respectively (Fig. 8.6). Thisshortfall cannot
be avoided by the SRT due to its 3 year lead time. In a more sophisticated model wher OCGT
generators participating in the energy market are able to forecast revenues from the SRT and, if
more profitable effectively ‘switch markets’ from energy to SRT, then this OCGT mothballing
may be prevented. Furthermore if such a mechanism was to be implemented, it would plainly
be beneficial for it to include some form of incremental SRT less than 3 years out from the
delivery year. The intention of these incremental tenders would be to incent vis generators
who have mothballed capacity to bring it back on line if it is required. Note that no te dering
occurred for the ten years after 2028 on account of high de-rated margins (as a result of new nu-
clear coming on line). This suggests that much of the tendered capacity will beutilis d during
the first years of its operation, but left idle for some years after that.
Inspection of the evolution of total installed capacity over time in Fig. 8.8 shows hinstalled
capacity consists of a large volume of OCGT capacity relative to the base case (cf. Fig. 7.15).
This shows that the response of the market to a SRT is to reduce CCGT investment (Fig 8.7)
with all OCGT investment after 2019 carried out in response to the tender only (note that the
positive purple bars after 2019 in Fig. 8.6 represent de-mothballing). More precisely, there
is 33% less CCGT investment here compared with base case, in contrast nuclear investment
remains largely unaffected. Consequently, by 2030 the generation market is dominated by non-
dispatchable generation (e.g., wind and nuclear account for 43% of installed c pacity, compared
with 16% in 2010), with a small volume of mid-merit generation (e.g., CCGT accounts for
24% of installed capacity, compared with 38% at the start of the simulation), andover 32%
(average of 28% over 2020-40) of the generation market as strategic reserve. Furthermore, these
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Figure 8.6: Plot of OCGT investments and mothballing/de-mothballing under SRT versusba e
case during 2010-40. Note that ‘market-driven’ investment is in respon e to energy
market revenues (i.e., the endogenous investment decision).
Figure 8.7: Plot of CCGT investments and mothballing/de-mothballing under SRT versusba e
case during 2010-40.
simulation results show that the SRT is required to meet shortfalls throughout the 2020s, though
once large volumes of nuclear investments begin entering the system, de-ratemargins climb
above the 10% target (average de-rated margin 17.5% during 2030-40). Consequently, the
system is holding a large volume of unused reserve in some years. From a plicy perspective, it
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is arguably uneconomical to tender for such a large volume of peaking capacity in the lead up
to, and thoughout the early part of, the 2020s, when it may only be required fo the first years
of its operation. That said, as shown in Fig. 8.6, positive tender volumes begin again in 2038
suggesting that they will be utilised again after a period of inactivity.
Figure 8.8: Plot of total installed capacity over 2010-40 under the SRT, i.e., the result of the
mix and amount of generation investment and retirements over time.
8.2.4 Market-wide capacity market (after [54])
In this section a simplified version of the PJM’s Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) istested. The
target of the RPM“is to achieve the target level of reliability most of the time”[51]. This target
is based on loss-of-load probability 1 day in 10 years (or 0.0003) with procurement of capacity
occurring 3 years before it is required. In this application, the target levl of reliability is the
10% de-rated capacity margin.
There was a desire to keep the capacity market mechanism simple so that integrat on into the
existing model framework could be achieved in a reasonable time frame. Consequently, many
of the complexities of RPM (see [51]) are not included in this implementation. Firstly, no
locational pricing is considered on account of the model being single bus.Secondly, deferral
of capacity retirement, which is something that the RPM has been known to induce [51], is
excluded on account of the fixed lifetime assumption, however altered mothballing patterns
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can be assessed. Thirdly, no demand-side resources or transmission projects are considered in
addition to competing generating resources in the capacity market. Finally, onlyone auction (3
years out) is included here, while the full RPM includes “base-residual” (3 years out) and three
“incremental” (20, 10 and 3 months out) auctions.
Figure 8.9: Alternative capacity market demand curves used in this study. Inspired by [54].
Like the RPM, a capacity demand curve is used to determine required capacitymargins as a
function of capacity prices. In addition to the classical vertical demand curve, a number of
downward sloping demand curves are tested, these were inspired by [54]. These curves are
known as Variable Resource Requirement (VRR) curves in the RPM [51]and are displayed in
Fig. 8.9. It is important to note that these curves are a function of target de-rated capacity, not
de-rated margin (one can be derived from the other because the forecast system peak load in
(2.14) is known, e.g., Fig. 7.12). This method avoids negative ratios when the ac ual (projected)
margin is negative and furthermore, these functions are consistent for different values of the
target margin. The highest price for capacity (e.g., ratio of actual to target de-rated capacity
below 1 in vertical demand curve) is based on twice the annualised FCs for anew entrant
OCGT unit minus expected annual energy market and ancillary services (AS) revenues, known
as the “net cost”. The VRR curves used here are inspired by those tested in [54]; “Curve 1”
is similar to the “no demand curve”, “Curve 2” the “net cost at installed reserve margin (IRM)
curve”, where IRM is the ratio of installed capacity over peak demand [54], “Curve 3” the
“net cost at IRM + 1% curve” and “Curve 4” the “net cost at IRM + 4%curve”. The curves
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are calibrated so that the capacity price is precisely the net cost of the OCGT unit when the
ratio of actual to target de-rated reserve capacity is 1 (curves 1 and 2), 1.01 (curve 3) or 1.04
(curve 4). Note that the curves tested in [54] included predicted energymarket revenues when
calculating annualised net costs; this was determined using the relationship ofenergy market
and AS revenues to unforced (or de-rated) reserve for a hypothetical new turbine in a dynamic
simulation model of the PJM market [54], and empirically using“the actual values that would
have been experienced for such a turbine in years 1999-2004”[54]. Taking a similar approach,
the relationship beween energy market gross margins from the 30 year base case simulation
versus the target de-rated capacity required to meet a de-rated margin of10% are analysed.
These are displayed in Fig. 8.10. The points show the realised OCGT grossmargins (GMs)
during each year of the 30 year base case simulation. Only ratios below around 0.96 yield
positive gross margins and furthermore, the average GM for the values inthe range [0.94,
0.96] is -7.32£/unforced MW-yr. As a result of this rather bleak picture for OCGT GMs,the
maximum capacity market price is set at twice the full net cost of a new entrant OCGT plant
(i.e., 2 · 47, 250 = 94, 500 £/unforced MW/yr, Table 7.5) and the VRR curves 1-4 in Fig. 8.9
have been calibrated according to the descriptions above and gradients described in Section
V-A of [54].
Figure 8.10: Relationship of OCGT energy market and AS revenue gross margins to de-rated
margin, expressed as a ratio to the target.
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8.2.4.1 The capacity market auction process
Capacity is offered into the auction by competing generators (or generators, demand and trans-
mission in full RPM model) and an aggregate supply curve is calculated. The market clearing
price is obtained from the intersection of the supply and the demand curves.An example of this
is shown in Fig. 8.11; the graph shows the PJM capacity market auction results for the 2012/13
planning year at the 3 year ahead stage (i.e., the “base-residual” RPM capacity market auction).
Note that, for the RPM auction, capacity is offered based on unforced capacity (UCAP), e.g., if
a 50 MW unit has a FOR of 0.05, then50 ·(1−0.05) = 47.5 MW is offered into the auction. To
maintain consistency, this is referred to herein as de-rated capacity. Although included purely
for demonstration purposes, the clearing price in Fig. 8.11 is expressed in$/MW-day, which
can be translated into£/MW-yr (as in Fig. 8.9) by multiplying by 365 and using the appropriate
currency conversion.
Figure 8.11: Example PJM RPM clearing for 2012/13 for offered UCAP (supply) and VRR
curve (demand). Intersection of Regional Transmission Organization(RTO) sup-
ply and demand curves determines the auction clearing price. Source [228] (used
directly).
In this implementation, the generator supply curve at each yearly auction is costructed using
the total installed capacity (i.e., all capacity participates in the auction), which is de-rated and
offered into the auction. For simplicity, this is modelled as a single vertical supplysegment, and
the capacity market clearing price, which is paid to all generation resources per de-rated MW,
is the intersection between the total de-rated supply and demand curves. The investor includes
the capacity price at each decision year and assumes the current price will b sustained for all
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GM ix − FCx + CMPx
(1 + r)i−τx
− (ICx +DCx), (8.4)
whereCMPx is the capacity market price.
8.2.4.2 Simulation results
Fig. 8.12 shows the evolution of de-rated capacity margin over the period 2016-4 for each of
the demand curves tested. The evolution of the mix and amount of generation over time for
each demand curve is shown in Fig. 8.13. The graph shows how de-ratedm rgins improve
significantly relative to the base case. It should be noted that given the uncertainty in many
of the input parameters used to calculate expected de-rated margins, it cannot be said with
a high degree of confidence, that the simulated values of de-rated capacity m rgin will be
realised. Therefore, once again, rather than focus on absolute values, this analysis focuses on
the performance of the demand curves relative to one another and to the base case. Table 8.1
provides summary statistics on average de-rated margin and capacity prices(Fig. 8.9) for the
30 simulated future years.
Figure 8.12: Plot of de-rated capacity margins for the 4 capacity market demand curves tested
relative to ‘energy-only’ market base case during 2016-40.
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De-rated Capacity Ratio to target Years target
margin price de-rated capacity met
[%] [£/unforced MW-yr]
Average SD Average SD Average SD
Base case 5.6 7.1 - - - - 5/30
Curve 1 11.9 3.8 39,679 43,144 1.02 0.03 21/30
Curve 2 13.9 4.2 36,307 27,784 1.04 0.03 27/30
Curve 3 14.7 4.3 38,191 29,419 1.04 0.04 29/30
Curve 4 17.1 4.9 41,933 31,019 1.06 0.04 30/30




Figure 8.13: Plot of total installed capacity over 2010-40 for the 4 capacity market demand
curves tested (a) “Curve 1”; (b) “Curve 2”; (c) “Curve 3”; and (d) “Curve 4”.
The expectation would be that “Curve 1” would exhibit a very volatile capacity market price
due to the curve paying either zero when above the target level of de-rated c pacity, or twice the
full net cost of a new entrant OCGT plant when below it. Further, as a reult of this volatility, the
simulation would display less investment and hence higher security of supply risk relative to the
other demand curves, yet there ought to be an improvement relative to the base case. Results
showed this to be the case, with the capacity price oscillating between zero andmaximum
throughout the simulation as Fig. 8.14 shows. Moreover, as shown in Table8.1, the target
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de-rated margin is achieved in 21 of 30 years, compared with 5 of 30 in the base case. These
findings are broadly similar to [54], where for a dynamic simulation model of thePJM market,
the target de-rated margin was met in 54% of years compared with 34% with no capacity
market.
The expectation would be that “Curve 2”, would be less volatile than “Curve1”, again providing
a better level of security of supply relative to the base case. This was indeed th case (Table
8.1), and the target margin is met in 27 of 30 simulated years with a much smoother capacity
market price (Fig. 8.14). “Curve 3”, would be expected to be less volatile than “Curve 1”,
again providing a better level of security of supply relative to the base case. However given that
demand is willing to pay just 1% higher than “Curve 2”, the expectation would bethat these
curves would produce broadly similar results. This was indeed the case, with the reduction in
price voliatility relative to “Curve 1” visible in Fig. 8.14. Here the target margin ismet in 29/30
simulated years.
“Curve 4” would be anticipated to perform best in terms of security of supply risk because
demand is willing to pay for capacity in years when available generation is expected (recall that
the auction occurs 3 years ahead of delivery) to exceed the target level of de-rated capacity by
up to 14% (Fig. 8.9). This is indeed the case, though the results suggest that this curve may
be over-paying for capacity because de-rated margins are well abovethe target in most years.
However given that all other curves experience at least one year when the target is not met,
there is a higher degree of confidence that this demand curve mitigates the security of supply
concerns present in the base case simulation.
Fig 8.14 shows the capacity market price for each demand curve, in£/unforced MW/yr, paid
to each generator in addition to energy market revenues. There is clearlya boom and bust
pattern to the capacity market in the early years, particularly under “Curve1”. Recall that
“Curve 1” is designed to pay either zero when de-rated capacity is equalto or above the target
or twice the full net cost of a new entrant OCGT plant when below the target. This leads to
a highly volatile price relative to the other curves which provide a smoother payment profile
(Fig. 8.9). For curves 2 to 4, the capacity price is positive in all years outto 2030, although
it reduces after 2030 in response to new nuclear plant entering the system (Fig. 8.15), which
results in high de-rated margins (Fig. 8.12). Fig. 8.16 shows the impacts on OCGT gross
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Figure 8.14: Yearly capacity market prices for the 4 capacity market demand curvestested.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 8.15: Cumulative (a) OCGT; (b) CCGT; and (c) nuclear investment for the 4 capa ity
market demand curves tested relative to the ‘energy-only’ market bascase.
margins (GMs). Results for curves 2-4 show that OCGT generators receive positive and less
variable GMs in most years out to 2030 (in fact, using “Curve 4”, OCGT generators receive
positive GMs in all years 2010-30). In contrast GMs reduce after 2030 and in some years and
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are in fact lower than for the base case (e.g., 2032). This occurs because more capacity is built
under the 4 capacity market designs (Fig. 8.15) than in the base case. Conseque tly, generators
receive less revenue from the energy market on account of higher levels of available resource
(recall that price mark-up is reduces as capacity margins increase). Thus w en the capacity
price reduces, generator GMs perform similarly to under the ‘energy-only’ market simulation.
A similar pattern emerges for CCGT generation; Fig 8.17, demonstrates how thevariability
of GMs is reduced relative to the base case, particularly for demand curves 2-4, though the
outlook for overall levels of profitability across the 30 year simulation remainsbleak. The
average CCGT GMs were -37.8£/kW, -33.6£/kW, -25.26£/kW -26.4£/kW and -20.8£/kW,
for the base case, “Curve 1”, “Curve 2”, “Curve 3” and “Curve 4”, respectively. This indicates
that although profitability remains low, a relative increase across the 30 years was experienced
for all demand curves tested. As it is relative difference that is of interest here, the conclusion
must be that introducing a capacity market has a positive effect on CCGT and OCGT GMs, in
addition to the level of generation adequacy risk.
Figure 8.16: Plot of simulated total gross margins for OCGT capacity for the 4 capacity market
demand curves tested relative to the ‘energy-only’ market base case.
Fig. 8.15 shows the cumulative trend in levels of investment relative to the basecase. Note
that this is the volume of investment triggered, not changes in installed capacityas in Fig. 8.13.
An interesting observation when comparing “Curve 1” to “Curve 4” is the mix an amount of
capacity over time in both cases. “Curve 4” provides a higher level of installed capacity and de-
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Figure 8.17: Plot of simulated total gross margins for CCGT capacity for the 4 capacity market
demand curves tested relative to the ‘energy-only’ market base case.
rated margins, although the degree of diversity within the capacity mix reduces. For instance,
nuclear capacity in 2040 is 21 GW and 15 GW for “Curve 1” and Curve 4”,respectively.
Moreover all four capacity market curves produce significant reductions in short and medium
term nuclear investment relative to the base case (Fig. 7.15), and the capacity mix contains a
much larger volume of CCGT and OCGT plant. Perhaps most striking, is the transfo mations
in nuclear and OCGT investment; nuclear is significantly reduced early in the simulation (Fig.
8.15(c)), with OCGT investment much higher relative to the base case (Fig. 8.15(a)). This is
attributed to the fact that the capacity market price is based on the total fixed costs of a new
entrant OCGT, so it is hardly surprising that this type of generation becomes more attractive for
investment.
A useful piece of analysis is to compare the total capacity market costs (i.e., total realised
de-rated capacity multiplied by the capacity market price in each year of the simulation) with
the reduction in unserved energy costs relative to the ‘energy-only’ market base case (i.e., no
capacity market). This result would likely be of interest to policy makers seeking to answer the
question: is a market-wide capacity market good value for money for consumer ? Fig. 8.18
shows a plot of the cost of each demand curve tested per MWh of unserved nergy reduced
over 2016-40. The data suggest that “Curve 1” provides the least value for money (note the two
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Figure 8.18: Plot of cost of reduction (£million) per unserved MWh reduced 2016-40 for the 4
capacity market demand curves tested (Fig. 8.9).





Average SD Average SD
Base case 57.8 92.5 - -
Curve 1 1.7 1.6 1.7 4.1
Curve 2 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.3
Curve 3 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.4
Curve 4 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.6
Table 8.2: Summary statistics for the cost of energy unserved in the ‘energy only’ market
base case (cf. Section 7.5.1) and capacity markets, and the cost of the reduction
in unserved energy (MWh) for the market-wide capacity markets over 2016-40.
price spikes in 2028 and 2038), with all four curves experiencing high costs per unserved MWh
reduced later in the simulation. The first 5 years of the simulation period are omitted from
the plot as costs per unserved MWh reduced are an order of magnitude hgher in some years
(e.g., cost in 2013 are in excess of£25 million for all demand curves tested). This is due to the
low levels of unserved energy across all cases (including the ‘energy-only’ market case) during
2010-15. The capacity market has positive prices in some of the first years of the simulation
on account of the 3 year planning horizon (e.g., planning year 2013 forecasts de-rated margins
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for 2016, Fig. 8.14) . The lowest costs per unserved MWh reduced arexperienced during
the period 2023-27 for all the demand curves tested, this is hardly surprising given that this is
the period of highest security of supply risk in the ‘energy-only’ marketbase case. Table 8.2
provides some summary statistics on the total costs of unserved energy for the ‘energy-only’
market base case and the capacity markets tested. Predictably the cost of un erved energy is
significantly reduced with the introduction of a capacity market. For instance,average costs of
unserved energy are 98% lower for “Curve 1” relative to the base cas, with the other demand
curves performing better still. Furthermore, “Curve 2” seems to offer the best value for money
as the average cost per unserved MWh reduced is lowest at£1m, although this curve did not
reach the target level of de-rated capacity margin in all simulated years (Table 8.1). Therefore
a risk-averse policy maker may view “Curve 4” as the most attractive option eve though its
value for money appears lower relative to other designs. Generally speaking, this comparison
suggests that the capacity market is worthwhile, although its value for money islower in those
years where generation adequacy risk is also low. The optimal policy may beto introduce the
capacity market some years in advance of the period of highest security of supply risk (2023-
28), though waiting too long may increase investor uncertainty and lead to an investment hiatus.
Conversely, introducing a capacity market too early may lead to consumers ov -paying for
capacity. If used in an actual policy analysis, further tests would be required. For instance the
mix and amount of capacity over time is different for each simulation (Fig. 7.15 and Fig. 8.13)
so total year-on-year total system costs would also need to be compared.Th se costs include:
1) total production costs; 2) annualised fixed costs of the generation mix; 3) capacity market
costs; 4) unserved energy costs; 5) system balancing costs; and 6) transmission reinforcement
costs. This analysis is left for future research.
In summary, the introduction of a capacity market leads to a lower simulated levelof g neration
adequacy risk, yet once the period of highest adequacy risk has passed, the capacity price
reduces significantly. This has a negative impact on generator GMs, with CCGT and OCGT
units once again unable to recover their fixed costs in most years after 2030. Further, the
diversity of supply reduces: the capacity mix becomes dominated by CCGT, OCGT and wind
generation during the 2020s with penetrations of nuclear generation not sig ificant until after
2030. This can be viewed as a positive outcome: a high volume of flexible generation would
complement the variability of wind.
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These results demonstrate that introducing a capacity market mitigates simulated security of
supply risk concerns during the 2020s and provides reasonably goodvalue for money, yet the
dynamic nature of the capacity market price means that generator revenuerisk r turns after
2030 when the capacity price reduces. The use of a mechanism that induces investment in the
capacity required to meet a target level of security of supply risk (or a proxy for it) is sensible,
although an analysis of costs per unserved MWh reduced shows that to achieve optimal value
for money it may be desirable to allow the system to drop below the target level of d -rated
margin in some years. The fact that these investments struggle in later years as de-rated margins
recover is a less desirable outcome. It is interesting to note that the period ofovershoot, 2032-
37, is of a similar duration to the period of highest generation adequacy riskin the base case,
2023-28. This suggests that, depending on the generation adequacy policy in place, around 6-7
years of tight (or excessive) supply conditions will be experienced during (or after), a period of
intense thermal generation investment in response to rapid wind capacity growth, thermal plant
retirements, and demand growth.
8.3 Chapter summary
In this chapter the integration of two capacity mechanisms in the dynamic model has been pre-
sented. To begin, Section 8.1 provided an overview of the modelling approach, including why
techniques from control theory could not be called upon to directly implementth se mecha-
nisms. Next, in Section 8.2, by drawing on the base case model results for theGB market case
study, together with recent debate about generation adequacy in GB, theneed for and design of
a GB market capacity mechanisms was presented. This included a discussionon the socially
optimal level of investment in sub-section 8.2.1. Results showed that the system may fall below
the optimal level of reliability for a VOLL of 10,000 and 30,000£/MWh. This was followed
by a deeper analysis of the de-rated capacity margin results from the basecase, in particular
how this measure is dependent on the scaling factors applied to each generator. Following this,
the implementation of the strategic reserve tender was described. Simulation results showed
that the SRT is required to meet shortfalls throughout the 2020s, though once large volumes
of nuclear investments begin entering the system, de-rated margins climb abovethe 10% de-
rated margin target after which large volumes of reserve are unused in some years. This was
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then followed in sub-section 8.2.4 by implementation and results for the market-widcapacity
mechanism. Results showed that the introduction of a capacity market leads to alower sim-
ulated level of generation adequacy risk and, although less diverse relative to the base case, a
supply mix that compliments the variability of wind generation. The results and interpretation






This final chapter discusses the results of this research and provides conclusions. The thesis
statement from Chapter 1 is answered and contribution to knowledge reviewed. Implications
of thesis findings are discussed, including impacts on electricity market reform. Recommenda-
tions for further work and overall thesis thoughts and experiences arealso shared.
9.1 General discussion of results
Like any project spanning a significant amount of time, the model implementation evolved as
knowledge was acquired and understanding improved. There have been two main iterations of
the model. In the first instance, the goal was to validate performance against the past. In light
of the findings in the validation phase and feedback from a subsequent pblication [194], the
second goal was to develop the model to account for the high penetrationsof wind power that
are expected to emerge in GB.
9.1.1 The dynamic generation investment market model
Dynamic models can provide insights that are not always available when analysing a single
moment or point of system balance. Further, the effect that the mix and amount of capacity
over time has on the level of security of supply risk and generator profitability can be assessed.
In this thesis, a dynamic generation investment model, which captures the negative feedback
mechanism that exists between market conditions, investor price expectations nd the timing
and intensity of year-on-year thermal capacity addition and withdrawal has been presented. In
combination with exogenous model parameters which include forecasts for demand and wind
capacity growth and production, the model has been applied to a GB market cs study to




The initial task was to extend the work of Häni [123] and apply the model to the GB generation
investment market. This was motivated by a key philosophy of control theorythat the first task
should be to model the behaviour of the real system. In this case, the real system was chosen
to be the GB ‘energy-only’ electricity market since the introduction of the NETA framework
in early 2001. The simulations against the historic market dynamics were scrutinised, partic-
ularly the replication of historic levels of capacity margin, and a number of limitations were
discovered. For instance, the dynamic model took a simplistic approach to calculating investor
gross margins. Furthermore, a robust methodology to investigate the impact of high levels of
wind power investment on market dynamics was required. This was coupledwith the need to
estimate the expected contribution of generating units to serving load and the revenues they
receive by doing so in a power system with a high wind penetration that is notnecessarily in
long-run equilibrium. As the simulation was to be run over many years (2010-4), this required
a computationally fast, accurate and robust technique. An opportunity to undertake a 6 week
placement with the Electricity Policy Research Group at the University of Cambridge was seen
as an ideal opportunity to research such a method. During this placement, theMOND tech-
nique for approximating the LDC was investigated and was perceived as theideal candidate to
be developed and embedded into the dynamic capacity investment market model.
9.1.1.2 Final implementation
The dynamic investment model into which the MOND technique is embedded was upd ted
and described. The model includes a Monte Carlo investment model which randomly sampled
capacities, fuel prices and load growth. The distribution of potential profits are constructed
from the MC simulations of the stochastic variables and a risk averse investorwith Value at
Risk decision criteria withq = 5% is assumed. New features of the investment decision were
also developed, these included an aggregate investment response curve as well as a mothballing
response curve based on the philosophies of Prospect Theory. TheMOND technique was
applied to calculate expected output, costs and revenues of thermal generatio subject to varying
load and random independent thermal outages in a market situation. It wasadapted for use in
the dynamic capacity market model with high penetrations of wind by performing aresidual
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load calculation with simulated wind outputs. The MOND has proved very easy toconvolve
with plant outages for the expected output calculations. Further, expressions for calculating the
expected revenues from price mark-up have been derived. The validity of these expressions
was confirmed by Monte Carlo simulation, although as discussed in Section 7.2,if used for
an actual policy analysis, the impact that the number of Monte Carlo runs hason the model
outcomes should be evaluated and, if possible, larger sample sizes used.
9.1.2 Wind modelling
In light of preliminary model results, and observations about the relative success of policies
outside of pure market rules in promoting investment in wind generation, it wasdecided to con-
sider growth in wind capacity as exogenous to the model. This motivated an investigation into
how best to incorporate production from increasing penetrations of windthin the dynamic
investment simulation model. The techniques used to transform simulated and measured wind
speed data for 2005-09 to power outputs have provided a contribution to knowledge in addition
to the dynamic investment model work. Outputs from the production model werematched with
empirical load data to estimate residual load duration curves for various penetrations of on and
offshore wind. The results from this stage of the work were employed to update the investment
market simulation model for an assumed level of installed wind, and estimate futurthermal
generation investment trends in GB.
Results showed dramatic changes to the shape of residual load distributionsas the penetration
of wind increases, with a trend towards normality at high penetrations. Further, the standard
deviation of the distribution increases substantially with negative residual demand experienced
at high penetrations. These negative loads occur for penetrations of 30 GW and above, yet the
peak load remains largely unchanged. The residual load distributions provided an approxima-
tion of what thermal generation (in reality, also hydro power and other renewables) production




9.1.3 ‘Energy-only’ market results
An ‘energy-only’ market setting with an existing installed capacity similar to that of GB has
been used to estimate the economic profitability of capacity investments. Using relative levels
of de-rated capacity margin and LOLE as the risk metric, simulation results for GB show that
levels of generation investment lead to a increase in generation adequacy risk in some years,
with erosion of de-rated capacity margins in the mid 2020s, and very tight supply conditions are
experienced during a small number of peak hours. Many new investments,particularly peaking
units, were unable to recover their fixed costs.
The relative increase in levels of security of supply risk was explained byinspection of the
residual load histograms. The shape of the right-most tail suggests that even with very high
penetrations, wind power does not contribute in all high demands periods.On the basis of the
period analysed, the frequency of these high-demand/low-wind periodsis too low to justify
investment by private investors and it is these very high-demand hours when the potential for a
capacity shortfall is highest.
9.1.4 Sensitivity analysis
A sensitivity analysis demonstrated that assumptions about investor risk profiles and expec-
tations about new builds, load growth and the ability to exercise market powerhav a strong
impact on simulated investment dynamics and subsequent levels of generationadequacy risk.
Overall, the model’s qualitative behaviour was reasonable for the sensitivities tested and pro-
vided some useful insights, particularly when comparing the base case to theperfectly com-
petitive market results. In all cases a pattern of increased relative levelsof risk and erosion of
de-rated capacity margins was experienced during the 2020s to some degre . Fu thermore, the
period of highest security of supply risk is 2023-28, though the magnitudeof this risk differs
between experiments. A prolonged period of increased security of supply risk is experienced
throughout the 2020s for the perfectly competitive market case. Also providing investors with
perfect foresight about capacity under construction produces lessinve tment. This leads to
more frequent periods of relatively high LOLE and low de-rated margins after 2020. In con-
trast generators experience positive gross margins in more years due tolower surplus margins,
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and hence higher prices. A sensitivity analysis on the primary fuel pricesshowed that lower
coal prices (or indeed higher gas prices) may lead to different technology choice, with relative
levels of high generation adequacy risk shifting to earlier in the time horizon.
9.1.5 Capacity mechanisms
The topic of the last stage of the research was to determine whether explicit capacity mecha-
nisms such as tendering for strategic reserve (e.g., [67]) and capacity markets (e.g., [54]) can
be designed to alleviate resource shortfall, prevent investment overshoot and achieve a 10%
de-rated capacity margin. The results of the GB ‘energy-only’ market simulation indicated that
such a mechanism may be desirable to improve reserve margins in the mid 2020s.
Results of the strategic reserve tender showed that the target is met in most years. The genera-
tion investment response to this mechanism is to reduce CCGT investment relative to the base
case, with all OCGT investment after 2019 carried out in response to the tend r o ly. Conse-
quently, the generation market becomes dominated by generation outside the energy market,
with over 32% of the generation market as strategic reserve. Such a high level of strategic re-
serve is arguably inappropriate in a liberalised electricity market. Moreover, a situation where
the majority of generation investment is carried out in response to a centrally managed mar-
ket undermines the credibility of the mechanism. Furthermore, the SRT is required to meet
shortfalls throughout the 2020s, however once large volumes of new nuclear begin entering the
system during 2032-37, de-rated margins rise well above the target. Consequently, the system
is holding a large volume of unused reserve in these years.
Results of the market-wide capacity market demonstrated that introducing a capacity market
mitigates simulated security of supply risk concerns during the 2020s, although the level of
capacity market price volatility, and hence revenue risk, differs betweenthe capacity market
demand curves tested. The sloped demand curves perform best in terms of 1) meeting the tar-
get and 2) making generator revenue streams more predictable, yet some investment overshoot
is experienced during 2030-35 on account of longer lead time plant entering he system. Con-
sequently, generator revenue risk returns during this period. Furthermor , a comparison of the
total capacity market costs to the reduction in unserved energy costs relative to the ‘energy-
only’ market case suggest that on order to achieve optimal value for money it may be desirable
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to allow the system to drop below the target level of 10% de-rated margin in someyears. How-
ever, it may be better to err on the side of caution and implement a more expensive capacity
mechanism that delivers the target level of de-rated capacity margin in all years. These result
would likely be of interest to policy makers seeking to answer the question: is the mprovement
in the level of security of supply risk delivered by a capacity market relative to 1) an ‘energy-
only’ market; and 2) alternative capacity market designs good value for money f r consumers?
However, if used in an actual policy analysis, further tests would be required. For instance,
the mix and amount of capacity over time is different for each realised investment sc nario the
‘energy-only’ market and capacity market cases, so total year-on-year total system costs would
also need to be compared. These costs include: 1) total production costs;2) annualised fixed
costs of the generation mix; 3) capacity market costs; 4) unserved energy costs; 5) system bal-
ancing costs; and 6) transmission reinforcement costs. This analysis is left for future research,
perhaps integrated into the extensions suggested in Section 9.3.3.
In light of these findings, a more appropriate approach might be to encourage demand-side
participation through smart grids and smart metering. Given that a significant numbers of smart
meters are expected to be installed in GB by 2020 (e.g., DECC’s goal of 53 millionsmart meters
in 30 million homes and businesses across GB by 2020 [229]), this approach c uld be the most
economical. That said, there is huge uncertainty surrounding the achievability of this target,
and given that policy uncertainty delays investment, relying on smart meter delivery is risky.
If the model presented here were to be extended to include demand-side participation, then
methods of implementation would have to be devised. Options include:
• Modelling demand-side participation as an endogenous model parameter. Including an
additional generator(s) that could represent a volume of capacity (or energy) available for
“dispatch”, hence providing demand-side price response (DSR). Theexp ctation would
be that this DSR would be called upon at periods of peak demand when prices a e typ-
ically highest (presumably the opportunity cost of a DSR consumer that hasdecided to
reduce its demand would be lower than the VOLL, yet above the variable operating cost
of the most expensive peaking unit). This DSR generator could be included in the prob-
abilistic production costing and the effect of this additional capacity on expected output,
costs and revenue of thermal generation estimated. The expectation would be that in-
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creasing the amount of available resource with a dispatch price below the VOLL would
have a damping effect on prices and, if investors accounted for this DSRwhen forming
their expectations, lead to less investment relative to the base case presented in Section
7.5. However less investment does not necessarily mean a less reliable system as the
DSR capacity would lower the total level of de-rated capacity required at system peak.
• Modelling demand-side participation as an exogenous model parameter. If dman -side
participation was driven by exogenous model parameters such as the availability of re-
newable resources, then profiles for demand net of wind production (and any other re-
newable resource for that matter) and demand-side response could be derived outside
the model. These would then be provided as inputs for the MOND technique. This
approach would also encapsulate the so-called ‘smart grids’ phenomenon, whereby at
times of high demand and/or low available wind resource non-essential loads, such as
certain household appliances or industrial processes, could be switched off or have their
usage delayed until a more convenient time. Conversely, at times of high (and possibly
surplus) production such processes could be enabled [230]. This method could also be
applied if an energy storage device were being considered. These profil s would take into
account the timing (e.g., base or peak demand hours) and level of demand reduction ex-
pected. Note that this method of implementation will not explicitly capture the feedback
between prices and demand-side participation (as described in the previous bullet), so the
“decision” to reduce demand is based on factors outside of pure market rules. However,
this could be captured implicitly. For example, a group of consumers connected to a
smart meter who increase demand during high wind hours (wholesale priceslikely to be
lower), and reduce it during low wind hours (wholesale prices likely to be higher).
9.1.6 Reliability of results
When making projections about the future levels and timings of generation investment, it is
important to remember that estimates about profitability are inherently linked, andtherefore
sensitive, to the price of raw materials, exchange rates and the state of financial markets. Fur-
thermore, economic projections are very difficult to make given the huge unc rtainty surround-
ing estimates of market structure, technological progress, investment decision processes and
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policy. Unforeseen time delays and technical issues, such as lower than expect d availability
makes estimation problematic. Other confounding factors include the time scales required for
investment appraisal, not to mention licensing and planning. That said, economic projection
modelling can provide some insights providing uncertainly is addressed and results interpreted
accordingly.
As noted in [20], a simulation model such as this shows“the occurrence of cycles based on
decision rules assumed by the model, where the behavior of the investorsis still an empirical
question”. For instance, the degree of heterogeneous investment response is not modelled di-
rectly, however the investment response of the model is a smooth function ofprices and costs,
reflecting how a heterogeneous group of market participants would likely respond to changes
in market conditions. Moreover, unlike other simulation models of a similar category, this im-
plementation has been applied to an existing market, which included a simulation of historic
investment trends. The focus has been on the likely behaviour of merchant generation in-
vestment in market environments. Given that the simulated investments and levelsof capacity
margin were not unreasonably different from reality in both the preliminaryand updated model,
the reliability of the results can be interpreted with a reasonable, but not high,de ree of relia-
bility. For instance, the level and timing of CCGT investments in both the historic simulations,
showed 1) that the technology of choice was as in reality at that time and 2) that modelling
a single investor to represent the aggregate response of the market wasreasonable approach.
If the model presented here were to be used for an actual policy analysis, a number of key
areas of future research are recommended. These include: 1) a survey of investors regarding
their use of analytical approaches when evaluating investment decisions under ncertainty and,
if appropriate, modification of investor risk-averse decision making, 2) to develop an explicit
representation of the heterogeneity of investor response, and 3) modelling endogenous bilateral
contracting.
That said, no economic projection model should ever be viewed as able to mimic the behaviour
of market participants precisely, and estimates of key inputs, such as the price mark-up function,
have a large impact on simulation results. Results from simulation models that look tothe
future, which is hugely uncertain, must be viewed with a degree of realism and c ution. More
precisely, the absolute values of, for example, capacity investment and relised levels of de-
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rated margins and LOLE projected in this thesis are very much dependent onthe model input
parameters (e.g., assumed investor risk profiles and their use of analyticalapproaches when
evaluating investment decision under uncertainty, FORs and residual loaddistributions). A
more robust method of analysis is to look at relative levels of change to the sensitivities and
capacity mechanisms tested. For instance, the introduction of a both SRT and amarket-wide
capacity mechanism certainly increased projected de-rated margins in the model, h wever to
say that if implemented, both mechanisms would achieve the 10% target in all years would be
unwise and further research is required.
One of the key factors limiting the reliability of the absolute values output by the model, is
the limited availability of data on the generation side of the GB market. This is a commonly
held view across research groups undertaking research in the powersecto . For instance, [231]
has recently called for improved transparency in the GB market and a key reason for change
was that“academic and technical research into emerging problems is all but impossible”.
Further, [1] states that“investors in new generation capacity, particularly small market players,
need access to market information, a well-established marketplace and regulat d access to
this marketplace.”, suggesting that the issue is not restricted to the academic community. The
conclusion here must be that the degree of competition would benefit from ahigher degree of
transparency.
Other limitations of the modelling approach include:
• This implementation of the MOND technique does not consider the possibility of avail-
able wind generation exceeding either 1) available export capacity in a generation pocket
due to transmission congestion or 2) raw demand net of inflexible base load (e.g., nu-
clear). Considering each in turn, firstly, if a representation of the load and available wind
production in each region of the network is available, then curtailment of windpro uc-
tion due to transmission congestion could in theory be assessed by multi-area production
costing methods. Secondly, future applications of this method could approximatethe
effect of inflexible generation by dispatching its must run capacity first and assuming a
zero or negative price for the portion of the time that this capacity is on the margin.
• The load duration curve method (of which the MOND is a particular case) does n t
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consider the possibility that ramp rate limitations could also result in wind spill.
• The residual LDC approach removes the chronological issues that arise in the wind and
load time series. This is particularly important in the presence of large amounts of hydr
and pumped hydro generation where chronological production costing methods may be
preferred to load duration curve methods. However this implementation of the MOND
technique is applied to the GB power system where the amount of hydro and pumped
hydro is relatively small (about 4% of capacity), so the use of a load duration curve
approach is reasonable.
• The impact of demand-side participation and smart grids on investment dynamics nd
realised levels of security of supply risk. This is left for a topic of future research, with
possible methods of implementation discussed above in Section 9.1.5.
• Although the dynamic model has a stochastic element when looking forward and un-
dertaking investment decisions, the ‘real-time” model is deterministic. As a result, pa-
rameters such as realised peak demand (99.9% load distribution percentile),gen rator
FORs (expected values), demand growth and fuel prices (following DECC projections)
are all based on one reality. To bestow more confidence on the model projections, a
model where realised values are also stochastically simulated is required. However given
that the 30 year simulation execution takes between 525 and 1575 minutes, adding this
level of complexity is likely to make execution time unworkable, although increasing
parallelisation of computing may make it possible.
• By taking an aggregate approach to modelling, the granularity of the aggregate supply
curve is reduced. This aggregation was necessary in a model such as this where in-
vestment over a long-term time frame was under investigation. A more sophisticated
model where the ability of new entrants or existing participants to gain “better than aver-
age” scarcity rents compared with other generators in their technology category by, e.g.,
having superior thermal efficiency, may provide more robust estimations ofrealised and
expected future wholesale prices. Equally, as generating units age, theytend to expe-
rience a reduction in thermal efficiency and operating ranges on account of component
preservation. One approach would be to partition technology types into sub-categories
based on age, and assign thermal efficiencies accordingly (the older theuni , the lower
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the thermal efficiency). This also requires estimates of these efficiencies,and would in-
crease the complexity and running time of the model, perhaps without gaining significant
additional insights.
• Analysing only five years (2005-09) of empirical load and simulated wind data is ar-
guably not sufficient to gain a robust statistical representation of the windresource and
its relationship with demand. Furthermore, this approach assumes that historictrends
provide a fair reflection of the future. This is a heroic assumption given thechanges in
climate, and hence weather patterns, that are expected over the coming decades. This
remains the best available method of prediction.
• The assumptions for plant availability used here are also up for debate. For instance,
new nuclear builds were assumed to have 90% availability, yet the availabiltiy ofthe GB
nuclear fleet has been well below this level and has varied considerablyover time; from
80% in 1990 to 49% in 2008 [232]. Of course, these units are aging so longer and more
frequent periods of scheduled outage are to be expected, but these figures demonstrate
the variability of annual of plant availability (see [71] for impact on underlying risk cal-
culations), and why assuming high availabilty for the entire plant lifetime is perhas an
unrealistic assumption to make.
• In the GB case study application, neither of the capacity mechanisms tested consi ered
the interaction between capacity markets and the GB STOR market. This would need
careful consideration if a mechanism of this type were to be implemented in GB. Details
such as the fact that the PJM market ISO, on which the market-wide capacitymarket
tested here is based, is a not for profit organisation and the GB market SOis a for profit




Under a liberalised market framework, electricity generating capacity investment decisions are
taken and (in the most part) financed by privately owned generating firms.More precisely, firms
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participating in the ‘energy-only’ market undertake new builds or mothball existing plants in
response to wholesale market price signals. It is precisely this price feedback mechanism that
has been the focus of this thesis.
In light of this feedback concept, the modelling approach presented demonstrates that tech-
niques from modern control theory can be employed to model the dynamics ofgeneration
investment in liberalised electricity markets over a long-term time frame. Although system
stability analysis is not feasible, integration in the dynamic model of capacity mechanisms has
also been achieved using more traditional methods of implementation, i.e., setting a target de-
rated margin and introducing additional generator revenue streams basedon observations of the
expected realised de-rated margin 3 years ahead.
Further, the mixture of Normals approximation technique for load duration curves has been
extended and embedded within the dynamic model, thus providing a robust methodology for
future models of this type. Moreover, methods to calculate expected revenufrom price mark-
ups due to market power, a justifiable representation of oligopolistic power markets, have been
derived here for the first time.
9.2.2 Generation investment
Recalling the thesis statement given in Section 1.3, the results of the GB case study suggest
that the mix and amount of thermal investment in an ‘energy-only’ market with ahigh wind
penetration will lead to increased relative levels of security of supply risk during the 2020s, with
the tightest supply conditions coming during 2023-28. Further, simulations show a noticeable
increase in security of supply risk under both the perfectly competitive (i.e.,no price mark-up)
and imperfect market experiments. This was despite intense investment in thermal capacity, in
particular CCGT, and rapid exogenous growth in wind capacity. Analysis of generator gross
margins showed that many of the investment undertaken out to 2023, althoughreceiving good
returns during the first years of operation when adequacy risk is highest, a bust phase develops
after 2026 when large volumes of new nuclear capacity begin entering the system and security
of supply risk, and hence revenue, is dampened.
Given that the model assumes the representative investor is capable of securing the neces-
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sary debt to finance large-scale capacity investment and in reality“utilities are under pressure
to moderate or lower their capital expenditure programmes and to find higher-yielding and
higher-growth opportunities as a result of high debt levels, pressure togrow dividends, falling
share prices and increased pressure on credit ratings”[67], the intensity of investment may in
fact have been over-estimated here. On the other hand, the model assumes a fixed lifetime for
all capacity and an alternative outcome might be that generators, particularly in mid-merit units
such as CCGT, delay investment in new capacity by switching their units to opencycle, thus
increasing their SRMC, and running at lower utilisation factors, rather thanrisk building a new
mid-merit unit that may not provide adequate returns on the investment.
9.2.3 GB electricity market reform
In the coming years, the GB power sector is set to undergo arguably one itsmost significant
transformations to date. Underpinning this change is the need to mitigate the impactsof human
induced climate change by reducing GHG emissions from the power sector. There is a pressing
need to make the transition from a installed generating capacity which is dominatedby fossil-
fuel generation to one with high volumes of zero and low carbon generation. Already a number
of bold environmental targets are in place, for example, the goal of supplying 15% of energy
from renewable supplies (equal to 30-35% renewable electricity) by 2020, and an 80% reduc-
tion in overall GHG emissions from 1990 levels by 2050. Further, legislation has been put in
place to limit, and ultimately withdraw, large volumes of GHG-intensive fossil-fuelgeneration.
For instance, a significant volume of capacity is due to retire under the LargCombustion Plant
Directive in the run-up to 2016. Under this legislation, over 11 GW of fossilfue plant (∼8
GW coal and∼3 GW oil) is due to shut down. According to the UK Government, it is likely
that around 30-35 GW of new electricity generation capacity will be required ov r the next two
decades and around two thirds of this capacity will be needed by 2020 [233]. In addition, the
GB nuclear fleet is reaching the end of its design lifetime with all but 3.5 of the existing 10.5
GW due to retire before 2020. This is a significant loss to the system and newcapacity must be
built in order to replace these retirements.
As already discussed, the UK Government is developing policies whose combined goals are
1) to promote the level of investment in renewable generation required to meetthes targets;
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2) maintain the level of security of supply risk that society has come to expect;and 3) reduce
customer costs. These goals have introduced uncertainties that the current BETTA market
framework is struggling to handle efficiently. The view of Government is thatt ese goals will
not all be met by the current market, and consequently a reform of market trading arrangements
has been called for.
The results presented in this thesis can inform the debate about market reform, in particular the
response and profitability of thermal investments to policies promoting investmentin r ewable
technologies. As this model assumes that installed wind capacity will grow to a level likely to
be adequate to meet the 30-35% renewable electricity target by 2020, the results here focus on
the second goal outlined above, i.e., the level of security of supply risk. Smulation results have
shown that if the market remains as an ‘energy-only’ oligopoly market, the level of investment
required to offset retirements to existing capacity and to meet assumed demandgrowth, will
not be adequate to allow the system to maintain the target level of security of supply, i.e.,
achieving a winter peak target de-rated margin of 10%. That said, the low frequency of the tight
supply conditions that result from inadequate generation being built, sugge t that the system
may be able to cope without additional capacity mechanisms. Instead, targetingthe demand-
side through demand-side response and smart metering may be a more efficient method of
avoiding power shortages. More interconnection with Europe will also allevi t some security
of supply concerns, which seems a natural solution given that a number of EU directives on
gas and electricity are aiming to open markets in other EU countries up to competition[234].
However if a capacity mechanism is the prefered course of action, then theresults from the final
stage of this work suggest that both a strategic reserve tender and capacity m rket will reduce
security of supply concerns, though a degree of investment overshoot and generator revenue
risk after the period of highest adequacy risk is anticipated.
9.3 Recommendations for further work
9.3.1 Multiple agent model
A topic of subsequent research could be the integration into the dynamic investment model
investors with different attitudes to risk and methods of evaluating investment decisions under
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uncertainty. In this implementation alternate perceptions of reality and attitudes toward risk
were tested during the sensitivity analysis, by comparison multiple agents competing together
in a single simulation was not included. Further with 6 firms dominating the supply market
in GB, an interesting and potentially valuable piece of analysis would be to repres nt these
competing firms in the model. It could then be assessed whether a desire to maintain market
share in the face of plant retirement and demand growth leads to similar investment dynamics
presented here, or whether firms account for the effect of their investment upon prices and
mark-ups for their existing fleet and deliberately do not invest in order to keep prices high.
9.3.2 Complimenting the stochasticity of wind production
The estimates of wind production presented in Chapter 6 could form a basis for an investiga-
tion into the need for, and design of, generation technologies best suited tocompliment the
variability and stochasticity of high penetrations of wind. This includes the technical and op-
erational characteristics of these complimentary sources of generation. In this thesis, gas-fired
plant such as OCGTs are the primary source of flexible output power, although in a focused
analysis, options for energy storage will need to be considered.
9.3.3 Transmission network
The model presented here does not consider the impact of the transmissionnetwork on invest-
ment dynamics. Therefore, the next stage of investigation could be to assess the impacts of
transmission on generation investment. An area of possible future research would be to extend
the MOND technique to a two-area (e.g., Scotland-England) system with a transmission con-
straint. This could then be used to assess the impact of congestion on wind power availability
and thermal generation investment in each area. This could be implemented using a Mix of
Bivariate Normals reflecting the correlations in loads and wind in each area (e.g., as in [210]),
based on two area production costing methods (e.g., see [235]). To maintaincomputational ef-
ficiency, the model could draw upon scenario reduction schemes (e.g., see Chapter 7 of [236])
when applying multi-area production costing and making an assessment of cur ailment of wind
production due to transmission congestion.
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Furthermore, in GB, thetransmission network use of system chargesreflect the GB SO’s pre-
ferred locations for new build generation. These vary across the system and can be negative,
typically in areas close to high load centers, or positive, typically for remote locati ns. With
a review of these charges currently underway via OFGEM’sProject TransmiT, the impact on
the location and volume of investment over time of alternative charging arrangements can be
assessed. For instance, “real-time” locational system marginal pricing is being considered. Un-
der this framework, each node on the network, would have a different marginal price for power.
Advocates of this approach state that it reduces the ability of generators toexercise market
power in a constrained network (be that offers to increase, or bids to reduce production). An
interesting piece of analysis would be to investigate the impact of these reductions in generator
surplus (or short-run profit) on investment and security of supply risk dynamics. This could
be represented in the model by reduction (or even removal) of price mark-up in some or all
areas of the network (which would have to be represented in the model). This would inform
the debate about whether reductions in generator surplus under locational pricing leads to less
investment or just the right amount in the right locations.
Once the transmission network is accounted for, the impacts of congestion ona market-wide
capacity mechanism can be assessed. For instance, a mechanism that does not c nsider conges-
tion when procuring for capacity may lead to undesirable outcomes such as asituation where
the SO is not able to utilise capacity when it is needed due to the plant being located behind an
active transmission constraint.
9.3.4 Electrification of heat and transport
In this application of the model, the use of electrical energy in GB is assumed to con inue
into the future. If the UK is to achieve its ambitious GHG emission reduction targets,then
electrification of both the heat and surface transport sectors is required. For instance, the CCC
have stated that a“44% emission reduction in surface transport can be achieved by 2030”
(relative to 2008 levels) [237]. If policies are developed to promote the requi d uptake of
60% electric vehicle penetration by 2030 in order to meet this reduction, then electrical energy
demand, through vechile battery charging, will increase. The CCC have also st ted that“there
is scope for reducing industry emissions by almost half between now and 2030” (relative to
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2007 levels) [237]. In addition to energy efficiency improvements in buildings, this requires
widespread adoption of alternative methods of heating such as heat pumps, thus also having the
potential to increase electrical energy demand.
These observations motivate the following extension to this project: the case where future
electricity demand increases substantially from current levels. In modelling terms, this would
involve developing new daily and annual load profiles (e.g., Fig. 2.11), which are then used
to calculate the full and residual annual load probability distributions. The methodologies out-
lined in Chapters 6 and 7 would then be applied in order to estimate the mix and amount of
generation investment over time in response to policies promoting windand high heat and
transport electrification. Further, alternative load profile scenarios could be developed based
on alternate usage patterns. For instance, if heat pumping and vehicle charging were to occur
during peak periods (i.e, 07:00-19:00), then higher levels of installed capacity will be required
relative to the base case. If demand growth is participated by the investor, thenceteris paribus,
the simulated response of thermal generation investment may provide a similar leve of security
of supply risk to the base case. However the model could be used to establish the additional
capacity requirements and increases in overall system costs, which are then fed back into the
policy development process.
9.3.5 Other considerations
In this Section, some other possible areas of further work are summarised:
• Calculating appropriate levels of de-rated capacity margins for a given invstment sce-
nario: this model has used de-rated margin as a proxy for the level of generation adequacy
risk. It should be noted however that the same levels of de-rated margin donot necessar-
ily provide the same level of risk. It very much depends on the capacity mix and demand
scenario being analysed. Further work looking at the uncertainty of the input parameters
used to calculate expected de-rated margins and the level of underlying risk could be
explored.
• Application to other power markets: this model has been applied to a GB market cs
study where high penetrations of wind power are expected to emerge. Themod l could
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be adapted and applied to other power systems where policies to promote differ nt r -
newable sources of energy are being developed. Output from other technologies such as
marine renewables could also be included when calculating residual load dur tion curves.
• Interactions between power markets: the dynamic investment model has beenapplied to
a single electricity market. Assessment of the impact of renewable and generatio ade-
quacy policy in neighbouring regions is an active area of research (e.g., [128]). This is of
particular interest across Europe where a combined European-wide network of transmis-
sion system operators (the ENTSO) has replaced the 6 existing Europeantransmission
system operators, thus signalling the imminent arrival of a single Europeanpower mar-
ket.
9.4 Thesis conclusion
This thesis has taken an interdisciplinary approach to modelling generation investment in lib-
eralised electricity markets. Many disciplines have called upon during this research. These
include 1) dynamical systems and control theory to model the interactions between supply and
demand; 2) rational expectations, Value at Risk and Prospect Theory when modelling invest-
ment decision processes; 3) statistical analyses when calculating generation adequacy risk; and
4) wind resource assessment when estimating GB onshore and offshorewind production.
This project has enhanced the body of knowledge surrounding investment cycles in the power
sector, in particular where high penetration of wind power are likely to emerge. This thesis
describes an implementation of a dynamic capacity market investment model, whichincludes
an adapted method to calculate expected outputs, costs and revenues fromthe mal generation
investments in a nonequilibrium market setting. Price mark-ups in oligopoly markets ar ac-
counted for. Also described is a method of using de-rated capacity marginsas a proxy for
security of supply risk in a power system with high penetrations of wind.
Like any simulation model, the results produced must be interpreted with a degree of caution.
A number of assumptions and simplifications are required in order to create a tract ble model,
although many insights, such as those presented here, can still be gained.Going forward, this
thesis can be used for knowledge transfer, and as a basis for exploring the topics of further
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A.1 AIMMS source code for calculating COPT [73]
Prob(b) := 0;
Prob(0) := 1;




ProbUp(b+CapSteps(s)) += Prob(b)* AvailProb(StatType(s));





for (b in {1..Nsteps}) do
CumProb(b) := Prob(b) + CumProb(b-1);
endfor;
A.2 Marginal cost equations
Using the conversion factors listed given in 5.2.1.1 and technology emission assumptions given






(3.6 · 9.48Fg + 185Fcar) + v,
SRMCccgt = 64.38Fg + 349Fcar + 2.0,




( 3.6Fc0.02512 + 330Fcar) + v,
= 409Fc + 942Fcar + 1.0,
SRMCnuc =
8.9Fu
24·45η + v + e,
= 0.023Fu + 2.68
(A.1)
whereFg is the gas price (£/therm),Fc is the coal price (£/kg),Fu is the uranium price (£/kg),
V is in (£/MWh), Fcar is the carbon price (£/kg), e is the cost to convert, enrich and fuel
fabricate (CEFF) uranium which is assumed to be 2.5£/MWh, 8.9kg of Uranium (U3O8) is
needed to produce 1kg of CEFF uranium (U ) and 45 MWd/kg is the assumed burn-up [29]. In
this example, the thermal efficiencies,η, and variable O&M costs,V , are taken from Table 5.6.
To illustrate, given the fuel prices: gas: 60 p/therm (= 0.6£/therm), coal: 70£/T (= 0.07£/kg),
uranium 70£/lb (= 155£/kg) and carbon price 20£/T (= 0.02£/kg). The estimated SRMC are:
SRMCccgt =
1
0.53(3.6 · 9.48 · (0.6) + 185 · (0.02)) + 2.0 = 47.6£/MWh,
SRMCocgt =
1





0.02512 + 330 · (0.02)) + 1.0 = 48.5£/MWh,
SRMCnuc =
8.9·(155)
24·45·0.36 + 0.18 + 2.5 = 6.2£/MWh,
(A.2)
A.3 Capital expenditure schedule
For simplicity, the expenditure schedule applied in (5.18) for the model resultspresented in






-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1
Nuclear 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Coal 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Wind 0.3 0.3 0.4
CCGT 0.2 0.4 0.4
OCGT 0.5 0.5
Table A.1: Capital expenditure schedule applied in (5.18) for the preliminary model result
presented in Section 5.5.
wherez = 0.8 (i.e. the capital outlay increases by 25% each year).
A.4 DECC fuel assumptions
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure A.1: DECC low, central and high estimates for (a) gas, (b) coal and (c) ETS prices




Figure A.2: Plot of evolution of technology variable operating costs 2010-30 for central fuel
cost assumptions shown in Fig. A.1. All values are in 2010 prices.
A.5 Regional simulated monthly offshore wind generation
(a) (b)
Figure A.3: Plot of simulated monthly capacity factors versus ROC register data for (a) North
Hoyle and (b) Scroby Sands offshore sites.
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Figure A.4: Plot of simulated capacity factors versus ROC register data for (a) North West
Scotland, (b) North East Scotland, (c) North Islands, (d) North Wales,(e) East of
England and (f) South of England.
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A.7 Proof of correlation property (7.20)
This can be proved by considering the correlation betweenX + Y andX, whereX andY are
independent variables, then
corr(X + Y,X) = cov(X+Y,Y )√
V ar(X+Y )·V ar(X)
= E(([X+Y ]−[E(X)+E(Y )])·(X−E(X)))
sqrtV ar(X+Y )·V ar(X)
= E(([X−E(X)]+[Y−E(Y )])·(X−E(X)))√
V ar(X+Y )·V ar(X)
= E([X−E(X)]·(X−E(X))+[Y−E(Y )]·(X−E(X))√
V ar(X+Y )·V ar(X)
= V ar(X)+0√
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Dynamic Modelling of Thermal Generation
Capacity Investment: Application to Markets with
High Wind Penetration
Dan Eager,Student Member, IEEE,Benjamin F. Hobbs,Fellow, IEEE,and Janusz W. Bialek,Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Modelling the dynamics of merchant generation
investment in market environments can inform the making of
policies whose goals are to promote investment in renewable
generation whilst maintaining security of supply. Such models
need to calculate expected output, costs and revenue of thermal
generation subject to varying load and random generator outages
in a power system with high penetrations of wind.
This paper presents a dynamic investment simulation model
where the short-term energy market is simulated using proba-
bilistic production costing using the Mix of Normals distribution
technique to represent residual load (load net of wind output).
Price mark-ups due to market power are accounted for. An
‘energy-only’ market setting is used to estimate the economic
profitability of investments and forecast the evolution of security
of supply. Simulated results for a Great Britain (GB) market case
study show a pattern of increased relative security of supply risk
during the 2020s. In addition, many new investments can recover
their fixed costs only during years in which more frequent supply
shortages push energy prices higher.
Index Terms—Power generation economics, Mix of Normals
distribution, Thermal power generation, Wind power generation.
I. I NTRODUCTION
GOVERNMENTS who preside over liberalised energymarkets are interested in how the mix and amount
of generation investment will respond over time to policies
promoting high penetration of variable output renewable power
such as wind. Significant challenges arise when making an
economic assessment of the potential for generating invest-
ments in a mixed thermal-wind system. Methods are needed
that provide a reasonably accurate approximation of the ex-
pected contribution of generating units to serving varyingload
and the revenues received by doing so, whilst accounting for
plant outages and variable renewable sources.
This paper demonstrates a probabilistic production costing
method that considers the annual load curve and convolves it
with generator outages using the Mix of Normals distribution
(MOND) approximation. This is integrated into a dynamic ca-
pacity investment simulation. This production costing method
was first described in [1] and then extended and used for
the calculation of equilibrium capacity investment in a power
market in [2] and [3], respectively. In this study, the method
D. Eager is with the Institute for Energy Systems, The Universty of
Edinburgh, EH9 3JL, UK, d.eager@ed.ac.uk
B. F. Hobbs is with the Department of Geography and Environmental
Engineering, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland 21218, USA,
bhobbs@jhu.edu.
J. W. Bialek is with the Energy Group, School of Engineering,The
University of Durham, DH1 3LE, UK. Janusz.Bialek@durham.ac.uk
is applied for the first time to a nonequilibrium setting as part
of a dynamic market simulation.
The second focus of the work is to assess the impact of
high penetrations of wind power on risks associated with
investment in conventional thermal generation. Thereforethe
method above is extended to include a residual load calculation
(load net of wind output) using empirical load and simulated
wind data. This residual load data is then used in the MOND
production costing model. Finally, the MOND model is in-
corporated in a dynamic investment model and applied to a
simplified Great Britain (GB) power system test case for an
assumed (exogenously increasing) installed wind capacity.
The goal of this research is to address concerns about
whether ‘energy-only’ markets (i.e., without capacity mech-
anisms) with high penetrations of wind are capable of in-
ducing timely generation investments over a long-term time
frame. Examples of ‘energy-only’ markets currently operating
include GB, Australia’s National Electricity Market, Alberta,
Nordpool, Ontario and ERCOT.1 This is of particular interest
to policy makers whose goals are to promote investment in
renewable generation, maintain an adequate level of resources,
and reduce customer costs.
Building on the preliminary work of [4], the dynamic model
employs classical control theory to capture the interactions
between electricity supply and demand. It shares similarities
with existing dynamic models of merchant generation invest-
ments (e.g., [5], [6]), however this particular application to a
market with a high wind penetration is unique. Furthermore,
the production costing methods used by previous dynamic
models are deterministic, and therefore underestimate average
costs (due to Jensen’s inequality [7]).
This paper is organised as follows: in Section II, the
dynamic investment model in which the MOND technique is
embedded is described. Features of the investment decisionare
provided in Section III. In Section IV properties of a MOND
is described and its application to a market situation is given.
Section V describes input assumptions and the wind models
used. For the purposes of illustration, a number of simplifying
assumptions are made that in an actual application should
be subjected to careful validation. Results from the dynamic
simulation of capacity investment in a case study system with
an existing installed capacity similar to that of GB are given
1Note that some regulated vertically integrated utilities inUS power markets
(e.g., Midwest ISO) may be compelled by regulators to satisfy capa ity
margin criteria. In these circumstances investment decisionsare not primarily
governed by energy market prices.
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in Section VI, Section VII presents conclusions.
II. T HE INVESTMENT MARKET MODEL: OVERVIEW
Techniques from control theory are used to model market
investment dynamics (Fig. 1). Because the model is dynamic,
current market conditions (e.g., capacity under construction
or retirements), and market price predictions are fed back to
the investment block, modifying the investment behaviour.The
resulting investment decisions are then fed back to the market,
hence closing the loop.
Fig. 1. Modelling generation capacity investment as a control p blem;
investment can be viewed as a negative feedback control mechanism with
current and future energy prices (as a function of generation capacity margin)
acting as a feedback signal.
The dynamics of the system concern the evolution of
installed generation capacity and rate of demand growth. The
rate of change in capacity at a particular time-step dependso
new plant coming online or being de-mothballed, net of any
plant being retired or mothballed [8]. Both are delayed signals
from some earlier time. In the case of new plant, this delay
is the lead time for construction, and for retiring plant, this
delay is the design lifetime.2 Mothballing requires zero delay,
whilst de-mothballing requires a delay that is significantly less
than full construction. An aggregate approach is taken whereby
capacity is combined into five technology categories, namely
nuclear, coal, wind, CCGT and OCGT, each with its own
financial and technological characteristics. The model does not
consider the transmission network and is conceptually a single
bus system.
III. G ENERATION CAPACITY INVESTMENT
A. General assumptions
In this model the investment decision is taken annually and
is considered an irreversible decision. It is based on the Net
Present Value (NPV) of anticipated future profits.
For simplicity, a single investor who is well acquainted
with the structure of the market and capable of securing
the necessary debt to finance large-scale plant investment is
modelled. This representative agent approach has been used
2Further delays are caused by the need for investors to accumulate data in
order to form their expectations about future market conditions.
by other dynamic capacity market models (e.g., [9]). When
estimating the profitability of an investment, a Monte Carlo
(MC) approach is taken to obtain a probability distributionof
profitability whereby estimates for conventional plant alre dy
under construction (including delays), demand growth, and
fuel prices are considered stochastic.
In the base case, generators assume all plant will come
online with 100% certainty, and remaining build time is
stochastic. This is modelled as the sum of the expected build
time plus a random variable (r.v) that is sampled from a
lognormal distribution,lnN(µ, σ2). Decision making under
uncertainty is modelled by taking a risk averse attitude to
investment (cf. Section III-B). Currently operational plant is
expected to generate for the duration of its design lifetime.
Investors consider annual load growth to be stochastic and
is sampled from a Normal distribution.
The present value of an investment in technologyx (i.e.,






GM ix − FCx
(1 + r)i−τx
− (ICx +DCx) (1)
wherer is the firm’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC),
GM ix is the gross margin (cf. (11) or (16) depending on market
bidding assumptions) for yeari, FCx is the generator fixed
operating costs, andτx andαx are the expected build time and
plant lifetime, respectively. Although the investor randomly
samples capacity construction times for plant already in the
build stage, for simplicity we assume that investors consider
only fixed build times when assessing the present value of
an investment (1). In the case of plant lifetimes, the investor
assumes that capacity will close at the end of its design life.
A more sophisticated representation would have the investor
consider the possibility of random construction times and
lifetimes, which we leave for future research. Both these
elements are modelled as fixed in the real-time simulation.
We note that by assuming a fixed design lifetime, the model
overlooks the option for generators to repower their exist-
ing plant. However, representing this additional choice for
investors would add significant complexity to the model and
increase computational burdens, and so is not considered he.
ICx and DCx are the present worth of the investment cost
and decommissioning cost, respectively. Only nuclear projects
have considerable decommissioning costs; in the case of other
plant types the decommissioning liabilities are assumed tobe
offset by the salvage value of the assets [10]. All cashflows
are discounted to the start of the first year of operation.
Only the firstn years of expected revenues are stochastically
simulated by the investor (heren = 7); for the remaining
years the (discounted) average of the simulated revenues are
used (e.g., similar to [9]). Furthermore, investors cap thetotal
expected annual revenues received from scarcity rents (see
Section IV-B) at the annualised cost of an OCGT. These
actions ensure that expectations about future revenues are
not unduly influenced by high forward simulated wholesale
prices due to generation retirements far in the future. No
regulatory price caps are implemented in the real-time (annu l)
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simulation.
Because the model randomly samples capacity construction
times, fuel prices and load growth, a large sample is required
in order for investors to obtain reliable estimate of expected
project value (1).
B. VaR criterion
Value at Risk (VaR) is a common criterion used in finance
when investors place a high priority on avoiding poor out-
comes [11]. Generally speaking, given a project valueV , and
defining the level of risk aversion byq, the VaR is defined
as the valuevq such thatp(V ≤ vq) = 1 − q. In this model,
the distribution ofVx in (1) is computed by MC simulation
of the stochastic variables. We model a risk averse investor
with q = 5%, and an investment is deemed attractive if
p(Vx > 0) ≥ 95%.
The exact methods that generation companies actually use
to evaluate investments under risk are uncertain, and whether
they use probabilistic approaches is disputable. However,for
the purposes of this simulation model, a probability model
provides a convenient means for representing risks and how
greater risk discourages investment.
Despite their popularity, VaR models do have a limitation
relative to other risk criteria (such as Min Max Regret) as VaR
analysis must consider probabilities of outcomes, but typically
these probabilities are not well known. An alternative approach
would be to use Min Max Regret whereby an investment
decision for a particular realisation of the system is analysed.
Regret is defined as the difference between the net benefit
incurred when an investment decision is made for a realised
state of nature, and the maximum net benefit across all feasibl
strategies that can be obtained under that realised state. For
instance, investing in nuclear generation for a realised carbon
price that is lower than expected might have a higher regret
than investing in gas-fired generation under the same price.
However, the Min Max Regret criterion only considers the
worst regret for each alternative, which makes its results very
sensitive to the exact set of scenarios that are considered.
C. Modelling aggregate investment response
In some circumstances the expected profitability of new
investments is extremely high, thus triggering a wave of new
builds. In such cases, the investment rate will be limited by:
1) the firm’s beliefs about how many other market participants
will move to invest, 2) on the impact of new investment on
the profitability of their existing plant, and 3) on the ability of
the firm to secure the debt required to fund multiple projects
[6]. Using an aggregate investor response curve (AIRC) is
useful in models of this type. For instance, in [9], the aggreat
investment rate with increasing in the“risk-adjusted forecast
profit” , which is derived from the investor’s (risk averse,
concave) utility function.
In this paper, a function is applied to the outcome of the
VaR decision rule in order to estimate the aggregate investmnt
response of the market. This function is increasing with the















is the Profitability Index (PI) andξmax is the maximum yearly
investment lump per technologyx. ξmax andβ are calibrated
so zero investment is made ifPIqx < 0, andξi = ix volume of
investment is made ifPIqx = 1, whereix is a fixed constant.
Note thatξi determines the output of the investment response
block in the feedback system depicted in Fig. 1.
The function used in the base case is shown in Fig. 2 with
fixed ix = 2 GW andξmax = 4 GW, andβ = 0.7 resulting
from the calibration. Changingβ alters the aggregate response,
as shown by the dotted lines. For multiple investments with
PIx > 0, the option with the highestPIx is chosen.
Fig. 2. Plot of model aggregate investment response curve define by (2)
(solid line) whereix = 2 GW and ξmax = 4 GW . Also shown are the
minimum investment lump sizes along with curves for different values ofβ.
The degree of heterogeneous investment response is not
modelled directly, however the investment response of the
model is a smooth function of prices and costs, reflecting how
a heterogeneous group of market participants would likely
respond to changes in market conditions. In particular, the
amount of investment is a smooth monotonic function of
expected returns, as reflected in the AIRC (2), i.e., it is nota
type of response where if profits exceed a threshold, a large
amount of investment occurs.
Furthermore, forward and bilateral contracting between
generators and load serving entities is also not modelled
explicitly, however both forward prices and our investors’
expectations are driven by the same market factors. Moreove
those contracting are implicit in the way investor price expec-
tations are modelled. In a commodity market, forward price
expectations will be driven by the same economics as short-
term prices. For instance, in the face of capacity retirement
and demand growth, forward prices will rise. Our modelled
investor simulates prices 7 years out, which is further ahead
than most forward electricity markets go. Moreover explicitly
representing contracts and forward price expectations would
make the model significantly more complicated. For instance,
[12] presents a single stage investment problem in the presenc
of endogenous contract and physical markets. Even in that
very simple circumstance, the model and its analysis is very
complex. The effect of more long-term forward and bilateral
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contracts would be to reduce revenue risk for investors, i.e.,
lowering risk aversion, thus making them more willing to
invest for a given distribution of energy prices. Thereforeth
effect of more or less forward contracting can be implicitly
considered by adjusting the risk aversion parameter of the VaR
model (i.e., the level of risk aversion,q or the WACC,r, in
(1)).
IV. PRODUCTION COSTING BYM IX OF NORMALS
When estimating expected profits, varying loads (e.g., in
the form of the load duration curve (LDC)), the expected
contribution of generating units to serving these loads, and
the revenues they receive by doing so must all be approxi-
mated. It is helpful if the technique used is computationally
fast, accurate and robust. A mixture of Normals distribution
(MOND) approximation of the LDC meets this requirement
and is also straightforward to convolve with plant outages for
the expected output calculations.
A MOND is described as follows: consider a set,Y =
{y1, . . . , yn}, of Normally distributed r.vs. with theith el-
ement having meanµi and varianceσi. Let Φ(x|µi, σi) be
the cumulative distribution function (cdf) ofyi. A MOND is a









i=1 pi = 1 andpi ≥ 0, wherepi is the weight of the
componentyi [1]. Note that ifX andY are two independent
random variables each with MONDFX(x) andFY (y) given
by (4), thenX+Y is a MOND.3 In this application the distri-
bution of load (a MOND) is convolved with the distribution for
available conventional thermal generation (cf. Section IV-A).
It is a standard assumption in probabilistic costing and loss- f-
load probability models that the outages of different generating
units are independent of each other, and independent of load
[13], [14].
A MOND fit for approximating the annual LDC (MW)
is required. For example, ifL(x) is the probability density
function of load andFL(x) is the cumulative distribution
function of fL(x), then the LDC is simply the rotated and







which is a mixture ofK Normals (Φk) with the same
properties as (4). For a particularK, the best fitting value of
eachµk, σk andpk can be found by solving an optimization
problem that minimizes the sum of squares of the difference
between observed and fitted values of the LDC.
To illustrate the accuracy of this technique at approximating
a LDC, Fig. 3 shows the distribution of the GB hourly loads for
the period 2005-09 (normalised by the year’s average demand)
3The proof of this property is given in appendix A of [1].
4The exceedence distribution givesP (X > x), that is the probability that
the r.v.X (in this case load) is greater thanx.
and the fitted distribution. A normalisation is necessary when
comparing multiple years to account for demand growth. The
difference between the LDC plots in Fig. 3(b) is not visible at
this scale owing to the excellent fit provided by the MOND.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. (a) MOND pdf (4 Normal components clearly visible by their distinct
peaks) and histogram of normalised load data and (b) LDC fit with negligible
visible difference between mix of 4 Normals and empirical data.
A. MOND with conventional thermal generation (after [1])
and extension for wind
The available capacity at each hour from a particular unit is
a r.v. which is characterised by the unit’s Forced Outage Rate
(FOR). Let the capacity of unitu be defined bycu, its FOR
by ρu and expected available capacityGu = cu(1− ρu). That
is, the distribution of the unit’s available capacity follows a
Bernoulli distribution between zero andcu.5
If mu units of typen share the same capacity and FOR
characteristics and are subject to independent forced outages,
they can be treated as a single pseudo-unit (or generator) with
a distribution with the following moments:
E(Gn) = µn = mucu(1− ρu), (6)





where (pseudo-) generator,Gn, has capacitycn = mucu.
To simplify the presentation for the remainder of the paper,
the convention will be to use ‘generator’ when referring to
a ‘pseudo-unit’ (collection of units of a given type), andcn
when referring to the capacity of that generator, because thi
is the last time individual units will be discussed.
Now the convolution property of the MOND is used to
determine theeffective load duration curve(ELDC) facing
the next generator to be dispatched (in merit order) [14]. If
the units can be grouped intoN (pseudo-) generators6 each










as the load minus the available capacity of generator types
1 . . . n (1 ≤ n ≤ N ) [1]. If Fn(x) = 1− Ln(x) is the cumu-
lative probability of effective loadx = L − ∑ni=1 Gi facing
the (n+1)th generator.Fn(x) is computed by convolving the
MONDs for load and available capacity.
5More general models exist to account for partial unit outages(e.g., see
[13]), however they are not considered here.
6The more units in a group, the closer the Binomial distributions to
Normal.
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The expected energy servedn (in MWh/yr) by generator









where Ln−1(x) is the load still to be met after adding
generator typen − 1 and Ln(x) is the load still to be met
after adding generatorn, which at the start of the convolution
process (n = 0) is obtained from (5).
The distribution for the ELDC after convolving in gener-

























Thus, the ELDC is described by a MOND with the same
number of component Normals as the original LDC.
Given eachLn(x) (n = 1 . . . N ), the probability that
generatorn or higher (in the merit order) is the marginal
source of energy (and so sets the price) is given byLn(0),
andhn = Ln−1(0) − Ln(0) is the probability that generator
n is on the margin.
The annual expected energy unserved (EEU) can be cal-
culated by integratingLN+1(x) (i.e., after convolving in the
complete set ofN generators) from 0 to∞ and multiplying
by 8760 hrs/yr. Furthermore the Loss-of-Load Expectation
(LOLE) for the period is determined by computing8760 ·
LN+1(0) [13].
Unlike conventional thermal generation units whose in-
dividual availabilities are assumed to be independent, wind
generators rely on the availability of the “fuel” resource and
therefore a dependency between available wind generation at
different wind plants is introduced. To address this issue,an
exogenous wind capacity is assumed and the resulting residual
LDC facing thermal generation is computed and the MOND
approximation is applied to this wind-adjusted data set. The
residual load in each hour is simply the hourly load minus
the sum of hourly output from all wind plants. By taking
this approach, the resulting distribution of net load takesinto
account both spatial correlations and temporal (e.g., monthly
and diurnal) trends in the availability of the wind resourceand
its relationship with demand.
Further the residual load approach allows us to calculate the
number of hours that available wind generation is greater than
aggregated demand, i.e., those hours when wind sets the sys-
tem marginal price. This is computed using the residual load
exceedence distribution before convolving any of the availble
thermal generation, i.e., the inverse of8760(1−FL(0)) where
FL(x)) is given by (5). This is of particular interest in systems
with high penetrations of wind when direct wind dispatch may
be required to curtail production at times when available wind
exceeds demand.
Wind production may need to be curtailed under other
circumstances. In particular, our implementation of the MOND
technique does not consider the possibility of available wind
generation exceeding either 1) available export capacity in
a generation pocket due to transmission congestion or 2)
raw demand net of inflexible base load (e.g., nuclear). Nor
can the load duration curve method (of which the MOND
is a particular case) consider the possibility that ramp rate
limitations could also result in wind spill. Considering each in
turn, given that the model is single bus, number 1) cannot
be addressed here and is left for future research.7 In this
application, it is assumed that UK Government policy will
ensure that the amount of congestion in the future will not be
so large as to affect the basic economics of thermal generation
investment. This is consistent with the GB regulator’s ‘connect
and manage’ transmission access policy [15]. In the case of
number 2), if inflexible base load generation needs to be
kept running then this will affect the economics of the wind
generator being constrained (i.e., the wind generator is given
a congestion payment by the System Operator). However,
installed wind capacity is an exogenous model parameter in
this analysis. The presence of inflexible generation can also
affect the economics of baseload generation by increasing
the number of hours of zero or negative prices. However,
the amount of hours when this occurs is relatively small in
most of our simulations. For instance, for the GB case study
presented in Sections V-VI, under the assumption that all
plants can be turned down except nuclear, in no year and in no
scenario is the probability of the net demand being below the
expected available nuclear capacity greater than 7%. Future
applications of this method could approximate the effect of
inflexible generation by dispatching its must run capacity first
and assuming a zero or negative price for the portion of the
time that this capacity is on the margin.
It is important to note that the residual LDC approach
removes the chronology of the wind and load time series.
This can be an important omission in the presence of large
amounts of hydro and pumped hydro generation; in such cases,
chronological production costing methods may be preferred
to load duration curve methods. However our implementation
of the MOND technique is applied to the GB power system
where the amount of hydro and pumped hydro is relatively
small (about 4% of capacity), so the use of a load duration
curve approach is reasonable.8
B. Expected revenues from the energy market
During a particular year, the probability that generatorn
will be at the margin is given byhn and the price in that
event will be the marginal cost of the generator,MCn. This
assumes price-taking (competitive) behaviour by generators.
Furthermore, once the convolution process has been completed
for all N generators, the probability that there will be insuf-
ficient generation to meet demand is given byLN+1(0) and
under this condition the price is assumed to reach Value of
Loss Load (VOLL). The expected gross margin for a particular
MW of capacity belonging to generatorn when generatori
is at the margin is given by:Rin = max {hi(πi −MCn), 0}
(£/MWh), where πi is the wholesale price when generator
7If a representation of the load and available wind production in each
region of the network is available, then curtailment of wind production due to
transmission congestion could in theory be assessed by multi-area production
costing methods.
8Note that there is little scope for new build of hydro technologies in GB
due to the lack of suitable sites.
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i is at the margin, which in the absence of market power
is given byMCi. The expected annual perfectly competitive












It is assumed that in a competitive energy market, generators
bid to produce electricity at or around their marginal cost.But
recent analyses of the GB market [16] showed a tendency
for balancing market (BM) prices to rise above the estimated
marginal cost of the last generator dispatched in peak demand
hours. Empirical analyses from other markets support this
claim [17], [18]. This price mark-up during peak demand
hours occurs because firms can raise their bids knowing that
the lack of alternative resources will mean their bids will
be accepted. Accordingly, in this study price,π, includes an
additional mark-up term that alters the shape of the aggregate
supply curve as the system approaches scarcity. This new price
function is described in [4] and is defined here as:




wheremc(L,G1, G2, . . . , GN ) is the marginal production cost
of meeting the load,L, given realised total available generation
G∗N =
∑N
i=1 Gi. The second term,w(L,G
∗
N ) = ae
b(L−G∗N ),
is a function of the capacity margin, defined as total available
capacity minus load in a particular hour. The parametersa
andb are calibrated so that a capacity margin of zero provides
a mark-up equal to the VOLL. For instance, whereL and
G∗N are expressed in GW, for a VOLL of£10,000/MWh,a =
10, 000 and b = −1.123, and for £2,000/MWh,a = 2, 000
andb = −1.101.
For simplicity, linear variable costs are assumed for all
generators. Fig. 4 shows an example of the price function
given by (12); the curve behaves like a classical linear step-
wise marginal cost supply function for small loads, but as
the system approaches scarcity, the mark-up function becoms
evident and soon becomes the dominate component of price.
The price mark-up function used is informed by a cal-
ibration exercise against GB market index price data (i.e.,
balancing mechanism prices) presented in [4]. Here the func-
tion is simplified to an exponential (Fig. 4). This is to keep
the derivations presented in Section IV-C simple. However
in practice any function of available capacity margin can be
used (e.g., in [4] a hyperbolic and exponential are employed
to provide a better match with the empirical price data).
A sensitivity analyses on the impact on model results of
alternative function parameters is briefly discussed in Section
VI-B, with a deeper examination provided in [8].
Now the market price (12) no longer just depends on which
generator is on the margin, it now depends on the overall
margin, G∗N − L as well. Furthermore, since the price can
exceedMCn if n is on the margin, the question of whether
a particular incremental MW of capacity within is called
upon or not must be considered because marginal generatorn
can still earn a positive gross margin.
Further, the expected gross margin (11) must be extended to
Fig. 4. Supply function for a given realised available capacity for generators






) (shown as black line). Marginal cost dashed, price is solid line.
consider the price function (12) and merit order operation.This
is less straight-forward than under marginal cost-based pricing
because the market price mark-up requires consideration ofthe
total margin,MN , as well as the marginal unit.
By assuming that price mark-up is non-zero (i.e.,
w(L,G∗N ) > 0) only when generatorN or N − 1 is on the
margin, calculation of the probability distribution ofw(L,G∗N )
can be achieved by considering the joint probability distribu-
tion of the capacity marginsMN−1 andMN .9
C. Expected price mark-up calculation
For each component of the MOND (4), we consider the
joint distribution of capacity marginsMN−1 andMN , which
is given byf(MN−1,MN ) with correlationσMN−1/σMN [8].
The revenue that a MW belonging to generatorn ≤ N earns
from price mark-up,RPMn (£/MWh), is considered forn ≤
N −2, n = N −1 andn = N . The derivations forn = N −1
are included below, full derivations for the other cases canbe
found in [8]. If n = N − 1, thenRPMn is broken down into






(1− ρn)f(MN ,MN−1)w(MN )dMNdMN−1,
(13)
which is the case where all of generatorN − 1’s available
capacity will be dispatched because load exceeds the available
capacity of generators 1 throughN − 1. The inner integral
upper bound is some value,v, above which the price mark-up
is negligible owing to the large surplus margin. The integral
lower bound is0 because becauseMN ≤ 0 results in zero















−1 · (MN−1 −MN−2)
(15)
9This assumption is reasonable in an aggregated capacity modelwith large
generator type sizes.
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whereMN−2 is the surplus margin after all available genera-
tion lower in the merit order thanN−1 has been dispatched.10
MN−2 is a r.v. and computation of its pdf is awkward;
however by approximating the realised value ofGN−1 by
its expectation:E(GN−1) = cN−1(1 − ρN−1),11 (15) can be
expressed as a function ofN − 1 (see [8]).
Finally, by integrating over the subregions of the
{MN−1,MN} space (see [8]), the expected annual gross
margin for generatorn can be calculated as
GMn = CGMn + E[en] ·RPMn. (16)
This is an important extension to (11); by exploiting the
properties of the probability distribution of capacity margins,
this allows for the additional revenue received from market
price mark-up to be calculated during the production costing
process. To our knowledge this is the first time these deriva-
tions have been presented. The validity of these expressions
have been confirmed in [8] by Monte Carlo simulation.
The MOND approximation technique is embedded within
the dynamic investment model depicted in Fig. 1. More
precisely, it is used to calculate the expected gross margin,
GM ix, in (1) and realised gross margins in the wholesale
electricity market. In both cases these are given by (11) or
(16), depending on market bidding assumptions.
V. CASE STUDY ASSUMPTIONS
The new dynamic model is applied to an ‘energy-only’
market setting without a separate capacity market, with a initi l
capacity mix comparable to GB, a VOLL of£10,000/MWh,
and a simulation time horizon of 30 years (2010-40). 100
Monte Carlo simulation runs are carried out for each plant
type in each decision year. If used for an actual policy analysis,
the impact that the number of Monte Carlo runs has on the
model outcomes should be evaluated and, if possible, larger
sample sizes used. The purpose of this paper is to present and
illustrate a methodology, so extensive testing of the effect of
the number of simulations was not undertaken. An indication
of the importance of sample size is given by the standard
error of the expected revenues. The samples are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d), so this error is proporti nal
to 1/
√
N (hereN = 100) [19]. For instance, for nuclear in
2020 in one run, the standard error was about 5% of the
average revenue, which is reasonably precise. If the sample
size was increased ten-fold to 1000 samples, one would expect
an error of 5%/
√
10, or about 1.5%. Moreover, application of
variance reduction methods (e.g., [20]) can result in smaller
standard errors than i.i.d. sampling; however this is left for
future research.
Fuel and carbon forward prices are based upon the UK
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) central
case estimates [21]. Assuming investor price forecasts are
similar to these estimates, the investor model uses the DECC
10The−1 scalar is applied to the denominator of (15) in account ofMN−2
being negative. If it was positive, thenGN−1 would not be dispatched (i.e.,
p
disp
N−1 = 0), which is not considered in (14).
11Note here thatcN−1 is the capacity of the generator typeN − 1, which
is the sum of a number of individual units who share the same capacity nd
FOR characteristics (see section IV-A).
estimate plus a r.v. to estimate future fuel prices. This r.v. is
modelled as a mean reverting stochastic process.12
Investors assume a mean of 0% and standard deviation
of 1% for annual load growth (cf. Section III-A). This is
based on variations in demand growth [9] as well as the
perception that economic growth could be offset by increased
energy efficiency, thus allowing for small or even negative load
growth. They also assume the parameter values for remaining
build times (cf. Section III-A) areµ (mean) = one year andσ
(standard deviation) = six months.
Investors in peaking capacity (i.e., OCGT) assume addi-
tional revenue can be obtained from the ancillary services (AS)
market (here exogenously assumed to be£10,000/unforced
MW/yr). Knowledge about revenues obtained from this market
is somewhat uncertain in GB, therefore we have made an
estimation consistent with the idea that AS revenues form a
critical component of peaking capacity profitability, however
they are insufficient by themselves to trigger investment.
Similar models applied in the US (e.g., [9]) also do not treat
the AS market explicitly, and instead assume a fixed (and
relatively modest) contribution of AS to peaking unit gross
margins. Furthermore these are likely to be a second order
effect when considering generation investments on a decadal
time scale and are likely to be relatively unimportant for
cycling and base load capacity, given their relatively large
capital costs.
The main ancillary services payment in GB is via the
SO’s short-term operating reserve (STOR) market. Units who
participate in this market can chose to participate in both the
STOR market and the energy-only market. Under a “flexible”
contract, units specify availability windows, outside of which
they can participate in the energy market. Alternatively, under
a “committed” contract they participate in only the STOR
market. The revenues from this market are relatively small
(e.g., typical availability payments are around£5/MW/hr [22])
and because of their small size, are in reality only considere
for low capital cost plant investment (i.e., peaking units).
Hourly wind production is derived by scaling total installed
wind capacity by simulated hourly aggregated GB wind ca-
pacity factors (CFs). Onshore, the methodology described in
[23] is applied, whereby hourly wind speed data for 2005-09
is obtained (to match the empirical load data), and aggregate
GB CFs are obtained by applying regional weightings derived
from the current wind capacity in operation, construction,
or consented. For offshore wind, we instead use outputs
from a validated (see [24]) fully compressible, nonhydrostatic
mesoscale atmospheric 3km grid point model. The main
justifications for using wind speed measurement data when
simulating aggregate onshore wind production are: 1) thereis
the lack of extensive time series data with adequate temporal
resolution for currently operational farms in GB; and 2) the
amount and geographical dispersion of onshore wind farms
will grow over time, and will include production from regions
where CFs and correlations with loads and wind from other
areas are not currently known.
The total installed wind capacity is exogenous to the model,
12See [8] for parameters used.
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and is expected to increase linearly from 2010 levels (approx-
imately 2 GW or 3% of total installed capacity), up to 30 GW
by 2020 with a maximum of 35 GW in 2025, after which it
levels off. We justify this approach by the fact that, to date,
large-scale investment in wind capacity is driven by policy,
rather than economic considerations. It is therefore assumed
that policies promoting wind investment are successful in
meeting renewables targets,13 and the purpose of this work is
to provide insights into the response of investment in thermal
generation and subsequent levels of security of supply risk.
This magnitude of increase in total installed wind capacityin
a system with around 75 GW of total transmission connected
capacity and a maximum and minimum annual demand of 60
GW and 20 GW, respectively, transforms the GB system from
a low to high wind penetration. Note that a positive probability
of wind exceeding load (negative net demand) arises only
for scenarios in which the wind penetration exceedes 32
GW. Furthermore the fraction of hours in which this occurs
diminishes as load growth continues after 2025. For example,
for a wind penetration of 35 GW (the maximum simulated
level) in 2025, of the 43,825 simulated wind and empirical
2005-09 demand hours, 113 experienced negative net demand
(0.3% of hours).
The residual load facing thermal units for a particular houris
calculated by subtracting the hourly wind production from the
full load. Fig. 5 shows an example of the impact on the 2005-
09 residual load histograms as penetration of wind increases.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Result of increasing installed wind capacity from (a) 2 GW to (b)
20 GW on residual load histograms. Data shown is for 2005-09. Numbers in
brackets indicate volume of onshore and offshore capacity respectively.
Data on initial 2010 system capacity in Table I is derived
by aggregating GB capacity data [26] into the five capacity
types. Unit sizes are 500 MW for nuclear and coal, 200
MW for CCGT and 50 MW for OCGT. To keep the model
simple, minor sources of peaking capacity such as oil and
pumped storage is combined with OCGT. CHP and hydro are
aggregated with CCGT plant to obtain the unit totals shown
in Table I. This table also shows the financial and technology
input assumptions, including capacity cost assumptions, total
annualised fixed costs (TAFCx) and total interest accumu-
lated during construction (TIACx).
We assume there will be no load growth until 2020 (al-
though, as explained, realised growth varies around the mean
rate). This is broadly in line with central Updated Energy
13For instance, the UK Government has a target of around 30% renewabl
electricity generation by 2020 in order to meet the binding European Union
target for renewable energy [25].
Projections published by DECC [27] and base forecast winter
peak demand figures from the GB System Operator (SO) [26].
Expected electricity demand after this point is assumed to
grow at 1% per year.
VI. CASE STUDY RESULTS
A. Base case results
The model has been implemented using in the Mat-
lab/Simulink environment. The computational efficiency ofthe
MOND technique allowed for each production costing run to
execute in under 1.5 seconds.
Fig. 6 shows the evolution of total installed capacity in
the simulation. Also shown is the full and de-rated capacity
margin. The de-rated margin is the ratio of de-rated capacity
(DC) (installed capacity scaled by expected availability at peak
demand) to most probable peak load (PL); i.e.,[DC]/[PL]−1.
The FORs in Table I are used to de-rate conventional capacity,
and for wind the long-term capacity credit (%) values are
calculated using only those hours within 10% of peak demand
[23]. These range from 9-35% depending on level of installed
capacity (the higher the total installed capacity, the lower th
capacity credit). The forecast for peak demand is obtained
from the 99.9% percentile of the year’s MOND cdf for full
load (i.e., the load which is exceeded approximately 9 hours
per year). The use of de-rated margin is preferable when
calculation of an absolute level of risk is difficult. Moreover
it can easily be compared with the GB SO’s current estimate
of what constitutes an acceptable margin.14
Fig. 6. Plot of simulated capacity growth, de-rated and full capacity margins.
The “historical theoretical de-rated margin” (2001-10) is what the forecast
de-rated margin would have been for a given winter using the GBSO’s
assumptions about plant availability and winter peak [28].
To compare the performance of the simulation against
historic trends in GB, the model was run from 2001-10 and
a comparison between the modelled and actual capacity mar-
gins was performed.15 The comparison shows that simulated
margins do not perfectly match historic trends in all years
(e.g., 2002/3), however there is a reasonably good agreement
of our model with reality, which gives a degree of confidence
14For example, see Appendix to [28] and the UK Government’s recent
consultation on GB electricity market reform [25].
15See [4] for cost and initial capacity data.
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TABLE I
GENERATOR INPUT ASSUMPTIONS WITH SYMBOLS DEFINED INSECTION III.
Technology Therm. ρ Capex FC Var. O&M Lifetime Build WACC TAFC TIAC Initial No.
x eff. (FOR) £/kW £/kW/yr £/MWh α (yrs) τ (yrs) r (real)a £/unfor.MW/yr £/MW (GW) units
Nuclear 0.36 0.10b 2,913 37.5 1.8 40 7 0.09 400,750 931,170 11 22
Coal 0.35 0.14 1,789 38.0 2.0 40 5 0.07 216,710 344,100 27.5 55
CCGT 0.53 0.13 718 15.0 2.2 25 3 0.07 91,840 96,030 28.6 143
OCGT 0.39 0.10 359 15.0 4.4 40 2 0.07 47,250 36,690 7.7 154
aAssuming a 2.5% rate of inflation.bRecent years have shown a decline in the annual availability of the GB nuclear fle t (likely due to age), therefore this value is reduced to
75% for existing nuclear capacity. New nuclear builds are expected to have 90% availability.
in the realism of our future projections. The average absolute
difference between the historical theoretical de-rated margin
and the simulation was 1.6% with a standard deviation of
1.3%. A comparison of available historical data on CCGT
expansion during 2004-09 [29] showed that CCGT investments
triggered by the simulation (3.9 GW during 2004-09) did not
correspond in all years, however the volumes and timing were
not unreasonably different.16 A further analysis of differences
in levels of actual and simulated total installed capacity can
be found in [8].
The future trend shows an erosion of de-rated capacity
margins after around 2015. This coincides with the Large
Combustion Plant Directive17 plant retirements and rapid
offshore wind growth. Of the 30 simulated future years, the
average de-rated margin is 5.6% with a standard deviation of
7.1%. De-rated margins are negative in 4 years, below 5% in
15 years, and below 10% in 25 years. For those years where
margins are below 10%, an average shortfall of 1 GW of
capacity was projected. The GB SO has recently stipulated
that a de-rated capacity margin of 5 GW over expected peak
demand is desirable (see Appendix to [28]). These simulation
results suggest that a lower than desirable level of adequacy
risk could potentially occur.
The annual LOLE and EEU was also calculated (cf. Section
IV-A). The average annual LOLE across the 30-year simula-
tion was 0.03 hrs/yr with a standard deviation of 0.05, and
average annual EEU of 5.7 GWh (less than 0.002% of typical
year’s total annual energy demand). The yearly LOLE together
with the volume of hypothetical additional capacity required
to meet a 5 GW de-rated capacity margin at peak is plotted
in Fig. 7. A value of zero implies that de-rated margin is in
excess of 5 GW.
These projected risk and de-rated capacity margin figures
suggest that the system may experience tight supply conditis
during peak demand in some years. Some of these results
can perhaps be explained by inspection of the residual load
histograms from Fig. 5(b); the shape of the right-most tail
suggests that even with very high penetrations, wind power
does not contribute in all high demands periods. However
the frequency of these high-demand/low-wind periods is too
low to justify investment by private investors. And it is these
very high-demand hours when the potential for a capacity
16CCGT investment was the primary source of capacity expansion in GB
dring this period.
17A control on emissions from heavily polluting large combustion plant
introduced by the European Union in 2001. Approximately 11 GWof
emission-intensive capacity is expected to be decommissionedby 2016 under
this legislation
Fig. 7. Plot of simulated LOLE (bars) and capacity shortfall over 5 GW
de-rated capacity margin (solid line).
shortfall is highest (excluding here SO actions such as voltage
reductions). From a policy perspective, it is arguably uneco-
nomical to design policies aimed at ensuring there is adequat
generating resource available for these low-frequency events;
n alternative approach would be to encourage demand-side
participation through smart grids and smart metering.
Further, an analysis of generator revenues showed symptoms
of a boom and bust investment cycle. Simulated OCGT total
gross margins were positive in only 7 of the 30 simulated
years. The largest investment years were 2017/18, which
included the forecast prices for 2023-25, the period when gross
margins are highest. However investment reduces in 2019-
22 in response to expectations about prices being dampened
(although not sufficiently to prevent an overshoot) as new
investment in OCGT and other technologies enter the system.
The pattern of high gross margins directly corresponds to those
years where adequacy risk is highest (cf. Fig. 7). The boom
in OCGT investment in expectation of the high gross margins
fter 2023 is followed by a bust phase around 2026 when large
volumes of new nuclear capacity begin entering the system.
This increases the capacity margin but reduces profitability for
peaking units.
B. Sensitivity analyses
In order to test the robustness of the model, sensitivity anal-
yses have been performed on a number of model assumptions.
These included:
1) The ability of plant owners to exercise market power
and volumes of revenues received by doing so; this is
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achieved by calculating expected gross margins using
(11) instead of (16).
2) The impact on investment of the expected scarcity price;
this is achieved by reducing the VOLL and recalibrating
price mark-up (see section IV-B) when calculating (16).
3) Altering investor estimates about construction lead times
to match reality (i.e., as shown in Table I) in order
to test the hypothesis that differences between realised
and investor expectations about prices is due to the
uncertainty surrounding capacity under construction.
Also the aggregate investment response (2), investor risk pef-
erences, uncertainty about load growth and varying economics
of peaking plants (revenue from AS and fixed costs) were all
found to affect investment dynamics.
Overall, the model’s qualitative behaviour was reasonable
for these sensitivities and provided some useful insights,
particularly when comparing the oligopolistic base case tothe
perfectly competitive market results. A pattern of increased
relative levels of risk and erosion of de-rated capacity margins
was experienced during the 2020s to some degree in all
cases. Furthermore, the period of highest security of supply
risk is 2023-28, however the magnitude of this risk differs
between experiments. A prolonged period of increased security
of supply risk is experienced throughout the 2020s for the
perfectly competitive market case. Plainly these dynamicsay
differ in a model representing more sophisticated firms who
account for the effect of their investments upon mark-ups for
their existing fleet. In this case, firms may deliberately not
invest in order to keep prices (including mark-ups) high. Also,
providing investors with perfect foresight about capacityunder
construction produces less investment. This leads to more
frequent periods of relatively high LOLE and low de-rated
margins after 2020. However, generators experience positive
gross margins in more years due to lower surplus margins, and
hence higher prices.
VII. C ONCLUSION
We have presented the MOND technique for calculating
expected output, costs and revenues of thermal generation
subject to varying load and random independent thermal
outages. This method has been adapted for use in a dynamic
capacity market model with high penetrations of wind by
performing a residual load calculation with simulated wind
outputs. An ‘energy-only’ market setting has been used to
estimate the economic profitability of capacity investments.
Using relative levels of de-rated capacity margin and LOLE
as risk metrics, simulation results for GB show that levels
of generation investment lead to a mild increase in generation
adequacy risk in some years, with erosion of de-rated capacity
margins in the mid 2020s, and very tight supply conditions are
experienced during a small number of peak hours. Many new
investments, particularly peaking units, were unable to rec v r
their fixed costs.
If the model presented here were to be used for an actual
policy analysis, a number of key areas of future research
are recommended. These include: 1) a survey of investors
regarding their use of analytical approaches when evaluating
investment decisions under uncertainty and, if appropriate,
modification of investor risk-averse decision making, 2) tode-
velop an explicit representation of the heterogeneity of investor
response, and 3) modelling endogenous bilateral contracting.
An area of possible future research would be to extend
the MOND technique to a two-area (e.g., Scotland-England)
system with a transmission constraint. This could then be used
to assess the impact of congestion on wind power availability
and thermal generation investment in each area. This could
be implemented using a Mix of Bivariate Normals reflecting
the correlations in loads and wind in each area (e.g., as in
[2]), based on two area production costing methods (e.g., see
[30]). To maintain computational efficiency, the model could
draw upon scenario reduction schemes (e.g., see Chapter 7
of [31]) when applying multi-area production costing and
making an assessment of curtailment of wind production due
to transmission congestion.
The next stage of this research will address whether explicit
capacity mechanisms such as tendering for strategic reserve
(e.g., [25]) and capacity markets (e.g., [9]) can be designed to
alleviate resource shortfall and prevent investment overshoot.
The results here indicate that such a mechanism may be
desirable to improve reserve margins in the mid 2020s in Great
Britain.
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[2] J. G. Iñón, “Long-run Probabilistic Production Costing-Based Analysis
of Electricity Market Designs for Long-Run Generation Investment
Incentives under Spot-Pricing and Transmission Open-Access,” Ph.D.
dissertation, John Hopkins University, 2012, in preparation.
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Abstract 
The extent to which large volumes of offshore wind can 
contribute to a secure and reliable electricity supply is a 
subject of much debate. Key to providing credible answers 
requires a detailed understanding of the wind resource and its 
variability in time and space. Here, a mesoscale atmospheric 
model was employed to create a ten year hindcast of British 
onshore and offshore wind speeds. This was used to simulate 
the output of a British offshore wind fleet and combined with 
demand data to assess reliability during periods of high 
demand.  Further, capacity value calculations using Effective 
Load Carrying Capability for the combined onshore and 
offshore GB wind fleet provides an estimate of the long-term 
reliability of production.  
1 Introduction 
Integrating large amounts of variable renewable generation 
into the electricity network presents a significant challenge 
and is the subject of much debate.  This is particularly true in 
the UK where wind generation is expected to become a 
significant supplier of energy, with a large increas s in 
capacity expected offshore, perhaps in excess of 30GW by 
2030, up from around 1GW today.  
Debate centres on the question: ‘to what extent can a variable 
and stochastic resource contribute to a secure and reliable 
electricity supply?’ Key to answering this is a detailed 
understanding of the wind resource and its variability in time 
and space. However, there are relatively few sources of 
offshore observations with sufficient temporal resoluti n or 
accuracy to address this. In a future system with high 
penetrations of wind, the temporal variability of wind will 
determine numerous characteristics such as the capacity v lue 
of wind and the amount of reserve required to maintain an 
adequate level of system security.  
This paper presents the results of a high resolution re-analysis 
using a mesoscale atmospheric model to recreate ten years of 
hourly wind speeds across Great Britain (GB) and 
surrounding waters. Wind speeds are extensively validated 
against observations from a number of available buoys, 
lightships and offshore platforms. The dataset is used to 
simulate ten years of wind production. Taking inspiration 
from capacity value calculations for onshore wind [1] this 
new data is used to produce the first credible estimate of the 
contribution of British offshore wind generation in supporting 
demand. 
2 Mesoscale modelling 
2.1 Simulation 
Mesoscale atmospheric modelling is becoming widely used in 
the wind energy field, both for short-term forecasting and 
longer-term resource assessment. Mesoscale models ar  
computationally demanding, so many studies either simulate 
relatively short time periods or employ statistical downscaling 
to reduce the computational requirement needed to capture a 
representative period. However, short term analyses do not 
fully capture wind speed variability, while statistical 
approaches do not produce continuous historic time-series 
which can be matched with historic patterns of energy 
demand. 
This study uses the Weather Research and Forecast (WRF) 
model [7], a fully-compressible non-hydrostatic mesoscale 
model with multiple boundary-layer, land surface, 
microphysics and cloud physics options. The model was 
configured with three nested domains down to 3km resolution 
(Figure 1). Boundary conditions were taken every six hours 
from the NCEP Global Forecast System Final Analysis 
dataset at 1o resolution. Two- way nesting and analysis 
nudging was used on all domains. The main physics options 
are summarised in Table 1. 
Ten years were simulated, from 2001-2010 inclusive, on the 
UK Research Council’s high performance computing 
platform, HECToR. 
 
Figure 1: Nested domains at 27, 9 and 3km resolution 
Domain 1 2 3 
Resolution (km) 27 9 3 
Integration timestep (s) 135 45 15 
Analysis nudging y y y 
Cumulus scheme Kain-Fritsch  None 
PBL scheme MYJ [4] 
Surface layer Monin-Obhukhov [5] 
Land surface scheme NOAH  
Land use dataset MODIS 
Table 1. Summary of mesoscale model configuration.  
 
WRF uses a terrain-following, pressure based vertical 
coordinate system. The vertical resolution was increased close 
to the ground to reduce any errors associated with 
interpolation to fixed heights.  Wind speeds were int rpolated 
to hub height from the closest model level:  
 
)/ln(/)/ln( 00 zzzzUU mmz ⋅=          (1) 
where Uz is the wind speed at hub height z. Um is wind speed 
at the closest model level zm and z0 is the local roughness 
length taken from WRF. Over water, WRF uses a Charnock 
formulation for roughness length. 
2.2 Wind farm load factor 
For existing (as well as planned and under construction) 
onshore and offshore wind farms, hourly wind speeds were 
converted to power output using the manufacturer’s power 
curve for the appropriate turbine. The make, model and size 
of turbine are specified in the RenewableUK wind farm 
database.  
 
The location of future offshore wind farms were taken from 
the Crown Estate leasing rounds. A generic 3MW turbine was 
assumed for Round 2 sites, and a generic 5MW turbine for 
Round 3, based on commercially available models. The final 
installed capacity in each offshore site was assumed to be 
distributed in proportion to the maximum lease capaities.  
 
Overall GB-level aggregate load factors (LFs) were computed 
as averages weighted by final installed capacity. That is, if 
LFni represents the LF of wind farm n at time t, then the 
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where Cn is the final installed capacity of wind farm n. 
Aggregate offshore and onshore LF are calculated separately, 
i.e. n is restricted to either offshore or onshore farms. For 
offshore farms, this means longer term calculations are 
weighted towards the larger Round 3 sites. 
2.3 Validation 
Wind speeds were validated against onshore met stations and 
offshore buoys, lightships and platforms. Standard e ror 
statistics of Bias (B), Mean Percentage Error (MPE), Root-
Mean-Square Difference (RMSD) and coefficient of 
determination (R2) were calculated.  
Table 2. Summary of error statistics by observation type 
 
Table 2 summarises the error statistics by class of 
observation. The performance is generally good, with high 
correlation values. Onshore the agreement between simulated 
and observed wind speeds was very good, with overall high 
correlation and low bias.  Offshore a seasonal biasof -1 to -
2ms was found in summer months. This merits further 
investigation, however it does not affect the capacity value 
analysis presented here which is based only on winter wind 
speeds.  
Monthly measured LFs for the largest onshore wind farms in 
each region of the UK (covering 196 wind farms with a 
totalled installed capacity of 2.7GW) were compiled from 
Ofgem’s Renewable Obligation Certificate (ROC) Register 
for the period from April 2006 to December 2010. LFs for 
existing offshore wind farms were also compiled from the 
time they became operational until December 2010. By the 
end of that period, that amounted to 8 wind farms with a total 
installed capacity of around 1 GW.  
Simulated LFs at the same sites were derived from the 
modelled hourly wind speeds and then averaged to monthly 
values. No accounting for wake losses or other array losses 
was carried out at this stage. Figures 2 and 3 show the 
agreement between average monthly LF averaged across 
onshore and offshore sites. Onshore, the predicted LFs were 
found to be consistently higher than observed. This would be 
expected before losses have been considered. A linear scaling 
factor of 0.69 gave the best adjustment between simulated and 


































































Figure 2: Average monthly LF for existing onshore wind 
farms. The thick grey line shows the actual weighted 
average LF from 196 large wind farms. The solid black 
line shows simulated LFs at 100% availability/no losses 
and the dashed line shows these values scaled by 0.69. 
 n B MPE RMSD R2 
  m/s % m/s  
Met stations 220 0.02 -0.5 0.44 0.96 
Buoys 9 0.24 6.25 1.16 0.82 
Lightships 4 -0.38 -1.99 1.30 0.91 






















































































Figure 3: Average monthly LFs for existing offshore wind 
farms. The thick grey line shows weighted average LF for 
all operational offshore The solid black line shows 
simulated LFs with no adjustment for losses. The large 
deviation in the first winter period is due to low technical 
availability in the early stages of some offshore farms. 
 
Offshore, the predicted LFs were already in quite close 
agreement to the observed values, except for two winter 
periods were technical availability at a number of offshore 
wind farms was very low. LFs were slightly too low in
summer, confirming the seasonal wind speed bias seen at 
observation sites. For this reason, no further accounting for 
wake losses or technical availability was performed for 
offshore sites. 
3 Reliability analysis 
3.1 Historic wind and demand time series 
The relationship between wind generation and electrical 
demand is of primary interest when analysing the reliability 
of the wind resource. Of particular interest is theavailability 
of the wind resource during periods of high demand. In 
Britain the highest demands are driven by low temperatures 
occurring during winter (November-March). It is during these 
periods that the adequacy risk is typically highest. 
 
Historic aggregated half-hourly demand data going back to 
April 2001 is available from the GB System Operator (SO), 
National Grid [9]. The GB ‘IO14_DEM’ data is the most 
applicable for generation adequacy calculations because this 
is based on operational generation metering and includes 
station load and pumped storage (PS) pumping [1]. However 
this data is inconsistent as prior to April 2005 it relates to 
England and Wales only. The ‘INDO’ demand measure, 
which excludes station load and PS pumping, is avail ble for 
the entire period. The winter ‘IO14_DEM’ values can be 
approximated by raising the ‘INDO’ measure by 600 MW 
and is used where the ‘IO14_DEM’ data is not available.  
 
To account for underlying changes in absolute levels of peak 
demand, each winter's demand is normalised by out-turn 
“Average Cold Spell” (ACS) peak demand and rescaled to 60 
GW. ACS peak demand is forecast each year in advance of 
the forthcoming winter by the SO, and is described as having 
“a 50% chance of being exceeded as a result of weather 
variation alone” [8]. The out-turn ACS peak is calculated post 
winter and is a measure of what peak demand would be given 
a winter's underlying demand patterns and “typical” winter 
peak weather conditions [8]. This makes it suitable value for 
the normalisation. These values can be found in [1] and [10].  
The half-hourly data is transformed to hourly resoluti n by 
taking the hourly demand to be the maximum of the two half-
hour periods. Finally, the normalised hourly demand data is 
then matched with the hourly simulated wind LFs. The time 
series spans 9.5 consecutive winters from winter 2001/02 to 
December 2010, totalling 34,128 demand hours.  
Figure 4 shows the simulated average aggregate long-term 
LFs for wind generation during the highest demand hours. 
The 90%+ normalised demand hours are categorised into 1% 
bins and the cumulative number of hours at each demand 
level are indicated on the graph (i.e., each label indicates the 
number of hours demand is at or above x). Note that demand 
levels above 100% of peak are possible on account of ACS 
peak being exceeded in some years. Interestingly, the pattern 
of average LFs shows a good agreement with the analyses of 
transmission metered wind farms presented in [14]. However 
absolute levels of average LF are higher with around a 45% 
LF at 90% to 95% levels of demand compared to 20% in [14]. 
This is hardly surprising given the increased geographic 
diversity of the wind capacity. As mentioned earlier, no 
scaling factors were applied to the simulated offshore LFs, 
which may lead to systematic over-estimation in the results. 
Therefore a second case where weighted offshore LFs are 
scaled by 0.69 is also included in Figure 4. This reduces the 
average LF at 90% to 95% demand levels to around 35%. The 
level of deterioration in average LFs at high demands is less 
severe than in [14], although this is based on just 2 hours of 
simulated data. It highlights the challenge for determining the 




Figure 4. Average long-term LFs for highest demand levels 
(right y-axis): base-case and wind scaled by 0.69 (upper 
and lower dashed lines). The demand hours per 1% 
normalised demand bin are shown on the left y-axis. 
3.2 Risk metrics 
The loss-of-load probability (LOLP) in a particular period is 
defined as the probability that available generation is unable 
to meet demand: 
),( DXpLOLP <=            (3) 
where X is the available generation and D is the system 
demand, both of which are random variables. The loss-of-load 
expectation (LOLE) is the expected number of periods ver a 
given period in which available generation is unable to meet 




tLOLPLOLE            (4) 
where LOLPt is the LOLP in period t. Here, the period t is 
assumed to be one hour and T spans a number of years.  
3.3 Capacity value calculations 
The use of capacity value is common when measuring the 
contribution of renewable energy generation to meeting 
demand. Here the Effective Load Carrying Capability 
(ELCC) defines the capacity value (or capacity credit). The 
ELCC for a particular level of additional generating capacity 
estimates the amount of additional demand that can be served 
due to the extra generation whilst maintaining the original 
level of system risk [6]. The purpose of this study is to 
demonstrate an application of the mesoscale model, not to 
determine an absolute measure of wind generation capacity 
value for GB. Moreover, a specific methodology has been 
applied to calculate capacity value, and while the authors 
concede that this is not necessarily cutting edge probability 
theory (e.g., see [14]) it is a fully valid contribution to 
defining current approximations of capacity value in GB (e.g., 
[11,12]). What is more, this is understood to be th first time 
that capacity value for a combined on- and offshore wind 
resource has been calculated using the ELCC approach.  
 
The capacity value is estimated as follows. Consider some 
additional wind generation w which increases overall system 
capacity. If the system LOLP in hour t before the additional 
generation is added is the “initial” LOLP, then adding the 
additional generation will reduce the LOLP. The total 
reduction depends on the reliability of the additional 
generation. This reduced LOLP can be expressed by: 
),(* WDXpLOLP −<=            (5) 
where W is the contribution to demand from the additional 
generation. Similarly, using the same principle as (4), the 
reduced 9.5 winter LOLE can also be determined. 
 
The ELCC for the additional generation is found by 
increasing demand until the reduced LOLP* risk returns to its 
original value. Here the interest is in the ELCC across the 
entire time horizon; however calculation of the ELCC for a 
single period is the starting point. This is given by [14]: 
),()( WdDXpDXp ELCC −+<=<          (6) 
where dELCC is the ELCC. This can be extended over multiple 
periods to: 
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where st is a scalar applied to the ELCC in order to account 
for the level of demand being experienced. Or put another 
way, the scalar places a higher weight on the highest d mand 
periods when solving (7). 
 
 
3.3.1 Treatment of conventional generation 
The next step is to construct a probability distribution for 
available conventional generation. Here, the term 
conventional generation covers all forms of generation 
currently connected to the high voltage transmission system 
in GB, with the exception of wind. Furthermore, the 
availability of conventional generation is assumed to be 
independent of demand and available wind capacity. 
Technical plant availability data is not available in GB. 
However most generating companies try to make availble as 
much capacity as possible at time of highest demand (to not 
forgo high wholesale market prices), thus availability is a 
function of the unit’s forced outage rate (FOR), which it is 
reasonable to assume are independent [1]. 
 
Generation unit data is taken from the National Grid Seven 
Year Statement [10] and the expected winter peak 
availabilities in their Winter Outlook [11] are used as FORs. 
This data is summarised in Table 3. The Unit Effectiv  
Capacity (UEC) in [10] has been used for all units, apart from 
those which are transmission constrained; in this ca e the 
individual UEC is scaled in order to match the transmission 
limit. Hydro units belonging to the same hydro scheme are 











Nuclear 22 10.1 0.75 
Interconnector 1 2 1.00 
Hydro 9 1.1 0.60 
Coal 62 27.9 0.90 
Oil 4 2.7 0.80 
Pumped storage 16 2.7 1.00 
OCGT 34 1.2 0.90 
CCGT 124 26.7 0.90 
TOTAL 272 74.4  
 
Table 3: Transmission connected conventional unit types 
[11]. 
 
The capacity outage probability table technique [2] assumes 
available capacity follows a Bernoulli distribution between 
zero and full capacity. With a 1 MW bin size, the resulting 
aggregate probability density functions have mean and 
standard deviation of 65.3 GW and 1.8 GW, respectivly. 
Using this distribution the hourly winter LOLPs can be 
computed (3).  
 
For simplicity each normalised hourly d is assumed to be 
fixed and does not itself follow an assumed probability 
distribution. Hourly LOLPs can be summed to produce th  
total 9.5-winter LOLE (4). Similarly the reduced LOE is 
calculated using the expected wind output at each hour 
estimated by the numerator of (2).  
 
3.3.2 Build-based capacity value: focus on offshore wind 
Initially the offshore wind resource is considered in isolation 
with particular interest in the relationship between the spatial 
distribution of generation capacity and capacity value. The 
hourly aggregated GB offshore wind LFs are estimated using 
a projected offshore wind build schedule. This timeable is 
constructed from the three Crown Estate auctions (rounds 1-
3) that define the locations and expected capacities of the 
offshore farms (see [13]). The aggregate LFs are then derived 
using the geographically weighted average of locatin l LFs 
(2). The results of this analysis are illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Capacity value (left y-axis) and ELCC (right y-axis) 
results for GB offshore wind using long-term and build-
based LFs. 
 
The dashed line shows capacity values calculated using long-
term aggregate weighted LFs. This assumes all sites are 
included and the contribution from individual locations scaled 
by weighting their capacities. The solid line shows the 
capacity values calculated using the build-based aggregate 
weighted LFs over just the wind farm sites expected to be 
online at the start of each year considered. The total installed 
capacity expected to be online by the stated year is the same 
in both cases, however the build-based LFs are weighted 
across a less diverse resource. The graph demonstrates hat 
considering sites by build schedule leads to lower estimated 
capacity values with the monotonically decreasing 
characteristic common in capacity value plots not present 
(e.g., Figure 7). This can be explained by the added value of 
capacity diversity improving (but not eliminating) the impact 
of dependence between sites on resource reliability in some 
years (particularly for the larger Round 3 sites). 
 
Further, the box in Figure 6 shows the expected availability 
and standard deviation of offshore wind capacity during high 
demand hours (note that the total installed capacities are as in 
Figure 5). In this case, those demand hours within 5% of peak 
provide a sample size of 655 hours over the 9.5 winters. The 
selected probability mass functions demonstrate how the 
distribution of aggregate LFs for the sampled hours changes 
over time. There is a visible reduction in expected low LF 
hours as geographical diversity increases, and the probability 
of high loads factors remains high relative to those typically 
simulated for onshore (e.g., [1]). 
 
Figure 6. Probability mass function for GB off-shore wind 
LFs for selected years based on demand hours within 5% 
of annual peak.   If the LF falls in a particular rnge (x-
axis), it is deemed to be at the middle of that range (i.e., 
LFs in the range 0-4% are deemed to be 2%). Mean and 
standard deviation of total available capacity depicted in 
box. 
 
3.3.3 Aggregate GB wind capacity value 
 
Attention now turns to the combined GB wind resource, 
Figure 7 shows the ELCC and corresponding capacity value 
results for combined on- and offshore analysis using the long-
term aggregate weighted LFs. These results suggest that for 
high levels of highly geographically diverse installed 




Figure 7. Capacity value (left y-axis, line) and ELCC (right y-
axis, bars) for the combined on and offshore GB wind 
resource calculated with long-term aggregate LFs. 
 
Figure 8 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis for ELCC 
that included the following (the numbers match Figure 8): 
1) Scaling factor 0.69 applied to long-term offshore wighted 
loads factors; 
2) Normalised peak demand reduced from 60 to 57 GW 
(initial LOLE reduced by 99%); 
3) Reducing the total available conventional generation by 4 
GW to a distribution with mean 62.2 GW, and standard 
deviation 1.7 GW (initial LOLE increases by 3000%).  
 
As might be expected with sensitivity factor 1 the effect of 
scaling offshore wind LFs downwards tends to reduce the 
capacity value of wind. In 2 the risk is reduced, so i  the 
ELCC and capacity value is also reduced. In 3 the risk
increases and the ELCC does likewise. This is a well-known 
result of ELCC analysis and demonstrates the impact of 
underlying system risk on the results obtained.  
 
 
Figure 8. Sensitivity of ELCC value to assumptions.  
4 Discussion 
A major assumption here is that the last ten years winds are 
reasonably representative of future wind in the UK. Ten years 
is not enough to represent a full climatology and there is 
evidence of climate change affecting wind speeds [3].
However, ten years is long enough to sample a wide range of 
synoptic conditions and weather types and the analysis is a 
substantial improvement on comparable studies.  
The output of wind at times of peak demand varies 
considerably between years. For example, in 2010, blocking 
high pressure over northern Europe led to very cold 
temperatures and high electrical demand, yet low wind speeds 
persisted over the UK. This highlights the difficulty, perhaps 
even the validity, of attempting to represent the contribution 
wind makes towards reliability as a single figure.  
5 Conclusion 
A detailed understanding of the wind resource and its 
variability in time and space is vital for understanding the 
contribution of offshore wind to reliable electricity supply. 
Here, a mesoscale atmospheric model was employed to create 
an ten year hindcast of British offshore wind speeds and 
simulated production.  
Results of a reliability analysis have provided insight into the 
reliability of production from offshore wind at periods of high 
demand. What’s more, credible estimates of combined long-
term onshore and offshore capacity value have been d rived 
and the sensitivities of these estimates to the underlying level 
of system risk discussed. 
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Validation of a dynamic control model to simulate
investment cycles in electricity generating capacity
D. Eager,Student Member, IEEE, J. Bialek,Senior Member, IEEE, and T. Johnson
Abstract—The ability of the liberalised energy markets to trig-
ger investment in the generation capacity required to maintain
an acceptable level of security of supply risk has been - and will
continue to be - a topic of much debate.
Modelling the dynamics of investment in generation capacity
can inform this debate. More precisely, if investment is viewed
as a negative feedback control mechanism with energy prices
acting as the feedback signal then the system can be formulated
in terms of differential equations and addressed as a problem in
optimal control.
The approach presented uses techniques from control theory to
model investment market dynamics and a classical NPV approach
is used for the investor decision process. The results of the model
verification stage are presented whereby the model’s ability to
simulate the market trends witnessed in Britain since early 2001
is tested with encouraging findings reported.
Index Terms—Power generation economics, Optimal control,
Simulation.
I. I NTRODUCTION
SO far, in Europe and the US, market liberalisation has beenseen as a success in terms of efficiency and lower prices.
However, various imperfections and catastrophes (e.g. Califor-
nian crisis in 2000 and 2001) indicate to market designers that
improvements are still achievable. One of the main concerns
is that the onus is now on privately owned generating firms to
respond to supply shortages by investing in generation capacity
in order to maintain an adequate level of security of supply
risk.
An installed capacity capable of meeting demand whilst
considering plant maintenance, unscheduled outages, utilisa-
tion factors, variable generation and unpredicted contingen-
cies, is vital in order to avoid power shortages and blackouts.
Nowadays it is widely accepted - certainly in Great Britain
(GB) - that a benchmark capacity margin at or above 20% for
a predomiately thermal system provides and acceptable level
of risk. To illustrate this point, Fig. 1 shows the GB capacity
margin in recent years; there has been a clear oscillation in
the margin and what’s more as the penetration of wind power
increases, it will need to increase significantly if the risklevel
is to be maintained. Many observers attribute this capacity
margin instability to the market framework under which the
industry operates. Capacity payments (and such like) are used
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Fig. 1. Generation capacity margin in the GB since industry privatisation
[7]. Dates of significant market framework changes also shown.
in most countries in order to ensure an adequate capacity
margin, however GB is a rather rare (but not unique) example
of an energy-only market, i.e. without capacity payments.
The purpose of this research is to establish whether a
liberalised market framework is capable of inducing optimal
investment in generation capacity over a long-term time frame
(∼20-30 years). In the first instance, a simulation model of
the current GB energy-only market has been constructed with
the aim of estimating long-term characteristics and whether
without capacity instruments it is likely to induce large price,
reliability and capacity oscillations.
It is well known in control engineering that time lags and
uncertainty are responsible for worsening system stability and
creating undamped oscillations. Any generation investmenhas
an inherent time lag of 3-5 years for gas and coal plants
and 8-10 for nuclear before becoming operational. Moreover,
analysis of consecutive GB System Operator (SO) Seven
Year Statements [11] showed that many projects are subject
to delay and/or abandonment. This combination of inherent
investment time lags, delays and uncertainty about the level
of capacity coming on line in the future creates generation
capacity oscillations like those shown in Fig. 1.
By taking a dynamical systems approach, the simulation
can be analysed for its stability characteristics and further-
more, controllers with the goal of minimizing the effect
of uncertainties can be designed. Other models that share
similarities with this methodology include [9, 15, 16, 20] and
more significantly [14], which the work presented here is an
extension of. Furthermore [9] and [20] explicitly state the
dynamic equations used to model the evolution of the system,
however crucially none go as far as to analyse the system for
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its stability characteristics.
Like many countries, this topic is currently very relevant i
GB and a large volume of work has been published in this field
by both academia and industry [1, 2, 19, 21]. These studies
focus on the capability of the current market framework to
deliver a secure electricity mix whilst meeting firm emissions
reduction targets and renewable energy obligations. In thecas
of [19], a static approach to modelling is taken whereby an
investment forecast is made assuming future gas and coal
prices and then key indicators such as electricity prices ar
calculated. However in the model presented below a feedback
mechanism is present, whereby a year-on-year investment
decision is taken enabling investors to adapt their behaviour
based on current market conditions; this includes projectsin
the pipeline, time delays, fuel prices and so on.
The results presented here are from the model verification
stage of the work; a comparison between the market dynamics
witnessed since the introduction of the New Electricity Trading
Arrangements (NETA) in England and Wales (E&W) and the
simulation results over the same time period are presented.
NETA is the name given to the system under which electricity
was traded in E&W up until April 2005. It came into being in
March 2001 and was altered in April 2005 when the electricity
market in E&W merged with its counterpart in Scotland into
a single GB wholesale market1.
The paper is organised as follows: Section II describes
the model formulation and the important elements of the
simulation; this includes how capacity, demand, fuel price
and wholesale electricity price are simulated. Section III
contains a description of the investment decision process and
how uncertainties faced such as fuel price and demand are
modelled. Section IV includes the results of the comparison
study and finally section V concludes the paper.
II. T HE MODEL
The approach of applying techniques from optimal control
theory is taken to model market investment dynamics (Fig.
2). Because the model is dynamic, current prices and their
predictions are fed back to the investment block modifying
the investment behaviour. The resulting investment decisions
are then fed back to the pricing mechanism hence closing the
loop.
Two control problem models have been developed in par-
allel for this work. One is the discrete-time model formulated
with difference equations and the other is the continuous-time
model formulated with differential equations.
A daily time-step model has been implemented for both the
discrete and continuous case. The model using the daily time-
step is run to establish likely investment trends for the years
ahead. The results from this simulation are added to the hourly
time-step model and a detailed analysis of key factors such as
wholesale price trends and security of supply risk are assessed.
In fact a direct comparison between historical wholesale prices
and simulated prices is included in order to verify the model
1Namely the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements
(BETTA).
Fig. 2. Electricity investment as a control problem; investment can be viewed
as a negative feedback control mechanism with energy prices (as a function
of generation capacity margin) acting as a feedback signal.
pricing function formulation, details on this function aregiven
in section II-C.
Because there is an investment element to the model, a
forward-looking simulation has also been developed. This
model uses market conditions in the real-time simulation as
initial conditions and then makes predictions on the futurestate
of the system during the lifetime of a potential investment.
Crucial uncertainties such as future demand, fuel prices and
wholesale energy prices are all simulated.
Therefore, for the purposes of model verification, the real-
time model is based on historic data with minimal uncertainty
(except for new investments and price), however the invest-
ment decisions are still based on a uncertain perception of the
future.
A. Capacity
The central dynamics of the system surround the evolution
of installed generation capacity. The rate of change in capaity
at a particular time-step is dependent on new plant coming
online or being demothballed together with any plant retiring
or being mothballed. Both are delayed signals from some
earlier time. In the case of new plant this delay is build
time, and in the case of retiring plant this delay is lifetime.
The control system linear time-invariant (LTI) differential









whereGx is the installed capacity of plant typex,
dIx
dt
= Ix(t − τx + ǫ) =
{
Cx if invested in x
0 otherwise
(2)
is the investment rate and
dRx
dt
= Ix(t − αx) =
{
Cx if x retired
0 otherwise
(3)
is the rate of plant retirement.Cx is the capacity,τx is the
expected build time,αx is the expected lifetime andǫ is a
random variable representing unforeseen delays (e.g. in the
planning process). An aggregate approach is taken whereby
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capacity is combined into five technology tranches, namely
nuclear, coal, wind CCGT and OCGT each with its own cost
characteristics.
In the base case, project delays are modelled as lognor-
mally distributed with mean 1 year and variance six months.
Furthermore, the number of projects that are abandoned is
modelled using a simple discrete probability distributionsuch
that on averagex% of projects are abandoned. In the base
case,x = 0 for coal nuclear, CCGT and OCGT2 and owing
to its poor record at gaining planning permission and so on,
x = 50 for wind3.
Finally, plant included in the Large Combustion Plant Di-
rective (LCPD)4 is also modelled whereby the lifetime of the
11GW+ which has opted out of the directive (i.e. opted to
close rather than retrofit the equipment necessary to reduce
emissions) is given a reduced lifetime based on the estimations
of remaining generating hours given in [13].
B. Fuel Prices
The data shown in Fig. 3 was used to model generator
fuel and emissions prices at real-time. Plainly the gas price
is modelled with a greater degree of accuracy than the other
fuel prices, this was for a number of reasons: firstly only
detailed historical data of gas prices was obtainable, secondly
by having a detailed model for gas, the characteristic of
electricity prices being strongly correlated with gas prices can
also be checked and verified.
Fig. 3. Fuel prices, from top left (clockwise) gas [22], coal[3], uranium [8]
and carbon [22].
C. Wholesale electricity price simulation
Simulating wholesale energy prices is an important aspect
of any model that addresses investment in generating capac-
ity under a liberalised market framework. Furthermore, the
wholesale price trends witnessed can indicate to observers
how well the system is functioning and whether there is has
2The logic here being that traditionally, new thermal capacity is usually
built on an exisiting site with a grid connection so will not come up against
stiff planning resistence.
3At the time of writing this paper, a basic analysis of British Wind
Energy Association (BWEA) data [5] revealed that from 2004 to2008, 495
applications were submitted and 258 have been approved to date.
4A control on emissions from heavily polluting large combustion plant
introduced by the EU in 2001.
TABLE I
GENERATOR DATA [17].
O&M O&M life- build
Gen. Effic- Availa- Capital fixed variable time time
type iency bility £/kW £/kW £/GJ yrs yrs
Nuclear 0.36 0.78 1485 43 0.05 40 7
Coal 0.48 0.86 400 14 0.28 40 5
Wind - 0.28 1000 27 0.0 25 4
CCGT 0.58 0.87 300 7 0.56 25 3
OCGT 0.39 0.95 330 10 0.75 40 2
been adequate investment in capacity. For example, there isa
tendency for over-investment to lead to periods of low energy
prices and conversely under-investment leads to periods of
high prices.
It is assumed that in a competitive energy market, generators
will bid to produce electricity at or around their marginal cost
and therefore our pricing function has a marginal cost element
included. Also during periods of tight supply, an upturn in
prices is commonplace, therefore an uplift function which is
driven by the generation capacity margin is also included.
Details of each element are described below.
1) The marginal cost element: This is computed using the
generator supply curve. Individual supply functions are derived
from the generator marginal costs; in general these are based
on the common cubic function of power output [24]. By
assuming a uniform heat rate across the operating range, the
cubic model is simplified and only the linear term remains:
C(P ) = bP · F + V · P, (4)
whereP is the power produced (MW),F is the fuel cost,V
is the variable operation and maintenance cost andb can be
derived from the generator thermal efficiency.
The cost of carbon is included by appending an additional
term to the cost function (4) of the formCO = bP · ϑ · Fcar,
whereϑx is the carbon produced by burning the particular fuel
type andFcar is the price of carbon. The full generator cost
function is then given by
C(P ) = bP · (F + ϑ · Fcar) + V · P. (5)
The assumptions for each of the plant types outlined are
given in table I. TheCO2 equivalent output of each generator
type is given by: gas - 185 (Kg/MWh) and coal - 330
(Kg/MWh) [6]. All other technology types are modelled with
zero carbon emissions.
2) The uplift function: Two forms of uplift function were
considered; an exponential [23]:
U1(t) = e
a·L(t)−C(t) (6)
and a hyperbolic [14]:
U2(t) =
s · g · L(t)
C(t) − g · L(t) (7)
wheres, b and l are scalar factors and can be set in order to
induce the desired price behaviour andL(t) andC(t) are the
load and available capacity respectively (in GWs).
The hyperbolic function was used under reasonably healthy
system conditions when an adequate capacity margin is present
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Fig. 4. Example electricity uplift function simulations for both (6) (labelled
with a parameter) and (7) (labelled withg parameter).
(range 50-20%) and the risk is low. However it does not
increase sufficiently quickly as the system approaches scarcity.
Under these conditions, the exponential function is better.
When there is inadequate generation, the system is at the
mercy of suppliers who can bid any price they can think of.
This is referred to as thehockey stick bid; a normal supply
curve is bid for most of the generation but the last few MW
are bid at a very high price. An exponential function models
this situation quite well. Therefore the uplift function was
constructed as a max of (6) and (7):
U(t) = max {U1(t), U2(t)} (8)
3) Price setting procedure: The price is set by performing
an economic dispatch and the marginal cost bid (5) of the last
generator type to be dispatched sets the marginal cost element
of the price. By assuming a linear cost curve, the speed of the
economic dispatch optimization model is greatly increased; the
supply curve is simply a piecewise step function where each




= b · (F + ϑ · Fcar) + V. (9)
for each generator typex.
The current demand and available capacity is then fed into
(8) and the wholesale market price is given by:
S(t) = Cmargx (P ) + U(t) (10)
whereCmargx (P ) is the marginal cost of the final generator
type to be dispatched.
III. I NVESTMENT DECISION
In order for adequate capacity to be maintained, investment
in new capacity must be forthcoming. In this model the
investment decision is taken annually and is based on the Net
Present Value (NPV) of expected future profits. These profits
are calculated in the standard way:Ω = π · P − C(P ), that
is profit (Ω) is revenue received from selling power (π · P )
minus the costs incurred producing it (C(P )).
To give significant weight to the early years of an invest-
ment, only the revenues for the first 15 years of a project are
considered, however expected costs incurred are included for
the lifetime of the plant. Renewable obligation certificates5
(ROCs) becomes active at the end of 2002 and nuclear is not
considered for investment before 20066.
A forward-looking simulation model is used to assess the
future state of the system. This model is formulated in the
same manner as the real-time simulation (1). To address
the problem of future uncertainties and imperfect investor
foresight, a Monte Carlo approach is taken when calculating
an expectation of the future.
When calculating the yearly utilisation factor of a potential
investment based on future load duration curves (LDCs) and
plant availability, a5th order polynomial fit is applied to
the LDC and the required baseload (assumed to be value
of the LDC at max duration) and peak energy is computed.
The forward-looking model assumes an annual growth rate
of the base demand profile (based on 2001 data) of 1.2%
with forecast volatilty of 100MW increasing at a rate of
10% p.a. This volatility is modelled as a random variable
∼ N(0, 102 · (1.1)y−1) wherey is the simulation year.
The expected price of each of the fuel types in the system
is an exogenous parameter and is modelled as a stochastic
process. More precisely a Geometric Brownian motion
dFt = µ(Ft)dt + σ(Ft)dWt, F0 = f > 0. (11)
is constructed for each fuel type and the parameters are define
based on perceived drift (average behaviour) and volatility
characteristics. The initial values (Fx,0) are taken to be the
average of prices witnessed over the previous year. Forward
curves are not included in this iteration of the model.
Fig. 5. Example of NPV confidence test showing optimal V (i.e.V optx )
For each Monte Carlo simulation, a different NPV is com-
puted, sayVx, and aVx > V optx check is carried out based
on a statistical confidence test (Fig. 5), where isV optx is the
minimal acceptableVx for the particular technology. There is
also a secondary logical check that the expected utilisation
factor for all thermal generation is greater than zero in the
first year of operation (uf(1) > 0), otherwise the investment
is delayed. When a number of technology types are optimal in
terms of the above criteria, those projects are ranked by their
Profitability Index (PI) and the option with the largest PI is
chosen. PI is defined as the ratio of present value (PV) of cash
flow and PV of initial investment.
We do not consider different types of investor being present
in the market at this stage. Instead we model a single investor
who is risk averse; this investor assumes all plant currently i
planning or under construction will come online with 100%
certainty and furthermore the minimum NPV requirement
5UK mechanism to stimulate investment in renewable generation whereby
each MWh generated from a renewable source is eligible for subsidy.
6This reflects the UK’s political stance on nuclear held at thetime.
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is set at twice the project fixed costs and accepted if the
confidence test onVx is significant at the 95% level.
In the case of peakers, revenue from the SO annual tender
for short-term operating reserve (STOR) is also considered.
Based on the data at [12], a 2GW annual tender with an
availability price of 2£/MW/h with a utilisation (estimated
at 3% of hours) price of 100£/MWh was included.
The model also enables peaker plant to be mothballed. The
decision to mothball plant is taken every six months and is
based onVx < V optx whereV
opt
x is the generator fixed costs
for next six months. The mothballing of existing capacity is
a direct consequence of the market feedback mechanism; if
a genco believes that a particular plant will not be able to
cover it’s fixed costs from revenues in the energy-only market
(and assuming it has not established a contract with the SO
to provide reserve), then mothballing the plant until the price
rises sufficiently is an option.
Once capacity is mothballed (of which there is currently
1.25GW in GB [13]) then it remains connected to the system
but no longer contributes to short-term security of supply risk
calculations (as it would take a number of months to get the
plant ready to generate again from the mothballed state).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The model has been implemented using in the Mat-
lab/Simulink environment.
To verify our approach and model formulation, we have
attempted to simulate market dynamics in GB since the
introduction of NETA. The model has been tuned to reflect
the situation just prior to the introduction of this market
framework. Real-time demand is modelled based on historic
half-hourly GB demand data taken from [10]. The initial plant
mix used the simulation is shown in table II, also shown
are projects already under construction at the start of the
simulation7. To get a complete GB picture, we have combined
the E&W and Scotland systems into a single energy market8.
As mentioned previously, an LTI equation is required for each
generator type in the model (1), therefore the model simplifies
the actual GB system by only considering five generation tech-
nologies. In order to achieve the same installed GB capacity
as in reality, capacity from peaker plant such as pump storage
and oil are combined with OCGT and other baseload such
as natural flow hydro is included with coal. The dual fuel
plants are divided based on their estimated thermal efficiency
characteristics and load following capabilities [4]. By taking
this approach, model complexity is kept to a minimum and
computational time is reduced. For example, using an Intel
dual-core 2.40GHz processor with 3.12GB RAM with 100
Monte Carlo simulations for each investment decision and a
daily time-step simulation period of 8 years takes many hours
to complete.
7That is projects whose time to completion was below the base build times
given in table I.
8As mentioned earlier, this actually became the case in April 2005 with the
introduction of the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements
(BETTA) in GB.
TABLE II
APPROXIMATE GB INSTALLED CAPACITY IN 2000 [7].





Mixed or Dual Fuel 6.87
CCGT 19.35 1.27 20.6




TOTAL 72.04 2.07 72.05
atransmission connected capacity only
A. Base case results
Fig. 6 shows the model simulation of capacity margin
against reality. Plainly the negative response after 2001 of
the solid line is deeper but the frequency of oscillation in
the two lines is very similar and the margin also seems to be
better damped than in reality; however considering the model
is based on a number of assumptions and simplifications, these
results show a good agreement with reality.
Fig. 6. Generation capacity margin oscillations witnessed since market
liberalisation (solid line) and simulation results from 2000 (dashed line).
Fig. 7. Evolution of total installed capacity in GB (reality) and the simulation.
GB maximum demand also shown.
Fig. 7 shows the evolution of installed capacity (ICAP)
in the simulation versus reality in the base case (where the
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Fig. 8. Evolution of installed capacity for each generator type in GB (solid
lines) and in the simulation (dotted lines).
investment decision in annual). Both lines follow a similar
trajectory however the simulation is much smoother, this effect
is created by plotting the installed capacity at beginning of
each year. As mentioned already, prices witnessed in the
market are fed back into the investment decision, however by
having an annual investment decision time-step only averages
are considered.
B. Investments
Fig. 9. Capacity investment triggered during the simulation and ctual
investments announced in GB. Data on wind from BWEA [5] and CCGT
builds estimated from SO seven year statements [11] assuming 3 year build
time.
Fig. 9 shows the volume and type of investment triggered
during the simulation. There is little investment in the early
years owing to the 2GW already being under construction
when the simulation starts and furthermore investors would
not be looking to undertake a new investment when prices are
falling and uncertainty increasing.
Wind power investment is also another key area of interest.
Fig. 9 shows that no significant investment in wind occurs
until after 2005. This is owing to not only the ROC subsidy
becoming active, but also there are significant extra costs
incurred for other projects; for CCGT the cost of gas increases
by 60% from 24 p/therm to 39 p/therm and coal projects
have the additional cost of emmissions to consider. Fig. 9
also shows BWEA data on applications received for new
wind farms received in GB [5], the main points to note here
are although wind power investment is delayed until 2005 -
perhaps owing to the high hurdle rate for this technology, there
seems to be an over investment in later years. Recalling that
the model does not consider grid connection and so on - so
conceptually this system is single bus - arguably this trendis
quite plausible. Of course much of this investment will not
make it through the build stage owing to the high probability
(0.5) of project abandonment.
Fig. 10. Cumulative capacity added to the system in the simulation (dotted-
line) and in GB (solid line).
The cumulative capacity added to the system can be see
in Fig. 10. New builds were initialised for both wind and
CCGT and both represent reality well (of course some of these
builds were already underway at the simulation start time, but
those projects that were initialised by the investment decision
process do contribute in the later years).
C. Mothballing
Although in reality CCGT capacity growth remains constant
throughout the simulation (Fig. 10), the same cannot be saidof
OCGT plant; inspection of Fig. 8 shows a downturn in OCGT
capacity in 2005 not akin with reality. This downturn can be
explained by a sharp increase in mothballed plant in 2005 and
thus the installed capacity also falls behind reality (Fig.7). The
likely cause of this behaviour stems from a combination of
an increase in installed CCGT capacity - which reduce OCGT
revenues from the energy market, together with a 60% increase
in gas prices (cf. Fig. 3). Limited information is available
pertaining to when exactly GB’s (currently) 1.25GW [13]
of plant was mothballed. The information that was available
concerned the mothballing of plant in early 2003, with much
of it returning to the system in the winter of the same year [18].
Owing to the reduced complexity of the model compared with
reality, it is difficult to capture this behaviour as individual
plant characteristics cannot be included. Therefore althoug
the model is replicating the dynamics of the system quite well,
some further work is required in the area of mothballing.
D. Importance of the reserve market
A sensitivity test was carried out whereby a weighting
coefficient,w, in the range 0 to 1 was applied to the additional
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revenue received by OCGT plant for providing STOR. For
example,w = 1 is the base case andw = 0 represents a
complete removal of the STOR market. Fig. 11 shows the
importance of having a separate market for reserve (which is
essentially a capacity payment for peaking plant); withoutit
the initial capacity margin slump is deeper owing to intensified
withdrawal of peaking plant from the system. Owing to greater
CCGT investment in the early years than in the base case, the
margin does recover after 2005, however CCGTs are not well
suited to providing reserve and hence the level of security of
supply risk is greatly increased. Interestingly the introduction
of w leads to a better initial downturn in capacity at the start
of the simulation (w=0.5) and although the margin remains
below reality in subsequent years, the difference is constant
implying that this payment is a key parameter in the model.
On the whole, including a steady revenue stream for peakers
removes much of the uncertainty surrounding utilisation and
price, thus keeping more peaker plant connected to the system.
Fig. 11. Plot of GB generation capacity margin (solid line) with reserve
market sensitivities (dashed lines) for various coefficientweightings (w).
E. Wholesale energy prices
Another key area of analysis was the ability of the model to
simulate wholesale energy prices. Fig. 12 shows a good overall
matching of trend. The loss of precision after April 2008 can
be explained by recalling that detailed gas price data for these
years was not available (cf. Fig. 3). The ability to push through
high fuel costs is demonstrated when the simulated prices
for April 2001 to April 2007 are viewed in isolation. The
mean difference between the actual and simulated prices was
4.0 £/MWh with standard deviation 9.6£/MWh, however the
reduced dataset with more accurate fuel price models was 0.70
£/MWh with standard deviation 4.35£/MWh.
It should be emphasised that the main aim of the model
is not to predict the electricity prices but to investigate
whether or not an energy-only market results in excessive
capacity oscillations and if so, design an appropriate damping
mechanism. Hence our main aim is to investigate the need for
a capacity mechanism whatever happens to the primary fuel
prices. Obviously as the absolute level of electricity prices
depends strongly on the primary fuel prices, predicting future
electricity prices would require a sophisticated gas and coal
price prediction model and that would be beyond the scope
of this research. Any changes in primary fuel prices have the
effect of shifting the level of prices up or down (assuming
constant spark and dark spread) and could cause a switch from
gas to coal or vice versa. This is justified by inspection of
Fig. 13 and 14 which show results from a simulation using
predicted gas and coal prices and not actual data from 2001-
2007. Plainly the price graph is different (influence of demand
profile is more noticeable) however the capacity graph is only
marginally affected.
Fig. 12. Average monthly wholesale energy prices in the simulation (dashed
line) and in GB wholesale market (solid line) [22].
Fig. 13. Average monthly wholesale energy prices in the simulation when
using fuel price predictions (dashed line). GB wholesale market data in
included for a comparison with Fig. 12 (solid line) .
V. CONCLUSION
A power generation investment model which is formulated
as a problem in optimal control has been presented. As when
analysing any control system, the first task is to model the
behaviour of the real system and simulations against the
market dynamics witnessed in GB since the introduction
of NETA in 2001 are very encouraging. Furthermore, the
investment decision aspect of the work is seemingly rational
in it’s decision making process, which bodes well for the next
stage of the work - that is to analyse the system for it’s
stability characteristics and move on to looking at expected
future investment dynamics in GB. The next iteration of the
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Fig. 14. Generation capacity margin oscillations witnessedince market
liberalisation (solid line) and simulation results from 2000 with actual prices
(dashed line, as in Fig. 6) and predicted prices (dotted line).
model will also aim to include different types of investors
and assess how alternate perception of reality influence the
model feedback. From here one can identify problems such
as instability and look to design and implement an economic
controller with the goal of meeting system performance spec-
ifications; in this instance these specifications surround the
system level of security of supply risk.
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